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1.1.- Objective 
?
The fashion in which the European Union pursues its objectives has varied 
enormously over time. In all fronts but, in particular, as a public administration that 
implements the policies of the Union. Currently, the European Union’s executive action is 
not as it was originally designed to be. The model of executive federalism, where the Union 
takes decisions in the fields where it is competent and Member States implement them, was 
valid for the old Communities and still perceivable in the Treaties and in the rulings of the 
Court of Justice. Today it is often more of a legal fiction than a reality. 
 
The reality is more complex, more pragmatic and yet more functional and ambitious 
than the old paradigms assume. Political science has aimed at describing and assessing the 
new trends regarding the EU and European integration with new theories and innovative 
ideas. Legal doctrine should also forsake the orthodox approaches of the past and analyse the 
dynamic reality as it actually is. If the categories of the past are not apt to describe the new 
situation, academic work should be started in the development of new relevant categories.  
 
There is an interplay of national and Union actors in many, if not most, of the fields 
where the Union plays a role. If the Union can be described as federal, it certainly is a very 
peculiar federal structure. European public administration is an integrated administration 
characterised by an intense cooperation between the national and the EU administrative levels 
in every phase of the policy circles. At the same time that the old distinction between direct 
and indirect administration vanishes, there appear other forces shaping the current scenario; 
the expansion of the areas covered by the EU administrative action and decentralization of 
functions through agencies and other bodies, which simultaneously become nodes of 
networks inclusive of the national stakeholders. Legal analysis cannot afford to remain 
insensible to this dynamism. The intention of this work is to be an academic contribution to 
the description of this reality. 
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This phenomenon of intense cooperation in the European Union is reflected in many 
fields of study and can be perceived and analysed from different perspectives. It is 
noteworthy that the logic of cooperation has become preponderant in many areas of the EU's 
policy-making, but this has not been reflected in the judicial architecture of the Union. For a 
jurist, particularly with a focus on administrative law, the most remarkable element of this 
phenomenon is that of 'composite procedures'. 
 
Composite procedures are the procedural display of this intense cooperation between 
the Union and the Member States. They are heterogeneous and lack a general legal 
framework. However positive they are for building networks of mutual trust between the 
national and Union's public administration, and however efficient for the adoption of 
technically complete and consensual decisions, they raise many concerns from a legal point 
of view. There is not much value in making further terminological precision at this early 
point. One of the merits of this work is to provide consistent definitions for a concept that is 
neither straightforward nor settled. Suffice it to say at this moment that, in composite 
procedures, the logic of intense cooperation between the public administration of the Union 
and its national counterparts reaches its zenith and becomes proceduralised. 
 
It is not worth searching for a definition to this concept in the case-law or the 
legislation. Many of the shortcomings of composite procedures stem precisely from this 
situation of lack of determination. The legislator creates composite procedures at a speedy 
pace without a consequent change in the general legal categories. Primary law is based on 
assumptions that do not hold true for composite procedures, and judges have these categories 
in mind when adjudicating disputes related to these composite procedures. No wonder, the 
solutions they offer lack coherence, are not satisfactory in terms of respect for individual 
rights, and judges find themselves blocked in legal dead-ends. 
 
Given the importance of composite procedures in the Administrative Law of the 
Union it is perhaps striking that the scholarly attention that the phenomenon of composite 
procedures has received until now is relatively low, and the solutions that have been offered 
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are not complete. Ultimately, composite procedures are not a legal category in the mind of 
the Union's judges and the Union's legislators yet, and there comes the objective of this 
dissertation. 
 
The aim of this work is to make a relevant categorisation of composite procedures, 
identify and describe the problems and legal concerns they bring about, and to propose 
concrete solutions to the challenges they trigger. 
 
The intellectual challenge is demanding, yet extremely stimulating. The analysis and 
understanding of a multilevel structure of administrative decision-making is in itself a 
thought-provoking exercise for a legal researcher, but the discovery of gaps in the protection 
of individual rights in this complex structure, so as to advance solutions, has truly been a 
thrilling task.  
 
Procedural rights were conceived in the logic of a citizen vis-à-vis one public 
authority. In composite procedures, several authorities intervene, which distorts the 
traditional scheme and might lead to shortcomings to the detriment of the individual. 
Likewise, the right of judicial review, which is consubstantial to the notion of rule of law, can 
be endangered in situations where private parties may be denied the right to challenge acts 
emanating from composite procedures. The Court of Justice puts a big nominal emphasis in 
the protection of rule of law, but it arguably fails to make a complete assessment of these 
procedures. This is in part because it lacks the means of cooperating closely with national 
courts, and in part because it keeps its strict line of interpretation of the provisions giving 
access to justice. This results in several gaps in judicial protection, some of them entailing 
relevant breaches of the right of judicial review. The analysis of these lacunae occupies the 
central part of this dissertation. 
 
In the context of composite procedures, questions like what is the competent 
jurisdiction, what acts are reviewable and who has legal standing still remain unsolved. In the 
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final part of the work, some proposals to overcome these gaps will be presented. A new 
mechanism for cooperation between the national and the European courts would bridge many 
of the gaps and would help to overcome the current asymmetry between the intense 
cooperation at the administrative level and the lack thereof in the judicial system. A 
codification of administrative procedural rules would also contribute to the clarification of the 
mentioned questions. 
 
1.2.- Structure  
 
A rigorous analysis of composite procedures entails a prior discussion about 
administrative procedures in the European Union, and this, in turn, requires a deliberation on 
whether or not there is a European Union's public administration that can act through 
administrative procedures. These previous analyses constitute the first two chapters of the 
dissertation, and not for purely esthetical reasons. The conclusions of what kind of public 
administration the EU administration is and what kind of administrative procedures serve its 
action are relevant and will be reflected in the other parts of this work. 
 
In the context of national law, the concepts of public administration and 
administrative procedures can perhaps be taken for granted. In the context of the European 
Union, it would be an intellectual mistake to do so. Putting a question mark on the existence 
of a real European Union's public administration and, subsequently, testing whether the 
adjective 'administrative' is really appropriate for the procedures it follows is not only a 
necessary scholarly apriori for the meticulous study of a peculiar type of administrative 
procedure of the Union's public administration. It is the necessary preamble where the 
particular characteristics of the Union will appear evident and will bear relevance for the 
central part of this work. Even though it will be concluded that yes there is a Union's public 
administration and yes there are administrative procedures in the European Union, it shall be 
explained why and what their specific characteristics are.  
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The structure of the dissertation follows this logic. The second chapter is devoted to 
the Union's public administration. The expression itself appears almost self-contradictory. 
The idea of public administration - certainly more alien to the common law tradition and thus 
less elegant in the English language - is linked to the modern constitutional State in which a 
separation of powers is established. Thus, it would be negligent to assume that this applies to 
the European Union directly, without further elaboration. It is perhaps for this reason that 
only a limited number of scholars have used the expression, and some have taken it for 
granted without much reflection. Doubts to the existence of a European Union public 
administration are legitimate. 
 
The situation has dramatically changed with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
because Primary Law now says that there is a European administration, and that it is open, 
efficient and independent. But then, what is this 'European administration'? Does is refer to 
the executive machinery of the Union, i. e. the Commission and the agencies only? Or does it, 
as a functional approach to the European administration, include national public 
administration when implementing EU policies too? Does it correspond to the EU's public 
administration that we are looking for? These question indeed point to the core of the 
discussion that will be elaborated in a later part of the dissertation. The question on the 
existence of a Union's administration and its characteristics is, thus, far from superfluous.  
 
Even though the conceptions of public administration are different in the several 
Member States and, what is more, they are changing rapidly, one can say that the Union's 
public administration is a peculiar one, different from all other national public 
administrations. The main feature of EU's public administration vis-à-vis its national 
counterparts is precisely its degree of interdependence with the national administrations, its 
reliance in external agents and its openness to outside stakeholders. Conceived as a small 
apparatus which relied on national administration to implement its policies, the European 
administration has evolved to a multilevel administration in which each level frequently 
interacts with the others to carry out its duties. This evolution again is intimately linked to the 
central part of this thesis.  
15 
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Cooperation has been inherent to the European integration since its early beginnings. 
Yet, in its conception, cooperation was a clearly structured, where the central authority would 
decide and the decentralised bodies would implement. An elegant paradigm, relatively easy 
to handle for lawyers, but one which fades away with the emergence of composite 
procedures, where cooperation is intense, blurred, and multidirectional. Cooperation does not 
only reflect the practical need found in the light administration of the old communities, so 
much dependent on the national administrations, but also a source of legitimacy for the 
Union, as the enlargement of its competences is more readily accepted by Member States as 
long as they are given a significant role in the process of policy design and implementation. 
 
So, taking the existence of a Union's administration as a departing point, its peculiar 
characteristics would be highlighted. The element of 'mixicity', which has increased over 
time, is doubtlessly the element with the greatest impact in the subsequent parts of the 
research. The logic of cooperation permeates all aspects of the Union's administration, and 
certainly the administrative procedures through which it operates.  
?
Administrative procedures are conceived as the fashion through which public 
administration carries out its duties. Can this concept be transposed directly to the procedures 
carried out at the level of the Union without further elaboration? Chapter three aims at 
replying this question. Considering that the conception of administrative procedures differs in 
the different Member States and that they have evolved significantly over time, it is difficult 
to reply with a simple affirmative answer. 
 
Taking this historical evolution as an example, it is worth noting that the emphasis on 
the conception that individual rights are affected, not only by the decision of the 
administrative authority, but also along the procedure for this decision-making, is relatively 
recent. Yet protection of procedural rights has gained relevance, and it is frequently posited 
as a justification of the powers of the public administration. Public authorities can 
16 
?
legitimately take decisions, to the detriment of the citizens if necessary, as long as the 
decisions have been taken after the administrative procedure and in respect of the relevant 
principles and guarantees.  
 
This individual rights-oriented understanding of the administrative procedure, which 
was probably not prevalent in some Member States only some decades ago, has been 
emphasised by the Court of Justice of the European Union and has large implications for our 
analysis. Without fully respecting the rights of the individuals throughout the procedure, there 
is no valid decision. Without a sufficient access to a competent court that can review the 
decision, there is a serious breach of fundamental rights. These statements, which reflect the 
current understanding of administrative procedures, are not self-evident in the context of 
composite procedures.  
 
Furthermore, the present time is particularly interesting, as the debate on codification 
of administrative procedures in the European Union has gained traction, both in the academic 
circles and in the institutional agenda of the EU. That is perhaps an opportunity for the 
solutions that will be advocated at a later stage.  
 
 The fourth Chapter starts with the difficult task of providing a comprehensive, legally 
sound, yet simple definition of composite procedures and a justification of the use of those 
terms. The difficulty of this exercise resides in the lack of legislative and judicial references. 
After the definition, a classification within composite procedures will be laid down. This 
classification is important because some of the shortcomings of composite procedures affect 
the different types of composite procedures differently.  
 
The largest part of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the existing European 
legislation setting up these composite procedures. This exercise is also difficult because 
composite procedures are created without any reference to this category and, while in some 
cases the procedures indubitably fall within the definition given, some other fall rather into a 
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grey area. Composite procedures are more and more numerous, particularly in the field of 
authorisation of particular products within the internal market. The rationale behind it is that 
Member States are more willing to allow for the central powers of the Union taking decision 
on such authorisation when they share this power through a composite procedure. However, 
some other areas of EU action, like the space of freedom, security and justice, are also 
relevant for recently established composite procedures. This analysis puts the observation of 
the phenomenon of composite procedures into a concrete practical perspective and hints 
already to some of the legal concerns of the following chapter. 
 
Composite procedures have recently gained scholarly attention. However, in most 
cases the academic approach has been fragmentary, stressing particular shortcomings or 
particular types of composite procedures. One of the goals of this research is the search of a 
global perspective on composite procedures, the challenges they bring about and the solutions 
that can be put forward. This is not the same as exhaustiveness. The number of composite 
procedures is hard to determine because more and more are being created, and many of them 
have peculiar characteristics that might lead to specific problems that are difficult to foresee 
before a concrete situation is presented. In this vein, the most relevant examples of composite 
procedures will be presented.  
 
These nine examples of composite procedures range from very wide areas of EU 
action like agricultural policy, to very specific examples like ecolabels; from old composite 
procedures that have varied much over time, like the management of European funds, to very 
recent examples like the procedure for authorisation of biocides; and from examples were the 
features of composite procedures are easily identifiable and serve as useful patterns for our 
analysis, like the procedure regarding pesticides, to those where the features of composite 
procedures are blurred, like it is the case of procedures in the area of freedom security and 
justice. The description of the specific procedures enacted in secondary legislation will be 
essential for the identification of the shortcomings they entail. 
 
18 
?
The fifth chapter of the dissertation is the longest and most important. The rights of 
the individual in his relation vis-à-vis the public administration are fundamentally distorted 
when there is more than one public authority intervening, each one subject to a different legal 
framework. These distortions can be perceived at three different moments of time. Firstly, 
during the administrative procedure itself, as the question of ‘before whom’ does the 
individual exercise his procedural rights can be a source of concern. Secondly, at the moment 
the administrative decision is taken, as it covers the activities of several public authorities, all 
of which conform the procedural iter, and thus the reasons, of the final act. Thirdly, at the 
moment when the administrative decision is brought before the judges, as the question of 
what judge is competent for which decision, or which part of it, would appear highly 
complex. 
 
Hence, three aspects are identified as the most relevant challenges that composite 
procedures bring about. The first, during the administrative procedure itself, is the procedural 
guarantee of a hearing before the final administrative decision is taken. The second relates to 
the administrative decision itself, as the administration has the duty to state all the reasons for 
it. The third, most important, is the right to a judicial review. The conception and scope of 
those rights will be analysed together with the case law of the Union's courts when 
confronted with the specific cases brought before them in the context of composite 
procedures.  
 
This chapter focuses thus on a critical analysis of the existing case law, identifying the 
merits and the shortcomings of the rulings until now. The criticism in this analysis is directed 
more often to the inability of the Courts to tackle the shortcomings of composite procedures 
given the lack of mechanisms to do so than to the contents of the rulings per se. That is why 
the solutions proposed later are not primarily related to a change in the approach of the judges 
of the Union in itself but rather to a change in the legal framework, which will bring about a 
consequential change in the judicial perception of composite procedures and thus in the 
existing case law. Even where one could be critical of the outcome reached by the Union’s 
courts, in most of these cases, it is hardly imaginable how they could have reached a different 
conclusion given the existing legislative framework. 
19 
?
 
The sixth chapter includes the proposals to overcome the shortcomings identified in 
the fifth chapter. The primary objective of the proposals put forward in this chapter is that 
they are comprehensive -meaning that they leave none of the gaps described uncovered- and 
they are effective in tackling the problems identified.  Although the assessment of the 
political opportunity of the proposals of this work cannot be our primary concern, these 
considerations are also taken on board. 
 
In this vein, the codification of composite procedures is not a mere idea discussed in 
the academic circles of administrative lawyers. The proposal which is yet to be taken by the 
European Commission but, formally, it is on the institutional agenda. This provides the 
perfect opportunity for a regulation which describes and regulates composite procedures. The 
legal technicalities of this proposal, such as the legal basis for it, or the wording of some of 
the provisions which would resolve the problems identified, will be described in this chapter. 
 
The proposal is thus to include composite procedures in the general codification of 
administrative procedures. Yet as ambitious as this proposal is, it would not suffice to tackle 
all of the shortcomings identified. Since the competence of the EU courts cannot possibly 
cover the whole of the procedural iter ending in an EU decision when the national 
administrative authorities have taken part in it, a mechanism of cooperation between 
European and national courts will be proposed. This mechanism should mirror mutatis 
mutandis the preliminary ruling procedure but in an inverse direction. The technicalities to be 
put in place, in terms of reform of secondary legislation, will also be explained. 
 
Finally, in terms of structure, it should be noted that each chapter starts with some 
preliminary remarks on its relevance and the internal structure of the chapter, while linking it 
to the outcome of the previous chapter. Likewise, each chapter ends with some conclusions, 
even if provisional. Even with the risk of reiterating some of the ideas of the conclusions at 
the end of this work, the structure of each of the chapters facilitates the identification of the 
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outcome of the assessment carried out for each of them as well as the consecutive 
development of each of the chapter on the foundations of the result of the previous one.  
 
1.3.- Methodology 
 
The questions that this doctoral dissertation aims at answering have not, to my 
understanding, been fully replied so far. These questions are 'What are composite 
procedures?', 'What are the problems they entail?' and 'What solutions can be proposed for 
them?'. We will explore that the topic of composite procedures in the European Union has 
gained academic attention and there is an increasing number of publications on the issue. 
However, the approach is mostly fragmentary. Several articles have been published on a 
particular problem identified in composite procedures, or on a particular case decided by the 
Court of Justice, or on the occasion of codification and the possibilities if offers for 
composite procedures. This study intends to provide a general view, in the types of composite 
procedures it covers, in the different problems they bring about and in the solutions proposed. 
The systematic perspective intends to be one of the qualities of this research.  
 
In the never-ending process of accumulating knowledge, this work intends to single 
out the important aspects that are legally problematic and try to find solutions from a general 
wide-ranging point of view. We will see how this lack of a general perspective is indeed at 
the origin of many of the difficulties in the context of composite procedures. The 
methodology of the dissertation is clearly reflected in its structure, with a significant variation 
for each of its parts.  
 
The second and third chapters rely heavily on academic literature, primarily of legal 
scholars, but not exclusively. Works belonging to the field of political science are also 
incorporated. Many of the pages of these first parts have a descriptive character of the current 
state-of-affairs, though with the intention of drawing relevant conclusions for the subsequent 
analysis. Thus, the first two chapters are needed as a prerequisite of the study of composite 
procedures. They involve an ample literature review in which the main aim has been to 
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synthetize effectively and uncover the way forward to the further research which is arguably 
much needed in the field of composite procedures. In that there was the risk, common among 
literature reviews, for producing lists of citations and findings that resemble a 'phone book 
without much plot'1.  
 
The intention of these two chapters has been to prove that there is an EU public 
administration and that it is able to act according to administrative procedures. It would be a 
mistake to take these elements for granted. Simultaneously, as evidence is provided that these 
elements exist, the focus is on the peculiar traits of both the EU administration and its 
administrative procedures. These traits relate to logic of intense cooperation for which one of 
the main manifestations is precisely the phenomenon of composite procedures. In so doing, it 
has been the intention of the assessment to carry out a successful literature review which, in 
the words of Webster and Watson, is one that: 
 
"creates a firm foundation for advancing knowledge. It facilitates theory development, 
closes areas where a plethora of research exists, and uncovers areas where research is 
needed"2. 
 
The fourth chapter entails a detailed assessment on the existing legislations which 
establishes the different examples of composite procedures. In this part the task is to go, 
inductively, from the concrete example found in secondary legislation to relevant schemes 
that the researcher needs for systematization and, once this is done, the general category can 
be used to identify the problems of composite procedures. An additional step to simplify the 
understanding of the reader has been to draw charts where the procedure can be understood in 
a glimpse.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
1
 Andrew Booth, Diana Papaioannou, and Anthea Sutton, Systematic Approaches to a Successful Literature 
Review SAGE Publications (New York, 2012), at 3. 
2
 Jane Webster, and Richard Watson, "Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: Writing a literature review", 
26(2) MIS Quarterly, 26, 2, 13-23, at 13.?
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The fifth chapter focuses primarily on the case-law of the Court of Justice. It contains 
predominantly an analysis of the judicial approach to the different challenges of composite 
procedures, acknowledging its merits and highlighting its possible shortcomings. This 
analysis of the case law is difficult because the courts have never referred to composite 
procedures, but have tackled the different controversies of the different composite procedures 
differently. The task of researching and singling out the relevant cases has, thus, been large. 
Furthermore, given the lack of a common category, the sensibilities of the judges in the 
diverse areas of law have also been divergent, thus complicating the analysis. Academic 
sources, in analysing the case law and in the preliminary description of each of the three 
points of focus, are also an important part of this chapter.  
 
The sixth chapter is the one that relies less on external sources, both academic articles 
and case law, and more on all the result of the work of the previous chapters. In this last 
chapter, the thesis navigates in relatively unexplored waters, and requires certain insights in 
the legislative field and in the political realities of the EU institutional processes. As it tackles 
the challenge of creating a new legal framework, which should be fully satisfactory, it is the 
most forward-looking. 
 
1.4.- Acknowledgements  
 
The idea of devoting a doctoral research to the complex phenomenon of composite 
procedures stemmed from a lecture in Luxembourg from professor Herwig Hofmann. I had 
the inspiration that from the difficult notion of composite procedure an analysis of many 
aspects of the current state of affairs on European administrative law was possible. I thank 
him for this initial source of inspiration and for his ideas on reaction to my initial interest 
back then.  
 
23 
?
The period of  doctoral research has been one of very changing circumstances for me. 
Along the path I have had the privilege to enjoy the support, ideas, feedback and enthusiasm 
of my supervisor. I want to express my sincere appreciation to professor Angel Manuel 
Moreno Molina. 
 
Some other academics and professionals have provided me with important ideas 
reflected in this work. I want to express special thanks to professor Alfred Aman who gave 
me some insights on the comparison with the federal understanding of administrative 
procedures in the US, to Kurt Riechenberg, long time legal clerk in the Court of Justice and 
who gave me some input in the search for case law outside of the most cited rulings of the 
EU Courts, as well as to the Secretariat of the Committee of Legal Affairs of the European 
Parliament for their guidance in the legislative history of the codification. 
 
Finally, for their understanding and support I want to thank my family. This project 
has taken some time away from them. For that I am thankful and I hope that the result of this 
research compensates them.  
24 
?
 

26 
?
 
1.1.- Propósito 
?
La forma en la que la Unión Europea ha llevado a cabo sus objetivos ha variado 
enormemente en el tiempo. Esta afirmación, que es aplicable a todos los ámbitos, es 
particularmente importante en relación a la ejecución de las políticas de la Unión. 
Actualmente, la acción ejecutiva de la Unión Europea no tiene lugar de la forma en la que 
originalmente fue diseñada. El modelo del llamado "federalismo ejecutivo", según el cual la 
Unión toma las decisiones en los ámbitos de sus competencias y los Estados miembros las 
ejecutan, fue valido en las antiguas Comunidades Europeas y todavía puede percibirse en los 
Tratados y en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia. Hoy en día, este modelo es más una 
ficción que una realidad. 
 
La realidad es más compleja, más pragmática pero también más funcional y 
ambiciosa de lo que resulta de los antiguos paradigmas. Los politólogos han procurado 
describir y analizar las nuevas tendencias relativas a la UE y a la integración europea con 
nuevas teorías e ideas innovadoras. La doctrina jurídica debería también abandonar los 
enfoques ortodoxos del pasado y analizar la realidad tal y como es. Si las categorías del 
pasado no son aptas para describir la nueva situación, la investigación académica debería 
comenzar a desarrollar nuevas categorías que resulten relevantes.  
 
Existe una interacción entre los actores de la Unión y los actores nacionales en 
muchos, si no la mayoría, de los ámbitos en los que la Unión tiene competencias. Si la Unión 
puede ser definida como federal, es sin duda una estructura federal sui generis. La 
Administración Pública europea es una Administración Pública "integrada" y caracterizada 
por una cooperación intensa entre los niveles administrativos nacionales y europeos en todas 
y cada una de las fases del iter de las políticas de la Unión. Al mismo tiempo que la vieja 
distinción entre la administración directa e indirecta se desvanece, aparecen otras fuerzas que 
modelan el escenario actual: la expansión de las áreas bajo la influencia de la acción 
administrativa de la Unión y la descentralización de funciones a través de las agencias y otros 
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órganos que se tornan, simultáneamente, en nódulos de redes que incluyen a las agencias 
descentralizadas nacionales. El análisis jurídico no puede permitirse permanecer al margen de 
este dinamismo. El objetivo de este trabajo es lograr una contribución académica a la 
descripción de esta realidad.   
 
Este fenómeno de la cooperación intensa en la Unión Europea se refleja en muchos 
ámbitos de estudio y puede percibirse y analizarse desde distintas perspectivas. Merece la 
pena resaltar que la lógica de la cooperación se ha vuelto preponderante en muchas áreas de 
la formulación de políticas, pero ello no se ha reflejado para nada en la arquitectural judicial 
de la Unión. Para un jurista, en particular con especialización en Derecho Administrativo, el 
elemento más destacado de este fenómeno de cooperación son los procedimientos 
compuestos.  
 
Los procedimientos compuestos son la traducción procesal de esta cooperación 
intensa entre la Unión y los Estados miembros. Los procedimientos compuestos son 
heterogéneos y carecen de un marco jurídico general. Aunque sean positivos para la 
construcción de redes de confianza mutua entre las Administraciones de la Unión y de los 
Estados miembros, y aunque sean eficientes para la adopción de decisiones técnicamente 
completas y consensuadas, los procedimientos compuestos traen consigo muchas cuestiones 
complejas desde un punto de vista jurídico. No es pertinente en este punto inicial hacer 
mayores precisiones terminológicas, pero uno de los méritos de esta tesis es el de aportar 
definiciones coherentes para este concepto que no es ni unívoco ni aceptado de forma 
unánime. Baste en este momento indicar que en relación a los procedimientos compuestos la 
lógica de la cooperación intensa entre las Administraciones Públicas nacionales y de la Unión 
alcanza su apogeo desde un punto de vista procesal. 
 
No tiene utilidad buscar una definición del concepto de procedimientos compuestos 
en la jurisprudencia o en la legislación. Muchas de las deficiencias de los procedimientos 
compuestos tienen su origen precisamente en esta situación de falta de determinación clara. 
El legislador crea estos procedimientos compuestos a un ritmo acelerado sin una 
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modificación consecuente en las categorías jurídicas generales. El Derecho originario se basa 
en suposiciones que no son ciertas en relación a los procedimientos compuestos, y el 
juzgador tiene las viejas categorías en mente cuando decide sobre las controversias relativas a 
los procedimientos compuestos. Sin duda, las soluciones que ofrecen los jueces de la Unión 
carecen de coherencia y no resultan satisfactorias en términos de respeto para los derechos 
subjetivos, de forma que los tribunales se encuentran bloqueados en "callejones sin salida".  
 
Dada la importancia de los procedimientos compuestos en el Derecho Administrativo 
europeo, es quizá sorprendente que la atención doctrinal que se ha dado a este fenómeno haya 
sido escasa hasta ahora, y que las soluciones que se han ofrecido sean incompletas. En 
definitiva, los procedimientos compuestos no son todavía una categoría jurídica en la mente 
del juez o del legislador de la Unión. Hacer de ellos una categoría coherente es el objetivo de 
esta tesis.  
 
El propósito de este trabajo es por tanto hacer una categorización apropiada de los 
procedimientos compuestos, identificar y describir las cuestiones jurídicas problemáticas que 
plantean, y proponer soluciones concretas para los retos que traen consigo.  
 
El desafío intelectual es exigente, si bien muy estimulante. El análisis y la 
comprensión de la estructura multinivel del proceso decisional es en sí mismo un ejercicio 
que invita a la reflexión del investigador jurídico, y el descubrimiento de las lagunas en la 
protección de los derecho subjetivos en esta estructura compleja, de modo que se puedan 
avanzar soluciones para ellas, ha sido una tarea francamente apasionante. 
 
Los derechos procesales fueron concebidos en esquema lógico de un ciudadano frente 
a una autoridad pública. En los procedimientos compuestos, varias autoridades públicas 
intervienen lo cual distorsiona el esquema tradicional y puede en ocasiones llevar a 
deficiencias en perjuicio del particular. De forma similar, el derecho a la tutela judicial, 
consustancial al principio del Estado de Derecho, puede ponerse en riesgo en situaciones en 
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las que a los particulares se les niega el derecho a impugnar actos que emanan de dichos 
procedimientos compuestos. El Tribunal de Justicia pone un gran énfasis, en términos 
nominales, en la protección del principio del Estado de Derecho en la Unión, pero yerra al no 
conseguir un análisis completo de estos procedimientos. Ello se debe en gran parte a que 
carece de los mecanismos de cooperación estrecha con los jueces nacionales, pero también en 
parte por mantener una interpretación estricta de las normas de acceso a su jurisdicción. Ello 
lleva a varias lagunas en la protección jurisdiccional, algunas de las cuales traen consigo 
importantes violaciones del derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva. El análisis de estas lagunas  
ocupa la parte central de la tesis. 
 
En relación con los procedimientos compuestos, cuestiones tales como cuál es la 
jurisdicción competente, qué actos son recurribles y quién tiene legitimación para recurrir aún 
permanecen sin respuesta clara. En la parte final de este trabajo, se presentarán algunas 
propuesta para solucionar estas cuestiones. Un nuevo mecanismo de cooperación entre los 
tribunales nacionales y los de la Unión evitaría muchas de las lagunas identificadas, y 
contribuiría a superar la actual asimetría entre la cooperación intensa que existe a nivel 
administrativo con la ausencia de la misma entre los sistemas judiciales. La codificación de 
los procedimientos administrativos también contribuiría a clarificar muchas de las cuestiones 
planteadas. 
 
?
1.2.- Estructura  
 
Un análisis riguroso de los procedimientos compuestos lleva consigo la previa 
discusión sobre los procedimientos administrativos en la Unión Europea, lo que a su vez 
requiere de una deliberación sobre si existe una Administración Pública de la Unión Europea 
que pueda actuar por medio de dichos procedimientos administrativos. Los análisis previos 
constituyen los dos primeros capítulos de la tesis, y ello no sólo por razones puramente 
estéticas. Las conclusiones sobre qué tipo de Administración Pública es la Administración de 
la Unión y qué tipo de procedimientos administrativos utiliza son relevantes y serán 
utilizadas en las partes subsiguientes de la tesis.  
30 
?
 
En el marco del Derecho interno, los conceptos de Administración Pública y 
procedimiento administrativo pueden quizá darse por sentados. En el ámbito de la Unión 
Europea, sería un error conceptual hacerlo. Poner un signo de interrogación sobre la 
existencia de una verdadera Administración Pública de la Unión Europea y, 
consecuentemente, comprobar que el adjetivo "administrativo" sea realmente adecuado para 
los procedimientos de que se sirve no es solo un apriorismo académico necesario para el 
estudio meticuloso de un tipo peculiar de procedimientos de la Administración Pública de la 
Unión. Es, de hecho, el preámbulo necesario en el que se plasmarán las características 
especiales de la Administración Pública de la Unión y que resultará de importancia en la 
parte central de la tesis. Incluso aunque se concluirá que sí existe una Administración Pública 
de la Unión y que sí existen procedimiento administrativos para la Unión, deberá explicarse 
por qué y cuáles son sus características específicas.  
 
La estructura de la tesis sigue la siguiente lógica. El segundo capítulo está dedicado a 
la Administración Pública de la Unión. La expresión parece a primera vista casi 
contradictoria en sí misma. La idea de una Administración Pública -ciertamente un término 
ajeno a la tradición del common law y por ello menos elegante en lengua inglesa - se vincula 
indisolublemente al Estado moderno constitucional de la separación de poderes. Así pues, 
sería negligente dar por hecho que el término es aplicable directamente a la Unión Europea, 
sin mayor elaboración. Es quizá por ello que un número limitado de autores utiliza la 
expresión, y alguno de ellos la ha dado por sentado sin una reflexión pausada. Las dudas 
respecto a la existencia de una Administración Pública de la Unión son por ello legítimas.  
 
La situación ha cambiado drásticamente desde la entrada en vigor del Tratado de 
Lisboa, dado que el Derecho originario habla ya de una "administración europea" y dice de 
ella que es abierta, eficaz e independiente. Pero, ¿qué es entonces esta "administración 
europea"? ¿Se refiere sólo a la maquinaria ejecutiva de la Unión, esto es, a la Comisión y a 
las agencias? ¿O incluye también, en una aproximación funcional, a las Administraciones 
Públicas nacionales en tanto en cuanto implementan las políticas de la Unión? La cuestión de 
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la existencia de la Administración Pública de la Unión y de sus características aparece así 
lejos de ser superflua.  
 
Si bien las concepciones sobre la Administración Pública son diversas en los distintos 
Estados miembros y, lo que es más, han cambiado a gran velocidad, puede decirse que la 
Administración Pública de la Unión es distinta respecto a todas ellas. El rasgo principal de la 
Administración Pública de la Unión Europea frente a sus homólogas nacionales es 
precisamente su grado de interdependencia con las Administraciones nacionales, su 
vinculación a agentes externos y su apertura a otras partes interesadas. Concebida 
inicialmente como un pequeño órgano con dependencia de las administraciones nacionales 
para implementar sus políticas, la Administración Pública europea ha evolucionado a una 
Administración multinivel en la que cada nivel interactúa con frecuencia con otros para llevar 
a cabo sus tareas.  
 
La cooperación ha sido inherente a la integración europea desde sus inicios. Aun así, 
en su concepción, la cooperación estaba claramente estructurada, de forma que la autoridad 
central tomaba las decisiones y los órganos descentralizados las llevarían a cabo. Un 
paradigma elegante, relativamente fácil de gestionar para los juristas, pero que sin embargo 
se desvanece ante la emergencia de los procedimientos compuestos, en los que la cooperación 
es intensa, difusa y multidireccional. La cooperación no sólo se refleja en la necesidad 
práctica que se encuentra en la liviana administración de las antiguas Comunidades Europeas, 
tan dependiente de las Administraciones Públicas nacionales, sino también en constituir una 
fuente de legitimidad para la Unión, de forma que la ampliación de sus competencias es 
aceptada con más facilidad por los Estados miembros en tanto en cuanto se les dé a ellos 
también un papel significativo en el proceso de diseño de políticas y en su implementación.  
 
De esta forma, partiendo de la existencia de la Administración Pública de la Unión, se 
analizarán sus características. El elemento de la 'mixticidad', que se ha incrementado con el 
tiempo, es sin duda aquel que tiene mayor impacto en las partes subsiguientes de la 
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investigación. La lógica de la cooperación permea a todos los aspectos de la Administración 
Pública de la Unión, y evidentemente a los procedimientos a través de los que actúa. 
 
Los procedimientos administrativos son concebidos como la forma mediante la cual la 
Administración lleva a cabo sus funciones. ¿Puede este concepto ser transpuesto directamente 
a los procedimientos empleados a nivel de la Unión sin mayor elaboración? El capítulo 
tercero tiene por objetivo dar respuesta a esta pregunta. Teniendo en cuenta que la 
concepción de los procedimientos administrativos es distinta en los diferentes Estados 
miembros, y que ha evolucionado notablemente a través del tiempo, sería difícil dar una 
respuesta simplemente afirmativa.   
 
Tomando como ejemplo esta evolución histórica, merece la pena destacar que el 
énfasis en la concepción según la cual los derechos subjetivos resultan afectados no sólo por 
el acto que pone fin al procedimiento administrativo, sino también a lo largo de todo el 
procedimiento administrativo, es relativamente reciente. Hoy la protección de los derechos 
procesales ha ganado mucho peso, y estas garantías constituyen a menudo la justificación de 
los poderes de la Administración Pública. Las autoridades públicas pueden en efecto tomar 
una decisión, en detrimento de los particulares si es necesario, en tanto en cuanto la decisión 
haya sido tomada tras el preceptivo procedimiento administrativo y en respeto de los 
principios y garantías aplicables.  
 
La aproximación al procedimiento basada en los derechos subjetivos de los 
particulares, que quizá no era prevalente en algunos Estados miembros hace apenas unas 
décadas, ha sido adoptada por el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea y ello tiene 
importantes consecuencias para nuestro análisis. Sin un respeto pleno a los derechos de los 
particulares a lo largo del procedimiento administrativo, no puede haber una decisión válida 
en Derecho. Estas afirmaciones, que reflejan la actual concepción del procedimiento 
administrativo, no parecen tan evidentes en relación con los procedimientos compuestos.  
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Además, el momento actual resulta particularmente interesante, dado que el debate 
sobre la codificación del procedimiento administrativo en la Unión Europea ha tomado 
fuerza, tanto en los círculos académicos como en la agenda institucional de la Unión. Ello es 
posiblemente una oportunidad para las soluciones por las que abogaremos posteriormente. 
 
El capítulo cuarto comienza con la difícil tarea proporcionar una definición de 
procedimientos compuestos que sea jurídicamente válida y omnicomprensiva, a la vez que 
simple, así como una justificación para el uso del término "procedimiento compuesto". La 
dificultad del ejercicio reside en la falta de referencias legislativas y jurisprudenciales. Tras la 
definición, se establecerá una clasificación entre los distintos tipos de procedimientos 
compuestos. Esta clasificación es importante porque algunas de las deficiencias de los 
procedimientos compuestos afectan de distinta forma a los distintos tipos de procedimientos 
compuestos.  
 
La mayor parte de este capítulo está dedicado al análisis de la legislación existente 
que establece los procedimientos compuestos. Este ejercicio es también difícil porque los 
procedimientos compuestos son creados sin referencia alguna a esta categoría y, mientras que 
en algunos casos los procedimientos se encuentran claramente dentro de la definición dada, 
algunos otros se encuentran en una zona gris. Los procedimientos compuestos son cada vez 
más numerosos, en particular en el ámbito de la autorización de productos en el mercado 
interior. La base lógica de ello es que los Estados miembros son menos reacios a otorgar 
poderes decisionales a la Unión en la medida en que los poderes sean compartidos a través de 
un procedimiento compuesto. Sin embargo, otros ámbitos de actuación de la Unión Europea, 
tales como el espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia, también cobran relevancia en el caso 
de procedimientos compuestos establecidos recientemente. Este análisis parte así de una 
perspectiva práctica y casuística en la observación del fenómeno de los procedimientos 
compuestos. 
 
Los procedimientos compuestos han ganado recientemente atención doctrinal. Sin 
embargo, en la mayoría de los casos la aproximación de la doctrina ha sido fragmentaria, 
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subrayando deficiencias concretas o tipos específicos de procedimientos compuestos. Uno de 
los objetivos de esta investigación doctoral es la búsqueda de una perspectiva global sobre los 
procedimientos compuestos. Esto no quiere decir lo mismo que exhaustividad. El número 
concreto de procedimientos compuestos es difícil de determinar porque cada vez se crean 
más, y muchos de ellos tienen características peculiares que pueden llevar a problemas 
particulares que son difíciles de prever antes de que se presente la situación concreta. En este 
sentido, se presentarán los ejemplos más importantes de procedimientos compuestos.  
 
Estos nueve ejemplos de procedimientos compuestos abarcan desde áreas muy 
amplias de la acción de la Unión como la política agrícola común, a ejemplos muy 
específicos como las eco-etiquetas; desde antiguos procedimientos compuestos que han 
variado a lo largo del tiempo, como la gestión de fondos europeos, a ejemplos muy recientes 
como el procedimiento para la autorización de biocidas; y desde ejemplos en los que los 
rasgos de los procedimientos compuestos son fácilmente identificables y que sirven como 
esquemas útiles para nuestro análisis, como el procedimiento relativo a los pesticidas, a 
aquellos cuyos rasgos son más difícil, como es el caso de los procedimiento en el área de la 
libertad, seguridad y justicia. La descripción de los procedimientos específicos que aparecen 
en el Derecho derivado será esencial para la identificación de las deficiencias que conllevan.   
 
El capítulo quinto de la tesis es el más largo y más relevante. Los derechos del 
ciudadano en su relación con la Administración Pública se distorsionan de forma sustancial 
cuando existe más de una autoridad pública interviniente en el procedimiento, cada una de 
ellas bajo un marco jurídico distinto. Estas distorsiones pueden ser contempladas en tres 
momentos temporales distintos. En primer lugar, durante el procedimiento administrativo en 
sí, cuando surge la cuestión de "ante quién" debe el particular ejercitar sus derechos 
procesales. En segundo lugar, en el momento en que se toma la decisión que pone fin al 
procedimiento administrativo, la cual cubre las actuaciones practicadas ante distintas 
instancias administrativas que conforman el iter procedimental y con ello la motivación del 
acto administrativo. En tercer lugar, en el momento en que la actuación administrativa resulta 
recurrida en los tribunales, dado que la cuestión de qué juez es competente para qué acto 
administrativo, o parte del mismo, aparece como extremadamente complicada.  
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De este modo, se pueden identificar tres aspectos como los principales desafíos de los 
procedimientos compuestos. El primero, durante el procedimiento administrativo, la garantía 
procesal del derecho a la audiencia antes de la adopción del acto administrativo. El segundo 
se relaciona al acto administrativo en sí, puesto que la Administración Pública tiene la 
obligación de motivación de la decisión. El tercero y más importante, el derecho a la tutela 
judicial efectiva. La concepción y el alcance de esos derechos se analizarán junto a la 
jurisprudencia de los tribunales de la Unión cuando éstos se han confrontado con los casos 
concretos relativos a procedimientos compuestos.  
 
Este capítulo se centra así en el análisis crítico de la jurisprudencia existente, 
identificando los méritos y las deficiencias de las sentencias dictadas hasta ahora. La crítica 
en esta parte se dirige con más frecuencia a la incapacidad jurídica de los tribunales de la 
Unión de hacer frente a las deficiencias de los procedimientos compuestos, dada la ausencia 
de mecanismos para ello que al contenido de las decisiones judiciales, que al propio 
razonamiento de las mismas. Por esta razón, las soluciones propuestas en lo sucesivo no se 
refieren tanto a una modificación en la aproximación que hacen los jueces de la Unión como 
a un cambio legislativo que debe llevar consigo una modificación consecuente de la 
percepción por los jueces de los procedimientos compuestos y por tanto una modificación en 
la jurisprudencia sobre ellos. Incluso si se puede adoptar una posición crítica sobre el 
resultado a que llegan los tribunales de la Unión, en la mayor parte de los casos, es 
difícilmente imaginable como podrían haber llegado a una conclusión distinta con el marco 
legislativo vigente. 
 
El capítulo sexto incluye las propuestas para superar las deficiencias identificadas en 
el capítulo quinto. El objetivo principal de las propuestas presentadas en este capítulo es que 
las mismas sean omnicomprensivas, en el sentido de que ninguna de las lagunas quede sin 
cubrir, y que sean eficaces a la hora de hacer frente a los problemas identificados. Aunque el 
análisis de la oportunidad política de las propuestas de este trabajo no puede tener una 
atención principal, estas consideraciones también se tienen en cuenta. 
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En este sentido, la codificación de los procedimientos administrativos no es una mera 
idea discutida en los círculos doctrinales de expertos en Derecho Administrativo. Una 
iniciativa formal debe aún ser tomada por la Comisión en este sentido, aunque el tema está ya 
formalmente en la agenda institucional. Esto ofrece la oportunidad perfecta para un 
reglamento que defina y regule los procedimientos compuestos en general. Se describirán en 
este capítulo los detalles técnicos de la propuesta, tales como la base jurídica para ello, o la 
redacción de algunas de sus normas que resolverían los problemas identificados. 
 
La propuesta es por tanto incluir los procedimientos compuestos en la codificación 
general de los procedimientos administrativos. A pesar de lo ambicioso de esta propuesta, no 
sería suficiente para hacer frente a todas las deficiencias identificadas. Puesto que la 
competencia de los tribunales de la Unión Europea no puede en forma alguna cubrir la 
totalidad del iter procedimental que finaliza en un acto administrativo de la Unión, debe 
proponerse también un mecanismo de cooperación entre los tribunales de la Unión y los de 
los Estados miembros. Este mecanismo debería reflejar mutatis mutandis el procedimiento 
prejudicial si bien en un sentido inverso. Se explicarán también los detalles técnicos de esta 
propuesta a nivel de la modificación del Derecho derivado. 
 
Finalmente, en términos de estructura, debe subrayarse que cada capítulo comienza 
con unas notas introductorias sobre su relevancia así como la estructura interna del capítulo, a 
la vez que se vincula el mismo con el resultado del capítulo anterior. De forma similar, cada 
capítulo acaba con unas conclusiones provisionales. A riesgo de reiterar algunas de las ideas 
de estas conclusiones con las que se harán al final de la tesis, la estructura de cada capítulo 
facilita la identificación del resultado del análisis realizado para cada uno de ellos, así como 
el desarrollo de cada capítulo sobre la base de la conclusión del anterior. 
 
1.3.- Metodología 
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Las preguntas a las que este trabajo doctoral pretende dar respuesta no han sido, a mi 
juicio, contestadas de forma completa hasta la fecha. Estas preguntas son "¿qué son los 
procedimientos compuestos?, ¿qué problemas traen consigo?, y ¿qué soluciones se puede 
proponer para hacerles frente?. Se explorará como el tema de los procedimientos compuestos 
ha ido ganando atención doctrinal y hay un número cada vez mayor de publicaciones sobre el 
asunto. Sin embargo, la aproximación hasta ahora es fundamentalmente fragmentaria. Se han 
escrito diversos artículos sobre algún problema en particular identificado en relación con los 
procedimientos compuestos, o en una sentencia en particular del Tribunal de Justicia, o con 
ocasión de las oportunidades que se presentan en el marco de la codificación. Este estudio 
tiene la intención de ofrecer una vista panorámica, tanto de los distintos tipos de 
procedimientos compuestos, de los diferentes problemas que conllevan, como de las 
soluciones que se ofrecerán. Esta perspectiva sistemática pretende ser una de las cualidades 
de esta investigación.  
 
En el proceso interminable de la acumulación de conocimiento, este trabajo tiene la 
intención de identificar los aspectos que resultan legalmente problemáticos y procurar 
encontrar soluciones desde una perspectiva lo más amplia posible. Se verá precisamente 
como esta falta de perspectiva general constituye el origen de muchas de las dificultades 
relativas a los procedimientos compuestos. La metodología de la tesis se refleja con claridad 
en su estructura, con una variación para cada una de sus partes.  
 
Los capítulos segundo y tercero se apoyan fuertemente en fuentes doctrinales, 
fundamentalmente jurídicas, pero no sólo. Otros trabajos del ámbito de la ciencia política 
también son tenidos en cuenta. Muchas de las páginas de estos primeros capítulos tiene un 
carácter descriptivo del actual estado de la doctrina, aunque el propósito es poder extraer las 
conclusiones necesarias para el análisis subsiguiente. De esta forma, los dos primero 
capítulos son un requisito previo y necesario para el estudio de los procedimientos 
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compuestos. Con ello existe el riesgo, común a trabajos que se apoyan en fuentes doctrinales, 
de dar lugar a listas de citas que se parezcan a una suerte de "guía telefónica sin argumento"1.  
 
La idea detrás de los dos primeros capítulos es la de proporcionar pruebas de que 
existe una Administración Pública de la Unión Europea y existen los procedimientos 
administrativos de la misma. Simultáneamente a esta labor probatoria, se pone el énfasis en 
los rasgos peculiares tanto de la Administración Pública de la Unión como en sus 
procedimientos administrativos. Al hacerlo, el propósito ha sido llevar a cabo un análisis de 
la doctrina exitoso, lo cual, en palabras de Webster and Watson, es aquel que  
 
"crea unos cimientos firmes para avanzar el conocimientos. Facilita el desarrollo de 
teorías, cierra áreas en las que existe una plétora de investigaciones, y descubre áreas donde 
la investigación es necesaria"2. 
 
En el capítulo cuarto se realiza un análisis detallado de la legislación existente por la 
que se establecen los distintos ejemplos de procedimientos compuestos. En esta parte, la tarea 
consiste en comenzar, de una forma inductiva, en el ejemplo concreto identificado en el 
Derecho derivado y llevarlo a los esquemas relevantes necesarios para que el investigador 
pueda realizar una sistematización y, una vez hecha esta, la categoría general pueda ser 
utilizada para identificar los problemas de los procedimientos compuestos. Un elemento 
adicional para facilitar la comprensión del lector ha sido la elaboración de cuadros en el que 
cada procedimiento compuesto pueda ser entendido de un vistazo. 
 
El quinto capítulo se centra fundamentalmente en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de 
Justicia. Contiene predominantemente un análisis de la aproximación judicial a los distintos 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
??Andrew Booth, Diana Papaioannou, y Anthea Sutton, Systematic Approaches to a Successful Literature 
Review SAGE Publications (New York, 2012), p.  3.?
??Jane Webster, y Richard Watson, "Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: Writing a literature review", 
26(2) MIS Quarterly, 26, 2, 13-23, p. 13.?
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desafías de los procedimientos compuestos, dando cuenta de sus méritos y subrayando sus 
posibles deficiencias. Este análisis jurisprudencial es complicado porque los tribunales nunca 
se han referido a los procedimientos compuestos en sí, sino que han resuelto las distintas 
controversias que se les han presentado de forma diversa. La labor de búsqueda e 
identificación de los casos relevantes ha sido pues ardua. Además, dada la falta de categoría 
común, las sensibilidades de los jueces de la Unión han sido distintas en las diferentes áreas, 
lo que ha complicado el análisis. Las fuentes doctrinales son también importantes, tanto en el 
comentario de la jurisprudencia como en la primera descripción de cada uno de los desafíos 
sobre lo que se estructura el capítulo. 
 
El capítulo sexto es el que se apoya menos en fuentes externas, tanto en trabajos 
doctrinales como en jurisprudencia, y más en las conclusiones de todos los capítulos 
anteriores. En este capítulo la tesis discurre por sendas relativamente inexploradas, y requiere 
ciertas nociones sobre el proceso legislativo y las realidades políticas de los procesos 
institucionales de la Unión. Puesto que aborda la creación de un nuevo marco normativo, con 
la idea de que sea completamente satisfactorio, es el capítulo más ambicioso y prospectivo.  
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2.1.- Justification, method and terminology 
 
The comprehensive assessment of composite procedures in the European Union1 
requires the prior analysis of two elements: European public administration and 
European administrative procedure. 
 
This first chapter will cover the European Union's public administration. This is 
not a merely academic apriori or aesthetic exercise. Few legal scholars have 
traditionally used the term 'European public administration', and fewer have written 
extensively on it. The state of affairs has changed with the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, as it enshrined the term European public administration. Even with the 
mention in the Treaties, the existence of a public administration of the European Union 
cannot be taken from granted. One cannot forget that the 'Administration publique', as 
first conceived in France, was born as the management apparatus of the executive 
power. Its birth is hence intimately linked to the modern State where the separation of 
powers prevailed.  
 
Only with difficulties can one support the statement that the separation of 
powers exists in the European Union in a likewise fashion as in member States. That is 
why the academic elaboration on the existence of a European administration must go 
farther than the formalistic argument ‘because the Treaty so says’. Thus, the question 
whether a public administration does exist at the European Union level will be analysed 
in detail. 
 
As important as the questioning of the existence of a European public 
administration is the analysis of the features and trends that characterise the EU public 
administration today. What it is differs greatly from how it was designed, and this 
aspect has a paramount importance for the subsequent development of the thesis. As we 
shall see, the emergence and proliferation of composite procedures ise indeed one of the 
                                                 
1
 The Union has replaced and succeeded the Community (Article 1 (3) TEU). This article will use the 
terms ‘EU’ and ‘Union’ including where it refers to what was pre?Lisbon the Community; except where 
the historical context requires otherwise. 
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most remarkable features of a public administration that no longer decides so others 
(member States) execute, but often cooperates with them in implementing policies that 
have been subject to common agreements through different legal instruments. 
 
The existence of an EU public administration is a necessary condition for the 
existence and assessment of the administrative procedures of the EU. Once the 
existence of an EU public administration is settled and its properties are outlined, the 
analysis of the different categories of administrative procedures to carry out its activities 
will be pertinent. 
 
There is also a terminological question which is much related to the different 
legal traditions within Europe. To the British tradition, public administration is an 
imported set of words from France that has never been part of their public law tradition. 
The famous allocation of Dicey there is not such a thing a Droit administrative in 
Britain speaks for itself. For the British, public administration is a alien term, a 
Gallicism at best, which can lead to misunderstandings, not to speak of the North 
American conception by which administration is considered what we, in continental 
Europe, call government.  
 
For the sake of clarification, the term public administration shall be used in the 
sense that it is traditionally understood in continental Europe, heir to the French 
Administration Publique, and indeed used in the European Union acquis. That is as the 
public machinery at the service of the executive power, however difficult it is to 
determine such concepts at the European Union level. 
 
2.2.- Historical and comparative background of a European public administration 
 
2.1.1.- Original design of a European public administration 
 
The existence of a European public administration has been subject to academic 
debate, and many scholars had doubts whether the administrative structure of the 
European Communities qualified as an authentic public administration or was rather a 
large and complex general secretariat of an international organisation, being the national 
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public administrations the bodies primarily in charge of executing EU law2. The 
existence of a public administration is a prerequisite for the legal assessment of the 
administrative procedures that stem from it. Although doubts on the existence of a 
European public administration have largely dissipated after the Treaty of Lisbon3, the 
proper conceptualization of the EU public administration and its strong connections 
with national administrations encompass the organizational framework for composite 
procedures. 
 
Throughout history, public administration has come hand-in-hand with the 
modern concept of nation-state. From the sixteenth century, modern Western European 
states needed an organisation integrated by expert civil servants for the implementation 
of law and order and for setting up a defensive structure4. Given the strong linkage of 
public administration to the essence of the nation-state5, it is very difficult to define a 
simple notion of the European or EU public administration6.  
 
Originally, the cession of sovereignty in the early European Communities put 
into question the classical principle of territoriality of public law7, under the old maxim 
quidquid est in territorio, est etiam de territorio. Although Member States allowed 
public power to be exercised externally to their own territorial base and organization, 
they did not create a new administration with parallel powers to national public 
administrations. On the contrary, there was a lack of a European public administration, 
in the sense of a bureaucracy ready to carry out the implementation of the new common 
                                                 
2
 Jérôme Roux, Droit Général de l'Union Européenne, LexiNexi (Paris, 2010), at 99. 
3
 In particular, article 298 (1) TFEU. The consequences of the Treaty of Lisbon shall be assessed in detail 
in Section 2.5. 
4
 Christopher Thornhill and Gerda van Dijk, “Public Administration Theory: Justification for 
Conceptualisation”, 45(1) Journal of Public Administration (2010), 95-110, at 99. 
5
 Øivind Støle, “Towards a Multi-Level Community Administration? The Decentralization of EU 
Competition Policy”, in Morten Egeber (ed.), Multilevel Union Administration. The transformation of 
Executive Politics in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan (Houndmills, 2006), 86-102, at 89. 
6
 Mario Chiti, a pioneer scholar in the field of European Administrative Law, understands that the legal 
notion of public administration from a EU perspective is very problematic. The notion itself varies 
depending on the context of reference and techniques used for the development of the integration process. 
See, Mario Chiti, Diritto Administrativo Europeo, Giuffrè Editore (Milan, 2011), at 283. 
7
 Herwig H. C. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe and Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy in the 
European Union, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2011), at 6. 
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policies. But this was wisely circumvented with the scheme of the so-called “indirect 
administration”.  
 
The founding father Jean Monnet explains in his Mémoires the problems 
concerning the scarcity of administrative capabilities he found in the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community. The High Authority had very limited human 
and material resources, but the first officials and units did have the necessary relays 
with national public administrations to make the European project take off8. So rather 
than doing (faire), the High Authority would make others do (faire faire).  
 
In such a way, the old Communities could administer their policies “indirectly”. 
According to Monnet, it was sufficient to have a few hundreds European officials in 
order to put thousands of national experts to work. They would make the powerful 
administrative machineries of Member States (les puissantes machineries des États) 
serve the mission of the Treaty9. This pragmatic approach prevailed over the more 
idealistic view of a political structure ressembling a federal State, advocated by Altiero 
Spinelli, where the Union would enjoy administrative powers10. 
 
The initial setup was a dual administrative order in which the administration of 
common European policies took place indirectly through lower-level national 
administrations, in what was originally called in French mise en oeuvre indirecte 
(indirect implementation). From that point of view, many scholars described the early 
Communities as a federal system11, owing to the fact that the federal idea entails a 
                                                 
8
 Jean Monet, Mémoires, Le livre de poche (Paris, 2007), at 544. 
9
 Monnet, Mémoires…, at 545. 
10
 Claudio Franchini, "Les notions d'administration indirecte et de coadministration", in Jean-Bernard 
Auby, and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère (eds.), Traité de droit administratif européen, Bruylant 
(Brussels, 2007), 245-65, at 246. 
11
 William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Little, Brown and Company (Boston, 
1964), 11. He points out that the European Communities, and the ECSC in particular, had clear federal 
traits from the beginning. For a general study of the federal characterization of the Communities as a 
federal entity see for instance Michael Burgess “Federalism and the building of Europe 1950-72”, in 
Michael Burgess (ed.), Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950-2000, Routledge 
(London, 2000), 55-100; and David Kelemen, “The structure and dynamics of EU federalism”, 36(1-2) 
Comparative Political Studies  (2003), 184-208. 
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means of structuring the relationship between interlinked authorities12 with a balance of 
powers allotted to the central authority and the component entities. The tenet of 
federalism is the combination of self-rule and shared-rule13. This feature was thus 
present in the foundations of that early architecture. 
 
The peculiarity of the system, unique to the EU, but federal in substance14, lied 
in the fact that national authorities act on behalf of European law15. This system became 
known as “executive federalism”, being first conceptualised by German tradition as 
Vollzugsföderalismus16. It is best described by the current president of the Court of 
Justice, judge Lenaerts as a system “in which component entities become agents for the 
application and enforcement of the policy choices made at the central level.”17 
 
With regard to the design of the administrative machinery of the ECSC, first, 
and the three Communities, afterwards, in itself, the most decisive influence was that of 
the French Administration Publique model. Historically, administrative law itself traces 
its origins in the post-revolutionary France18.  
 
Upon the recognition of citizens' rights in the Déclaration des Droits de l'homme 
et du citoyen as well as the separation of powers, the modern Administration appears 
with some of its current traits19. The creation of the Conseil d'État is generally identified 
                                                 
12
 Koen Lenaerts, “Federalism: Essential concepts in evolution: the Case of the European Union”, 21(3) 
Fordham International Law Journal (1997), 746-98, at 748 
13
 Daniel Judah Elazar, “Exploring federalism”, University of Alabama Press, (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1987), at 
5. 
14
 Nicholas Aroney, “Federal Constitutionalism/European Constitutionalism in Comparative Perspective”, 
in Gert-Jan Leenknegt (ed.), Getuigend Staatsrecht: Liber Amicorum A. K. Koekkoek, Wolf Legal 
Publishers (Tilburg, 2005), 229-51, at 245. This author identifies a number of features, like the ones 
discussed above, that are similar to the institutional foundations of the other federal States 
15
 Philipp Dann, “Looking through the federal lens: The Semi-parlamentary Democracy of the EU”, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper Series No. 5/2002, at 6, available at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/02/020501.pdf 
16
 Alan Fenna, “Federalism and Intergovernmental Coordination”, ”, in Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds.), 
Handbook of Public Administration, Sage Publications (Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003), 750-63, at 752. 
17
 Lenaerts, “Federalism: Essential concepts …”, at 765. 
18
 Eduardo García de Enterría and Tomás Ramón Fernández, Curso de Derecho Administrativo, vol 1, 
Civitas, (2008), at  30. 
19
 Didier Truchet, Droit administratif, Thémis, (Paris, 2008), at 34. 
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as the moment of birth of the law discipline for the Public Administration, that is, 
Administrative law20. 
 
Subsequently, at the end of the 19th Century, the two classical French schools of 
Public Administration appeared. The School of Toulouse led by professor Hauriou 
insisting on the special prerogatives of the Administration as an institution, on the one 
hand; and the School of Bordeaux les by professor Duguit focusing on the functions of 
the Administration, notably, the function of public service. From one or the other 
perspective, the French conception of public Administration entails a special status 
thereof, with a special discipline of law. This means that Public Administration is not 
subject to general private law, but an isolated discipline with a focus on protection of 
the public interest21, and that the relationships of civil servants with it is also different 
from a normal employment relationship.  
 
The model of the French Administration Publique was exported, or at least was 
heavily influential, in other European countries and beyond22. This was certainly 
reflected in the original design of the Administration of the early communities. Indeed, 
the model of the French Administration was reflected in the organisation of the early 
Communities not only for reasons of inertia, but it was precisely the intention of 
Monnet to have permanent officials devoted to the general interest of the Communities, 
instead of a model of seconded national servants on a temporary basis23. This system 
would ensure the attainment of the objectives of European integration. Later on, the 
structures grew and the following president of the Commission, Mr Hallstein, 
introduced the further hierarchies inspired in the German model24.  
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 Jan-Bernard Auby and Lucie Cluzel-Métayer, "Administrative Law in France", in René Seerden (ed.), 
Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States, Intersentia 
(Cambridge, 2012), 5-38, et 5. 
21
 Olivier Gohin, Institutions administratives, Librairie Générale de Droit et Jusrisprudence (Paris, 2006), 
at 8. 
22
 Martin Painter and Guy Peters, "Administrative Traditions in Comparative Perspective: Families, 
Groups and Hybrids", in Martin Painter and Guy Peters, Tradition and Public Administration, Palgrave 
(Basingstoke, 2010), 19-30, at 21. 
23
 Anne Stevens, "Les hauts fontionnaires de l'Union Européenne: uniformité statutaire et diversité 
culturelle", in Françoise Dreyfus, Jean-Michel Eymeri (eds.), Science politique de l'administration : Une 
approche comparative, Economica (Paris, 2006), 9-27, at 12. 
24
 Ibid. at 13. 
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However, even with this initial conception of a French Public Administration, 
which would evolve later taking on board certain aspects of the Anglo-Saxon 
administration too, was never fully-fledged. It remained dependent on national 
Administrations to execute the policies of the Communities, theorically through indirect 
administration, and later progressively through shared schemes. 
 
2.1.2.- The different models of federalism 
 
There are traditionally two models of federalism: dual federalism and 
cooperative federalism25. The gist of dual federalism lies in the institutional autonomy 
of the different levels of government with a clear vertical separation of powers in which 
competences are allocated according to policy sectors, not policy functions. As a result, 
both legislative and executive powers are found in either level. At the same time, 
representation of component entities is weak at the central level. The archetype of this 
model is the original federalism of United States of America26. 
 
On the other hand, the model of cooperative federalism model is based on a 
functional division of powers between the different levels of government. While the 
central authority legislates, component entities are responsible for implementing 
legislation. This results in many shared competencies and a strong representation of the 
component entities at the central level. The prime example of this type of federalism is 
Germany27. 
 
                                                 
25
 See further details in Tanja A.Börzel and Thomas Risse , “Who is Afraid of a European Federation? 
How to Constitutionalise a Multi-Level Governance System”, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series No. 
5/2002, at 11, available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/00/00f0101.html   
26
 The dual model of federalism was descriptive of the United States’ political system only at its origins 
and throughout the nineteenth century. The Civil War led to substantive modifications of this model, but 
it was in the 1930’s when most authors agree that Roosevelt’s New Deal together with the Supreme 
Court’s landmark ruling NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) of 12 April 1937 
changed the system to a more cooperative version of federalism, see  Harry N. Scheiber, “Federalism and 
Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System”, 14 Law & Society 
Review (1979), 663-722, at 667. However, many of the original features of that model still exist today. 
27
 Søren Dosenrode, “Policy-making in Federations and in the EU”, in Søren Dosenrode (ed.), 
Approaching the European Federation, Ashgate (Aldershot, 2007), 59-86, at 70. This model is also called 
the continental model as its features are also present, albeit less intensely, in Austria and Switzerland. 
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Authors have argued that the “confrontative” American model of federalism28, 
where there is a powerful autonomy of each level of government together with a clear 
separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branch of government contrasts29 
with the “dynamic confusion of powers” in the European Union30. Professor Guy Isaac 
defined executive federalism as opposed to the federal system of the United States 
because the Community system is centralized when it comes to the law-making powers, 
but it is scattered as regards the executive action31. However, there are interesting 
lessons to be learned from the evolution of American federalism; the early American 
theorists did not conceive a “federal state” until after the late 19th Century as the word 
“state” was restricted to the parts of the Union32 and the American Constitution was 
deemed in part an international instrument33.  
 
 Administrative implementation by member States is the paradigm of the 
cooperative rationale, but it goes farther than the German model. On the one hand, 
because competences of both levels overlap and, on the other hand, because of the wide 
powers of the constituent parties. This feature, which has been an updraft trend until 
today, leads to the core idea of this work. 
 
2.1.3.- The early model of executive federalism in the European integration 
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 Søren Dosenrode , “Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an analytical 
framework”, 2(3) Perspectives on Federalism (2010), 1-28, at 11. 
29
 A detailed comparative analysis of the American and EU federalism can be found at Mark Tushnet 
(ed), Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America, Greenwood Press (New York, 1990). 
30
 See more on the contrast between the two models in Vivien Schmidt, “Federalism and State 
Governance in the European Union and the United States: An Institutional Perspective”, in Kalypso 
Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the 
United States and the European Union, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2001), 335-54, at 339.  
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 For reference to a classic academic work on the Community system, see Guy Issac, Droit 
Communautaire Général, Masson (Paris, 1983), at 185.  
32
 Kalipso Nicolaïdis, “Conclusions: The Federal Vision beyond the Federal State”, in Kalipso Nicolaïdis 
and Robert Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Government in the United States 
and the European Union, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2001), 443-82, at 444, affirms “to be sure, 
none of the pre-civil war American thinkers on federalism […] saw the United States as a ‘federal state’. 
For them the word ‘state’ still denoted not the whole but the parts of the union.” 
33
 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, and Terence Ball, The Federalist:  with Letters of 
Brutus, Cambrindge University Press (Cambridge, 2003), 187; cited in Robert Schütze, From dual to 
cooperative federalism. The changing structure of European law, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 
2009), 58. Hamilton stated that the American Constitution was “in strictness, neither national nor 
international, but a composition of both”. 
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The scheme of executive federalism was both possibilistic and ambitious in its 
origin34. It was effective for the execution of the European policies, and came up as 
acceptable for member states whose administrative organisation and powers remained 
untouched35. Member states should be in charge of the transposition and application of 
EU legislation. The monitoring role of the Commission in this respect did not in itself 
change this division of labour between levels of governance. Indirect implementation 
portrays the Union as a system in which the constituent states are integrated into a larger 
whole as coherent entities36. 
 
 
This early architecture still remains in EU law; in particular, in the general 
principle laid down in article 291(1) TFEU37 which states that member states shall adopt 
all measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts. 
Implementation at the central level is possible but exceptional, conferring implementing 
powers upon the Commission in specific cases 38.  
 
It was later captured most clearly in the Declaration No 43 annexed to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam: 
 
“The High Contracting Parties confirm … that the administrative 
implementation of Community law shall in principle be the responsibility of the 
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 See for a historical overview of 'executive federalism' along European integration, Robert Schütze 
"From Rome to Lisbon: "Executive Federalism" in the (New) European Union", 47(5) Common Market 
Law Review (2010), 1385-1427. 
35
 See Deidre M. Curtin and Morten Egeberg, “Tradition and innovation: Europe's accumulated executive 
order”, 31(4) West European Politics (2008), 639-61, at 649.  
36
 Ibid., at 650. 
37
 Article 291(2) TFEU reads: “Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts 
are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific 
cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
Council.” 
38
 Direct implementation by the Commission is common in the field of competition law. Article 105 
TFEU confers the powers of application of antitrust provisions in articles 101 and 102 TFEU upon the 
Commission; article 106 TFEU likewise entrusts the Commission with the antitrust control of public 
undertakings; article 108 TFEU stipulates the direct responsibility of Commission on state aid cases; and 
article 22(2) of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L 24, 1-22)) awards the Commission exclusive 
powers concerning mergers of EU dimension. Besides, article 317 TFEU provides that the Commission 
shall implement its own budget on its own responsibility, although in cooperation with Member States. 
See Hofmann, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy …, at 259-260. 
51 
Member States in accordance with their constitutional arrangements. This shall 
not affect the supervisory, monitoring and implementing powers of the 
Community Institutions as provided under Articles 145 and 155 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.” 
 
In addition to that Declaration, many scholars highlight that the lack of legal 
basis in the Treaties for a common administrative policy is a solid piece of evidence of 
the general preference for the indirect administration39. There is no EU legislation 
enacting general rules or horizontal standards for national administrations to implement 
EU law40, and the first steps in codification of EU administrative procedure have barely 
been taken41. The general rule is that member states act autonomously in executing EU 
law42 or, in other words, they retain “administrative sovereignty”43. As professor Weiler 
observed, Member States "often act as, and indeed are, the executive brach of the 
Union"44. 
 
Professor Olsen argues that from a historical point of view, the EU has given 
only modest attention to administrative issues. The focus has been placed on policy 
making and substantive results rather than administrative arrangements45; which is 
evidenced by the little attention initially awarded to administrative procedures46. 
According to Olsen, neither the Treaties nor the acquis communautaire prescribe a 
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specific model of public administration. A variety of national administrative systems are 
acceptable, without interference from the Union, as long as Union obligations are 
followed and common rules are implemented47.  
 
Jürgen Schwarze highlights that administrative instruments that leave discretion 
to member states have traditionally been more popular than those imposing specific 
administrative solutions48, and the European institutions have never been granted a 
general organizational, supervision or enforcement competence due to the resistance of 
member states. 
 
As professor Chiti has put it, the organisational autonomy of Member States 
allows them to remain anchored in their own domestic administrative systems, without a 
formal influx from the Union and operating autonomously from other Member States49. 
But these words remain at a purely theoretical level, and professor Chiti acknowledges 
that it is erroneous to believe that indirect execution excludes any involvement of the 
European authorities in the implementation process50. There are both formal and 
informal channels of influence. Among the former would be the many contacts between 
the EU officials and the relevant national offices. Among the later would be the plethora 
of information exchange mechanisms and coordination schemes which will be assessed 
in detail later in this work. 
 
Furthermore, the Commission has long advocated that implementation of 
common policies must be “as decentralized as possible” in its White Paper on European 
Governance so that the diversity of local situations are better taken into account51. This 
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White Paper proposed the opening up of the policy-making process to get more citizens 
and organizations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. 
 
This means that the Commission intends to go farther than the indirect 
administrative action schemes assume, providing decision-making processes with more 
legitimacy52, and bringing greater flexibility into how EU legislation is implemented. 
Thus, it should take into account regional and local conditions and establishing a more 
systematic dialogue with civil society. In other words, it results from this White Paper 
that the Commission wants to promote decisional partnerships and reshape the 
relationships it holds with national authorities from a one-direction, decide-and-execute 
pattern to cooperative networks involving not only its national counterparts, but also 
regional, local and civil society stakeholders53. 
 
2.1.4.- The transformation into a new cooperative model 
 
The system of indirect administration has played a central role in the 
development of the administrative action of European Union and it is still enshrined in 
several provisions of primary law. Nevertheless, legal academia increasingly ascertains 
that this dual administrative system is under profound transformation54.  
 
The dichotomy direct-indirect administration is far from representing the current 
state of affairs in EU law implementation, because the question is not whether 
competences of execution lie at either the European level of administration or the 
national level, but rather on what cooperative scheme exists between them55. The logic 
                                                 
52
 Marcus Höreth, “The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance: A ‘Tool-Kit’ for closing 
the legitimacy gap of EU policymaking?”, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Rheinische 
Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Discussion Paper  C94/2001, at 5. 
53
    Mario Telò, “Combiner les instruments politiques en vue d'une gestion dynamique des diversités 
nacionales”, in Christian Joerges, Yves Mény, Helen Wallace, and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds.), Mountain 
or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission’s White Paper on Governance, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 6/01, 13-21, at 20.  
54
 See for a general view of the current scholarly though, Maria Martens, Organized administrative 
integration: The role of agencies in the European administrative system, ARENA Report Series (Oslo 
2010), at 6-7, at http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/reports/2010/Report_02_10.pdf 
55
 Franchini, "Les notions d'administration indirecte et de coadministration....", at 263. 
54 
of separation is being progressively overshadowed by the logic of cooperation56, even 
though there usually is still a distribution of administrative tasks in many fields. 
 
There were clear-cut examples of cooperative rather than indirect schemes of 
administrative execution as far back as in the 1960s, as former president of the 
European Court of Justice Rodríguez Iglesias has revealed57. Professor Casesse also 
pointed out that cooperation between European and national authorities in EU law 
implementation was more and more present, in opposition to pure indirect 
administration58. This trend was exposed by a growing number of networks between 
national administrations and Commission’s services, according to the analysis of 
professor Wessels59. Legal scholars began speaking of a shared administration empower 
with the implementation of EU policies according to mechanisms that did not strictly fit 
into the category of indirect administration60.  
 
The decline of indirect administration was, understandably, in parallel with the 
rise of coordinated administrative action61. From a political science perspective, there is 
a structural change. The former autonomy between administrative units which was 
predominant in the early European Communities has given way to administrative 
integration, which translates into further cooperation and development of common 
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practices and proceedings62. Thus, the Union authorities are getting progressively 
involved in the implementation activities undertaken by member state authorities; 
simultaneously, national administrations are taking an active role in the creation of EU 
legislative and implementing acts63. The trend is becoming more intense as the 
subnational actors start to participate in the process64. This trend runs in parallel to a 
shift the European administrative setup moved from the traditional, hierarchical model 
of French origin to a more open, flexible one65. 
 
In sum, there is a consensus that the European Union has reached a further stage 
of cooperative federalism66, a complex structure of multilevel administrative 
interaction67 where cooperation between the national and EU administrative actors is 
intense in all phases; that is, in agenda setting, decision-making or implementation. The 
functions of the both public administrations in all phases of the policy circles are 
interwoven and the traditional distinction between direct and indirect administration is 
now blurred68. 
 
It is important for our legal assessment to see reality as it is, not as our old 
paradigms say it should ideally be; because problems and inconsistencies arise due to 
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the disparate evolution of the EU administrative action and the static legal and 
procedural framework and judicial architecture of the Union. 
 
2.2.- The mismatch: today’s European public administration and the classical legal 
approach 
 
2.2.1.- The traditional legal approach 
 
There is a growing divergence between the traditional conception of law and the 
reality of today’s European public administration. The evolution of European 
integration has reached a point where the European public administration is 
characterised by a non-hierarchical, flexible and interwoven relationship with national 
administrations and the uptake of new governance approaches69. 
 
The traditional legal conception was associated with the classic Community 
method. Although this method evolved through time70, it is characterised, as in former 
times, by clear rules, formal –even if sometimes complex– procedures, and institutional 
balance remaining within the limits of certain public entities of the Union. A 
noteworthy paradox is that even though the Community method has progressively 
increased its scope71, the emergence of new governance tools imply that the old 
approaches are is increasingly unfit to describe how the European Union actually 
functions. Joanne Scott and David Trubek underline the main reasons for this 
phenomenon72: 
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- the traditional conception of law looks for a unitary source of ultimate 
authority, but the EU acts rather upon a dispersal and fragmentation of authority, and 
rests upon fluid systems of power sharing; 
 
- the former clear distinction between rule making on the one hand, and rule 
application and implementation on the other no longer holds true. Instead, indeterminate 
and flexible rules are adapted to meet new challenges and resolve unexpected problems; 
 
- while a traditional conception of law might see itself as predicated upon 
existing knowledge, the emphasis in now put upon the need to facilitate the continuous 
generation of new knowledge;  
 
- hierarchies are not the only pattern of administrative organisation; and 
 
- courts no longer retain the monopoly on securing real accountability.  
 
As De Búrca has argued, there is a fundamental tension between the traditional 
constitutionalism focused on limited, clear and visible EU powers and the reality of a 
pragmatic, flexible and interwoven form of governance which is in permanent 
expansion73. Most European administrative law scholars74 have identified a growing gap 
between, on the one hand, the proliferation of new forms of administrative action in the 
Union and their regulatory framework and, on the other hand, their integration into a 
coherent system of protection of procedural guarantees and general principles related to 
good administration. 
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2.2.2.- New Governance approaches 
 
In other words, the old-rooted model of indirect administration which many 
lawyers have been using as a centre of gravity for the assessment of administrative 
action is becoming in a large part obsolete. Political science used the term “new 
governance” for at least three decades now to refer to a new specific pattern of resolving 
common public problems, a centrifugal model of public action characterized by 
devolution and centreless society75. In this vein, there is a proliferation of public-private 
partnerships or, more generally, a reliance on different forms of cooperation with the 
public sector for the management of public affairs76. 
 
New governance approaches did not emerge in order to describe special features 
of the European Union, but observers agree that its characteristics apply to how the EU 
carries out its administrative action much more intensely than at the national level77. 
 
It is difficult to find a consensual univocal definition of new governance that all 
authors could fully agree upon78 but the gist of new governance lies in the contrast with 
the traditional bureaucratic public administration79. Professor Rosenau in his often cited 
work “Governance without Government” deduced that the essence of the phenomenon 
was in authority simultaneously moving up towards supranational entities and down to 
subnational actors80. 
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What is relevant for the purposes of our analysis is that new governance points 
to the creation of a structure, not externally imposed, which results of an interaction of a 
multiplicity of governing and mutually influencing actors81. One of the leading 
contributors to the theorization of new governance in the European Union, Simon Hix, 
lays emphasis on the following interrelated characteristics82: 
 
- the process of governing is no longer conducted exclusively by the state, but 
involves all social, political and administrative actors that guide, steer, control or 
manage society; 
 
- the relationship between state and non-state actors in this process is polycentric 
and non-hierarchical and mutually dependent. 
 
- the key governance function is regulation of social and political risk, instead of 
resource redistribution.  
 
The result is a new problem-solving rather than bargaining style of decision-
making opposed to the classic state-centric, command-and-control, redistributive and 
ideological processes of government and politics83. The uptake of new governance 
methods at the Union level is, at least in part, due to the permanent resistance of 
member states to yield administrative competencies, as member states have accepted 
schemes of administration in which they could intervene and shape that decision-
making procedures84.  
 
New governance assumes that no single actor –in particular, not the central 
governing actor– has sufficient overview to apply the particular policy instruments 
effectively, so decisions shall be the outcome of interacting intervention effort of all the 
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involved actors85. These approaches are thus particularly adequate for the reality of how 
the European Union operates. Considering the mismatch between the ambitious goals 
an the limited capacity of the Union, the high expectations and the narrow legitimacy, 
new governance mechanisms appear as excellent opportunities for effective action86. 
Some sectors are particularly prone to this trend, like social policy87, regulatory action88, 
or even the mechanisms in the Council decision-making89. To some authors, a large part 
of the Union’s administrative action can be portrayed within this new governance 
framework90, although the powers of government in the classic sense still remain 
essential even in multi-level setups91. Consequently, there is a progressive uptake of the 
new government vision of administrative action. 
 
Unquestionably, there are different types of governance applicable to the 
European Union, and the old fashioned Community method remains one of them. 
Within the diffuse boundaries of the new government mechanisms, the European Union 
has systemic properties leading to a peculiar method that some scholars designate 
“network governance”92, as a sub-type of new governance pattern that is predominant in 
the European Union. Inasmuch as the essence of EU action is problem solving and the 
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setting of policymaking in the EU is defined by highly organised social sub-systems –
i.e. Member States–, this network governance entails that the Union has to pay tribute to 
the specific rationalities, assume that authority is dispersed and operate as an activator 
bringing together the relevant state and societal actors to make issue-specific 
constituencies93. 
 
2.2.3.- The difficult legal assessment of the new realities 
 
Those theoretical descriptions of the current patterns for European Union action 
are still not consensually adopted by the legal scholarship, leading to the 
aforementioned mismatch. Graínne de Búrca and Joanne Scott have systematised the 
relationship between law, as traditionally conceived, and new governance approaches as 
follows94: 
 
- the gap thesis, according to which formal law is blind to the practice of 
governance, either because it ignores those developments or because it contest its 
assumptions; 
 
-the hybridity thesis, in which law acknowledges the existence of new 
governance patterns, but it largely confines them to a soft law status95; and  
 
-the transformation thesis, which argues that new governance demands a whole 
re-conceptualisation of law. In particular, the adaptation shall bear major consequences 
in terms of procedural law, which indeed is at the central part of this dissertation.  
 
In sum, the traditional legal approach, under the most favourable assumption, 
finds it troublesome to adapt to the real functioning of the European Union. Any legal 
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analysis of the European public administration cannot neglect this starting point. A 
proper conceptualization of the European public administration is not possible without 
the dynamic context of how it actually functions. As political scientists have long 
argued, European integration is fundamentally a political process96. Jurists stress out the 
role of law in this process97, but they should not miss the context98 for our assessment, 
in particular at times when new governance approaches are leaving behind the 
traditional legal paradigms upon which the European Union administration was built. 
 
The static picture to be framed as European public administration results from 
this dynamic process of integration, in which the enlargement of administrative 
competencies has occurred concurrently with the interwoven involvement of Member 
States and other actors. Hence, it should come as no surprise that lawyers do not find 
themselves at ease with such a blurred and legally loose concept. Notwithstanding, it is 
a task to be carried out, not for reasons of legal academic aesthetics, but because only 
with a real, accurate overview of the structural and organisational foundations is it 
possible to address the concept and challenges posed by the procedures resulting from 
this reality. 
 
The “legal” vision of the European integration has been blamed for its isolation 
from the political and economic context in which it operates99. The political scientist 
Martin Shapiro famously criticised the legal thinking of his time for this reason. In his 
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view, legal scholars conceived the European Community as a mere juristic creation and 
used rigid legal patterns to describe the reality of European integration100.  
 
This work shall not conduct a legal analysis that remains confined to a self-
referential theoretical level. It shall carefully examine reality and adapt legal standards 
to it, in order to describe it and to propose plausible legal solutions. The exercise of 
fitting the new reality into the old legal paradigms is to be avoided. As professor 
Curtin101 pointed out, the Law shall not resort to a type of exercise in camouflage, and 
lawyers shall free themselves from the old schemes and paradigms when necessary to 
assess today’s European Union.  
 
Indirect administration and community method, as elegant from a legal point of 
view as they might appear, are clear examples of old paradigm, still visible and to a 
large extent, valid, but no longer sufficient. There is increasing evidence and 
theorisation that executive action is becoming something different, although certainly 
not more similar to a national administration. 
 
2.3- A European public administration thoroughly different from its national 
counterparts 
 
National public administration has evolved according to the needs of the national 
state whose purposes it serves102. The Western European newborn nation- states of the 
sixteenth century needed an organisation for the enforcement of law and order, and for 
the setting up a defence structure. Servants integrating such organisation were subject to 
the will of the king, rather than the law103. 
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Until the eighteenth Century nothing resembling an administrative structure in 
the modern sense of the word actually existed104. The need to administrative expertise 
grew then, due to the increasing functions of the state and the extending hold of 
European countries over other continents and people, so that larger numbers of experts 
were required105. The key transformation was the abandonment of the patrimonial 
conception of the state106 and the invention of the politics/administration dichotomy107. 
It was then that public administration began to be considered either the virtuous sister or 
the dull servant of politics108 at the same time that a functional distinction arose between 
the politician and the professional servant109, the latter being considered experts 
representing the general interest110. 
 
France presents a clear example of this evolution. The nature of the state was 
depersonalized by the French Revolution, so the state became the machinery set up by 
the nation for its own government and to organise its public services. Consequently, the 
allegiance of public officials changed from the monarch to the nation111. 
 
The first academic studies on the public administration can be found in France 
and Germany. In France, in particular, the pioneer on the analysis of what was firstly 
called science de la police was Charles-Jean Bonin. In his work Principes 
d'administration publique published in 1812, he put the focus on the relations between 
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the administration and the citizens112. The further theorisation on public administration 
came subsequently in the late nineteenth century, thanks to the works of von Stein, in 
Europe, and Wilson, in America. Both considered that the study of public 
administration was an autonomous discipline113.  
 
The trend towards the depolitization of public administration had its climax with 
the assimilation of public administration under the notion of bureaucracy by Max 
Weber. To Weber, public administration was the apolitical tool of government114.  
Weber’s characterisation of bureaucracy remained the centre of gravity for the study of 
public administration for much of the twentieth Century115.  In his description of public 
bureaucracies, he highlighted the following features116: a) a mission defined by top 
officials; b) authority granted from top to bottom; c) fixed jurisdictions within the 
organisation, with the scope of work defined by rules; and d) management by set rules, 
career experts, and written documents. 
 
This classic design has evolved in most national administrations in European 
countries117. The Weberian conception of the impartial bureaucrat, administering State 
authority in the interest of the community is the symbol of the early twentieth century 
European nation-state, when public administration was a highly elaborated hierarchy of 
authority superimposed upon a highly elaborated division of labour118. In France, the 
école classique of professors Chardon and Fayol also stressed the distinction between 
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the political power and the administrative functions, which shall work autonomously 
from each other119. 
 
The most remarkable trend in the evolution of public administration in the recent 
decades however is the overflow of the traditional limits of policy implementation, and 
the enlargement to the activities of public administrations to public formulation120. This 
phenomenon is altering substantially the classical, Weberian features of public 
administration. 
 
Even though outdated in some respects at the present time, the original design of 
a Weberian administration is still visible in most European national public 
administrations121. Although the topic of administrative reform aimed at departing from 
the rigidities of the Weberian model has had prominent place in the agendas of many 
European countries122, many national administrations are still predominantly 
hierarchical organisations relatively closed to external influences123.  
 
The early European Commission and its predecessor, the High Authority of the 
ECSC, were largely inspired in the hierarchical continental model. Institutional choices 
of the design of the Commission date back to the foundation of the Community in the 
decade of 1950, and the French model of administration was the main source of 
inspiration in the design by Jean Monnet124. This is true even when the Commission in 
its current structure was only established in 1967, it resulted from three entities 
corresponding to each of the three Communities.  
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It has been said about the Commission administrative structure that it is a 
“combination of Napoleonic and Germanic values, with the former putting a premium 
on hierarchy, codification, intellectual rationality, centralization and the creation of an 
esprit de corps among the élite of officials, and the latter stressing employee 
participation via works councils and the autonomy of each Commissioner”125. There are 
various aspects where the Napoleonic model has been especially visible. 
 
The civil service system is one of those elements. The career-system of the 
Commission was designed with the essential characteristics of the function publique126, 
that is, formal recruitment procedures and a statutory system of remuneration and other 
rights127. This system is opposed to the British and Scandinavian position-system of 
civil service, that did have an influence after the subsequent enlargements, by 
introducing certain flexibility in the recruitment process and, particularly in the 
agencies, limiting the staff with a statutory regime and hiring employees with a 
contractual relationship128. 
 
Internal hierarchy in the Commission and the other institutions, based on a 
system of grades, is also a heritage of the French model, as it is the link existing 
between the political positions –Commissioners or Ministers– and the administrative 
bodies through a cabinet that ensures the political control. Politization in Anglo-Saxon 
models takes place differently129. Hence, from a structural point of view, the public 
administration of the European Union was designed and still reflects, at its core, the 
Napoleonic model. 
 
Finally, the provisions in the Treaties on judicial review of the acts of the 
Communities were also clearly based on French legislation on the administrative 
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jurisdiction130, notoriously with regards to the grounds of review for the acts of the 
public administration131. 
 
The relative shift in the model of administration can not only be explained by the 
enlargements, notably that of 1973, but also, and perhaps to a larger extent, by the 
progressive increasing demands for a more efficient Commission during the 1990's132. 
In the 2000's, administrative reform ranked high among the Commission's priorities, 
and Vice President of the Commission Neil Kinnock notoriously launched a number of 
reforms contained in a White Paper133 that, once implemented, brought about the uptake 
of some 'new public management' techniques and practices and, more generally, a more 
flexible approach to the organisation and procedures. Afterwards, the proliferation of 
agencies and a new White Paper on Governance134 added up to the trend towards more 
flexibility135. However, the traits of the original system based on the French model in 
the abovementioned aspects remain visible136. 
 
Leaving the structure aside, from a functional perspective, the public 
administration of the European Communities has always been substantially different 
from its national counterparts. Since the beginning, the European level of decision 
making has been more involved in policy formulation than policy implementation, as 
was exemplified by the scheme of indirect administration. It stems from the fact that 
from the start the administrative bodies of the EC were more facilitators and designers 
than executors. This also has a consequence from a structural point of view, as a 
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relevant feature of the EU administrative bodies is that administrative responsibility is 
shared137, in a way that they heavily rely on the support from the national public 
administrations.  
 
Today, many of the characteristic of the EU administration are rather drawn by 
contrast to the Weberian classic model: 
 
- a mission is determined by cooperation, which usually involves other 
administrations; 
  
- hierarchical order is hollowed out by an increasingly joint administration; and  
 
- rules are understood in the context of the procedural nature of administrative 
law138.  
 
For some theorists of European Union political science, particularly of an Anlo-
saxon academic background, like professor Nugent, there is no use in analysing modern 
democratic governance in the EU in the light of old Weberian postulates139. While it is 
true that the embryo of a European administration was not born as a national 
administration, the heritage of the classic postulates, very present in the early 
configuration of the Commission, is still discernible in the public administration of the 
Union.  
 
This can be illustrated by the reasoning of the Court of Justice in early cases. A 
clear example is the von Lachmüller case140.  The Court was questioned on the validity 
of the dismissal of several translators employed by the Commission before the Staff 
regulations were approved. Although there is no specific legal framework for the labour 
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relationships of the workers of the Commission at the moment, the Court of Justice 
analysed whether the employment contracts fall with public law or private law141, hence 
it brought up the traditional summa divisio iuris developed in French law in 
particular142, and in continental European legal systems more generally, but not existing 
in English law143, where only recently the division has been studied144. This early case-
law understands that the essential element for a distinction it considers critical –public 
and private law– is, as in the classical formulation, its legal creation as a public person 
and the public functions it exercises. Specifically, it states that: 
 
“[t]he European Economic Community, acting within the powers conferred on it 
by the Treaty, has legal personality as laid down by Article 210 of the Treaty. That 
personality is one of public law by virtue of the powers and duties appropriate to it. 
Consequently, the contracts at issue were concluded by a person at public law.” 
 
This leads to the conclusion that there is a conception, even if not very elaborate, 
of a public administration in the Weberian sense, as understood by the French legal 
tradition. However, in comparison with national administrations of Member States, the 
EU public administration has evolved much faster from a hierarchical bureaucracy 
towards are more open organisation, until the present stage where the essence of an EU 
administration lies in cooperation -often not even a clearly structured cooperation- and 
not in hierarchy.  
 
Nonetheless, the traits of this classical administration are still so deeply 
embedded in the very notion of public administration that the term EU administration 
has rarely been used in academic literature until very recently. Terms which evoke a 
more open, less autonomous notion, such as European Administrative Space or 
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European Executive Order have been used in academic literature instead, until the 
formal recognition of a “European administration” in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Apart from these distinct structural elements and the dissimilar functions that the 
Union’s administration has pursued, there is an additional feature that further 
characterises the European Union as an administrative actor: pluralism. When a policy 
is formulated at the Union level many more stakeholders have an actual say than at the 
national level. While this is particularly true for the intervention of member states, it is 
not limited to it. National policy formulation is rather autonomous, more closed to 
interest influence and more conflictual, resulting in more political decisions taken at the 
top145. 
 
By contrast, the EU pluralist policy-making processes are more open to outside 
interests, more flexible in implementation and more consensual in style, resulting in less 
political decisions which are less often taken at the top146. These features have tangible 
consequences not only for the structure of an EU administration, but also at the level of 
the type of procedures that channel its decision-making. 
 
The original design of the public administration of the Union was once visibly 
inspired in the Napoleonic model. However, resulting from a number of changes, it has 
in many ways departed from this model. Additionally, the pluralism and openness of the 
EU public administration render it different from member state national public 
administrations, where often traditional characteristics of the Weberian model still play 
a relevant role. The permeability of the EU public administration lies not only in its 
need for external cooperation, but also in the fact that it is a notion that is constantly in 
flux and it has responded to demands for change more quickly than national 
administrations. Indeed, this results from the rich and complex evolution of European 
integration.  
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2.4.- The impact of the European integration process in the European public 
administration 
 
A look at some aspects of the European integration may also lead to some 
relevant conclusions. As previously argued, the conceptualisation of the European 
public administration shall be aware that its characteristics are recent, dynamic and 
result from a progressive evolution. The dynamism that characterises the European 
integration has a direct impact in the EU administration, whose legal framework has 
substantially varied over time147. 
 
In the early times of European integration many of the scholars that approached 
the study of European integration did so under the light of federal theories. A large part 
of the original features of the early Communities, particularly so in the ECSC148, could 
be explained under the federalist postulates. Considering that federalism is both a 
structure and a process149, the initial institutional setup and the Treaty proclamations 
were consistent with the essential federal notion that the integrating entities “must 
desire to be united, but not to be unitary”150. The schemes of indirect execution could be 
explained according to the rationale of federalism and valid analogies could be drawn 
with the federation of the United States of America151, and how it developed in spite of 
the original resistance of Member States152. Moreover, once the Court of Justice 
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declared that the Treaties constitute the constitutional charter of the Community153, 
there was no obstacle to fit it in the modern conception of federalism whose core idea is 
that the division of powers between the centre and the parts is established 
constitutionally154. 
 
However, for many theorists of European integration, federalist approaches 
failed to fully capture the unique nature of European integration155. Neo-functionalism 
was also a salient theory in the early development of the Communities, and it focused 
more on the dynamic aspect of integration. Haas took note of Monnet’s pragmatic 
approach to the building of Europe156 and developed the key concept of ‘spill-over’. 
Agreement on integration in one economic area shall over time cause other policy-areas 
to integrate too, in order to fully achieve the integration of the first area. On the other 
hand, Haas understood European integration as a process whereby political actors in 
distinct national setting would change loyalties, expectations and political activities to a 
new political community, superimposed over member states157. 
 
Those two theories could be understood as compatible158, but when scrutinised 
against the reality of European integration in the following years they fell short of 
explaining it. In truth, member states as the ‘masters of the treaties’ were steering the 
whole process to a larger extent than the previous theories had predicted, in particular at 
moments like the institutional impasse of the crise de la chaise vide. The key institution, 
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the Council of Ministers, appeared to be nothing more than ‘intergovernmental 
negotiating forum’159. Largely influenced by the background in realist, American-based 
international relations theory, Professor Hoffmann put forward a thesis of 
intergovernmentalism. He reasoned that integration was possible in technical functional 
sectors where national interests coincided, but otherwise national governments remained 
not only the sole sovereign entities, but also the ones that had the monopoly of political 
legitimacy, as they were the only democratically elected actors160. 
 
A later reformulation of this theory (liberal intergovernmentalism) admitted that 
national leaders had agreed to give up some sovereignty, but only as it reinforced their 
power from the internal point of view, as they undermined potential domestic 
opposition by reaching bargains in Brussels and presenting results as European 
decisions161. However, the European Community's executive –the Commission– could 
not be considered a supranational source of change, only member States had that power. 
 
But again the general assumptions of this theory proved inconsistent with the 
subsequent developments. The ambitious agenda of the Santer Commission and the 
Treaty of Maastricht placed the federalist rhetoric in vogue once again162. As a result, 
from the early 1990’s many publications were responses to intergovermentalist 
hypotheses163. By then, European integration had already developed as an increasingly 
complex pluralistic process where many actors, not only member State governments, 
played a role. Increasingly, the European Union required the assembly and coordination 
of a dense network of experts164. 
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Multilevel governance approaches started to develop in order to explain this new 
complex reality165. The emerging picture was that of a polity with multiple, interlocked 
arenas for political contest166. Proponents of multilevel governance analysis gave up the 
grand old prospect of finding a comprehensive single theory for European integration, 
and admitted that it is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making 
influences are shared across multiple levels of government. While national governments 
remain important pieces of the European puzzle, they no longer monopolize European-
level policy making167.  
 
Recent middle-range theories stress the diversity and segmentation of the EU168 
and are more apt for giving intellectual theorisation to the current situation of the EU. In 
particular, the policy networks approach assumes three basic points that actually apply 
to the European Union functionning: firstly, governance is frequently non-hierarchical; 
secondly, policy process must be disaggregated; and lastly, governments are responsible 
for governance, but other actors might play an important role169. Both national and 
supranational interests play a big role in the European decision process and they are 
different in each area of action, and they may appear interwoven as it happens in 
composite procedures. But these two are not the only relevant interests. In fact, many of 
the EU policy outcomes reflect purely technocratic rationality170. 
 
The lessons to be learnt from this quick panorama of grand integration theories 
is that they have all aimed at explaining the nature of the European Union with a 
consistent theorisation, but they have all failed to do so because the EU and the 
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processes of European integration are just too complex to be captured by a single 
theoretical prospectus171.  
 
The European Union and European integration has functioned differently at 
different points of time, therefore theories have in truth described a particular moment 
of integration rather than integration as a whole172. The initially modest and largely 
technocratic achievements of the European Communities seemed less significant than 
the potential that they represented for the gradual integration of the countries of Western 
Europe into something else, a supranational polity. Nowadays, the whole focus of 
political scientists remains in the European Union173. Hence, the focal point of those 
theories has shifted over time. In the 1960s the centre of attention was on European 
integration, while in the 1980s analysis of governance received more attention and 
finally in the 1990s the focus has moved to constructing the EU174.  
 
The debate taking place among the so called grand theories emphasised whether 
the supranational or the international element of European integration was prevalent 
and, with that in mind, authors have attempted to create an intellectual structure where 
the European Union could perfectly fit. The EU administration would then be simply 
characterised either as the federal higher authority of the Union or the general 
secretariat providing the institutional playing field for Member States to gather and 
reach agreements. 
 
It has not been the case. However, the theories can offer can offer some 
explanation if seen as pertaining to specific phases and issue-areas of European 
Integration175. But, beyond that conclusion, grand theories are unfit for describing the 
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uniqueness of the EU176, even more so today that some years ago. Different levels of 
EU decision making follow different rationales, so a single theory cannot explain the 
actual functioning of the EU177. 
 
The evolution shows that European integration is more complex that a few 
abstract, comprehensive postulates can achieve to describe. This has relevant 
consequences for a conceptualisation of the EU public administration, as it entails 
further intricacy in its nature and more unclear patterns in its functioning. A simpler 
federal, or even intergovernmental, scheme of European integration would place the EU 
public administration in a more discernible position, incardinated in the executive 
power. But this is not the real functioning of the Union. As middle-range approaches 
have argued, not a single pattern is fit for describing all the areas of EU action. Not even 
within administrative action a single pattern is full explanatory. The assumption that 
multilevel governance schemes are more and more frequent does not contribute much to 
a consistent theorisation either. They put emphasis in a major feature, but this is not 
sufficient for the conceptualisation needed. 
 
The evolution of integration does lead to a stronger argument for the existence of 
European public administration, but it also presents a major conceptual challenge. If 
public administration is part of the executive branch of a State, and the EU is still far 
from reaching the quality of a ‘State’, how can it have a true public administration? This 
essential query will be assesses in section 2.6, but there are novelties introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon than bring about new elements for the discussion. 
 
2.5.- The European public administration in the Treaty of Lisbon 
 
Legal scholarship has understandably developed a large analysis of the 
consequences of the new primary law provisions that, at last, formally support the 
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existence of a European public administration and even provide constitutional law 
foundations for the subject of European administrative law178. 
 
2.5.1.- An open, efficient and independent European administration as an objective in 
the Treaties. Article 298(2) TFEU 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, like the Constitutional Treaty179, takes a long awaited step 
and enshrines the term “European administration” in primary law. Hence, whatever 
doubts might have been raised about the very existence of a true European 
administration, they have faded away since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Article 298(1) TFEU reads:  
 
 “In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European 
administration.” 
 
While this provision had no precedents in the Treaties, allusions to an 
administration of the European Communities could be found not only in secondary law 
–the staff regulation180 and the former financial regulation181, for example–,but also in 
primary law provisions. The clearest example is article 24(1) of the Merger Treaty of 
1965182 which stated, speaking of the officials and other servants of the three 
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Communities, that they will form part of the single “administration” of those 
Communities. Perhaps strikingly, the Commission spoke openly of a European 
administration in its White Paper on Reforming the Commission183. 
 
Most administrative law scholars have welcomed this provision as the Lisbon 
Treaty introduces clarity to European administrative law and apparent legal foundations 
to the institutional structure of the Union184. This provision is arguably far from clear 
and univocal, and there is an exercise of interpretation to be made. Two questions, in 
particular, appear of particular relevance.  
 
The first question is what constitutes the innovative element that the Treaty of 
Lisbon introduces; i.e. what it does with respect to this ‘European administration`. Does 
it create it? Does it recognise it formally? Does it just characterise it as open, efficient 
and independent? The second question is what it means by ‘European administration’. 
Is it the depolitised machinery of the executive power? Or is it simply the administrative 
apparatus of the whole of the institutions, agencies and bodies of the Union? 
 
When it comes to the first question, it appears from the wording of the Treaty 
that it does not create something new, nor does it appear to enhance its status. It seems 
like it takes for granted that there is a European administration, and what it adds is how 
this public administration shall be. There is no creation of a ‘European administration’ 
because the Union’s legislator had already used the term administration in 
miscellaneous secondary law provisions185. What is more, even in primary law 
provision the nomenclature existed186.  
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The triple characterisation, although it has significant legal value, is not entirely 
new. Transparency and openness were already imperative to the Union’s authorities by 
virtue of several regulations and even primary law provisions187. Efficiency, from an 
economic point of view was also specified in the financial regulation188. All the three 
features could be deducted from the rights recognised in articles 41 and 42 ChFR189 
although, it is true, they did not have a binding character specially until the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The main legal effect of this provision, as acknowledged 
by some commentators, is the establishment of a legal basis for codification of 
European administrative procedures190, which is in itself a major innovation with 
critical consequences for the purposes of this work. 
 
When it comes to the second question, the meaning of the ‘European 
administration’ that the Treaty of Lisbon enshrines is still more important from our 
perspective. Some authors have underlined that, after reading that provision one would 
not have a clear idea of what European administration exactly is191.  
 
In order to decipher the meaning of this European administration, a short look at 
the historical background should be illuminating. The continental tradition of public 
administration, heir to the Napoleonic formulation of the Administration Publique, 
embeds public administration in the executive power, being the non-political 
institutional setup for policy implementation, as opposed to the political government. 
Legislative and judicial powers are served by smaller administrations, but these are not 
stricto sensu public administration.  
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On the other hand, a lato senso approach to the concept of public administration 
would lead, in a more lax interpretation, to any public entity that administers, therefore 
not restricted to the executive power. 
 
 The alternative is thus whether European administration ex article 298(1) TFEU 
fits the former or the later conception. The precedent of this provision, like almost every 
novelty the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced in primary law, is to be found in the 
Constitutional Treaty. Article III-398(1) CT, with the same wording of article 298(1) 
TFEU, was placed in the section under the title provisions common to Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies192. The contextual interpretation in the Treaty 
of Lisbon is less clear, as article 298 is awkwardly embedded in the section of the TFEU 
that establishes the rules of legislative procedures193. One should consider that this 
provision is not linked to the Commission in particular in any way and the precedent in 
the CT being a common provision to all institutions, agencies, offices and bodies of the 
Union. 
 
That being said, there are three arguments supporting the idea that the European 
administration referred to in article 298(1) TFEU is a generic administration rather than 
the strict view of the continental conception. 
 
-Firstly, the historic and systematic interpretation of the provision brings about 
that it is applicable to all institutions, including the legislative and judicial institutions. 
 
-Secondly, according to a literal interpretation, the reference to institutions, in 
plural, entails the it refers to the whole of them, not restricted to the ones with executive 
powers (particularly, the Commission). 
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- Thirdly, the second paragraph of article 298194 links the legislative 
implementation to the Staff Regulations195 which are applicable to the official and other 
servants of all EU institutions and bodies. 
 
As a result, it appears that the meaning of ‘European administration’ shall not 
equal the traditional notion of public administration. While there are serious doubts that 
one can argue that the European administration is a public administration as 
traditionally understood, similar doubts apply to the pertinence of speaking about the 
principle of separation of powers in the European Union. 
 
When the Vice-president of the European Convention Giuliano Amato in charge 
of drafting the European Constitution famously said that “Montesquieu never went to 
Brussels” he implied not only that the doctrine of separation of powers was not 
applicable to the European Union, but also that it would not be in the farthest-reaching 
Treaty ever formally written196. It is indeed a locus communis among EU scholars to 
deny the applicability of the principle of separation of powers to the EU197, sometimes 
with political intentions of denying any parallelism with the State198. One could contend 
that the Commission does not hold the monopoly of the executive power, because the 
Council199 and even the European Council200 enjoy some competences pertaining to the 
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executive power. However, in general terms the functions belonging to the executive 
power are entrusted to the Commission201 and, by virtue of decentralisation, to a large 
extent performed by agencies. 
 
Professor Weiler once wrote that the language of modern democracy revolve 
around the State, which the EU is not. For this reason, the vocabulary could lead to 
conceptual shortcomings202. This attempt might very well be a piece of evidence of this 
formalistic inconsistency of the national-EU legal nomenclatures. However, even if this 
reasoning does not lead to an irrefutable deduction, one can be in a position to conclude 
that article 298(1) is not in itself revolutionary with regards to the EU public 
administration under analysis. It is not innovative and it is vague. It might help legal 
academia to get accustomed to the term ‘administration’ at the level of the European 
Union and it might provide with an additional nominal argument to advocate for its 
existence, although, arguably a weak one. It is merely a reflection on the side of the 
public power of the citizens’ rights conferred by articles 41 and 42 ChFR that speaks of 
a ‘European administration’ for the first time in the Treaties but in an improper fashion; 
perhaps with the intention of tackling the many critics against the lack of legitimacy of 
the Union. 
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Beyond that, its real implications as some commentators have underlined are in 
the codification of administrative procedure203. Although there is an ongoing debate as 
to the scope of the provision as a legal basis for codification204, the European Parliament 
has already submitted the Commission a resolution recommending a legislative 
proposal for Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union on this legal 
basis205. In any case, this is an aspect which will be dealt with at length in the following 
chapters206.  
 
2.5.2.- Hierarchy of norms. Articles 290 and 291TFEU. 
 
Numerous administrative law scholars consider that the introduction of hierarchy 
among the different types of legal rules is one of the most significant changes the Treaty 
of Lisbon has brought about to the area of administrative law207.  
 
The formal hierarchy among the different types of legal rules at the secondary 
law level is introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in articles 289, 290 and 291 TFEU, as 
intended by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe208, even thought the 
clearer nomenclature of the later was forsaken in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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As a result, to the traditional list norms approved thought the legislative 
procedure, henceforth named legislative acts in article 289209 TFEU, articles 290210 and 
291211 TFEU add the categories of delegated acts and implementing acts. Hence, there 
are three normative levels corresponding to legislative, delegated and implementing 
acts212. The distinction is also relevant in terms of access to justice, since article 263(4) 
TFEU establishes different requirements of legal standing for individuals when 
challenging regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures compared with the 
classical conditions when challenging legislative acts.213 
 
That hierarchy existed before the Treaty of Lisbon but it was not enshrined in 
primary law. It was frequent that a regulation adopted through co-decision would confer 
either the Commission or a comitology committee the power to adopt other acts 
implementing it214. Thus, formalization of this hierarchy of norms constitutes a major 
step in terms of clarification of normative instruments. More importantly for our 
purposes, it introduces an additional argument when it comes to the conceptualisation of 
the European public administration. By recognising a normative power which functions 
differently of legislative power and endowed to different entities, basically to the 
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Commission, at times to the agencies, it contributes to sharpening the separation of the 
executive power from the legislative power215. 
 
This element became visible during the debates in the Convention charge with 
the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. The Working Group in charge of 
simplification acknowledged that “hierarchy of norms was the consequence of a clearer 
separation of powers”216. The three objectives of this Working Group were: normative 
simplification, democratic legitimacy, and separation of powers. They argued in their 
final report to have met them all with the hierarchy of norms, stating that “[t]his brings 
us directly to a clearer hierarchy of legislation, which is the consequence of a better 
separation of powers. This is not with the aim of paying tribute to Montesquieu, but out 
of concern for democracy.” 
 
Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces a clearer split between the legislative 
and the executive branches of the Union, departing from the formerly blurred allocation 
of normative competences, legislative and non-legislative, and establishing a greater 
coherence by formally matching the organic-institutional distinction between 
institutions to the rule-making powers granted depending on the kind of norms they can 
approve217. That is, the legislative power awarded to the Parliament and to the Council, 
and the non-legislative power awarded to the Commission, eventually with the help of 
the agencies. In particular, the category of non-legislative acts of general application, 
the so-called implementing acts, unveils true existence of an administration with rule-
making powers comparable mutatis mutandis218 to those existing at the national level, 
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even though a clear-cut line to distinguish when implementing acts and when delegated 
acts apply has still not been drawn219.  
2.5.3.- Administrative cooperation. Article 197 TFEU 
 
The new Title XXIV220 TFEU on Administrative Cooperation also stems from 
the assumption that there is a European public administration, and that it shall cooperate 
with national public administrations in order to effectively implement EU law. 
Containing a single provision, article 197 TFEU reads: 
 
“1. Effective implementation of Union law by the Member States, which is 
essential for the proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of 
common interest. 
 
2. The Union may support the efforts of Member States to improve their 
administrative capacity to implement Union law. Such action may include 
facilitating the exchange of information and of civil servants as well as supporting 
training schemes. No Member State shall be obliged to avail itself of such support. 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary 
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measures to this end, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States. 
 
3. This Article shall be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States 
to implement Union law or to the prerogatives and duties of the Commission. It 
shall also be without prejudice to other provisions of the Treaties providing for 
administrative cooperation among the Member States and between them and the 
Union.” 
 
This provision might interpreted as a reinforcement of the traditional scheme of 
indirect administration221 –the three paragraphs refer to implementation by member 
states of Union law– as well as the traditional procedural autonomy that member states 
enjoy –by explicitly excluding harmonisation of national law regarding 
implementation–. It is noteworthy that one of the most prominent European 
administrative law scholars, professor Schwarze, appears sceptical of the autonomous 
legal value of such provision222. There is a call for voluntary cooperation, even 
exemplified by the exchange of information and of civil servants223; but in practice the 
cooperation developed so far goes much deeper than that. 
 
Where is then the innovation of this provision? It appears that it emphasises the 
need of cooperation between the Union and member states regarding implementation, 
although it is still considered a primarily national competence. It seems as if the draft of 
this article was aimed at reinforcing cooperation, which is deemed a necessity given the 
sometimes insufficient national administrative capacity224, while leaving the traditional 
patterns untouched. The aim is thus to adapt to what has proven the real functioning of 
implementation without touching the spine; implementation is to be carried out by 
Member States.  
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There is a substantial change in the patterns of implementation, not merely in 
terms of practical support. Union’s law is implemented often jointly, in a composite 
way, but the rules are also designed with a more than nominal participation of Member 
States. It could also be interpreted as aiming to build a legal wall against the influence 
of European rules and practices in the administrative systems of member states, which, 
as detailed later, is already an unstoppable phenomenon. This article arguably comes too 
late and corresponds to a model that is largely overcome. An example of that kind of 
camouflage consisting on leaving the simple traditional schemes virtually valid, 
although rarely used in practise. 
 
Finally, it is important to point out that this provision was introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon without prejudice to the general obligation of sincere cooperation of 
article 4(3) TEU, and therefore limits its scope to administrative cooperation225. 
2.5.4.- Fundamental rights. Articles 41 and 42 ChFR 
 
Some of the rights included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
becomes legally binding as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon according 
to article 6(1) TEU, entail the existence of a European administration and impose 
obligations onto it. It is the case of article 41 ChFR226, which grants a right to a good 
administration, and article 42 ChFR227, which recognises a right to access to documents.  
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The Court of Justice had already recognised and elaborated on those rights228. 
Firstly, related to the right to a good administration as the Court of Justice developed 
the principle of good and sound administration229 for the Institutions, and for the 
Commission in particular. Secondly, it accepted the right of access to documents. This 
right was recognised later as it could not it could not establish it as a general principle of 
law flowing from the constitutional traditions common to the member states230. Even 
with the judicial precedent, the fact that they have gained a legally binding character at 
the level of primary law is also essential for the consolidation of European 
administrative law231.  
 
The right to a good administration elevated to the category of fundamental right 
has far-reaching consequences for the configuration of a European public 
administration. The novelty of Article 41 of the Charter is that it transforms some 
elements of traditional principles of administrative law, like the principle of legality, 
into subjective public rights, thus configuring a public administration against which 
citizens can enforce their rights. This means that the European administration must not 
only comply with certain objective principles, like openness or efficiency, but that it 
must serve the citizens and be accountable to them232. 
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The formal recognition of these citizens’ rights is critical in the configuration of 
an open, efficient and independent European administration233. The foreseeable further 
development of such rights through secondary law will bring about a clearer, more 
defined functions as well as formal administrative patterns for the European public 
administration to act. Again, they also presuppose the existence of a European 
administration, and the cooperative schemes existent with, mainly, Member States, shall 
accommodate to be compliant with them. 
2.5.5.-The constitutionalisation of the European public administration 
 
Back in 2003, with nothing more on the table than the Treaties in the 
consolidated version of the Treaty of Nice, Paul Craig argued that there was a 
constitutionalisation234 of Community administration235. He based his thesis on the 
Financial Regulation of 2002236, that is, a piece of secondary legislation. He was 
certainly speaking at a substantive, not formal, level and he considered “the emergence 
of overarching principles that frame the entirety of Community administration”237 
signified the constitutionalisation of such administration. 
 
With the Treaty of Lisbon some of the principles framing the European 
administration are written in the primary law. But not only. Separation of administrative 
rule-making powers from legislative competences and, not without a certain degree of 
ambiguity, the use of the expression “European administration” is now in the Treaties. 
Hence, there is a formal constitutionalisation of the European public administration.  
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All the aforementioned provisions included in the Treaty of Lisbon, even article 
197 TFEU with its unclear intention, contribute to this constitutionalisation. 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon also sets constitutional limits to the European 
administration, like the democratic and rule of law principles, principle of equality, 
principles of transparency and participation, among others238. 
 
In conclusion, the existence of a European administration can no longer be 
refuted, something which has major consequences for the development of this 
dissertation. But what European public administration are we talking about? 
 
2.6.- What public administration? A European administration, a Union 
administration and an integrated administration of the EU. 
2.6.1.-Arguments for a European public administration 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon is revolutionary in many aspects of European 
administrative law, and certainly it provides a key argument supporting the existence of 
a European public administration. The formalistic argument is indeed a major element 
to advocate for the existence of a Union’s public administration. But there are additional 
arguments. 
 
In this vein, the meaning and the scope is article 298 is not clear. As previously 
argued, it appears from the wording and the historical background that the ‘European 
administration’ does not refer to the public administration linked to the executive in the 
old French sense of the word but rather to the administrative apparatus of all 
institutions, agencies and bodies of the Union. Additionally, the focus of the drafters of 
the Treaty is on the characteristics of openness, transparency, and efficiency, already 
required by the ChFR. Hence, the enshrinement in the Treaties of European 
administration is, despite the doubts cast, a relevant argument, but there are others.  
 
A public administration, in the general sense of the concept, cannot be limited to 
a mere general secretariat of an international organisation. Certainly, those permanent 
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bodies administer some tasks, conferred by States by virtue of an international treaty. 
The public administration of the European Union is qualitatively different from them. 
 
First of all, the European Union is distinct from international organisations 
inasmuch as there is an autonomous legal order stemming from it. As the Court of 
Justice established from one of its first rulings, Costa / Enel239: 
 
“By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its 
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation 
of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the Community, the 
member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. 
 
[…] 
 
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived 
of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the community 
itself being called into question .” 
 
Since there is an autonomous legal order arising from an independent source of 
law, the European Union has an antithetic nature as compared with other international 
organisations.  
 
The evolution of European integration has led to an exponential growth of 
competences and an expansion of areas covered by the functions of the Union. At the 
moment, there is almost no field of administrative action by public authorities that is not 
under some degree of competence of the EU. This almost global scope of competences 
is radically different from any other international organisation.  
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The exercise of these competences requires large administrative capabilities. A 
share of those capabilities corresponds to national public administration, put at the 
service of the Union’s objectives through the mechanism of indirect administration. 
However, as we have seen, those schemes are becoming obsolete. There is an increasing 
direct administration, especially in the areas of exclusive competence of the Union, and 
more notably a share of executive competences through cooperation, which constitutes 
the central part of this work. There is, thus, a European public administration to carry 
out this wide spectrum of far-reaching administrative capabilities. 
 
Additionally, the European Union, by virtue of this vast array of administrative 
powers, often maintains direct relationships with private parties. This is again a 
dissimilar element from any international organisation since, with very limited 
exceptions, the individual does not have a relevant status in public international law. 
Thus in the EU, the public administration imposes sanctions, awards subsidies, awards 
technical approvals, inspects material conditions, and so on. Sometimes with 
cooperation of national authorities, and sometimes without it. This direct relationships 
results in legal remedies that individuals may bring against Union’s measures, both as 
administrative appeals and judicial actions, as individuals enjoy legal standing before 
the European judges. 
 
2.6.2.-The polysemy of a ´European public administration´ 
 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon the use of the terms European public administration 
was split among legal scholars. Owing to the fact that the bodies in charge of the 
execution of EU law were primarily national administrations, often with the cooperation 
of Union’s Institutions or agencies, and seldom the latter by themselves, many 
commentators did not feel comfortable with the words European administration until 
recently, and many of them preferred to use opener and vaguer terms. Thus, this reality 
is often referred to with the expression “European administrative space”240. More 
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specific denominations found in academic publications are “European executive 
order”241 or "European Composite Administration"242. 
 
German doctrine has refered to the phenomenon with different denominations 
too. For example, the term Verwaltungkooperation (administrative cooperation) was 
used initially by professor Schmidt-Aßmann243, while other authors would speak of a 
Mischverwaltung (mixed administration)244. More recently, German scholarship 
generally uses the term Europäischer Verbundverwaltung (European administrative 
union)245.  
 
 It was the vestige of Monnet’s minimalist conception of a European public 
administration, more of a designer and facilitator than a true administrator. However, 
some authors did dare to write on a European administration and there were good legal 
reasons for that246 , but what they meant with European public administration was 
sometimes diverse.  
 
Administration as a general notion can be understood as the “practical 
management and direction of the public machinery”247. From a more specific EU 
perspective, it is the public machinery that implements and executes EU law. European 
public administration is a more complex concept than any national administration 
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because, as previously argued, both the European and national level of administration 
are in charge of creating, implementing and enforcing European law.  
 
 The European Union’s public administration can be understood stricto sensu as 
the complex of government bodies exercising administrative powers in the European 
Union, which includes the Commission, agencies and other official bodies. However, 
this is not necessarily equivalent to the notion of European administration. The most 
authoritative scholars in the field European administrative law conceive European 
administration as the combination248 of Union’s public powers and national 
administration responsible for implementing Union’s measures and acting as 
decentralised, Union government bodies249, and whose powers and functions are 
fragmentary and can be different in each policy area250. In other words, as della Cananea 
has put it, the European Administration is a polycentric Administration251. A notion of 
European administration has to leave behind the differentiation between Union 
implementation and national implementation, and assume that it is a joint European 
administration252. 
 
 If European administration is understood as “organisational apparatus entrusted 
with implementing EU law”253, we would likewise have to accept that national 
administrations, sub-national administrations and even sometimes private actors are 
included in that apparatus254. At least from a functional point of view, national 
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administrations implementing European law are indeed European administration255, 
together with the Union’s public administration. 
 
An explanatory example of this conception is Kassim’s definition of European 
administration as is "an amalgam of the European and the national marked by the 
interpenetration and interdependence"256. National administrations, he argues, have 
permeated EU decision-making structures, are present in all areas of EU activity, and to 
a large degree condition the functioning of EU institutions. 
  
The Treaty of Lisbon brings about a potential scholarly review of some of these 
assumptions. Article 298(1) refers to a European administration which, from the organic 
point of view shall be at the Union’s level. From the point of view of the activities 
performed, national administrations’ officials are also European administration like, as a 
matter of fact other actors could be. But cooperation is currently so intense that one 
could argue that European bodies are, they too, part of national administrations from a 
functional point of view.  
 
 European administration cannot be conceived without the support of national 
administrations. As evident as this idea is –dating back to the Monnet’s early design for 
the Communities–, one can argue today that there is an autonomous legal notion of a 
European administration, and that it has been constitutionalised by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Furthermore, it is a notion to be developed on that legal basis by secondary 
legislation257. Except for a few areas, this administration is inoperative if considered 
alone from a functional point of view. But from a structural point of view it exists 
independently, even though its most remarkable feature is its openness, permeability 
and interwoven links to national administration and other actors. According to the first 
scholarly conception, however, the cooperative element of European administration is 
so entrenched in its nature that it is deemed part of its definition more than a feature. 
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 This concept in strictness of a European public administration is, in my view, 
more practical for the legal assessment of the procedures through which it administers, 
in cooperation with the other public administrations, true, but still organically distinct, 
and, at last, with a constitutional nature. 
 
 For the sake of clarity, the term European Union public administration, EU 
administration or Union administration to refer to the Union’s administrative bodies; 
and European administration lato sensu for all bodies, Union’s and national, entrusted 
with administrative functions. This conception is not contradictory with the wording of 
Article 298(1) TFEU. On the contrary, as professor Craig has argued that Article 298(1) 
TFEU has two parts, the first refers to the 'institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union', and he second evokes ‘the support of a ... European administration'258. This 
difference reflects the fact that the European administration goes beyond the elements of 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, which could constitute strictly 
speaking the administration of the EU. Thus, European public administration is the EU 
administration as well as national public administrations when implementing EU law 
and policies, be it in the context of indirect administration or in the context of composite 
procedures. 
 
 In order to complete the characterization of European administration, it is useful 
to cite the conclusions of the recent works of professors Hofmann and Türk. They 
advocate for the use of the term integrated administration259. To these scholars, 
European administration is not so much a multilevel system in the sense of a hierarchy 
superimposed on member state administrations. It is rather a system of integrated level 
of administrative action in Europe260, in which direct and indirect administration is no 
longer distinguishable261.  
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As striking as it may seem, the enshrinement of the European public 
administration in primary law, thus making it more visible and defined, has come 
together with invigoration of the trend towards are more interwoven action of both 
national and European administrations. Intense cooperation between the national and 
European level in all phases of the policy circle has become the rule. 
 
This cooperation is not incompatible with some other clarifications and 
delimitations included in the Treaty of Lisbon. The prime example is the distribution of 
competences between the European Union and Member States262, but there are others, 
like more enforceable rules on principle of subsidiarity through the monitoring 
procedures for compliance with it263, which should incardinate administrative action in 
the closest level of administration to the citizen as possible. 
 
As De Bùrca has argued there is an evident paradox between these new 
provisions and what she describes as a “depiction of a clear division of powers amongst 
levels of authority in accordance with a static version of the subsidiarity principle, and 
the actual fluid sharing of powers and responsibilities amongst different levels in a more 
dynamic way”264. 
 
Thus, not only is the Union’s public administration dependent on national 
administrations, but national administrations are increasingly recipients of a great 
influence from European structures, procedures, and, indeed, administrative action. This 
is surprising because, from a formal and theoretical perspective, administrative policy 
remains in the hands of national administrations and they are protected by the principle 
of respect for procedural autonomy. This legal framework is not only maintained in the 
Treaty of Lisbon but, apparently, reinforced by article 197 TFEU.  
 
Actually, however, things are considerably different. The old formulation of 
procedural autonomy states that implementation of EU law is governed by the 
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 De Búrca, “The Constitutional Challenge…”, at 814-15. 
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institutional and procedural rules of member states265.Only two conditions developed by 
the Court of Justice were necessary in order for national procedures to be acceptable266: 
equivalence –member states shall not discriminate between claims based on national 
law and on EU law–; and effectiveness –enforcement of EU law shall not be impossible 
or excessively difficult–. Even though the dual requirement remained facially 
unchanged, the Court of Justice became progressively more interventionist vis-à-vis 
national rules267. Today, many scholars accept that procedural autonomy of member 
states is more of a legal fiction than a fully enforceable principle268. 
 
In the same vein, there is a process of “Europeanization” of national 
administrations. This phenomenon reflects in the change of domestic procedures, styles 
and even structures269. National patterns of governance, react and adapt to the 
challenges and opportunities arising from the administrative action of the Union and are 
thus subject to strong impact from the European Union270. The clash between the 
                                                 
265
 The traditional formulation of this principle results from the case-law in CJEC, Case 33/76, Rewe-
Zentralfinanz / Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland , judgement of 16 December 1976 [1976] ECR 
1989, paragraph 5: “in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system 
of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have 
from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such conditions cannot be less 
favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature […] the position would be different 
only if the conditions and time-limits made it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the 
national courts are obliged to protect.” Since then this declaration has been reiterated in numerous rulings 
Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 12; Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-
2433, paragraph 19; and Case C?432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I?2271, paragraph 38. 
266
 Michal Bobek, “Why There is no Principle of  ‘Procedural Autonomy’ of the Member States”, Bruno 
de Witte and Hans Micklitz (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member 
States Intersentia (Antwerp, 2011), 305-22, at 312-16. 
267
 The paramount example of this evolution is the ruling in CJEC, C-213/89, The Queen / Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex parte Factortame, judgement of 19 June 1990, [1990] I-2433, where the Court of 
Justice declared that a British Court had to set aside a national rule, which excluded interim measures, in 
order to comply with European Law. See further, Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, 
European Union Law. Text and Materials, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 2010), at 279-280. 
268
 Diana-Urania Galetta, Procedural Autonomy of EU Member States : Paradise Lost?: A Study on the 
"Functionalized Procedural Competence " of EU Member States, Springer (Hedelberg, 2011), at 121.  
269
 See Christoph Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional 
Change and Persistence, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 2001). In particular, he refers to some 
empirical changes, like the adoption of a European model of regulatory policy (see at page 37) of 
influences in administrative reform in some member states (see page 111).  
270
 Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels “The European Union matters: structuring self-made offers 
and demands”, in Wolfgang Wessels, Andreas Maurer, Jürgen Mittag (eds.), Fifteen Into One?:The 
European Union and Its Member States, Manchester University Press (Manchester, 2003), 29-65, at 56. 
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pluralist model of the EU and the statist model of most national administrations results 
most often in the superimposition of the EU patterns271. 
 
A compelling example is the trend towards a more decentralized and less 
politicized national administration on several technical and autonomous bodies272, 
sometimes as a result to some EU law obligations to member states273. The proliferation 
of agencies and expert committees provide evidence for this transformation, as 
advanced by the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance274, a 
phenomenon that happens at the UE level and drags national structures along. Joint 
administrative action often takes place involving national and EU agencies, rather than 
national governments and the Commission. 
 
In sum, a vision of the European public administration lato sensu composed on a 
central EU public administration but heavily reliant on its national counterparts 
corresponds to just one side of the overall picture. The relations between EU 
administration and national administrations are mutually dependent and increasingly 
interwoven. Hence the adjective integrated for a newly constitutionalised European 
administration is in the current state-of-affairs fully pertinent. 
 
2.7.- Conclusions 
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 Vivien Schmidt, “National pattern of governance under siege: the impact of European integration”, in 
Rainer Eising, Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, 
Rouledge (London, 1999), 155-72, at 161. 
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 See Balint, Bauer and Knill, “Bureaucratic change …”, at 69. 
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 For instance, article 3 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(OJ 2002 L 108 , 33-50) compels members states to have an independent regulatory body in the field of 
electronic communications networks and services: “1. Member States shall ensure that each of the tasks 
assigned to national regulatory authorities in this Directive and the Specific Directives is undertaken by a 
competent body. 2. Member States shall guarantee the independence of national regulatory authorities by 
ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally independent of all organisations providing 
electronic communications networks, equipment or services.” 
274 It is worth mentioning that the Commission, in its White Paper on European Governance, fosters the 
creation of regulatory agencies, thus losing some of its former functions, to focus its resources on core 
tasks, as it sees them fitter for drawing on highly technical know-how, their increased visibility for the 
sectors concerned and their cost efficiency. See in particular, pages 23-24 of the Commission’s White 
Paper on European Governance COM(2001)428, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/white_paper/index_en.htm.  
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The analysis of the European public administration is not simple and does not 
lead to straightforward conclusions. A European public administration exists, not only 
because it is mentioned in primary law, but because the administrative organisation at 
the European Union level has the essential structural, characteristics and functions that 
are attributed to 'public administrations', as a legal concept, which is a concept generally 
confined to the national level of government.  
 
That being said, there are many relevant peculiarities of the European public 
administration. It is structurally much lighter than its national counterparts, as it has 
traditionally relied largely on the support of Member States' administrations. In its 
functions, it rarely implements EU law and policies directly. However, it does not leave 
implementation exclusively to national public administrations, as the pattern of indirect 
administration would entail, but participates more and more in that implementation 
trough different mechanisms of cooperation with national public administrations. It also 
tends to be a more open (receptive of external influences, not only of Member States, 
but also other type of stakeholders) and decentralised (with a major role for agencies), 
that most national administrations. The key distinguishing element of European public 
administration lies on the existence of intense cooperation in most of the duties it 
performs. This element is, furthermore, essential for the development of the thesis. 
 
It would be logic to assume that the enlargement of the Union’s administrative 
action, through an increasing involvement in the implementation of the EU policies, 
came together with the invigoration of an autonomous concept of European 
administration. To some extent, it is true that the European public administration is 
strengthened from a legal perspective and receives more attention in the Treaty of 
Lisbon than ever before in the history of European integration. However, the trend does 
not necessarily point towards a centralisation of administrative competences. A 
devolution of administrative competences to member States’ administrations is not 
happening either, as the functions to execute remained always at the national level. It is 
rather a process of mixitisation, in the context of more mechanisms of cooperation, 
whose legal analysis is complex, whose legal framework is not clearly discernible. 
 
As a result, we find a European public administration which is not prone to a 
general theoretical characterisation either, surprisingly, at the moment that it receives a 
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formal status in the Treaties. Although one could argue that a European public 
administration also existed before, historically, the reliance on the implementing powers 
and capacities of national administration was significantly larger. At present, as we have 
argued, that reliance has turned into a much more complex cooperation. 
 
The paradigm of a Union administration that sets the rules and twenty-eight 
national administrations that implement and enforce, however elegant as it may seem 
from an academic point of view, has become obsolete. So the original idea that, after all, 
a European administration is not so important because national administrations are, in a 
executive federalism model, “the public administration” of the EU –if there ever was 
some truth in it–, does not reflect the current reality. Even though the European 
administration does not drag all the Weberian reminiscences of national bureaucracies, 
it still carries some old assumptions that legal scholarship might at times seem resultant 
to do away with. 
 
The striking paradox is that the European public administration becomes 
constitutionalised and executive action finally receives a more formal and 
comprehensive characterization in the Treaties, yet at the same time it seems like the 
European administration is departing even farther from the paradigm of a formal 
administration in the traditional sense of bureaucracy. Any description of how 
administrative action work in the EU has to consider the complexity and diversity of the 
intense level of interwoven cooperation between Member States and European bodies. 
 
Autonomy and, especially, procedural autonomy has enjoyed much scholarly 
attention, but only from the side of member States, that is, to which degree they have 
been able to maintain the procedural autonomy they are endowed with in spite of the 
influx of EU law. Indeed, given the current functioning of the Union it is a quimera to 
talk about autonomy, either from the national or from the European public 
administration. Both are mutually dependent. 
 
Administrative integration, even without any general formal legal basis to 
support it, is presently reinvigorated. The schemes of cooperation between Member 
States and Union’s institutions, agencies and bodies forcefully results in a certain 
process of symbiosis between both levels. At the same time, the Treaty of Lisbon aims 
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at simplification and, in particular, a clearer division of competences which, many could 
argue, would point out to a clearer federal structure. Here again there is a remarkable 
paradox, administrative integration lead neither towards a centralised European 
administration nor towards network with more understandable patterns, but towards a 
polycentric administrative organisation275. 
 
This phenomenon undoubtedly brings about many challenges to legal doctrine. 
The profound mutations in the European administrative action are still being 
conceptualized by lawyers and political scientists, and lack a general, comprehensive 
legal framework. It poses challenging legal questions and leads to some shortcomings, 
in particular as this evolution has come hand in hand with neither procedural 
codification nor substantial change in the judicial architecture of the Union.   
 
From a legal perspective, the main display of this intense cooperation is arguably 
procedural. The type of procedures emerging from this phenomenon cannot suit with 
the traditional unidirectional patterns of indirect administration, but are something 
different still to be elaborated and theorised by jurists. Hence the pertinence of assessing 
the legal implication of this complex, changing reality of a composite executive action 
of the EU and national administration. 
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3.1.- Preliminary remarks 
 
The preceding chapter affirmed the existence of a European public 
administration, but one with peculiar features that evolved from a minute 
administrative apparatus relying on national administrations to execute its policies to 
one in which multifaceted cooperation permeates all its activities. In this chapter, a 
similar academic challenge will be tackled; providing evidence for the existence of 
administrative procedures at the level of the Union. The assessment will lead to the 
conclusion that they exist, but also to underlining their special features. Similarly to 
the trends that have taken place at the national level, the importance and functions of 
EU administrative procedures have evolved significantly. We are at a critical moment 
for EU administrative procedures, when debates, long held by the academia, have 
commenced among legislators aiming at the codification of administrative procedure. 
As we will see, it entails a great opportunity to correct many of the shortcomings and 
legal gaps that composite procedures bring about. 
 
The European Court of Justice affirmed from the very first moment in the 
seminal ruling Costa / Enel the autonomy European Union Law1, on the premise that 
it arouse from an independent source of law (une source autonome). But this 
autonomy, still subject to diverse interpretations2, does not preclude EU law from 
resting upon some general categories pertaining to national legal orders. Certain 
elementary legal notions common to all national legal systems are applied without 
much elaboration in the European corpus of law3.  
                                                 
1
 EEC law back then. So was stated in the seminal judgement CJEC, Case 6/64 Costa / ENEL [1964] 
ECR 585, when the Court argued that the EEC Treaty  has created its own legal system which, on the 
entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and 
which their courts are bound to apply . 
2
 See for example on the ambiguity of the principle of autonomy both from an external and internal 
point of view; Jan Willem van Rossem, “The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?”, in Ramses A. 
Wessel and Steven Blockmans (eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence. The EU Legal Order under 
the Influence of International Organisations, Asser Press (The Hague, 2013), 13-46, at 41. 
3
 Luis Ángel Ballesteros Moffa, “Las dimensiones aplicativas el procedimiento administrativo 
europeo”, in Mercedes Fuertes (ed.), Un Procedimiento Administrativo para Europa, Aranzadi 
(Pamplona, 2012), 189-235, at 190. 
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If the Union’s legal order is based on the cession of sovereignty by Member 
States, one can logically assume that it exercises its powers in likewise manners. 
Thus, the administrative powers shall be ruled by similar norms and with similar 
instruments as the ones that can be extracted out of European comparative 
administrative law4. 
 
Unquestionably, the category of administrative procedure is one of these 
categories. The notion of administrative procedure, which has experienced a notable 
evolution in European countries, shall be assessed in the first place, only then will we 
proceed to analyse whether there procedures that channel the EU administrative action 
are indeed administrative procedures. Afterwards, the analysis will continue on the 
nature, features, and shortcomings of the administrative procedures that take place in 
the EU. 
 
3.2.- Early historical and academic background of the notion of  administrative 
procedures 
 
3.2.1.- Scholarly notion of administrative procedures  
 
As a general term, procedure can be defined simply as “an established way of 
doing something”5. From a legal point of view, that ‘way’ is established by legal 
rules. It qualifies as administrative as soon as the public administration is involved in 
the proceedings. 
 
One of the best known classical definitions of administrative procedure is 
professor Merkl’s. To this Austrian administrative law scholar, administrative 
procedure –Verwaltungsverfahren– is the form according to which the activity of the 
authority takes place6. Accordingly, authority and form were regarded as the key 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. at 191. 
5
 The Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2010). 
6
 Adolf Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, Julius Springer (Vienna, 1969), 213. Merkl’s book was 
first published in 1927 and was since then a work of reference for administrative law authors. 
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elements, back then an evolution from the old arbitrary rule and the lack of patterns 
for authorities to make decisions. 
 
A more descriptive academic definition of administrative procedure was later 
detailed by Italian authors. Massimo Giannini defined administrative procedure as “a 
combination of acts stemming from administrative authorities, linked to one another 
and aiming at a single purpose”7. The basic initial assumption is thus that 
administrative procedures are fundamentally aimed at making individual decisions. 
Even though the previous acts that together conform the administrative procedure, 
they do not enjoy autonomous legal effects. 
 
The existence and conceptualisation of an administrative procedure was per se 
a major step in the consolidation of the rule of law principle in modern European 
States, and in the fundamental overhaul of the old relationship between the State and 
its subjects8. Still today, the assessment of compliance, legal certainty and efficiency 
of administrative procedures remains a key element for the evaluation of the level of 
respect for the “rule of law” principle in different countries9. 
 
However, the idea that citizens enjoyed rights along the procedure constitutes 
a different assumption and would only come later on. It is not only pertinent to assess 
whether the decision incumbent upon them was lawful and had been adopted in 
accordance with the legal procedure, but also that they enjoyed individual rights 
throughout the process.  
                                                 
7
 Massimo Severo Giannini, Dirito Administrativo, Vol. II, Giuffrè Editore (Milan, 1970), at 239. This 
definition is the adaptation to administrative law of the well-know definition of procedure by professor 
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8
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des Staatsrechts” C.F. Müller Verlag, (Heidelberg, 3rd edition, 2004), 541-612. 
9
 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in its aim to promote economic and 
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Kleinfeld, “Rethinking Europe’s “Rule of Law” and Enlargement Agenda: The Fundamental 
Dilemma”, SIGMA Paper No. 49, (2012), at 37, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/site/sigma/publicationsdocuments/SIGMA_SP49_061112_Eng.pdf. 
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The grasp that the exercise of the powers of the state shall be limited to a 
formal proceeding as a check and a guarantee is intellectually inherent to the 
postulation of the principle of separation of powers10. All the three original powers in 
the old Montesquieu’s conception should have a procedure; a legislative procedure, a 
judicial procedure, and an administrative procedure. 
 
The notion of a judicial due process is very deep rooted in the essence of the 
rule of law11. So is the idea that the parliament shall comply with a procedure in order 
to enact laws. However, the understanding that administration shall respect a set of 
steps to carry out its functions was not self-evident, and it was not given much 
attention. When administrative procedures started to receive such attention, the same 
principles prevailing in judicial procedures were applied without further elaboration. 
This lack of attention is explained by the fact that the early conception of 
administrative procedure was nothing more than a path established by rules to make a 
lawful decision12.  
 
Even when a notion of administrative procedure began to erect and consolidate 
in European countries throughout the 19th Century –not necessarily in terms of 
codification, but rather through specific regulations–, the idea prevailed that it was 
nothing more than a formal sequence of acts aimed at a final decision. The central 
concept was the “administrative act” around which both legal scholarship and the first 
“administrative judges” –meaning the Councils of State of, for instance, France and 
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 Charles de Secondat (baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu), Esprit des lois  livres I à V, précédés 
d'une introduction de l'éditeur, Delagrave (Paris, 1892), available as electronic book version at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27573/27573-h/27573-h.htm. Montesquieu refers to procedures and 
procedural rules to limit the three powers in several pages, among others, 158, 186, 187, 221, 237, 261, 
and 285. 
11
 Due process appears in the oldest English tradition as part of the Magna Carta of 1215 (39th clause: 
"No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we 
go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land") 
and is portrayed by the classical scholar Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, Liberty Fund (Indianapolis 1982) (first published in 1897), as a key element of the rule of 
law. 
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 Javier Barnes, “Tres generaciones del procedimiento administrativo”, 67 Derecho PUCP (2011), 77-
108, at 81-82. He argues that the main reason for this lack of attention is that the need for an 
administrative procedure stemmed only from the claim to protect the rights and interests of citizens. 
The suitable mechanism to protect one’s rights and interests before the decision of the authority is 
made was indeed the judicial procedure. 
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Italy– constructed the system of administrative law. Even after administrative activity 
was already proceduralized; the procedure had no external relevance13 which, in terms 
of access to justice meant that only the final administrative act could be contested. 
 
 
3.2.2.- Early conception of administrative procedures in Europe and in other 
countries 
 
There is an interesting and convergent evolution of the different European 
legal orders during the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century, but the point 
of departure are different14. Overall, administrative lawyers set their sight on the acts 
of public administration and the eventual review on them, disregarding proceedings 
and the internal organisational framework. 
 
The paramount example of this phenomenon is France where, after the 
revolutionary conception of a state with separation of powers, a new administration 
générale de l’État emerged, radically diverse from what it was under the ancien 
régime15, and whose many powers were not even subject to the scrutiny of the 
judiciary16, as they were deemed political acts or actes de haute politique17. Under the 
Napoleonic conception of the decisional sovereignty of the executive, the emphasis 
was given to the free decision of the authority, considering public interest. The 
previous procedure was no more that a formal sequence lacking external relevance18. 
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 Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella , “Administrative Law In Italy: An Historical Sketch”, 4 Rivista 
Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico (2010), 1009-54, at 1025. 
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 Sabino Cassese, La Construction du droit administrative: France et Royaume-Uni, Montchrestiend 
(Paris, 2000), at 10. 
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 Bernardo Sordi, “Révolution, Reechtsstaat, and the Rule of Law: historical reflections on the 
emergence of administrative law in Europe”, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.) 
Comparative Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham, 2010), 23-37, at 27. 
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 Fabio Rugge, “Administrative Traditions in Western Europe”, in Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds.), 
Handbook of Public Administration, Sage Publications (Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003), 177-91, at 187. 
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 Such was the terminology used by the very first case law of the Conseil d’État; but there was an 
evolution from the initial case Lafitte (1822); where it stated that government acts are not susceptible of 
being challenged before any administrative jurisdiction to the case Prince Napoleon (1875), where it 
restricts the notion of political acts to those government acts that concern government’s relations with 
the legislative power or are relative to international relations. See, Prince Napoleon, opinion of 19 
February 1975, 46707, published in ‘recueil Lebon’ and accessible at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000007633029&dateTexte=  
18
 Michel Fromont, Droit Administratif des États européens, Themis (Paris, 2006), at 17. 
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Well into the 20th Century, it was considered that whatever preceded or 
surrounded the act was of the exclusive incumbency of the administration, as the case 
Dame Cachet illustrated very well. In that case of 1922, the Conseil d’État accepted 
the withdrawal, even with procedural breaches, of a previous decision granting rights 
because the closing act was rightful in substance19. 
 
In Italy, the establishment of administrative structures was contemporary with 
the birth of the modern nation-state in the late 19th century. Soon after the foundation 
of the Italian State, administrative activity gradually became more formalized and 
took on regular procedures, but these were based on the internal policies of the 
administrations rather than external norms20. Even after subsequent codification and 
the work of the Consiglio dello Stato in the 20th Century, the notorious scholar 
Giannini still in the mid-20th Century asserted that the administrative act alone was 
the moment of precise clarification of the relationship between liberty and authority21. 
 
A similar thinking was originally prevalent in Germany, where administrative 
procedure was deemed merely a serving function to the purpose of reaching a legally 
correct decision22. The introduction of substantial review on the procedure and the 
assessment of respect for fundamental rights during an administrative procedure came 
only after the Grundgesetz of 194923 in the Federal Republic.  
 
Meanwhile, the first codifications started in some other countries. The first 
general law on administrative procedure in Europe24, Spain’s law of 1889 did not aim 
at setting a general procedure valid for all areas where the public administration acted, 
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 Dame Cachet, opinion of 3 November 1922, 74010, published in ‘Recueil Lebon’ and available at 
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 Mattarella , “Administrative Law In Italy…”, at 1013. 
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 Massimo Severo Giannini, Lezioni di diritto amministrativo, Vol. I, Giuffrè Editore (Milan, 1950), 
290; cited by Mattarella , “Administrative Law In Italy…”, at 1025. 
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 Rainer Wahl, Herausforderungen und Antworten: das öffentliche Recht der letzten fünf Jahrzehnte, 
De Gruyter (Berlin, 2006), at 20. 
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 Ibid. 
24
 The Spanish law is not generally considered the first general act on administrative procedure, 
perhaps in view that the Spanish law was very short and rather than a legal code, a decree that ordered 
to all ministries to enact diverse rules taking into consideration eighteen so called bases. 
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but rather at setting up the bases according to which all the  ministry-specific rules 
would be subsequently enacted25. Hence, it was primarily a framework law whose 
provisions covered elements of the sequence such as deadlines26, the reports to 
elaborate the resolution27, the draft resolution28, and even the right of the individual to 
be heard29, but still the gist of the law was to regulate the basic aspects to reach a legal 
and sound resolution30. This law, while innovative and visionary, was insufficient and 
generated a situation where every department and ministry had its own procedural 
arrangements, to the detriment of the citizen but also to the efficiency of the public 
administration. The law of 1889 was only an embryo of a true codification because, 
because it did not avoid fragmentation, and it was unable to articulate effectively 
general principles of the administrative procedure31. A new law was enacted in 195832 
to correct these shortcomings, simplifying and homogenising administrative 
procedures. This law would be praised for its simplicity and its efficiency, being a 
powerful source of inspiration for several Latin American countries in their own 
administrative codifications33. The need to adapt to the decentralisation of the State 
after the democratic Constitution of 1978 motivated the abrogation of the law of 1958 
and the enactment of a new law in 199234, which would gravitate around the same 
procedural principles.  
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 Francisco González Navarro, “El Cincuentenario de la Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo de 17 
de Julio de 1958”, 17 Revista General de Derecho Administrativo (2008), 1-499, at 282-88. 
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 Act of 19 October 1889 (Ley de 19 de octubre de 1889 disponiendo que por cada Ministerio se haga 
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 Bases three and four.  
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 Basis ten.  
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 Such were the words of the sponsor of the act Gumersindo Azcárate, whose name is generally used 
by Spanish legal scholarship to refer to the law, and that are included in the foreword of the law. 
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 Francisco López Menudo, "Los principios generales del procedimiento administrativo", 128 Revista 
de Admnistración Pública (1992), 19-76, at 41. 
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 Act of 17 July 1958 on the Administrative Procedure (Ley de 17 de julio de 1958, de Procedimiento 
Administrativo) published in the Official Journal of 18 July 1958. 
33
 Eduardo García de Enterría, "Un punto de vista sobre la nueva Ley de régimen jurídico de las 
administratciones públicas y de procedimiento administrativo común de 1992", 130 Revista de 
Admnistración Pública (1993), 205-19, at 205. 
34
 Spanish Common Procedural Act of 26 November 1992 (Ley 30/1992, de Régimen Jurídico de las 
Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común; BOE 285 of  27 November 
1992). 
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Austria’s law of general administrative procedure is considered by many 
commentators the first actual general law on administrative procedure35. Even when 
its main objective was the internal functioning of the administrative bodies in the 
framework of an authoritarian regime, the legal formalism of the law was valuable 
from the perspective of the procedural guarantees it provided for the citizen36. 
 
Poland also had a long tradition of administrative codification, not only did it 
enact one the earliest codes of administrative procedure in 1928, but also the Polish 
Constitution of 1921 was avant-garde in providing for certain principles of the 
administrative procedure37. 
 
The Anglo-Saxon tradition departs from very different origins than continental 
Europe, as the reliance of the system on procedural principles in judging the 
lawfulness of administrative action was present earlier than in continental Europe, 
more focused on substantial aspects38. 
 
As early as in the mid-19th Century the English courts already established 
some procedural rights of individuals vis-à-vis  the action of public authorities. In the 
often cited ruling Cooper / Board of Works of 186339 the justice of the common law 
offered the citizen the same procedural rights, in this case the right to be heard, as in a 
judicial due process of law. The equalization of procedural rights of the citizen in an 
administrative procedure and in a judicial process had its acme a century later when 
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 Cooper / Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180, 182. An individual had started to build a house 
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such works to be demolished. The Board, without any other proceedings, had the house razed to the 
ground. The judge consider such demolition unlawful because, even if not provided by the statute, the 
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the Tribunal and Inquiries act40 was passed in 1958. It required courts to give reasons 
for decisions, but this translated in all public authorities being obliged to give reasons 
and thus to allow for a much wide scrutiny of the public administration by the judges 
later on41. 
 
Even with those differences from continental Europe, in a common law system 
hardly prone to legal revolutions, the evolution of the conception of administrative 
procedures entails important affinities42. Legal concerns relative to the expansion of 
administrative action during the 19th Century were similar; i. e. how to guarantee 
citizens’ rights from the increasing powers of the public administration. According to 
the British frame of reference, decision of the administrative authority could be 
reviewed by the ordinary courts43, but in the case-law of those courts there was a trend 
towards a more protective stance on individual rights. The Common law judges have 
been careful in requiring public authorities to exercise their discretionary power in a 
structured fashion44 and have blocked attempts to escape judicial review of 
administrative decisions45. 
 
In conclusion, the evolution of administrative procedure as a key element in 
administrative law emerged from the same premise that the public administration shall 
be subject to the law46, though the standard of privileges for the public administration 
was generally lower in common law systems. 
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Outside Europe, the evolution in the United States is also very illustrative. A 
traditionally reluctant country to the intervention of public power in social life47, the 
emergence of administrative law came relatively late to the United States48. In spite of 
the proliferation of independent agencies during the 1930’s as part of the New Deal 
policies, few aspects of an increasing administrative action had been proceduralised in 
a homogeneous fashion, leading to potential risks in the rights of citizens49. Hence, 
following an examination of administrative functioning after the setting up of the new 
agencies, the imperative need found for standardised administrative procedures50 
prompted the approval of the Administrative Procedure Act of 194651.  
 
Unlike in Europe, United States agencies are unique in the sense that they hold 
powers pertaining to all three branches of the federal government: judicial, legislative 
and executive; which created major constitutional concerns in its time52. The need for 
a procedure stemmed, first and foremost, from the fact that some of those agencies 
had judicial or quasi-judicial powers53. In that sense, there are many affinities between 
the administrative procedure and the judicial process. 
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The administrative procedure act does more than establishing a general 
administrative procedure. It sets up a legal framework with checks, balances, and 
public information and participation in the agencies’ functioning54, but it also 
establishes uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and adjudication. 
This statute already goes further than providing for a formal path to make lawful 
decisions by the administration, and it covers rulemaking competences too. There is 
even a visionary third section of the law that concerns administrative actions different 
from adjudication and rulemaking, but in this area the level of proceduralisation was 
very low55. 
 
The United States is thus an example on how the enlargement of executive 
action calls for a standarisation of decisional processes. Paradoxically this 
phenomenon was introduced by means of legislation in a common law country, 
whereas in the paramount representative of administrative law, France, the relevance 
of administrative procedure came thanks to the case-law of the Conseil d’État.   
 
In conclusion, there is a certain convergence  common law countries and civil 
law countries in terms of the proceduralisation of administrative action56; but in all 
cases it was not until well into the mid-20th Century that administrative procedure was 
considered more than the mere sequence of formalities to reach a decision by the 
competent authority. 
 
The sum and substance of this short oversight is that the notion that 
administrative procedures should be regulated or, what is more, that individual 
procedural rights could be breached, was not self-evident and came relatively late to 
some European countries with long administrative law traditions. And even then, the 
focus was primarily on the final decision. The objective was to limit the 
administration’s discretionary powers and ensure that decisions affecting citizens 
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were lawful, so procedure was no more than a tool to reach this objective. This 
conception is what some authors refer to as the first generation of administrative 
procedures57; characterised by: (a) an individual decision as an objective; (b) a 
subordinated function to substantive law; (c) a merely procedural vision of the 
different phases; and (d) procedure as a decision-making process. There is thus an 
evolution in the importance attached to administrative procedures and, in particular, 
the judicial reviewability of the different steps leading to the final decision.  
 
Resulting from this short overview, we can deduct that the first and traditional 
approach to administrative procedure is insufficient –judging by the current 
standards– in terms of effective judicial protection. The conception of individual 
procedural rights has changed dramatically. In truth, the idea that those rights are 
incardinated in administrative procedures as we see them nowadays, as a key element 
for a public administration deferential to the rule of law principle, has not been self-
evident and results from the following evolution. 
 
3.2.3.- The evolution towards a more central role of administrative procedures  
 
Since the decade of the 1950’s, a new vast field of competences for public 
administrations began to emerge and gain attention; that of rulemaking powers. In this 
field, the rule of law principle implied in a more visible manner that public 
administrations not only had to make rightful regulations, but they had to elaborate 
them in the rightful way; i. e., it mattered not only what  but also how.  
 
In the mid-20th Century there was a smooth but visible change of paradigm 
from the conception of the clear dichotomy between the creation of laws –most 
frequently containing mandates or prohibitions only– and the application thereof, in 
which it is generally considered that discretion is to be as restricted as possible58. The 
formerly clear distinction between law-making and law-executing powers dissipates59. 
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This phenomenon had different consequences but one of them is the enhancement of 
administrative procedures. 
 
As previously explained, out of the two grand sample procedures for State 
functions already existing, judicial procedure and legislative procedure, the original 
administrative procedure resembled more the former than the later because it aimed a 
taking the correct decision, just like in a judicial process. In many ways, however, the 
rules on legislative procedure were inappropriate for the public administration60, 
making it advisable to adopt new autonomous rules.  
 
The competence of public administrations to enact rules of general application 
was not unseen, but it was only from the 1950’s that it expanded so greatly that it was 
essential to proceduralise these powers, so that first of all, citizens’ rights were 
respected and, second of all, there was a way to accommodate legitimate interests and 
rights of individuals throughout the process. 
 
This was particularly the case in the United States61, where the administrative 
procedure act of 1946 was pioneer in setting up a general legal framework of 
administrative rulemaking procedures. When it comes to the rulemaking procedures, 
the Supreme Court soon deducted that the administrative procedure was more than a 
mere formality; it was a guarantee which assured fairness and mature consideration of 
rules of general application62, as it stated in its famous ruling NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co63. Under that premise, American courts acknowledged more generally, 
                                                 
60
 Barnes, “Tres generaciones …”, 89. 
61
 See more on the emergence of the regulatory state in the United States and the relevance of the 
administrative procedure act in Marc Law and Sukkoo Kim, “The Rise of the American Regulatory 
State: A View From the Progressive Era”, in David Levi-Faur (ed.) Handbook on the Politics of 
Regulation, Edward Elgar publishing (Cheltenham, 2011), 113-28. 
62
 The enactment of administrative rules of general application became the most relevant activity of the 
newly created agencies of the 1960’s and 1970’s during what American sholarships calls the 
environmental era, thanks in part to the large interpretation of delegation by the American courts that 
provided ample discretionany powers to the agencies; as an example in the Supreme Court case 
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Alfred C. Aman and William T. Mayton, Administrative 
Law, West Group (Saint Paul, MN, 2001), at 190-202. 
63
 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., judgement of 23 April 1969, 394 U.S. 759 (1969), at 764. See further 
Edward R. Leahy, “Rule-Making and Adjudication in Administrative Policy Making: NLRB v 
Wyman-Gordon Co.”, 11(1)(1) Boston Collegue Law Review (1969), 64-76, available at 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol11/iss1/5 
119 
 
also in single-case decision making processes, that all public authorities shall adhere 
to the established administrative procedure, even if intended as internal rules64.  
 
In France, it was the Constitution of 195865 that recognised a wide rule-
making power of the government even without delegation of the legislature, which, 
still today, remains as one of the widest rule-making powers endowed to a 
government in Europe66. In a similar fashion to single-case decision procedures, there 
was hardly any codification in France for a general procedure to exersice this 
autonomous pouvouir réglémentaire. But in the field of rule-making procedures, it 
was soon evident that procedures could not be considered a mere formality, in 
particular as they increasingly incorporated citizens’ right of participation67. 
 
However, by then, the Conseil d’État had already departed from its own 
former doctrine, where the administrative act was the sole centre of attention, and had 
looked at the administrative procedure without the glasses of the final acte 
administratif. The seminal case in this evolution was Dame veuve Trompier-Gravier68 
when the Conseil d’État stated that the reviewability of an act included the procedure 
through which the act had been created. It was a revolutionary statement as late as 
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1944. The Conseil d’État further enhanced the relevance of administrative procedure 
by focusing on some of the citizens’ rights thorough the procedure, like the right of 
access to administrative documents69.  
 
In that sense, the lack of codification of the administrative procedure in France 
that still persists today –what French administrative legal scholarship calls 
“immaturité procédurale”70–   was compatible with the development of a more central 
conception of administrative procedure. 
 
With a much narrower scope than the French constitution, the German Basic 
Law also provides for rulemaking powers of the administration but only in the 
framework of delegation from the legislative powers71. The German Administrative 
Procedure act does not address administrative rulemaking procedures, and there is no 
act of general scope in this regard72, but in many fields the elaboration of rules of 
general application –like environmental protection73 of urban planning74–, statutes 
ensure participation and other rights of individuals. The case law of German 
administrative courts has evolved to the point where procedural breaches during 
rulemaking processes often affect the validity of the regulations enacted75. 
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Notwithstanding, the key element in Germany was bestowed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. In its ruling of Mülheim-Kärlich76 it stated that fundamental 
rights –an essential element not only of Germany’s Constitution but also German 
legal conscience– must also inspire administrative procedural law as a guarantee to 
the citizens concerned. 
 
A similar trend can be observed in Italy, where in certain fields prone to be 
subject of administrative regulations participation rights have been introduced 
therefore increasing the importance of procedure77. 
 
In English law, consultation to interested groups and individuals in 
administrative regulation has been introduced on the basis of custom rather than a 
general legislative provision78. However, English courts have progressively set up the 
common law authority on the basis of the principle of legitimate expectations that 
public consultation as part of the decisional procedure shall be respected79. Recent 
case-law of the English judges have contributed to the recognition of consultation and 
other participatory rights in the policy and rule-making processes80. The distinction 
between individual and general acts lacks major consequences in Britain as the law of 
administrative acts is above all a law on the procedure, not on the substance, and the 
key element has always been whether a due procedure has been followed. 
 
An important evolution in the trend towards the enshrinement of 
administrative procedures was the recognition of some procedural rights to 
individuals in the new constitutions of some European states. Constitutions adopted in 
the 1970’s in the aftermath of authoritarian regimes added new rights to traditional 
civil and political rights. Such rights concerned the relationship between individuals 
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and the government, thus it was deemed essential to ensure legal protection of citizens 
against the government81. 
 
In Portugal, the Constitution of 1974 mandates that the law on administrative 
activity proceedings to ensure the participation of concerned citizens82. The Greek 
Constitution of 1975, also provides for individual procedural rights before the 
administration, notably the right to a prior hearing in administrative procedures of 
one’s concern83 and, more generally, the right to information84.  
 
In Spain, the Constitution of 1978 contains specific provisions regarding 
individual rights in the administrative procedure, such as the right of participation, 
access to files, and prior hearing85. The Spanish Constitutional Court outspokenly 
recorded an evolution in a ruling of 199586 when it admitted that: 
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“The administrative jurisdiction can no longer be considered a 
channel of control of legality from an objective perspective, i. e. as a process 
surrounding the administrative act only. It is essentially a means to enforce 
the right of judicial review of the interests and substantive rights of the 
citizens.” 
 
Newer constitutions in Eastern Europe also incorporate individual rights that 
enhance the constitutional dimension of administrative procedures. The Polish 
constitution of 1997 provides for rights of access to information, privacy, and access 
to documents much in detail87.  Similarly, the Czech Charter of fundamental rights 
and basic freedoms of 1992 imposes a mandate on the administration to provide 
relevant information to concerned citizens88. 
 
The concern about the relevance of administrative procedure eventually 
transcended at the international level, notably at the level of the Council of Europe. 
The European-wide acknowledgement of the major role of administrative procedures 
with regard to the rights of individuals vis-à-vis public administration had a critical 
point with the Resolution (77) 31 of the Council of Europe on the protection of the 
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individual in relation to the acts of administrative authorities89. Among other 
provisions, it stated that the concerned person had the right to be heard90, and the right 
of access to information91, while the administration was obliged to state the reasons of 
its decision92, and to indicate the remedies against the resolution and the time limits 
for it exercise93. 
 
The trend towards proceduralisation of administrative action was confirmed y 
other statements such as the Recommendation (80)2 concerning the Exercise of 
discretionary Powers by administrative Authorities94; the Recommendation (87)16 on 
administrative procedures affecting a large number of persons95; and the 
Recommendation (91)1 on administrative sanctions96. 
 
At the European Union level, the progression to the inclusion of participation, 
public information and other citizens’ rights in the administrative procedures has been 
enhanced by several EU directives particularly in the field of environmental 
protection97. 
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A general consensus emerged progressively in legal scholarship on the central 
role of administrative procedure. In practical terms, administrative procedures gained 
two sets of functions98: 
 
- Noninstrumental functions, which are new with respect to the previous 
situation inasmuch as they entail that administrative procedure plays a role by itself 
without being linked to the final decision that is its output. These functions are the 
promotion of citizens' participation at the same time that transparency and 
accountability are improved. But there are others like, on the side of the citizens, 
protection of dignity and fundamental rights and, on the side of the public 
administration, improvement of legitimacy99. 
 
- Instrumental functions, which are more visible. Administrative procedures 
are a legal shield for the protection of individual rights while at the same time a tool 
for the promotion of good administration, especially if discretionary powers exist100. 
 
This trend did not lead to the codification of administrative procedures in all 
countries, but the laws on administrative procedure have become more and more apt 
to improve the quality of administrative decision and rule making, as well as to 
protect individual rights up to a point where some scholar argue that those rights shall 
be heightened to the category of fundamental rights101. 
 
In conclusion, the most remarkable feature in the evolution of administrative 
procedures in European countries during the second half of the 20th Century is the 
central position that administrative procedures have gained in the possible review of 
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the actions of the public administration. An equally noticeable feature is the end of 
unilaterality. The participation of citizens in administrative procedures, notably in the 
context of rulemaking procedures, leads to the further enhancement of administrative 
procedure per se, with an external relevance which may operate, in case of judicial 
review, autonomously of the final decision. Access to information granted to 
individuals and interest groups further reinforce the status and provate parties and 
allow for a more comprehensive spectrum of source of information in the decision 
making process by public authorities. Participation, transparency and accountability 
have thus become major elements of the activity of public administration by virtue of 
the enhancement of administrative procedures. 
 
3.2.4.-The pending transformation of administrative procedures 
 
Recent developments in the widening of the scope of administrative action and 
the expansion of new administrative mechanisms have left the former definitions of 
administrative procedures outdated. Administrative procedures cannot be limited to a 
sequence of acts aiming at a single decision or a rule of general application. In the 
words of Schmidt-Aßmann, administrative procedure is an “intertwined process 
carried out by public bodies designed to gather, manage and analyze information”102. 
 
The new notion stems from the realization that public administration cannot be 
exclusively self-reliant, and it has to find mechanisms of cooperation with other 
public entities and even the private sector103. This is particularly true once the policies 
and actions executed by public administrations fall within the scope of what was 
previously referred to as “New Governance”104, a phenomenon of particular impact in 
the European Union, but which is widespread in European and North American 
countries105. 
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A new vision, still in progress, of the administrative procedure starts to emerge 
as legal scholarship begins to admit that the old schemes are no longer apt for the 
extension and variety of form of administrative action106. Three phenomena, which 
Javier Barnes calls the opening of the three old borders107, are of particular pertinence 
for this shift of paradigm: 
 
- The former clear-cut distinction between law application and law making has 
disappeared in many fields, following the confusion between policy 
formulation and policy execution. 
 
- The separation of the public and private spheres has vanished in many 
regulatory areas where they are mutually dependent. Public decision-makers 
search increasingly for the involvement of private actors108. 
 
- The division between domestic and international has also become illusory, 
especially so for the European Union and its Member States. 
 
Along these lines, administrative action is increasingly complex and unsuitable 
for a legal analysis with the sole traditional notion of administrative procedure. 
Hierarchies and centralization, always though as the frame of reference for an 
administrative procedure are not necessarily present in many policy areas, and the 
limited schemes of private participation are often insufficient for the amount and 
complexity of information needed to carry out new policies. 
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The end of unilaterality formerly highlighted is currently experiencing a new 
stage. It happens not only to include citizens’ rights, but also because the public 
authorities are increasingly in need of cooperation from other public administrations 
and stakeholders in the private sector. This feature, even more visible in the EU than 
at the national level, shall lead to a new vision of administrative procedures that still 
has be legally assessed and conceptualized109. 
 
In conclusion, the notion of administrative procedures from a comparative 
perspective has experienced a manifest evolution from the insignificance of a formal 
sequence aimed at producing the key element of ‘administrative acts’ to a central role 
in the control by individuals of the execution of administrative action, with and 
increasing participation of citizens. Judicial and scholar deference to substantive 
outcomes in the past has been counterbalanced by a strict procedural review which, at 
the European Union level has been embraced by the Court of Justice particularly by 
three recent rulings110, which will be analysed later on111: Vodafone112, Volker und 
Markus Schelke113 and Test-Achats114.  
 
Today, this recent development is accompanied by the uptake of New 
Governance approaches, which has a remarkable influx in the relations EU – national 
public administrations. 
 
3.3.- The concept of administrative procedures in European comparative law 
 
3.3.1.-Diverse approaches regarding the codification of administrative procedures 
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Before analysing the current state-of-affairs regarding the administrative 
procedures at the EU level, an overview of the different national conceptions of 
administrative procedures provides certain clues.  
 
As previously revealed, there is a convergent trend in the evolution of the 
notion and legal effects of administrative procedures in most European countries. The 
enhancement from a legal perspective of administrative procedures has resulted in the 
enactment of national acts or codes intending to be of general application. There is 
also a trend to the recognition of more and more procedural rights to individuals, 
which is visible in the newer acts or the recent amendments to some of those acts115. 
 
However, the legal framework varies significantly in terms of the degree of 
codification that different countries have reached. In countries lacking a codification 
of administrative procedures the trend can similarly be perceived in a more procedural 
rights based approach by the case-law116. 
 
The convergent trend does not necessarily entail an homogeneity of the 
underlying values in the recognition of individual rights or the pace at which they are 
incorporated. This is best represented by the Scandinavian approach to the access of 
information, seen as a basic right of citizenship, while other countries like the United 
Kingdom is still shyly moving away from secrecy as the general rule, acknowledging 
in a limited fashion that throughout administrative procedures, the person concerned 
has a right to access relevant information117. 
 
A short overview of the existing national legislations shall provide relevant 
insights of the current state of affairs and prospects of the EU legal order as concerns 
administrative procedures. 
 
3.3.2.-The general codification of administrative procedures in Member States  
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While in continental Europe the combination of the tradition of codification 
and the tradition of administrative law might lead to the belief that codification of 
administrative procedures was widespread among European countries, this 
assumption would prove false in a number of cases. 
 
All the previously mentioned countries that were pioneer in trying to codify 
administrative procedures enjoy comprehensive administrative procedural laws at this 
point in time.  
 
In Spain, codification of administrative procedures has a long tradition118. The 
law of 1992119 is one of the most comprehensive statutes as it contains general rules 
for all administrative procedures but also on the legal regime of all aspects of 
administrative decisions and of public administration. However, it lacks the 
provisions for the exercise of rule-making powers120. 
 
Similarly, in Austria the original law of 1925 was repealed by a new code of 
1950 and last by the General Administrative Procedure Act or Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz of 1991121. It is one of the most complete codifications 
of administrative procedures122, and it contains concepts of general scope and then 
details the procedural rules generally applicable. The Austrian codes were a model for 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia  and other European countries123. 
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Poland’s original law of 1928 was repealed by a new code during the soviet 
era124. The Code of Administrative procedure of 1960125 is still in force, although 
subject to profound revisions. Again, it is rather a code of general principles126, but 
contains the specific regulations of some of the most common administrative 
procedures, although most administrative procedures are regulated in special statutes, 
always in compliance with the general principles. 
 
Hungary repealed its original Code of Administrative Procedure dating back 
from 1957 in 2004, when it approved the General Rules of the Administrative 
Proceedings and Services127. The newest Hungarian law contains a systematic 
regulation of the latest developments analysed, providing for safeguards for legality in 
all stages of the procedure. The control exercised in the areas of governance and 
supervision is primarily directed at the prevention of violation of the law, but it can 
also focus on the protection of the civic rights of those concerned128. 
 
 Italy’s Law 241/1990 was similar to Spain’s in as much as it is streamlined 
and basic, rather focused on principles than details129. According to Italian legal 
scholarship, this piece of legislation has deeply penetrated the fabric of society by 
radically changing the relationship between the administration and those 
‘administrated’130, while at the same time improving the administrative efficiency131. 
Similarly, the Luxembourgish Law on non-contentious administrative procedure of 
1978132. 
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 A different approach to administrative procedure is the one taken by the 
German Verwaltungsverfahrengesetz of 1976, which is much more detailed and does 
not confine itself to general principles133. However, it has been criticised by its lack of 
comprehensiveness, especially as rule-making procedures are excluded134 and the 
federal structure of Germany precludes that its provisions are mandatory at the Land 
level135. In the German tradition, protection of fundamental rights is essential and thus 
procedure is largely seen as means for such protection136, thus enhancing the status of 
individuals vis-à-vis public authorities. 
 
 The Netherlands’ General Administrative Law Act of 1994137 was also aimed 
at more uniformity and systematization by means of subsidiary rules applicable as 
long as specific statutes specify no exceptions. Like the other laws of its generation, it 
has a individual rights approach138.   
 
The newest law is that of Croatia of 2009139. Most other EU member States 
also have also participated in the codification of general principles of administrative 
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procedures140; being a general opinion that a codified or at least published procedural 
rules are beneficial for a properly working and fair public administration141. 
 
In spite of codification, one could detect reminiscences of the old conception 
that the final decision only counts in some of the most important aforementioned acts. 
Examples of that statement are: the German Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz provision 
that allows for the of the final decision to be kept in spite of a procedural breach if it is 
obvious that it had no influence on the final decision 142; the Spanish Ley de Régimen 
Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y de Procedimiento Adminitrativo Común 
paragraph that excludes the annulment of a final decision for procedural breaches in 
certain cases143; and the Italian Nuove norme in materia di procedimento 
amministrativo e di diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi rule stating that  
measure adopted in breach of rules governing procedure or the form of instruments 
shall not be voidable if it is evident that the provisions it contains could not have been 
other than those actually adopted144.  
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3.3.3.- The lack of general codification of administrative procedures in 
Member States 
 
As an exception to the general progression of a codification in most EU 
member States, there are four countries that have decided not to enact general rules 
applicable to administrative procedure. This certainly although does not mean that 
such rules do not exist or that their legal regimen have followed a substantially 
different evolution to the one explained. 
 
In France the rules on administrative procedures must be found in two 
sources145. On the one hand, the case law of the Conseil d’État, which not only has 
evolved, but whose seminal cases are milestones in the evolution of the procedural 
administrative law in Europe. On the other hand, several pieces of legislation adopted 
at different points of time. The most important of them are the law of 17 July 1978 on 
several measures for improving the relations between the administration and the 
public146; the law of 11 July 1979 on the motivation of administrative decisions147; 
and the law of 12 April 2000, on the rights of citizens in their relations with the 
administrative authorities148. 
 
The historical reasons for the absence of any codification of administrative 
procedures in France are to be found in the spotlight traditionally set on the 
contentious procedures and the reliance on the prestige of the work of the Conseil 
d’État149. Although the current situation has long been criticised by prominent 
authors150, this does not preclude and new rights from being progressively introduced 
for individuals, and there is no prospect of change of approach. 
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The French vision has influenced many other countries, but singularly so 
Belgium151. Belgium relies on the principles laid down by its Conseil d’État and some 
scattered legislative acts and regulations pertaining to the regions and communities152, 
besides the right of access to documents, incorporated to the Belgian Constitution in 
1993153. 
 
Common law countries have traditionally resisted any codification. In England 
not only codification, but also administrative law appeared originally alien to its 
common law system, a feature which was best represented by Dicey’s negation of any 
kind of droit administratif in England154. Even as late as in 1935, the Lord Chief 
Justice of England stated in a ruling the administrative law was ‘continental 
jargon’155. However, this early conception has largely changed156. If the early 
academic though, largely represented by Dicey, considered that denial of a special 
legal regime for public power was the best way to protect private interest, now this 
legal conception has changed and it is generally accepted that a special regime of 
public law is convenient to ensure, among others, recently recognised rights such as 
the right of privacy and access to documents157. 
 
The original assumption is that in the United Kingdom the courts preserve 
individual rights, so any system that modifies or eliminates the judicial role raises the 
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specter of excessive governmental control158.  Thus, it is generally considered that 
administrative process must entail for the citizen the same guarantees than judicial 
process159. In addition, the courts themselves have developed a body of administrative 
law based on British principle of procedural fairness and reasonableness 160, with the 
concept of abuse of powers playing the central role in the judicial review of the public 
administration’s activity161. 
 
The common law judges had recognised several procedural rights of citizens 
even before the first European codes of administrative procedures were enacted, by 
virtue of the principle of natural justice, which cover the protection of individual 
rights. At the same time, individual rights before courts provided for by the different 
statutes were immediately transposed into the status of citizens vis-à-vis the public 
administration.  
 
Additionally, a series of ad hoc measures provide various unconnected 
elements of control and redress with the linked aim of providing for administrative 
justice. The Human Rights Act of 1998162, in particular, was capital in the 
introduction of new procedural rights163, thanks in part to the formal reception of the 
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case-law of the ECRH in Britain164. Other important pieces of legislation in this sense 
are the Freedom of Information Act of 2000165 and the Equality Act of 2010166. 
 
A similar system exists in Ireland, where the case-law has been supplemented 
by specific acts of Parliament like the Freedom of Information act of 1997167, giving 
general access to administrative documents. 
 
As a matter of fact, the reasons for the lack of codification in the four 
abovementioned countries are opposite. The French system is still Administration- 
centred and hence still when it comes to providing legal protection against the 
administration ensuring that the administration adheres to law and statute prevails 
over the protection of the rights of the individual. In the common law tradition, the 
individual-centred conception of administrative justice has left in hands of the jugges, 
not the legislator, the protection of citizens vis-à-vis public administration. 
 
Apart from those four countries, only Romania, with scattered administrative 
procedural provisions, and Malta, which is in the process of enacting a law of 
administrative procedure, lack some kind of administrative procedural code at the 
moment. 
 
The divergence is thus in the legislative technique rather than in the evolution 
of priorities. Diverse approaches have been adopted regarding codification, reflecting 
each country’s own national legal and administrative culture168, yet the evolution 
towards a strengthening of administrative procedures and the improvement of 
individual procedural rights is present in all the cases. All European legal cultures 
could agree with the statement by professor Schwarze that the fact that the 
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administration is conceded a margin of discretion and of assessment seems nowadays 
justifiable only if discretion is exercised under strict observance of procedural 
guarantees169. This shall not lead to the conclusion that one approach or the other is 
completely innocuous. Codification does provide a simpler legal framework and, 
more importantly, legal certainty. 
 
3.4.- The conception of administrative procedures in the European Union 
 
3.4.1.-Is there such a thing as an 'administrative procedure' of the European Union? 
 
The preceding outline of the conception and evolution of administrative 
procedures in European countries gives an idea that the concept is far from stable and 
homogeneous, even in a context limited to European countries. At the same time, the 
core of the notion can be discerned even when the judicial and scholarly focus might 
have rotated completely. It is a formal path, a sequence of formalities or, on a more 
ancient terminology, a rite that must be respected whenever an administrative decision 
shall be made, a rule enacted or an action taken. But he qualifying element of 
administrative procedures, as opposed to procedures in general terms, is that public 
administration is legally bound by these proceedings. 
 
It would be erroneous to take for granted without further elaboration that those 
formal paths followed by the European Union Institutions and bodies in carrying out 
their administrative action are administrative procedures. The existence of 
administrative procedures at the EU level is a necessary premise for the development 
of the core concept of this thesis. 
 
The existence of a European public administration was not consensually 
accepted by EU legal scholarship until very recently. Although there were solid 
arguments before for an ‘EU administration’, after the Treaty of Lisbon any legal 
ambiguity has dissipated. The main obstacle against the existence of administrative 
procedures at the EU level is thus overcome. 
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Paradoxically, unlike the European public administration, no serious doubts 
appear to have been raised related to the existence of administrative procedures, and 
they seem rather taken for granted. A basic legal justification for the existence of 
European administrative procedures is required before deepening the analysis and 
classification of them. 
 
Administrative law scholars have long written on the administrative 
procedures at the European level without much questioning their existence170; and this 
is due to the fact that the European legislators and judges did not hesitate to use this 
nomenclature too. In the case of secondary law, the visibility of administrative 
procedures has been greater in areas of direct competence of the Communities171. 
Such was the case in the field of competition law, with the first antitrust regulation of 
1962172; or agricultural policy instruments, with procedures to apply for agricultural 
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funds in the 1960’s173. But even before, the first decisions of the High Authority of the 
ECSC also contained provisions establishing elementary administrative procedures 
for the execution of the ECSC initial functions174. Those were the first European 
administrative procedures. The European legislator would start to use explicitly that 
denomination afterwards175, and the Commission used the terms with a more general 
scope in its internal rules of procedure176. 
 
The Court of Justice has also used the expression administrative procedures in 
a plurality of cases regarding different proceedings carried out by the Commission, 
like competition law procedures177, customs178, and civil service regulations179, just to 
                                                 
173
 Regulation No 130/66/EEC of the Council of 26 July 1966 on the financing of the common 
agricultural policy (OJ 1966 165 , 2965–2970 English special edition: Series I Volume 1965-1966, 216 
– 220; and Regulation No 741/67/EEC of the Council of 24 October 1967 on aid from the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee Section (OJ 1967 258,  2 – 4 English special 
edition: Series II Volume III, 25). 
174
 For example, ECSC High Authority: Decision No 2-52 of 23 December 1952 determining the mode 
of assessment and collection of the levies provided for in Articles 49 and 50 of the Treaty (OJ 1952 1, 3 
– 4 English special edition: Series I Chapter 1952-1958, 3); and ECSC High Authority: Decision No 
26-54 of 6 May 1954 laying down in implementation of Article 66 (4) of the Treaty a regulation 
concerning information to be furnished (OJ 1954 9, 350 – 351English special edition: Series I Chapter 
1952-1958 P. 0017). 
175
 For example, Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of 
social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community (OJ 
1971 L 149, 2 – 50 English special edition: Series I Chapter 1971(II), 416), article 92; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1416/76 of 1 June 1976 on the financial provisions applying to the European 
Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (OJ 1976 L 164 , 1 – 15), article 45; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 517/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports of textile products from 
certain third countries not covered by bilateral agreements, protocols or other arrangements, or by other 
specific Community import rules (OJ 1994 L 67, 1 – 75), preamble; Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests 
(OJ 1995 L 312), 1 – 4, articles 3 and 6; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2141/96 of 7 November 
1996 concerning the examination of an application for the transfer of a marketing authorization for a 
medicinal product falling within the scope of Council Regulation (EC) No 2309/93 (OJ 1996 L 286, 6 – 
8), preamble; Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 
145, 43 – 48), preamble; and Council Regulation (EC) No 717/2008 of 17 July 2008 establishing a 
Community procedure for administering quantitative quotas (OJ 2008 L 198, 1–7), preamble.    
176
 Rules of Procedure of the Commission [C(2000) 3614] (OJ 2000 L 308 , 26 – 34). 
177
 Case 52/69. Geigy AG / Commission [1972] ECR 787, paragraph 5; Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 
Hoechst / Commission [1989] ECR 2859, paragraph 15; Case 27/88, Solvay / Commission, [1989] 
ECR 3355; more recently, Case T-99/04 Treuhand / Commission [2008] ECR II-1501, paragraph 50; 
Case T-410/09 Almamet / Commission [2012] not yet published, paragraph 26. 
178
 Joined cases 98 and 99/75, Carstens Keramik / Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main, [1976] 
ECR 241, paragraph 7; and Case 51/84 Land Niedersachsen / Hauptzollamt Friedrichshafen [1985] 
2191, paragraph 14. 
141 
 
name a few fields. As a matter of fact, the case-law of the Court of Justice elaborated 
on certain general principles pertaining administrative procedures in cases in which 
there was a direct relationship between a European institution and a private party180. It 
is therefore only natural that not a lot of doubts were raised as to the suitability of the 
nomenclature. However, it might be meaningful to compare the proceedings followed 
at the EU level with the ones that take place in international organisations. 
 
In the case of international organisations, the term administrative procedure 
has sometimes been used to relate to their decision-making processes181, although 
without a deep legal assessment and rather from a political science perspective. Legal 
scholarship on international institutional law has studied the proceedings used by 
international organisations only superficially182. International organisations seldom 
enjoy full-fledged normative powers. In the few cases in which they do, the legal 
character and effects of such normative material are debatable, but the most solid 
arguments are on the side of their consideration as soft law instruments183. Even the 
few hard international law regulations that can be found do not approach stereotypical 
conceptions of law based on advanced domestic legal systems184. 
 
Accordingly, the rules which set the proceedings for international 
organisations to carry out their mandate often lack external relevance, and remain at a 
purely internal level185. They are referred to as ‘rules of procedure’, ‘standard 
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instruments’, or ‘internal operational rules’186, but the normative power of those 
instruments is low. There seldom are any direct relationships between international 
organisations and  individuals, and, when they occur, they are hardly proceduralised. 
Lacking external relevance and without a proper system of further judicial review, 
particularly for individuals, the qualification as administrative procedures for such 
rules is unsuitable.  
 
This is a consequence of the fact that legal regimes of international 
organisation are for the most part relatively new and undeveloped187. Politics 
permeates international law and limits its autonomy188. The activities by international 
organisations can only in a lax understanding be called forms of administration189. 
This is nowadays an insurmountable obstacle for the qualification of the different 
proceedings in international organisations as administrative procedures from a strictly 
legal point of view. 
 
In this sense, there is an essential distinctive element of the European Union as 
regards international organisations, which is the creation of a legal order. Unlike any 
international organisation, this new legal order is characterised by, on the one hand, 
its autonomy and supremacy vis-à-vis national legal orders and, on the other hand, its 
direct effect vis-à-vis individuals, entailing their right of judicial recourse directly 
before the EU judges. Thus, the existence of an autonomous, superior and directly 
enforceable legal order; and the legal recognition of a European public administration 
are the elements that set the European Union apart from international organisation for 
the purposes of our analysis.  
 
As a result, in the European Union, administrative procedures are carried out 
by a public administration –that of the EU though often in cooperation with its 
national counterparts–, to implement  the autonomous EU legal order, and allow for a 
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judicial review that, even with limitations, can be exercised directly by private parties. 
For this threefold reason, there are indubitably European Union administrative 
procedures. 
 
3.4.2.- The initial irrelevance of administrative procedures in the European 
Communities 
 
Even though European Community law was originally conceived as 
substantially a community of administrative law190, and administrative procedures are 
a key element of the discipline, the topic of administrative procedures received very 
little attention, both by the Treaties and by legal scholarship191. Professor Chiti sees 
two sets of reasons for this feature192.  
 
The first explanation lies in the influence of the legal conceptions of the 
original Member States. As we examined in detail before193, the key element in the 
relationship administration-citizen was, around the mid-20th Century, the 
administrative act –only element which could be reviewed– while whatever came 
before had at best a merely indirect relevance. This was particularly the vision in 
France –the country whose administrative law had by far the greatest influence in the 
legal configuration of the Communities194– until the case-law of the Conseil d’État 
began to shift but, by then, the legal foundations of the early Communities had 
already been established in accordance with the vision of the central role of the 
administrative act. 
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The heritage of the traditional conception of member States is manifest in 
article 173 of the Treaty of the European Economic Community195, which refers 
exclusively to Community acts and to the grounds of invalidity thereof. This 
provision has remained substantially unchanged until today196. 
 
The second set of reasons is to be found in some of the specific traits of the 
original legal order of the European Communities. Three characteristics are 
enlightening197: 
 
- firstly, the configuration of the EC legal order as a system with limited 
objectives under the principle of conferral198, which entailed a very restricted level of 
competences and thus a limited administration to carry out any functions. Although 
this principle is still in force, the competences of the Union have grown exponentially 
covering virtually all aspects of administrative activity to a larger or smaller extent; 
 
- secondly, the indistinctness between normative acts and single case decisions 
(or administrative acts), resulting in a lack of systematic treatment of the sources of 
EU law and the mechanisms to enact rules and to adopt decisions; and, 
 
- lastly, the minimalist conception of a European public administration, 
needing the support of national administrations and very rarely conducting the direct 
administration of their policies. This leads to the stoplight being put on the national 
procedures of indirect administration, rather than on the EU level. 
 
3.4.3.-The evolution and consolidation of administrative procedures at the EU level. 
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The same factors explaining the initial irrelevance of administrative 
procedures provide the hints for its subsequent evolution. National legislations shifted 
towards a more central role of administrative procedures in decision and rule making, 
a more formal approach199 that was welcomed by administrative legal scholarship. 
 
The EU specific factors also changed dramatically. To begin with, the 
expansion of EU competences in each and every amendment of the Treaties is perhaps 
one of the clearest indicators of the success of European integration200. Today few 
aspects of Member States policies remain exempt from EU influence. The result of 
this expansion is understandably the growth of EU administrative action201. 
 
As for the second aspect, the difference between normative and administrative 
acts was advanced by the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty202, meeting the old demands 
of legal scholarship for the clarification of sources of EU secondary law203. Although 
the Treaty of Lisbon leaves aside the clearer nomenclature of the Constitutional 
Treaty; that is, the formal distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, 
based essentially on the procedure for adoption204, it maintains the structural 
classification of secondary law provisions205, and introduces the term regulatory acts 
as distinct from single case decisions.  
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This is due in part to the term ‘regulatory acts’, which was not taken away in 
the Treaty of Lisbon206. On the occasion of the first interpretation of the provision 
referring to ‘regulatory acts’, i. e. article 263(4) TFEU207, which enlarged the citizens’ 
right to access to the European courts, the General Court elaborated with detail on the 
typology of EU acts. Thus, in the cases Inuit208 and Microban209, the GT clarified 
taxonomy of administrative law sources, which was later confirmed by the Court of 
Justice210. For the purposes of access to European justice, it was logical to open the 
procedural standing of citizens in non-legislative acts of general application, while 
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keeping a stricter stance with regard to legislative acts211. When it comes to the 
purposes of this work, the innovation at the level of primary law together with this 
recent case-law have paved the way for a more mature conceptualization of 
administrative procedures in the European Union. 
 
Finally, the enlargement of European public administration and its capabilities, 
as well as the ongoing substitution of indirect administration by composite 
procedures, which is the core element of this disertation. 
 
The very evolution in Member States from a substantive approach towards a 
rather procedural approach on the assessment of administrative decisions, as 
developed in the previous section, has had a clear impact in the conception of 
administrative procedures at the EU level. In this vein, it is important to highlight the 
diverse influences that the different national legislation.  
 
Thus, French administrative law, with its original focus on the ‘acte 
administratif’, had the most capital influence in the formulation of the key concepts of 
European administrative law212. The accession of Britain in the 70’s was essential in 
the development of procedural guarantees inherent to the common law concept of due 
process of law213, as was the German Bundesverfassungsgericht's214 contribution with 
the principle of proportionality. Lastly, the accession of Scandinavian countries in the 
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90’s was crucial in the enlargement of the scope of the principle of transparency and 
the recognition of the right of access to documents215. 
 
This juxtaposition of different legal traditions results in difficulties in using 
concepts that are essential in some administrative law traditions and go completely 
disregarded in some other, as it is the notable case of an "European administrative 
act". Professor Arzoz Santisteban216, points out that while this notion is generally used 
as a globalising concept covering the different measures takes as part of the EU 
administrative action (especially for German and Italian scholars), the term 
'administrative act' does not appear in European administrative law manuals of Anglo-
Saxon origin217.  
 
Besides these elements, there is a fundamental actor whose contribution can 
hardly be overstated. The Court of Justice set forth the general principles shaping 
administrative procedures in the Union218. Thus, in the absence of codification and, 
what is more, due to the scarcity of general provisions concerning administrative 
procedures, it is general principles that make up the backbone of the notion of legal 
procedures at EU level219. The consequences of the case-law of the Court of Justice 
are not only related to the development of general principles of EU procedural law, 
but also have been felt at the level of national legislation220. 
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It is precisely in view of the most recent case law of the Court of Justice that 
judge Lenaerts argues that there is a shift towards a strict process review that leaves 
aside the former emphasis exclusively on substantive outcomes221, which has been 
captured by recent rulings of the Court of Justice. This trend has a capital impact in 
the analysis carried out in this work. 
 
3.4.4.-The case law of the Court of Justice and the development of general 
principles of European administrative procedural law 
 
The principles of European administrative law constitute the backbone of the 
discipline. These principles have been developed and elaborated by the Court of 
Justice. The following of those principles have a particular impact on the conclusions 
that we will reach.  
 
The first principle, basic in even the earliest versions of modern public 
administrations in all member States, is the principle of legality. As developed further 
by the Court of Justice in several other general principles, it is a central element of 
European administrative law222.  
 
Considering that article 264223 TFEU entitles the Court of Justice to review the 
legality of all EU acts, i. e. their validity according to the EU legal order founded on 
the Treaties, the Court of Justice stated in Hörsch AG224 that: 
 
“in all the legal systems of the Member States, any intervention by the 
public authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person, whether 
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natural or legal, must have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid 
down by law, and, consequently, those systems provide, albeit in different 
forms, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention . The need 
for such protection must be recognized as a general principle of Community 
law.” 
 
This statement must be framed in the more pompous declaration that Les Verts 
that the EU is a community based on the rule of law225. Hence the idea that any 
activity of the public administration shall be bound by and apply the law constitutes a 
primeval principle from which all others derive. 
 
Two principles are linked to the principle of legality; the principle of legal 
certainty and the principle of legitimate expectations. The principle of legal certainty 
dates back to the earliest case-law of the Court of Justice. In SNUPAT226 in the early 
1960’s, the Court of Justice, ruling on the possibility of revoking unlawful 
exemptions, balanced the principles of legality and legal certainty227 and decided, 
considering that the general prohibition of retroactivity can be excluded if the 
interested party has provided the authorities with false information, to give prevalence 
to the former.  
 
The essence of this principle lies on the premise that the law must be certain, 
in that it is clear, precise, and understandable, and its legal implications are 
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foreseeable228. Hence, it is a guarantee for individuals who, in the words of the 
European judges in the recent ruling in Heinrich229, must be able to ascertain 
unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and act accordingly230.  
 
Excluding the scope of the principle concerning penal measures231, it entails a 
twofold restriction. On the one hand, a temporal limit, as it entails a general 
prohibition of retroactivity. This means that a measure cannot take effect before its 
publication232, although it is possible to regulate future effects of situations started 
before its entry into force233. On the other hand, it brings about a requirement of 
clarity. EU legislation must be understandable by its addressees and its consequences 
foreseeable234. Obscurity of legal provisions, however, has never been, so far, the only 
cause for the Court of Justice to annul an act235. 
 
The principle of legitimate expectations is an essential principle of the 
relations between the individuals and public administrations, limiting the possibilities 
of the later to modify courses of action in prejudice to the individual acting in good 
faith236. The principle of legitimate expectations implies a difficult balance between 
the lawful power of institutions to change their previous behaviour and the legitimate 
expectations of citizens who are subject to those changes237. 
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The case law of the Court of Justice is mostly related to areas of strict 
regulatory control, like agriculture238. It has shown a certain tendency to award the 
institutions a wide margin of manoeuvre in market management, even where the 
chosen scheme has been subjected to criticism239. On the contrary, there seems to be a 
stricter stance on the recipient of the measure. In Van den Bergh and Lopik / 
Commission240, for example, it stated that the principle cannot be invoked if a 
"prudent and discriminating trader" could reasonably have foreseen a change of 
schemes, particularly in agricultural policy where constant chages are needed to adapt 
to economic circumstances241. 
 
The case Spain / Council242 is very illustrative of the conceptual approach of 
legitimate expectations in term of time limits and reasonableness. In this case, Spain 
contested the amendment of the new cotton support scheme introduced by the 
Council243. According to it, the aids are not linked to the cotton actually harvested but 
rather to the maintenance of cultivation244. Spain argued that it infringed the 
legitimate expectations of operators in the cotton sector, as their crops were managed 
so as to comply with the previous scheme, and the change implies direct economic 
losses for them245. The Court stated that the principles cannot be pleaded if a prudent 
and circumspect operator could have foreseen that the adoption of a Community 
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measure was likely to affect his interests, as they are not justified in having a 
legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by 
the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be 
maintained246. Hence, this principle, as it has been conceived by the Court of Justice, 
has a limited operability. 
 
A more EU specific principle is the principle of non-discrimination or, in a 
broader sense, the principle of equality. It was originally aimed at abolishing all kinds 
of discriminations regarding nationality, but soon expanded247 to other aspects and 
grounds of discrimination248. Declared a general principle by the Court of Justice in 
Ruckdeschel249, this principle implies that analogous situations cannot be treated 
differently250 unless the treatment is objectively justified251. from the perspective of 
law execution, this principle is binding to all authorities in change of such 
implementation, including national authorities252. After the declaration of the basic 
principle that everyone is equal before the law is a basic principle by the Court of 
Justice253, it has been enshrined in primary law254.  
 
The principle of good administration is arguably the one with the most direct 
impact on administrative procedures at the EU level255. The Court of Justice –to be 
precise, the Court of First Instance more frequently–had consistently held that 
individuals do have a number of procedural rights ensuring that they are treated fairly 
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by the Commission256; but it was in max.mobil / Commission when it explicitly 
recognised it as a general principle stemming from the constitutional traditions of 
Member States257. 
 
In reality, when the explicit reference to ‘good administration’ was adopted by 
the Court of Justice, it had already been written in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights258, even if it did not have a binding legal value back then259. The principle of 
good administration is indeed an umbrella-principle, for some authors the 
specification of the principle of legality260, under which many other more specific 
procedural principles are safeguarded. Those had been declared and elaborated by the 
Court of Justice before the proclamation of the Charter in 2000. 
 
The procedural rights to of defence were recognised even if not explicit in the 
relevant provisions of secondary law. Thus, the Court of Justice considered that 
respect for the rights of the defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person 
which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, a 
fundamental principle of EU law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of 
specific rules261.  
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Among those rights of defence, under the legal concept of due process of 
law262, the case law of the Court of Justice has singled out the right to a fair hearing, 
the right to an impartial examination of all elements of one’s case (duty of care), and 
the right to a reasoned decision. In the case Technische Universität München / 
Hauptzollamt München-Mitte is stated263: 
 
“…where the Community institutions have such a power of appraisal, 
respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in 
administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those 
guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to 
examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual 
case, the right of the person concerned to make his views known and to have 
an adequately reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify 
whether the factual and legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of 
appraisal depends were present.” 
 
The right to be heard occupies a major position, with a very early recognition 
by the Court of Justice264. According to the Court of Justice, the traditional principle 
audi alteram partem requires that the person against whom an administrative 
procedure has been initiated must have been afforded the opportunity, during that 
procedure, to make known his views on the truth and relevance of the facts and 
circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support its 
claim that there has been infringement of EU law. Thus, the Court of Justice has 
repeatedly held that the right to a fair hearing is a fundamental principle of 
Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing 
the procedure in question265. 
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When it comes to the duty of care, also referred to as the principle of care or 
due diligence, can be described as a procedural tool for individuals to ensure that the 
Union’s Institutions handle their affaires with care in a twofold way, how the matter is 
handled and how different elements are assessed and balanced266. Thus, this principle 
imposes the obligation to observe duties and practices that do not lead to mistakes 
adversely affecting private parties267, but also to take into account the relevant input 
of third parties with no formal status in the administrative procedure in question268. 
The implications in practical terms of this principle are269, for instance, in the field of 
customs, that the Commission shall monitor trade between the EU and third 
countries270; or, in the field of medicines, that the OHIM shall respect certain 
deadlines and procedural practices that guarantee the effectiveness of the 
proceedings271. 
 
Last but not least, the right to a reasoned decision was an essential right in the 
earliest European procedural law272, as a consequence of its early incorporation to the 
Treaties273. As promptly as the Nold274 ruling in the late 50’s, the Court of Justice 
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established that a proper statement of reasons shall always support the decision taken. 
Later, it detailed that decisions must enumerate the facts forming the legal basis of the 
measure and the considerations which led to the adoption of such decision275. The 
obligation to state the reasons is aimed; firstly, at limiting the scope of discretionary 
powers of the executive276; secondly, at allowing the European judicature to exercise 
its powers of review of the legality of the decision277; and, thirdly, from the 
perspective of the individual, at enabling the concerned person to defend their rights 
with prior knowledge of the reasons of the contested decision278. 
 
Besides these core procedurals rights, some more procedural rights have been 
progressively introduced, either by the Court of Justice like the right to a reasonable 
duration of the procedures279; of by written law, like the right to address the 
institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to 
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obtain a reply in the same language280, or the right to a reasonable duration of the 
proceedings281. 
 
However, the case law of the Court of Justice does not provide the necessary 
legal certainty as for the extent of certain aspect of those procedural rights that have 
not been codified in an act of general scope282; and there is an ambivalent approach on 
the conception of those rights as to whether the focus shall be put on the interest goals 
advanced by the rights of defence or on it individual protection regardless of its 
contribution to the public interest283. The controversy surrounding the different 
approaches concerning the extent of individual procedural rights adopted by the Court 
of First Instance and the Court of Justice in cases like Monsanto / Commission284 and 
Reynolds / Parliament285 provides evidence for this lack of consistency. 
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Hence, it is still doubtful whether the procedural rights integrated in the right 
to a good administration constitutes a standard or an essentially individual right286. 
Although the Court of Justice does not admit it explicitly, and European courts always 
proceed and deliberates on a case-by-case basis287, the overall trend points out 
towards the consideration as an individual right288. Indeed, recent derivations of the 
right to a good administration have a purely individual impact, such as the right not to 
be treated in a way that it harms business reputation and secrecy289; thus linking the 
right of good administration to individual fundamental rights. 
 
The principle of proportionality, originating in the German legal tradition290, 
has been an essential general principle for the configuration of EU administrative 
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law291. It has worked as a balancing principle between public interest and individual 
rights or, in more abstract terms, a liberal rights-based constitutional rationality and a 
strong commitment to the Union’s public goals292. It has been enshrined in the 
provisions of primary law293, but more than those provisions, the essential content of 
the principle is to be found in the case law of the Court of Justice. 
 
This principle can be inferred from rulings as early as in the 1950’s294, and 
there is an early formulation of the principle so as to balance private and public 
interests in the opinion of the Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe in the case 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft295. As it was subsequently developed by the Court 
of Justice since the Fedesa296 ruling and several later cases297, taking on the German 
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legal tradition298, respect for the principle of proportionality involves a threefold test; 
firstly, the suitability test, i.e. whether the measure is the appropriate means to achieve 
a legitimate aim; secondly, the necessity test, i. e. whether the measure necessary to 
achieve is less restrictive means available;  and  thirdly, the proportionality test stricto 
sensu or balancing test, that is, whether a suitable and necessary measure 
notwithstanding imposes an excessive burden on the interests of the individual299 
 
Although these three tests remain nominally untouched since the first 
formulation300 an evolution is noticeable. Initially, the key element in the assessment 
was individual rights301. When deciding, the Court of Justice focused primarily on the 
extent to which an individual right was affected302 to determine whether the measure 
was disproportionate. This was a consequence of the more careful consideration that 
the Court of Justice gave to fundamental rights, a phenomenon motivated by the push 
of the German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof303 to the European judges to adopt a 
more fundamental rights-based approach to European integration304. 
                                                                                                                                            
be unfounded . Since the Council committed no manifest error in that respect, it was also entitled to 
take the view that, regard being had to the requirements of health protection, the removal of barriers to 
trade and distortions of competition could not be achieved by means of less onerous measures such as 
the dissemination of information to consumers and the labelling of meat. 
Finally, it must be stated that the importance of the objectives pursued is such as to justify even 
substantial negative financial consequences for certain traders. 
Consequently, the principle of proportionality has not been infringed." 
297
 Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I-4863, at 
paragraph 41; Case C-157/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, at paragraph 
60; and Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, at paragraph 81. 
298
 The Bundesverfassungsgericht had settled exactly the three same subprinciples, at Nicholas 
Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law, Kluwer Law (The Hague, 1996), at 26-36. 
299
 There are some commentators that argue that the second and third tests are in reality only one 
according to the case-law. In this sense, Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU law, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 2006), at 139. 
300
 Case C-2/10, Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini and Eolica di Altamura [2011]not yet published, 
at paragraph 73; Case C-127/07 Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine [2008]  ECR I-09895, at paragraph 
59; and Joined cases C-37/06 and C-58/06, Viamex Agrar Handels and Zuchtvieh-Kontor [2008] ECR 
I-69, at paragraph 35. 
301
 Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality…, at 172. 
302
 See for instance the opinion of AG Trabucchi in Case 118/75, Watson and Belmann, [1976] ECR 
1201, at 1209:  
“The requirements of life in a community and the fulfilment of the tasks incumbent on the State may 
call for adjustments in the definition of that degree of freedom which the subjective right of the 
individual represents. To constitute violation of the right, it is not enough that there should be any 
limitation whatever; the substance of the right must be affected.” 
303
 In particular the Judgment of 29 May 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271. This case is generally known as 
Solange I for the use of the same phrase in the court's decision: 
162 
 
 
This is not to say that the Court has become more deferent to the activity of the 
Institutions. On the contrary, when deciding what is a disproportionate measure, the 
Court of Justice has moved from a minimalist conception of only if manifestly 
inappropriate305 to a more exigent check. This evolution was not necessarily by 
initiative of the Court of Justice but rather because the Institution participating in the 
legislative process committed themselves to move away from process of law-making 
to process of regulation306. This was best illustrated by the interinstitutional agreement 
on better law making of 2003307 which fostered co-regulation and self-regulation, 
making the intervention of the European legislator conditional of the impossibility or 
inadequacy of the former mechanisms. 
 
Nevertheless, there are hints in the current case-law that the judicial approach 
is changing towards a procedural rather than substantial analysis308.  This change of 
approach can be evidenced in two recent judgements. In the Vodafone case309 -where 
the ‘proportionality’ of the Commission’s decision to impose a mandatory Euro-tariff 
for roaming costs of all mobile telephone operators was debated310– the Court of 
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Justice investigated on the details of the elaboration of the Regulation311, and when it 
ascertained that the European lawmakers had done a proper job in terms of 
preparatory studies, stakeholders’ participation, and impartial consideration of all 
relevant pieces of information, it concluded that the principle had not been 
breached312. In conclusion, the procedural rather than substantive assessment 
prevailed313. 
 
The contemporary ruling in Volker and Markus Schecke314 confirms the 
procedural approach can trigger inverse consequences. Related to the validity of 
certain provisions of two regulations315 that mandated the publication of the names of 
beneficiaries of agricultural funds, the Court of Justice found the measure 
disproportionate as regards he individuals’ fundamental right to privacy. The Court of 
Justice put the focus on the perspective on the fundamental rights316, but the reason 
why it found a breach of the principle of proportionality was primarily because the 
preparatory work was insufficient317. 
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Ultimately, the recent case law is already paving the way to a procedural 
approach of judicial review when it comes to the assessment of principles once 
thought to entail a purely substantive, results-oriented analysis, like he principle of 
proportionality. One could argue that the out of the conflicting approaches to 
subjective rights described in the famous work of Ronald Dworkin “Taking rights 
seriously” the procedural approach has gained ground and will probably prevail in the 
future. This is why what happens in the in the process of making a decision, enacting 
a rule or even designing a policy is so important, in itself and later in the possible 
judicial review of the resulting act, rule or action. 
 
In conclusion, the contribution of the Court of Justice has given prescriptive 
value to the notion of administrative procedures. Hence, even if not codified or even 
regulated, administrative procedures and its general principles bring about a general 
method of developing public activity, a notion undoubtedly applicable to national 
administration but also to the public powers at the European Union level318.  
 
That being said, it is expected that, in the future, the concretisation and 
development of those principles will come not only from the European judges but also 
from the European legislator. The Treaty of Lisbon is a good example in this sense, 
although it generally goes no further than the enshrinement of general principles as 
formulated by the Court of Justice319. Rephrasing the words of Ronald Dworkin in his 
work “Taking rights seriously”, when the general principles are put into practice and 
used to decide hard cases, who makes the policy decisions, a judge or a legislator, 
matters. According to him, it is a more democratic approach is to leave those policy 
decisions to elected bodies so judges limit their analysis to procedural issues320. So 
far, this generally has not been the case, but once the principles have been codified, it 
is expected that the legislator will have a more powerful say. 
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3.4.5.- The codification of administrative procedures in the European Union 
 
It was in the 1990’s that the development and consolidation of EU 
administrative law led to some voices in the academic world to posit a general 
codification of EU procedures321. Today, the subject has become a classic issue of 
debate among scholar, with its supporters and detractors322, which is only logical 
considering the very different stance on codification of administrative procedures in 
the various European national traditions. 
 
At the level of the academia, there is indeed a divergence of opinions as for the 
convenience of codification. Some authors have long advocated for a general 
harmonising administrative procedures regulation applicable throughout the EU and 
its Member States, stressing the benefits of codification and the many factors that 
make it necessary323. They draw an analogy with the codification in the US, which 
was long and controversial, but finally resulted in more efficiency for the public 
interest and easier judicial control324. 
 
Other commentators argue that codifying would not only be controversial as to 
whether there is a sufficient legal base in the Treaties, but also that such a regulation 
would be very inefficient in the current context. For instance, professor Carlow points 
out that procedural rules are necessary, but they must be area-specific, otherwise there 
is a risk that general rules are quickly outdated, and thus shall be continuously 
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rewritten325. In such a way, a code would lose its usefulness and become more of a 
burden than a tool for efficient administration. In a similar vein, some New 
Governance theorists understand that codification might be counterproductive for the 
purposes of the development of some of the current trends of governance326.  
 
In practice, however, the scholarly debate among the supporters of  
codification, or at least some legislative systematization of the existing rules and 
principles, takes places considering less maximalist options. In the current state of 
affairs two main alternatives have been postulated:  
 
On the one hand, a relatively precise administrative procedure act. Within this 
alternative, the scope of the European act has been debated so as to be limited to the 
EU administration only (including the Commission and the different agencies) or to 
include also de administrations of member States when they execute or cooperate in 
the execution of EU law. The more far-reaching proposal to have a fully harmonising 
act including national administrative legislations too would encounter the opposition 
of Member States, each with a different legal tradition as we have seen, and some 
would argue the breach of the subsidiarity principle327. 
 
A codification would be in line with the traditions of most Member States with 
codes of administrative procedure. However, there would be a difference between 
those general procedural acts which are only applicable to one administrative level, 
like the German Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz which is only binding to the public 
administration at the federal level, and those containing general principles applicable 
to all administrative bodies, including regions and municipalities, like the Spanish Ley 
de Procedimiento Administrativo Común and the Italian Nuove norme di 
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procedimento amministrativo328. As we will see afterwards329, the European act shall 
be closer to the latter alternatives than to the German model, among other things, 
because the German alternative reflects the constitutional limitation of shared spheres 
of competence and, more generally, cooperation between Bund and the Länder330. The 
determination of the scope of the European act is an essential question for the 
development of this work. 
 
The codification should take the form of a regulation that should be precise331, 
but not so much to impede for flexibility in the areas where specific provisions are 
needed; and that it would be a general procedure applicable only if there is no sector-
specific law, in which case, except for perhaps essential mandatory rules of principle, 
the special regulation would be prevalent. 
 
On the other hand, there are less ambitious proposals which posit a soft-law 
instrument for general principles coupled with sector-specific regulations. This would 
be a more conservative approach, which basically represents the status quo332. The 
case-law of the Court of Justice, as previously examined, counts at present as a source 
of systematization for general principles. The EU code of good administrative 
behaviour333 is already a clear example of a simple soft-law instrument, and the 
vertical regulations of different procedures are proliferating334. These alternatives do 
not add any valuable systematisation or, for that matter, legal certainty to the current 
situation. 
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The Institutions have also stepped in the debate. The European Parliament 
showed a keen interest on the subject, and decided to set up a Working Group on EU 
Administrative Law within the Committee of Legal Affairs335, which concluded in 
2011 with a working document that recommended the enactment of a piece of 
legislation providing for a general procedure limited to the direct EU 
administration336. The plenary of Parliament adopted a resolution urging the 
Commission to draft a legislative initiative337 on a law of administrative procedure in 
the European Union338. The resolution posits that the regulation shall codify two 
aspects. Firstly, it should contain several general principles339, most of which have 
already been established in detail by the Court of Justice340. Others could be found in 
secondary legislation341 or soft-law instruments342. Secondly, it shall provide for 
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certain rules governing administrative decisions, again, many of which had already 
been recognised by the case-law of the European courts, like the right to be heard343 
or the duty to state reasons344, or the right to have one’s affairs dealt with a reasonable 
time-limit345. 
 
The resolution has formally put codification of administrative procedures on 
the agenda of the Institutions346, even with a limited scope, as it is restricted to direct 
implementation. All process of codification entails a long period of ripening, as was 
the case in countries that enacted general acts of administrative procedure347, and, 
considering the width and depth of the debate on the codification of administrative 
procedures348, some authors argue that we are in a pre-codification period349. The new 
Article 298 TFEU, read in connection with Article 41 ChFR, provides a legal basis for 
the envisaged codification350. 
The strongest reason to codify administrative procedure is to end with the 
current normative fragmentation and thus comply with an essential principle of 
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administrative law; legal certainty351. Current rules of administrative procedure have 
been described by professor Nehl as a patchwork codification tailored to the specific 
requirements of sectorial policy implementation. They are barely consistent with one 
another and suffer from serious gaps, the most serious of which is individual 
protection352. Many of those gaps cannot be avoided by the creativity of the Court of 
Justice353.  
 
Secondary law contains many different provisions that can be classified in: 
 
- General acts, or limited codification with a horizontal dimension, i. e. with 
rules applicable to all or many administrative procedures354. This includes the 
regulation on the language regime355; staff regulation356; regulation on periods, dates 
and time limits357; regulation on access to documents358; regulation on data 
protection359; financial regulation360; the executive agencies regulation361; and the 
commitology regulation362. 
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-Special acts, or area-specific rules at the vertical dimension, which contain 
details, often complete, rules on certain administrative procedures363. 
 
A second factor is democratic legitimacy364. In a field as sensitive for 
individual rights as administrative procedures, the formulation and specification  of 
general principles only by the EU judges is unsatisfactory from a democratic 
rationale. Likewise, in absence of de minimis general rules, it is objectionable that the 
Commission or even agencies are free to determine certain aspects of administrative 
procedures. An ordinary legislative procedure with the intervention of the European 
Parliament would be the appropriate normative path and institutional source to 
regulate the major aspects of administrative procedures365. 
 
Furthermore, there are other factors, such as the enhancement of individual 
rights and guarantees by making them more simple to know by citizens, the efficiency 
of administrative actions thanks to a unified legal framework, and the opportunity to 
innovate, taking into account all consolidated know-how of the national 
codifications366. The danger of ossification367, pointed out by some of the sceptics of 
codification as a major drawback could be overcome by making rules general in 
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nature, avoiding excessive substantive uniformity368, and, except for certain basic 
norms that could not be abrogated in detriment of the citizen, applicable only in the 
absence of a special regulation. As Ziller has underlined, codification at the national 
level has not prevented a growth of area-specific procedural regulations369, precisely 
in this state of affairs, a codification would make it all more coherent370.  
 
There is an additional factor bearing particular relevance for the purposes of 
this work that has been largely neglected by authors discussing codification. As it was 
largely commented in the first chapter, the development of EU public administration 
is shifting towards patterns of intense cooperation with national authorities. It is for 
this reason too, increasingly more important as these schemes proliferate, that 
codification is so urgent371. A clear procedural framework is critical to meet the 
challenges that new administrative schemes entail, an idea that will be further 
explored. 
 
It is for that reason that it would be a mistake to limit the subjective scope of 
the regulation to the EU administration when acting in direct administration 
procedures, as the European Parliament has initially postulated. The main problems 
that should be tackled are precisely in administrative procedures where cooperation 
with national authorities is key. When the European legislator postulated for such 
limited subjective scope, it probably had in mind the traditional distinction between 
direct and indirect administration372 –the latter pertaining to the administrative powers 
of national authorities–, but as we have seen in the previous chapter this vision is no 
more than an illusion with little resemblance to reality. 
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Even the concluding document of the working group appointed by the 
European Parliament stresses than enhanced compatibility between EU and Member 
States law is one of the main objectives. Hence, when cooperation between the two 
take place, the European law shall rule procedural aspects of such cooperation. 
 
It has been acknowledged, even by the most prominent supporter of a wide-
reaching codification373, that there are serious doubts as to whether the European law 
can directly affect national administrative procedures374. However, prominent 
administrative law scholars like della Cananea have advocated for the competency of 
the Union to regulate even the execution by Member States of EU law375, i.e. indirect 
administration. Professor Ziller, who also admits the impossibility of codifying 
national administrative procedures with a European regulation, postulates that the 
rules and principles of the future act shall be applicable to the forms of cooperation 
between the Union and member States administrative authorities376. 
 
This solution is furthermore consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, main 
burden to a full harmonisation, because there is no way to proceduralise cooperation 
between the Union and national public administration at an inferior normative level 
than that of the EU. 
 
This outline of the codification movement provides evidence that there is an 
emerging consensus among the academia and the Institutions with normative powers 
that a regulation codifying administrative procedures shall be enacted. It is an 
appropriate opportunity to tackle with a general norm many of the challenges and 
shortcoming that composite procedures present, and thus address the numerous 
procedural issues that remain open. In this vein, it is imperative to bring into the 
debate the question as to what shall be the appropriate scope of such act. 
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3.4.6.- Types of administrative procedures from the EU perspective 
 
 
This last section intends to offer a useful classification of administrative 
procedures as regards EU law. It thus links the category of EU procedures with the 
core notion of the thesis. The delimitation of composite procedures entails a definition 
a contrario. Composite procedures must qualify as those which are neither purely 
national nor exclusively EU administrative procedures. The delimitation of this grey 
area when composite procedures are located is not an easy task. Any remote 
intervention of EU Member States in the adoption of an act does not render it 
“composite”, few or no procedures would then be purely European. Identifying the 
features that a composite procedure shall gather is essential for the further analysis of 
the legal challenges they present.  
 
The classic divide direct/indirect administration prima facie reflects the two 
big categories of administrative procedures. In cases where execution of EU policies 
is carried out by the very EU Institutions and agencies, we are in presence of a purely 
EU administrative procedures, in cases where the execution corresponds to Member 
States, national administrative procedures come into play. In reality, the distinction is 
more complex. 
 
EU administrative procedures are relevant first of all in areas of direct 
administration. Where the EU public administration is in charge of all the phases of 
the policy cycle and, specifically, in the execution of EU policies, procedures are 
purely European. Those areas are normally related to the exclusive competencies of 
the Union377. The administrative proceedings established are the paradigm of pure EU 
administrative procedures and, as such, they are provided for in EU acts of direct 
application, the paradigm of which are regulations. Examples of those procedures 
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include the Customs code378 and Code's implementing provisions379; the Regulation 
on antitrust policy380; the Regulation on merger control381: the Regulation on State 
aid382; the Regulation on structural and cohesion funds383; the Regulation on single 
common market organisations384 and the Regulation on ECB sanctioning powers385. 
Even in the fields governed by EU administrative procedures, there are different types 
of cooperation with Member States. For example, in the field of customs even if the 
procedure is completely regulated at the EU level, national authorities act merely as 
agents applying EU law. In the field of competition, there are several mechanisms of 
cooperation between the EU and national competition authorities.  
 
A second important example of EU administrative procedures would be the 
purely internal proceedings of the Institutions386. It would be, for instance, the case of 
the administration and execution of the EU budget387 and procedures contained in the 
staff regulations388. 
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A third example would be the case of EU procedures concerning the link of 
the EU administration and private parties engaged in contractual activity. It would be 
the case of the procurement legislation389. 
 
Finally, those procedures that concern sanctioning powers of the Institutions 
towards member States are also provided for in EU administrative procedures. The 
clearest example is the pre-contentious stage of the infringement procedure390, which 
is handled by the Commission. 
 
On the other hand, national administrative procedures are those provided for in 
national, or even sub-national, instruments. The typical example would be the 
proceedings regulated in national law through which EU law is executed391. When 
executing EU law, Members States must balance the procedural autonomy that they 
enjoy with the loyal cooperation that they are bound to.  
 
This results in a situation where their autonomy to determine administrative 
procedures as they see fit must be nuanced by increasing pressure for some degree of 
homogenisation, in such a way that national procedural law becomes increasingly 
functionalized to the requirements of effectiveness of substantive EU law392.  
 
However, the fact that national procedural law is heavily influenced by EU law 
and that, when executing EU law, national authorities must have some sort of contact 
with EU entities does not qualify those procedures as `European`. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is subtle. Hence the relevance of conceptualising and assessing procedures 
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qualifying neither as purely national nor as entirely European393. This will be done at 
length in the following chapter. 
 
 
3.5.- Conclusions 
 
'Administrative procedure' is an essential concept of Administrative Law that 
European Union law borrowed from European traditions. But in those traditions the 
dynamisism of this legal concept has been extraordinary. The idea that administrative 
procedure is a sequence of formalities bearing no external relevance has long been 
overcome, but there are reminiscences lingering in national legislations and in EU 
law. 
 
Administrative procedures bring about rights for the citizens, not necessarily 
linked to the final decision or rule adopted. This feature has phenomenal 
consequences for our analysis. Procedure has become a guarantee, and not only that 
the activity of the public administration is lawful, but also that it is transparent, that it 
accommodates legitimate interests of stakeholders, and that it gathers all the relevant 
pieces of information. All of it facilitates judicial review of administrative activity and 
strengthens the status of private parties. Although this trend has often come hand in 
hand with the progressive recognition of more and more individual procedural rights, 
it has not brought about codification of administrative procedures in all European 
countries. That is, codification is neither a prerequisite nor a consequence of the 
reinforcement of administrative procedures. However, codification does increase the 
level of legal certainty thanks to a simpler legal framework and facilitates a 
comprehensive and coherent spectrum of citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the activities of 
public power. 
 
Nowadays, administrative procedures face many challenges. Most of them are 
derived of the uptake of new governance approaches, and hence a more informal, less 
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hierarchical fashion of carrying out administrative action. One of the most remarkable 
trends is cooperation between administrative actors, but also cooperation with the 
private sector. Public administration can hardly perform all of the tasks it is endowed 
with alone, and this phenomenon leads to many questions as regards the place and 
function of administrative procedures in those schemes of cooperation. 
 
Little doubts have been raised about the existence of administrative procedures 
at the European Union level. On the contrary, the European legislator, European 
judges and legal scholarship have taken them for granted. They exist, even if they are 
still far from codified, but they do because of the peculiar, qualifying features of the 
EU, while this is not the case in international organisations. And there is a whole 
corpus of principles and rules developed by the Court of Justice and, more recently, 
based in the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, that shape a well-
established doctrine of administrative procedures. Logically, the notion and legal 
effects of administrative procedures in the EU have evolved in parallel to the 
maturation of administrative procedures at the national level; hence, participation, 
transparency and accountability shape the new procedural rights recognised to the 
individuals. 
 
After an analysis of the recent case-law of Court of Justice with regard to those 
principles and, notably, the principle of proportionality and the right to a good 
administration, it is possible to perceive an increasingly procedural stance on the 
assessment of administrative rules and actions, coming simultaneously as the 
individual rights-approach to judicial review. This has significant consequences for 
our analysis. 
 
The old scholarly debate on the convenience of the codification of 
administrative procedures in the European Union has reached a new stage after the 
request of the European Parliament to the Commission for a proposal on a European 
general administrative procedures regulation. While we have seen that codification is 
not present in all European countries, it would entail a meaningful step in tackling 
many of the challenges that administrative procedures face today. The fact that the 
debate has reached the level of the pre-legislative debate all but increases the interest 
of the solutions we might propose with regard to composite procedures. 
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As we will see in the next chapter, composite procedures are probably the kind 
of EU administrative procedures most in need of codification. That is because the 
legal challenges that they raise are powerful and can only be tackled with a common 
framework law and a clear recognition of procedural rights. A general legal regime 
would help to avoid the many gaps in judicial review that we shall see later on. It is 
therefore a mistake to restrict the law to procedures of direct EU administration, as if 
the others were only indirect administration and thus remain in the so questioned 
procedural autonomy of member States. 
 
Good procedures are essential to good substance. Appropriate procedural 
requirements contribute to quality outcomes. History shows that efficiency cannot 
justify lack of procedures and procedural rights, because indeed, administrative 
procedures are the best guaranty not only of liberty and individual rights, like Rudolf 
von Ihering argued several centuries ago394, but of the improvement of administrative 
rule and decision-making. 
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4.1.- Preliminary remarks 
 
Composite procedures result from the reshaping of the European administrative 
structures towards a more co-operative EU-national model. This structural change is 
happening at the same time as a profound evolution in the concept of administrative 
procedure.  
 
With the considerations of the two previous Chapters in mind, we arrive at the 
core element of the doctoral dissertation, which is the concept of composite procedures. 
‘Composite procedures’ is a concept increasingly used by legal academia and it is 
generally accepted today. However, providing a definition of composite procedures, 
both simple and comprehensive, turns out to be as a very complicated task.  
 
There is a tension between strictness and comprehensiveness. On the one hand, 
there is a need to put some limits to the large notion of proceduralised cooperation 
between the EU and Member States, so that the definition is relevant and has a clear 
delimitation. Otherwise, we would only be discussing the legal challenges of 
cooperation between the European public administration and its national counterparts. 
On the other hand, a very strict instance consisting on a list of clearly identifiable legal 
characteristics is counterproductive, as it leaves outside many situations whose legal 
problems also need to be tackled. 
 
Precisely, as we will see in this Chapter, composite procedures have proliferated 
out of necessity, and the European legislator has established these procedures as a 
compromise solution for specific cases. A compromise that stems from the objective of 
harmonisation, concentration of information and centralisation of decisions, on one side, 
and from the protection of national powers or, just pragmatically, the fact that expert 
information resources are at the national level, on the other. The legislator did not have 
any particular pattern in mind when setting up these procedures, so it is only natural that 
this pattern can hardly be constructed academically. But it is a task that cannot be 
escaped. We have seen the background of the emergence of administrative procedural 
cooperation and a new phenomenon which we will call composite procedures. A 
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definition is necessary in order to proceed further in analysing the legal challenges, 
shortcomings and solutions that relate to composite procedures. When giving this 
definition we need to be aware that it will remain either too weak or too rigid. A 
description of the main examples of composite procedures will help to the 
conceptualisation. 
 
4.2.- Composite procedures; concept, term and scholarly attention 
 
4.2.1.-What are composite procedures? 
 
The first difficulty regarding composite procedures is that there is no solid legal 
source to define it. As we will see, the EU secondary legislation establishes composite 
procedures in a purely fragmentary fashion, regulating the procedures on a case-by-case 
basis and without any general legal framework. Primary law, as we have seen, ignores 
composite procedures and assumes that indirect administration is the rule and direct 
implementation is the exception, as if nothing existed in-between1.  
 
Moreover, the European judges have circumvented the notion of composite 
procedures. When confronted with a legal shortcoming stemming from the complex 
nature of composite procedure, the European Courts have put the focus on the specific 
problem of the case while avoiding to see a more general, far-reaching phenomenon. An 
example of this statement is the description of a composite procedure in France 
Aviation2, a case in which the right to be heard was declared infringed. The Court 
identified simply an administrative procedure with two differentiated stages without 
appreciating any peculiar characteristic. while indeed, the reason why the right to be 
heard had not been respected was precisely that in the scheme of cooperation it was not 
clear before whom the individual had a right to a hearing. 
 
"The Court finds in limine that, in accordance with the relevant legislation 
described above, the administrative procedure which culminated in the adoption 
of the contested decision involved various stages, on the one hand, at national 
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 Case T-346/94, France Aviation / Commission [1995] ECR II-284. This case will be analysed at lenght 
in section 5.2.2. 
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level, since the applicant submitted its application for repayment, together with 
supporting documents, to the French administration and, on the other, at 
Community level, since the French administration drew up the applicant' s case 
and transmitted it to the Commission, which, after consulting a group of experts, 
declared the application for repayment to be unjustified."3 
 
That is why, for a general conceptualisation of composite procedures, it is 
necessary to rely essentially on academic sources, although considering both the 
legislation and the case law on composite procedures, because neither secondary law 
nor the rulings of the Court of Justice deal with composite procedures in a general 
fashion, or name them like that, for that matter. 
 
In a broad sense, one could argue that composite procedures are those 
administrative procedures in which both the European and the national public 
administrations intervene to reach a decision. In a public administration like the 
European one, so characterised by cooperation with national public administrations, it is 
easy to picture that a large part of the European administrative procedures would fit in 
that definition. This large understanding of composite procedures corresponds with the 
idea that some of the authors that have dealt with the subject-matter. The composite 
element of administrative procedures appears when both the European and national 
level of administration play a role in the design, enactment, implementation and 
enforcement of policies. Professor Herwig Hofmann defines composite procedures as 
multiple-step procedures with input from administrative actors belonging to different 
jurisdictions4, which entail highly integrated administrative procedural cooperation for 
development and implementation of EU policies5. Their main feature is that both 
national authorities and EU actors take part in making decisions in the administration of 
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C. H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law – Towards an 
Integrated Administration, Edward Elgar Publishing  (Cheltenham , 2009), 136-67, at 136. 
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European policies6. They go beyond the classic dichotomy of the "direct" and "indirect" 
implementation of EU law7. 
 
From this broad perspective, composite procedures are sequences of procedural 
steps in which administrative bodies from the national administration and the European 
Union provide with a contribution to the final result, normally a decision at either level. 
The core element of the notion is that intense cooperation between national and 
European authorities crystallises in a procedural arrangement with different degrees of 
formalism.  
 
This is a flexible approach that most scholars that have dealt with composite 
procedures would agree upon8. However, there is a problem to such definition regarding 
its limits. Most administrative procedures at the level of the European Union require 
some kind of intervention of the Member States, even in the form of a mere exchange of 
information. Similarly, at present, many national administrative procedures are largely 
influenced by European rules or actors, a phenomenon called by some authors the 
'Europeanisation' of national administrations9. For this reason, it is difficult to set a clear 
borderline between those procedures with a minimal, negligible intervention of another 
administrative authority, perhaps in the form of a mere transmission of information, and 
those which, because the degree of cooperation is very intense, depart from a regular 
administrative procedure either at the European or at the national level. Thus, reliance 
on external data by a public administration might happen with respect to mere 
information supplied by private actors, third countries, or international organisations but 
                                                 
6
 Giacinto della Cananea, “The European Union’s mixed administrative proceedings”, 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2004), 197-218, at 198. 
7
 Luis Ángel Ballesteros Moffa, “The Application of EU Law: Relevant Aspects of European 
Administrative Procedure”, Workshop on EU administrative law: state of play and future prospects (León 
- Spain), at 94, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=5998
3. 
8
 In this sense, Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, “Structures and Function of Administrative Procedures in 
German, European and International Law”, in Javier Barnes (ed.), Transforming Administrative 
Procedure, Global Law Press (Seville, 2008), 47-74, at 51; Mario Chiti, Diritto Administrativo Europeo, 
Giuffrè Editore (Milan, 2011), at 469; Della Cananea, “The European Union’s mixed …”, at 198; and 
Claudio Franchini and Giacinto della Cananea, I principi dell'amministrazione europea , G. Giapichelli 
Editore (Torino, 2013), at 195. 
9
 See footnote 269 of the second chapter. 
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this element does not necessarily entail a substantial modification of the nature of the 
procedure. 
 
As it will be explained with detail in the following Chapter, the actual legal 
challenges that composite procedures bring about happen when this cooperation is so 
intense that the input from one public administration on the administrative procedure 
followed by the other has legal consequences per se. In other words, the contribution of 
the 'other' level of public administration is not a mere source of information that the 
public administration in charge of the decision can use with full discretion. There must 
be a further element, the input has to be decisive or, at least, it has to have a determinant 
effect in the subsequent steps that the other public administration follows. The input 
must then be substantial. That happens, for instance, when a public administration 
receives an application and decides whether to proceed with it and forward it to the 
other administration or to declare it inadmissible, or when a report with a favourable 
opinion by another public administration is necessary in order to proceed to the final 
decision.  
 
For the purposes of this doctoral dissertation, it is necessary to define a stricter 
concept that goes beyond the general notion of cooperation. Hence, a notion of 
composite procedures stricto sensu will be used throughout this thesis, and the examples 
that will be explained in this Chapter will usually pertain to this more rigorous 
understanding. Based on the assumption that the cooperation is intense within the 
framework of an administrative procedure at one level, the qualifying element for the 
presence of a composite procedure from this strict approach is that the contribution by 
the other administrative level is so relevant that it has a decisive effect on the outcome. 
 
Consequently, what introduces a qualitative change in the nature of a procedure 
is the fact that the intervention of another administrative actor is binding upon the one 
that must take the final decision. Thus, for example, the fact that a report is necessary 
from another public administration would not be sufficient according to this strict 
approach. However, the intervention of another public administration in form of a report 
that has a direct and automatic impact on the procedure, producing legal effects 
irrespective of the appreciation of the authority in charge of taking the decision, does 
entail a substantial change in the nature of the procedure. This happens in such a way 
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because the authority in charge of taking a final decision is limited in its autonomy, and 
the intervening authority takes a relevant partial responsibility in the outcome of the 
procedure. 
 
Procedures of such kind are the ones that raise relevant legal challenges, as we 
will see extensively in the next Chapter, regarding access to justice or the effectiveness 
of procedural rights like the right to be heard10. It can easily be understood that if the 
authority taking the decision is somehow bound by a previous procedural step that 
another public administration took charge of, the possibilities of a judicial review, for 
instance, is severely affected as the administration taking the final decision will not be 
responsible for possible mistakes that the 'other' public administration made. Similarly, 
one could envisage relevant questions on the obligation to give reasons or the right to be 
heard. These legal concerns do not raise with such intensity when there is a mere 
reliance on the information provided by another level of administration, but the 
administrative authority taking the final decision still takes responsibility for assessing 
this information and deciding freely on the whole. 
 
Following those considerations, from this stricter point of view, composite 
procedures can be defined as administrative procedures in which both national and 
European administrative actors cooperate and share responsibility for the decision or 
measure adopted by one of them. More descriptively, composite procedures stricto 
sensu are administrative sequences in which actors from both the European and national 
public administration intervene and contribute with an input that is binding and cannot 
be overseen by the margin of appreciation of the authority that formally determines the 
final outcome of the procedure. 
 
Nevertheless, one has to be aware that the strict definition could leave aside 
cases that have been considered composite procedures by the academia. Moreover, there 
are times when the presence of such binding character is far from clear, for instance, 
when the legislation does not state the binding character of a report prepared by national 
bodies of experts but, due to the very technical nature of the authorisation procedure, the 
                                                 
10
 Sandra Antoniazzi, "Procedimenti amministrativi comunitari composti e principio del contraddittorio", 
in 3-4 Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico (2007), 641-736, at 700. 
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European authorities -lacking the needed technical expertise- cannot in practice but 
follow the conclusions. 
 
4.2.2.-Why the term ‘composite procedures’? 
 
Legal academia identified that there was a notion of administrative procedures 
where European and national administration took relevant part. This phenomenon has 
been addressed this concept with different names by the authors.  
 
For example, professor Schmidt-Aßmann referred to staged procedures, thus 
focusing on the different stages of the sequence11. For each different stage there are 
different actors whose participation is essential. 
 
Another adjective that has been used by scholars is 'mixed'. The term mixed 
procedures refers to those procedures characterised by the addition or amalgamation of 
contributions by different authorities. In this vein, professor Della Cannanea argued that 
both national authorities and either the Commission or EU agencies take part in making 
decisions in the administration of EU policies12. They do not mirror a constitutional 
structure based on separated powers but, rather, highlight the interaction of these 
powers13, hence with an emphasis on the element of mixticity. 
 
Finally, professor Mario Chiti, a leading scholar in the field of European 
administrative law, started to use the term procedimenti composti14, refering to the 
successive administrative organs that added their input to a single procedure, thus a 
procedure composed of different contributions. This terminology has been picked up by 
                                                 
11
 Schmidt-Aßmann, “Structures and Function of Administrative...", at 51. A variant of this term can be 
found in work of political scientists, see for example,  reference to 'multi-staged' procedures in Thomas 
Gehring, "Communicative Rationality in European Governance? Interests and Communicative Action in 
Functionally Differentiated Single Market Regulation", in Erik O. Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Jürgen 
Neyer (eds.), European Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation, ARENA (Oslo, 
2003), 57-140, at 126. 
12
 Della Cananea, “The European Union’s mixed …”, at 198. 
13
 Ibid. at 198. 
14
 Mario Chiti, Diritto Administrativo Europeo… at 469-70 (term also used in the first editions of this 
work).  
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other scholars. Professor Hoffman, for example, has extensively written on the topic of 
'composite procedures'15. 
 
Considering there is no other authority than legal doctrine for the name of this 
concept, since no reference to it can be found in the case-law or in the legislation, and 
the relative immaturity of its study, one could choose the term one deems more 
descriptive.  
 
'Composite' is the most suitable adjective for the concept that this dissertation 
intends to analyse. Composite refers to an object or item made u of different things, 
parts or substances16. For our purposes, a procedure made up of the aggregation of the 
inputs of the diverse administrative authorities. Ethimologically, the term is the most 
pertinent as it refers to the process of putting 'ponere' together 'cum' with a very 
straightforward translation to Latin languages17. This notion exists in German too18. It 
can be argued that this feature of aggregation is also present in the term 'mixed', 
meaning items that consists of things of substances of different origins or types19. 
However, the term composite puts the emphasis on the feature that those elements come 
together to conform something different and are not merely added up, going beyond a 
mere juxtaposition of procedural arrangements.  
 
4.2.3.-The increasing importance of composite procedures in legal academia 
 
Composite procedures have been subject to a systematic academic analysis only 
very recently, from the decade of 2000's. It was analysed extensively how the logic of 
cooperation has been overshadowing the logic of separation almost since the beginning 
of the European Communities, contrary to what was written on the Treaties20. Only after 
composite procedures have proliferated to the extent that they are now one of the most 
                                                 
15
 Hofmann, “Composite decision making procedures...". 
16
 Collins English Dictionary, HarperCollins Publishers (New York, 2003). 
17
 Procedures composées, in French; procedimenti composti, in Italian; procedimientos compuestos, in 
Spanish; procedimentos compostos, in Portuguese; and procedurile compu?i, in Romanian. 
18
 Verbundverfahren. 
19
 Collins English Dictionary, HarperCollins Publishers (New York, 2003). 
20
 See section 2.1.4. 
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relevant and common mechanisms for the implementation of EU law, legal scholarship 
has begun to elaborate on them and their consequences in a comprehensive way. 
 
Rather than a systhemathisation, or even a specific denomination of composite 
procedures, some legal scholars realised of the legal problems that some procedural 
arrangements characterised by intense cooperation between national and European 
administrations brought about. 
 
From a political science and organisational point of view, scholars put the focus 
on the trend towards more cooperation in policy design and policy implementation 
before legal academia came up with the notion of composite procedures21. 
 
 Within legal scholarship, professor Casesse was one of the first scholars to 
realize that cooperation between European and national authorities was getting more 
and more intertwined to the extent of a substantive change of nature with a paper that 
was published in the 1980's22. Afterwards, there are more works that examine specific 
examples of cooperative procedural arrangements and the challenges they entail23. 
Former president of the Court of Justice, Professor Rodriguez Iglesias argued in the 
early 1990's24 that these procedures of intense cooperation can be traced as far back as 
the 1960's, and offers the example of Directive 64/221/EEC25 on the free movement of 
workers. He quickly identified the problem of access to justice as the main concern 
regarding these procedures. 
 
                                                 
21
 Wolfgang Wessels, “Comitology: Fusion in Action. Politico-Administrative Trends in the EU system”, 
5(2) Journal of European Public Policy, (1998), 209-34. 
22
 Sabino Cassese, “Theoretical Sketch of Cooperative and Multidimensional Nature of Community 
Bureocracy”, in Joseph Jamar and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) Community bureocracy at the crossroads: 
L’Administration communautaire à l’heure du choix : actes du colloque Collège d’Europe, De Temple 
(Bruges, 1985) . 
23
 Albrecht Weber, "Il diritto amministrativo procedimentale nell’ordinamento della Comunità europea",  
2 Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, (1992), 393-412. 
24
 Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, “Sui limiti dell'autonomia procidimentale e processuale degli Stati 
membri nell'applicazione del diritto comunitario”, 1 Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario 
(2001) 5-28, at 5. 
25
 Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures 
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health (OJ 1964 L 56, 850-857). 
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The approach at the beginning was on a case-by-case, identifying the 
shortcoming of specific procedures set up by European legislation. The Borelli26 case 
triggered the attention of the academia27, and is often cited as the paradigm of the 
dysfunctionalities of the stilled not conceptualised composite procedures, which had 
proven relevant in practice and for which the Court of Justice did not provide a 
convincing solution. However, even when this ruling of the Court of Justice underlined 
some of the problems of composite procedures, legal scholars still did not address 
composite procedures in a systematic way, which proves the immaturity of the concept 
still in the 1990's. 
 
As composite procedures became more frequent, at the expense of both national 
procedures (indirect administration) and purely EU procedures (direct administration)28, 
legal scholars began to elaborate the concept as a peculiar type of proceeding for the 
implementation of EU policies. It was professor Schmidt-Aßmann29, among the German 
scholars, and professor Chiti30, among the Italian scholars, that began to give composite 
procedures a special consideration as a different category of administrative procedure, 
to which they devoted a specific section of their manuals of European law.  
 
Together with this more systematic treatment came the realisation that 
composite procedures were actually becoming the most common method for the 
implementation of EU policy31, in particular after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
                                                 
26
 Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli / Commission, [1992] ECR I-6313. This judgement and its 
consequences will be explained later in section 5.3.5. 
27
 As an example, Roberto Caranta, "Sull’impugnabilità degli atti endoprocedimentali adottati dalle 
autorità nazionali nelle ipotesi di coamministrazione", Foro Amministrativo (1994), 752-61; and Eduardo 
García de Enterria, “La ampliación de competencias de las jurisdicciones contencioso-administrativas por 
obra del Derecho comunitario. Sentencia Borelli de 3 de diciembre de 1992 y artículo 5 CEE”, 78 Revista 
Española de Derecho Administrativo (1993), 297-314. These academic publications only focus on certain 
legal problems highlighted by the judgement of the Court of Justice, but do not analyse composite 
procedures in general,. 
28
 Edoardo Chiti and Giacinto della Cananea, "L'attività amministrativa", in Giacinto della Cananea (Ed.), 
Diritto amministrativo europeo. Principi e istituti, Guiffrè Editore (Milan, 2011), 103-30, at 112. 
29
 In this respect, one of the first authors to describe the peculiar traits of this type of procedure was 
Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, "Verwaltungskooperation und Verwaltungskooperationsrecht in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft", Europarecht (1996) 270-301. 
30
 Mario Chiti, Diritto Administrativo Europeo, ... 469-70. 
31
 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2012), at 70. 
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Treaty32. Since then, the scholarly focus on composite procedures has not ceased to 
increase. Today, the notion of composite procedures is generally accepted and the most 
notorious network of European administrative law researchers, ReNEUAL, admitted in 
its recent meeting in Brussels in 2014, acknowledged that composite procedures 
entailed many of the major challenges that European administrative law will have to 
confront in the coming years33. 
 
4.2.4.- Classification of composite procedures  
 
Similarly to the question of a definition of composite procedures, lying down a 
relevant classification of composite procedures is a difficult task due to the lack of 
general normative framework and the relative immaturity of the academic study of the 
subject-matter. Other factors that hinder a straightforward classification are the very 
features of composite procedures, which are not absolute and definite; as well as the 
dynamism of the context in which they operate, inasmuch as these procedures appear, 
expand and change on a case-by-case basis more and more frequently. 
 
The most evident criterion for classification relates to the direction in which the 
procedure develops. Thus, a composite procedure can be initiated at the national lever 
and be taken over by the European authorities which take the final decision. In this case, 
the procedure can be described as bottom-up composite procedure34. Examples of this 
procedure would be the procedure for the authorisation of pesticides35 and the procedure 
                                                 
32
 Chiti and della Cananea, "L'attività amministrativa...", at 114. For them, the fact that effective 
implementation of EU law is a matter of common interest that Member States are in charge of constitutes 
a clear omen of the proliferation of composite procedures. 
33
 The Research Network on EU administrative law, ReNEUAL, discussed the draft model rules on EU 
administrative procedures that they had elaborated based on the work of several leading scholars on the 
field (professors Herwig Hofmann, Jens-Peter Schneider, Jacques Ziller, Oriol Mir Puigpelat, Joana 
Mendes, Deirdre Curtin, Giacinto della Cananea, and Paul Craig, all of them often cited in this this thesis, 
were participating in the conference). In the report "Towards an EU Administrative Procedure Law? - 
Report of the ReNEUAL Conference in Brussels March 15 and 16, reference to composite procedures 
was frequent. In their assessment of the self-initiative report of the European Parliament they appeared 
very critical on the constraint that the envisaged European initiative of the Commission would only cover 
EU administrative procedures of direct implementation. More information on the conference and the draft 
papers and model rules can be found on www.reneual.eu and 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/calendarevent.faces/en/599/html.bookmark.  
34
 This criterion has been used, for example, by Della Cananea, “The European Union’s mixed …”, at 
201. 
35
 See section 4.4.2. 
193 
 
for the authorisation of biocides36, where the admissibility of the application is assessed 
by national authorities, and then the dossier is forwarded to the European authorities. 
The inverse case, where the procedure starts at the level of the European Union and 
finishes with a national decision, would then be a top-down. Examples of such 
procedures would be the procedure to determine and grant ecolabels37, but they can be 
also be found in several areas where EU funds are managed and awarded by Member 
States38. 
 
This criterion does not encompass the whole range of composite procedures. 
There are many examples of composite procedures started and finished at one 
administrative level of decision-making that end with a final decision at that level with a 
relevant contribution of another public administration. Examples of such procedures can 
be found in the field of medicines39 and chemicals40. 
 
As a result, a more comprehensive criterion of dual classification of composite 
procedures would be to look exclusively at the public administration that issues the final 
decision. This can indeed be an important standard for distinction. We will see that 
composite procedures that lead to a decision taken by the Commission or another 
Union's body are not only more numerous but also more relevant for the purposes of our 
analysis. From the perspective of European Union law they are more relevant because it 
immediately becomes evident that the gaps in procedural rights or access to justice 
affect an administrative decision taken by the Union. On the contrary, on the cases of 
decisions issued by a national administrative authority, national law comes into play. 
We will see how these procedures also provoke legal lacunae which sometimes national 
administrative law cannot solve. Coordination mechanisms are necessary in both, but it 
is in the first type of procedures that solutions are more urgent. 
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 See section 4.4.5. 
37
 See section 4.4.9. 
38
 Della Cananea, “The European Union’s mixed …”, at 200. 
39
 In particular, the centralised procedure is initiated and finished at the European level, with an 
assessment report which the national authorities take charge of, see section 4.4.4. 
40
 See section 4.4.6. 
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Another classification can be formulated based on the number of intervening 
administrations. Most composite procedures involve a national administration and the 
European public administration. This scheme, however, can further be complicated. In 
some cases, several public administrations might take part in the procedure. For 
instance, in the procedure for the authorisation of pesticides and the centralised 
procedure for the authorisation of pharmaceuticals intended for human use several co-
rapporteurs might be appointed. The difference is more substantial when the 
miscellaneous national authorities interact with each other more besides with the 
European ones. This happens, for example, in the mutual recognition procedure in the 
field of medicines, once an authorisation to market a medicinal product has been 
granted at the national level in one Member State. The procedure does not remain at a 
purely interstate level, because in case of disagreement the Commission might be called 
to intervene, eventually settling the dispute41. Nevertheless, these tripartite composite 
procedures are rare. 
 
The possibility exists that the composite element of administrative procedures 
lies in the cooperation among Member States only. Professor Hofmann calls these 
procedures horizontal composite procedures in contrast to the vertical EU-Member 
States composite procedures42. The cases just mentioned where there is an intervention 
of the Union are not strictly horizontal procedures, and could be described as triangular 
procedures.  
 
The most relevant criterion of distinction, however, for the purposes of this 
thesis is related to the degree of intervention of the Administration which does not issue 
the final decision. We already commented on this point when defining composite 
procedures and indicated that the boundaries between a composite procedure and a 
traditional administrative procedures that relies on a certain cooperation by another 
public administration was on the legal effects of the input of one public administration 
on the procedure that ends with a decision by the other. We will call composite 
procedures stricto sensu those procedures in which there is a clear binding element in 
the contribution of the public administration that does not take the decision. 
                                                 
41
 See for details Section 4.4.4. 
42
 Herwig H. C. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe and Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy in the 
European Union, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2011), at 408. 
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The binding nature of the input is clear in some cases, like when a positive 
assessment of the application is a requirement for the other administration to proceed 
any further, but in some other cases it is not. The example of chemicals43 is very 
eloquent because although the results of the assessment that specialised bodies of 
Member States must carry out are not mandatory for the Commission, the technical 
expertise required for such analyses entail that those results are not in practice put into 
question and thus are conclusive. Another example can be found in some mechanisms 
of information exchange where the applicable rules do not specify that data provided 
cannot be disregarded, but data as difficult to get as fingerprints used for national 
authorities dealing with asylum procedures44, cannot be challenged in practice, even 
though the rules do not specify its binding character.  
 
Even though the delimitation might always not be straightforward, the 
distinction is relevant. As we will see in the next chapter the shared responsibility of 
two administrative procedures is the element that brings about a real change of 
paradigm. In case only one public administration takes responsibility for the entire 
administrative procedure, the problems that administrative cooperation may entail do 
not require the deep legal analysis and solutions that will be proposed in the next 
chapters. 
 
Finally, an additional, perhaps less relevant criterion is whether composite 
procedures are open to the participation of other stakeholders or it remains closed to the 
interaction between national and European public authorities. The subject-matter of 
several composite procedures make it prone to receiving input from the representatives 
from the industry or groups of experts, like it is the case of the approval of pesticides 
and GMOs. However, this participation is generally consultative only. An example of a 
more far-reaching participation is ecolabels, were stockholders are even given the right 
to ask for the initiation of the revision of the award criteria45. Nevertheless, even if this 
                                                 
43
 It will be examined in detail in section 4.4.6. 
44
 See section 4.4.9. 
45
 Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 66/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 on the EU Ecolabel (OJ 27 L 2010, 1-17) and more in detail, section 4.4.8. 
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case, and although they might have an important practical contribution to do, the legal 
relevance of their input is minor from a legal point of view. 
 
4.3.- The origin and development of composite procedures 
 
Composite administrative procedures have been growing apart from the two-
level system of indirect implementation of EU law so functional in Monnet’s ideas46 
and still enshrined in the Treaties47, as we saw extensively in previous chapters. Due to 
both the imbalance of the EU objectives with regards to its capabilities48, and the 
increase in the ambitions of the Union and the reluctance of Members States to yield 
more formal powers, composite procedures have emerged, somehow informally in the 
beginning and later with specific procedures in certain Regulations, though still without 
any kind of legal systematisation.  
 
The traditional logic of indirect implementation, according to which national 
public administrations' capabilities would only be necessary for the implementation of 
European policies has, in most fields, been substituted by the logic of cooperation 
between European and national public administrations. This is not only true for the 
implementation but also for the development and framing of those policies. Information 
gathering and processing, technical expertise and risk assessment capabilities, they all 
have proven essential for the administrative action of the EU. It is now evident that the 
national level of Administration needed to be brought into play for these tasks49. This 
phenomenon explains much of the proliferation of composite procedures. 
 
                                                 
46
 Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Le livre de poche (Paris, 2007), at 558, and previously in section 2.2.1. 
47
 Article 291(1) TFEU states that Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding Union acts. Implementation at the central level is possible but exceptional, as 
result from Article 291(2) TFEU. 
48
 Les Metcalfe, “Reforming the Commission”, 38 (5) Journal of Common Market Studies (2000), 817-
41, at 824 highlights that the lack of administrative resources to cope with its functions has led to a 
dependence by the Commission on the member States, not only in implementation, but on every phase of 
the policy-cyrcle. 
49
 Paul Craig, “Shared Administration and Networks: Global and EU perspectives”, in Gordon Anthony, 
Jean-Bernard Auby and John Morison (eds.), Values In Global Administrative Law, Hart Publishing 
(Oxford, 2011),  81-116. The author analyses examples where information networks and pooling of 
knowledge are particularly intense. 
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 There is yet another factor for the involvement of national administrations in the 
European administrative action which shall not to be neglected. Acceptance by member 
States of the extension of European competences into more sensitive areas has often 
happened on the condition of more intervention by national authorities50. Indeed the 
surge of composite procedures can be a paramount example of the neo-funcionalist 
logic in which certain developments create “needs” to which the system is required to 
respond, by setting in motion new procedures51. 
 
The reasons behind the development and proliferation of composite procedures 
have also had other manifestations. This is particularly the case of comitology and 
European agencies. Both of them emerged from the practical needs of more EU action 
but with EU powers under control of Member States. Many of the particular 
arrangements for the allocation and control of European funds also respond to the same 
logic.  
 
Comitology procedures, as we will see, are not composite procedures but follow 
a similar logic of cooperation and they are at times very tightly connected to composite 
procedures inasmuch as they are often one of the phases of the administrative sequences 
that constitute composite procedures. Similarly, agencies are not present in all 
composite procedures and not every procedure in which agencies participate are 
composite, but as we will examine later, in many of the composite procedures the 
intervention of agencies, both European and national, is relevant. Hence, these are 
phenomena with a certain degree of connexion to composite procedures and which 
provide the relevant context for the analysis of the specific examples of composite 
procedures. 
 
                                                 
50
 See Hussein Kassim, “The European Administration: Between Europenization and Domestication”, in 
Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (eds.), Governing Europe, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2003), 
139-61, at 148. 
51
 The basic idea is once the EU level has been put in charge of functionally specific tasks, it will set in 
motion processes which generates pressures towards further integration. See, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 
“Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light on the New Dynamism of the 
EC”, 20 (1), Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1991), 1-21, at 4. This article analyzes how 
recent developments in European integration could be explained in the light of the neo-functionalist 
rationale. The proliferation of composite procedures can also somehow reflect those ideas. Also, on this 
line, Ben Rosamond, "The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the 
Neofunctionalism of Enrst B. Haas", 12(2) Journal of European Public Policy (2005), 237-254. 
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4.3.1.-Comitology 
 
 
Comitology procedures are not per se composite procedures. There is a 
necessary organic element of composite procedures that does not exist in comitology. 
That is, national authorities intervening in a European administrative procedure must do 
so in their capacity of national authorities, and not as members of a European body; that 
being said, there is a reason to explain comitology as part of the origin of composite 
procedures. The logic of cooperation with Member States in the implementation of EU 
law by European authorities was first apparent in comitology and then extended to 
composite procedure. As a matter of fact, it will be explained later that many of the 
examples of composite procedures bring about a comitology procedures as one, usually 
the last, phase of the overall procedure52. 
 
The essential objective of composite procedures, that is, the joint 
implementation of EU law, originated first with the development of comitology 
procedures. Comitology refers to a set of procedures through which EU countries 
control how the European Commission implements EU law53. Before it can implement 
an EU legal act, the Commission must consult, for the detailed implementing measures 
it proposes, a committee where every EU Member State is represented. The committee 
provides an opinion on the proposed measures, which can be more or less binding on 
the Commission, depending on the particular procedure.  
 
Comitology procedures were the result of a practical legal necessity; there was a 
need for a homogeneous administrative action at the EU level yet no provision could 
serve as a legal basis for the setting up of such procedures. The field where it emerged 
was the implementation of agricultural policy54. 
 
                                                 
52
 See for example procedure for the authorisation of pesticides (Section 4.4.2), genetically modified 
organisms (Section 4.4.3), biocides (Section 4.4.5), and pharmaceuticals for human use (Section 4.4.4). 
53
 Definition extracted from the webpage of the Comitoloy register, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=implementing.home 
54
 Carl Fredrik Bergström, Comitology. Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee 
System, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2005), at 46. 
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Comitology was originally based on article 155(4) of the European Economic 
Community Treaty55 which provided for an eventual delegation of implementing 
powers by the Council onto the Commission. Once the first of these procedures were set 
up56, the proved so practical that they quickly expanded to many policy areas of the 
former EEC57. As a counterbalance to the delegation of powers of the Commission, a 
committee composed of national representatives would be involved in the adoption of 
implementing measures. If this committee rejected the draft decision, the Commission had 
to refer the matter back to the Council58. Their role was primarily “supervising” the 
Commission59. 
 
The consequence of the emergence of comitology procedures in the institutional 
balance and the powers allotted to the European level of decision making was twofold: 
firstly, it enabled an enormous expansion of the Commission administrative action, not 
foreseen by the Treaties; and secondly, it enabled the direct participation of Member 
States in that European administrative action, again not foreseen by the Treaties. 
 
                                                 
55
 The provision in the original version of the Treaty of Rome stated: “In order to ensure the proper 
functioning and development of the common market, the Commission shall: … exercise the powers 
conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the latter.” 
56
 Article 25 f) of Council Regulation 19/62/EEC of 4 April 1962, relating to the common organisation of 
the market in cereals, pork, eggs, poultry and fruit and vegetables (OJ 1962 30), is considered the 
provision that gives “birth” to comitology procedures. At that time the Council recognised that it lacked 
the resources to make all the necessary implementation rules in the first agricultural market regimes. 
There was strong national resistance to an unconditional delegation of powers to the Commission, so the 
compromise was found to set up implementation committees on an ad hoc basis when delegating 
executive duties to the Commission. 
57
 There was a noteworthy increase of comitology procedures in the areas of agriculture, development aid, 
food safety and customs union. For further insights on the origins and development of the comitology 
procedures, see Renaud Dehousse, “Comitology: who watches the watchmen”, 10(5) Journal of 
European Public Policy (2003), 798–813; Christian Joerges, “Deliberative Political Processes Revisited: 
What we have learnt about Legitimacy of Supranational Decision-Making”, 44(4) Journal of Common 
Market Studies, (2006), 779–802; and Jen Blom-Hansen, “The origins of the EU comitology system: a 
case of informal agenda-setting by the Commission”, 15(2) Journal of European Public Policy (2008), 
208-26. 
58
 For a detailed description of the early functioning of the comitology committees and its development, 
see, Bergström Comitology – Delegation of Powers ..., at 38. 
59
 Ellen Vos, “50 Years of European Integration, 45 Years of Comitology”, in Andrea Ott and Ellen Vos 
(eds.), Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives,  T.M.C. Asser Press  (The 
Hague, 2009), 31-56, at 35. 
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Although the Court of Justice had confirmed that these procedures were not in 
breach of EC law60, an explicit legal base for comitology was later introduced by the 
Single European Act in article 202 of the EEC Treaty61, and codification followed by 
virtue of a general Comitology Decision, which systematized the scattered proceedings 
into three basic categories procedures62. 
 
There were subsequent changes in the rules of the Comitology system to this 
date63, introducing, among other things, a more relevant role of the European 
Parliament. The Treaty of Lisbon has brought about a radical change in implementing 
powers at EU level through the splitting the legal basis into two: delegated acts and 
implementing acts64. The procedure for the adoption of implementing act is what 
                                                 
60
 The Court of Justice emphasised that a delegation of powers to the Commission under Article 155 EEC 
was entirely optional, and that consequently Article 155 EEC did not preclude the Council from 
subjecting delegated powers to detailed rules for their exercise with the participation of a committee, Case 
25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel / Köster, Berodt & Co., [1970] ECR 1161; 
Case 23/75 Rey-Soda / Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1975] ECR 1301; and Case 5/77 Tedeschi / Denkavit 
Commerciale Srl. [1977] ECR 1555.   
61
 “The Council shall confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. 
The Council may impose certain requirements ... [These] must be consonant with principles and rules to 
be laid down in advance by the Council. 
The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly implementing powers 
itself”. 
62
 The so called first Comitology Decision was Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying 
down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, (OJ 1987 L 
197, 33). 
63
 The first Comitology Decision was repealed by the new Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 
1987, (OJ 1987 L 184, 23). This Decision was amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC, of 17 July 
2006 (OJ 2006 L 200, 11). Finally, consistent with the new rules in the Lisbon Treaty, all the former 
instruments have been replaced by Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for 
control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ 2011 L 55/13. 
64
 The relevant provisions are articles 290 and 291 TFEU. According to article 290: 
“1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general 
application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. 
The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defined in the 
legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be reserved for the legislative act and accordingly 
shall not be the subject of a delegation of power. 
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is subject; these 
conditions may be as follows: 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European 
Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its component 
members, and the Council by a qualified majority. 
3. The adjective ‘delegated’ shall be inserted in the title of delegated acts. 
Article 291 provides:  
201 
 
remains of Comitology, now simpler and with eventually a narrower scope65. Indeed, no 
committees of experts from Member States will be participating in the procedures for 
the adoption of delegated acts, and hence these procedures can no longer be considered 
multi-level procedures. 
 
Comitology was thus conceived as a practical arrangement to allow the 
Communities to extend their executive powers without Member States yielding 
unlimited powers to the Commission. The rationale behind comitology was to find a 
middle ground between far-reaching European Administration and a dysfunctional 
intergovernmental administration66. In such a way, comitology can be seen as the 
“embryo” of multi-level execution of EU law which has progressively expanded67 and 
become more intense.  
 
Indeed many academic writings provide practical evidence that the logic of 
supervision and control of the beginning has now been replaced by that of 
                                                                                                                                               
“1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union 
acts. 
2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall 
confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases 
provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council. 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of 
regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of 
implementing powers. 
4. The word ‘implementing’ shall be inserted in the title of implementing acts.” 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, that distinction whether an act of the Commission had a delegated or an 
implementing nature was not so clear-cut. The fact that there is two categories, however, does not imply 
that the distinction between the two of them shall not be controversial. There is abundant literature on the 
distinction between the two, for instance, Paul Craig, “Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New 
Comitology Regulation” 36 European Law Review, (2011), 671-90; Steve Peers and Marios Costa, 
“Accountability for Delegated and Implementing Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon”, 18(3) European Law 
Journal (2012) 427-60; Alan Hadacre and Michael Kaeding, “The two new worlds of delegation of 
executive powers to the European Commission and its implications for European and national public 
administrations” 2011(1) EIPASCOPE (2011), at 
http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/20110912105558_EipascopeSpecialIssue_Art5.pdf.   
65
 Alan Hardacre and Michael Kaeding, “Delegated & Implementing Acts – The New Comitology”, EIPA 
Essential Guide, September 2011, at 15, at http://publications.eipa.eu/en/details/&tid=1839. 
66
 Morten Egeberg, Günther F. Schäffer and Jarle Trondal, "EU committee governance. Between 
Intergovernmental and Union Administration", in Morten Egeberg, Mutilevel Union Administration. The 
Tranformation of executive politics in Europe, Palgrave (Basingstoke, 2006), 66-85, at 67. 
67
 The list of comitology committees which amounts to approximately 300 can be found in the 
Comitology Register online at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm. 
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cooperation68. The original idea that Comitology committees would just supervise and 
control the Commission’s implementation powers no longer reflects the practice of EU 
law implementation. It is rather an institutionalised co-operative mechanism to uphold 
supranationalism69, which can be considered the gist of the composite procedures which 
we are examining. Nevertheless, comitology procedures have reached a certain maturity 
and enjoy a clear legal framework, unlike composite procedures. 
 
4.3.2.Agencies 
 
 
 There are many concomitances between the factors that explain the emergence 
and proliferation of European agencies and those that have given rise to composite 
administrative procedures. 
 
 Scholars usually describe the origin and evolution of European agencies as a 
series of waves70. It is not necessary to describe this evolution in detail or the specifics 
of each and every agency at this point. What is important for the purposes of the thesis 
is to underline that the emergence of agencies with an increasingly relevant role in the 
implementation of European policies is linked with the phenomenon of administrative 
cooperation between European and national actors71. As professors Curtin and 
Dehousse argue, the mushrooming of autonomous agencies is one of the most important 
structural developments of the past two decades in EU policy making72, and certainly 
                                                 
68
 Academic research on the institutional negotiations on establishing comitology committees, the impact 
of the comitology voting procedures and the behaviour of the Commission in relation to the committees 
supports that view. See Vos, “ 50 Year of European…”, at 48. 
69
 Mario Savino, “The Role of Committees in the EU Institutional Balance: Deliberative or Procedural 
Supraationalism?”, in Thomas Christiansen, Johanna Miriam Oettel and Beatrice Vaccari (eds.) , 21st 
Century Comitology – Implementing Committees in the Enlarged European Union, European Institute of 
Public Administration (Maastricht, 2009), 19-48, at 38. 
70
 Daniel Kelemen and Giandomenico Majone, “Managing Europeanization: The European Agencies,” in 
John Peterson and  Michael Shackleton (eds.), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford, 2012), 219-240, at 220. Normally, the first wave is identified with the creation of the two 
first agencies in the 1970's, endowed with limited, strictly operational capabilities; the second wave came 
in the 1990's with a large spectrum of agencies able to issue administrative acts that were binding for third 
parties; and the last wave came with the recent creation of  regulatory agencies.  
71
 Jesús Ángel Fuenteaja Pastor, La Administración Europea. La ejecución europea del Derecho y las 
políticas de la Unión, Aranzadi (Cizur Menor, 2007), at 310. 
72
 Deidre Curtin and Renaud Dehousse, "European Union agencies: tipping the balance?", in Madalina 
Busuioc, Martijn Groenleer, and Jarle Trondal, The agency phenomenon in the European Union, 
Manchester University Press (Manchester, 2012), 193-205, at 193. 
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one that has a crucial impact in composite procedures, mostly characterised by the 
intervention of EU and, sometimes, national agencies. There are many reasons that are 
usually pinpointed as explaining the creation of agencies in the European Union73, such 
as the need to gather technical expertise74, the willingness to ensure autonomy from the 
Commission, the increase of administrative capacity, depolitisation, the convenience of 
decentralised bodies to facilitate coordination with national actors75, or even the 
increase of the level of compliance at the national level76. Indeed, the proliferation of 
agencies is part of a broader trend common to national political systems of Europe and 
other areas77. 
 
In reality, considering the European context in particular, professor Chiti 
revealed that agencies appeared at the moment when the scheme of indirect 
administration became flawed and insufficient for the increasing objectives of the 
Communities but, at the same time, direct administration was deemed unacceptable to 
Member States78. These elements can be identified as the same causes for the birth of 
composite procedures. The establishment of agencies, interdependent to their national 
counterparts79, and where Member States could intervene and get a chance to shape the 
                                                 
73
 Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies. Law and Practices of Accountability, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford, 2013), at 24. The rationale for agency creation is certainly different in each specific case, but, as 
this author argues, the main causes for this prolific phenomenon are common to all. 
74
 Stefan Griller and Andreas Orator, “ European University Institute, New Modes of Governance Project 
Policy Brief 22, Sring  2008, at 1, at http://www.eu-
newgov.org/database/PUBLIC/Policy_Briefs/NEWGOV_Policy_Brief_no22.pdf. 
75
 Berthold Rittberger and Arndt Wonka, "Introduction: agency governance in the European Union", in 
Berthold Rittberger and Arndt Wonka (eds.), Agency governance in the European Union, Routledge 
(London, 2012), 2-11, at 5. 
76
 Esther Versluis, "Catalysts of compliance? The role of European Union agencies in the implementation 
of EU legislation in Poland and Bulgaria", in Madalina Busuioc, Martijn Groenleer, and Jarle Trondal, 
The agency phenomenon in the European Union, Manchester University Press (Manchester, 2012), 172-
190, at 173. 
77
 Fabrizio Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western 
Europe, Edward Elgar Publishing (Cheltenham, 2008), at 107.  
78
 Edoardo Chiti, Le Agenzie europee. Unità e decentramento nelle Amministrazioni comunitarie, Cedam 
(Milan, 2002), at 57. 
79
 Edoardo Chiti, "Les agences, l'administration indirecte et la coadministration", in Jean-Bernard Auby, 
Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, Traité de droit administratif européen, Bruyland (Brussels, 2007), 267-
82, at 275. 
He argues that European agencies enabled the creation of a efficient network with other national agencies. 
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decision-making procedures at the agencies was considered acceptable to national 
governments and respectful to the distribution of powers laid down in the Treaties80. 
 
Moreover, the procedural cooperation which is channelled through European 
agencies is thus considered respectful of the principle of subsidiarity, inasmuch as 
indirect administration is not possible but direct administration is deemed 
disproportionate81. This procedural cooperation will often take the form of composite 
administrative procedures. 
 
European agencies allow for an expansion of the EU administrative action well 
accepted by member States as long as they can participate in it, similarly to the 
compromise found in comitology. In fact, national agencies are usually willing to 
surrender some autonomy to EU agencies, since they gain reciprocal powers of cross-
border enforcement in other Member States82. From that perspective, they are not only a 
key element of the integrated administration that the EU has become, but the ideal 
framework for the emergence of composite procedures. As a Report presented to the 
Commission in 1999 on the role of specialised agencies in decentralising EU 
Governance83 correctly points out: 
 
“… [T]he new European agencies have not been designed to operate in isolation, or 
to replace national regulators. Rather, they are expected to become the central nodes 
of networks including national agencies as well as international organisations.” 
 
Professor Dehousse argued that one of the evident problems of European 
integration was, and still is, to ensure the uniform application of EU regulations at the 
                                                 
80
 Karl-Heinz, "The New European Agencies. The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a 
European Network of Environmental Administrations", Report 50 Robert Schuman Centre EUI (1996), at 
3. 
81
 Yannis V. Avgerinos, "EU Financial Market Supervision Revisited: The European Securities 
Regulator", Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/03 (2003), at 14. 
82
 Paul Craig, “Shared Administration and Networks: Global and EU Perspectives”, in Gordon Anthony, 
Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison and Tom Zwart (eds.), Values in Global Administrative Law, Hart 
Publishing (Oxford, 2010), 81-116, at 97. 
83
 Michelle Everson, Giandomenico Majone, Les Metcalfe, Adriaan Schout, “The Role of Specialised 
Agencies in Decentralising EU Governance”, Report Presented to the Commission, 1999, at 85, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pdf. 
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national level84. Direct execution had to be restricted to certain, very specific policy 
areas, if procedural autonomy of Member States was to be maintained. Thus, the only 
solution that could be envisaged was the creation of agencies playing the central role on 
pan-European regulatory networks with intense procedural cooperation85. We will see 
later how agencies take a relevant part in the clearest examples of composite 
procedures86. 
  
Many scholars have highlighted that agencies are an evolution from previous 
forms of administrative co-operation in the European system, being different from them 
basically in their completeness and institutional stability87. This evolution has led to a 
new legal model of joint exercise of supranational functions which can be defined as 
decentralised integration88, in which agencies are part of "common systems" where 
national and European bodies participate89. 
 
In certain areas, agencies represent an evolution from comitology committees and, 
to a certain extent, follow the same rationale, that is, the need to increase the areas of 
European administrative action while keeping Member States involved in the process. 
Agencies entail more institutionalised mechanisms and further guarantee of 
independence and technical expertise90. An example that illustrates that is the European 
Medicines Agency which substituted several comitology committees on the field91. 
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 Renaud Dehousse, "Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European 
Agencies", 4(2) Journal of European Public Policy (1997), 246-61, at 254. 
85
 Dehousse, "Regulation by networks...", at 255. 
86
 See sections 4.4.2., 4.4.3, 4.4.4 among others. 
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 Dehousse, “Regulation by Network ...", at 246; and Les Metcalfe, “Etablissement de liens entre les 
différents niveaux de gouvernance : intégration européene et mondialisation, 66(1) Revue Internationale 
des Sciences Administratives (2000) 139-168, at 139; Alexander Kreher, “Agencies in the European 
Community – A Step Towards Administrative Integration in Europe”, 4(2) Journal of European Public 
Policy (1997), 225-245, at 225. 
88
 Edoardo Chiti, “On European Agencies”, in Erik O. Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Jiirgen Neyer (eds.), 
European Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation, ARENA (Oslo, 2003), 275-326, 
at 324. 
89
 Sabino Cassese, "Il procedimento amministrativo europeo", in Francesca Bignami and Sabino Cassese, 
Il procedimento amministrativo nel diritto amministrativo europeo - Rivista Trimestrale di diritto 
pubblico  (2004), 31-53, at 32. 
90
 Ellen Vos, “Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies”, 37(5) 
Common market Law Review (2000), 1113-34, at 1116. 
91
 See Hofmann, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy …, at 922, and, with the same example, 
Kelemen and Giandomenico Majone, “Managing Europeanization...", at 231. 
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Although there is frequently a connexion between agencies and composite 
procedures, this connexion cannot be generalised. When it comes to European agencies 
no general legal approach to their decision-making procedures can be made. Their 
procedural arrangements are determined on a case by case basis and there is a lack of 
common framework to all of them92, so not every single one of the decision-making 
procedures in the European agencies involves actors from different levels of 
administration. Moreover, even when they involve those multiple actors, this does not 
necessarily entail that the cooperation takes a procedural form. Many of the functions of 
agencies are restricted to sharing of information and best practices. Functions of such 
nature do not entail composite procedures, or administrative procedures for that matter, 
inasmuch as they are not aimed at making individual decisions.  
 
The rationale behind agencies and composite procedures is thus the same; the 
practical need for mechanisms of intense cooperation93 between national and European 
authorities aimed at the execution of EU law. A very relevant feature that is also 
common to both of them is fragmentation and non-existence of barely any legal 
systematisation94. Finally, agencies and composite procedures both bring about the legal 
challenge of their accountability95. Thus, although the phenomena are different, they 
have similar causes at origin and often the examples of composite procedures entail the 
intervention of European agencies.  
                                                 
92
 Many scholars complain that the system of agencies is ambiguous and confusing due to this lack of 
common framework which results in a heterogeneous situations concerning the European agencies’’ 
functions, decision-making powers and structures. See for instance Sami Andoura and Peter Timmerman, 
“Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European Agencies Reignited”, European Policy Institute 
Network, Working Paper No. 19, October 2008, at 1, at http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1736.pdf. 
93
 An idea of the intensity in cooperation that is present in some regulatory agencies (and in composite 
procedures) can be illustrated by Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety 
(OJ 2002 L 31, 1–24), which reads:  
" 8. The Authority, Commission and Member States shall cooperate to promote the effective coherence 
between risk assessment, risk management and risk communication functions. 
9. The Member States shall cooperate with the Authority to ensure the accomplishment of its mission." 
94
 In the case of agencies, however, there exists a general legal framework for executive agencies; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002, laying down the statute for executive 
agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (OJ 11 L 2003, 
1–8). 
95
 For agencies, see for more detail Busuioc, European Agencies... 
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4.3.3.- Joint execution of EU budget, shared management of European funds. 
 
  
From the very beginning, most of the important policies of the European 
Communities were implemented through schemes of joint management of funds. The 
majority of  the European budget consisted, and still consists, of funds that are managed 
jointly by the Commission and the competent national authorities, and it traditionally 
consists from its most part in the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
Structural Funds, although it has recently been extended to other areas like 
Development Cooperation96.  
 
Thus, the initial policy areas that were central to the action of the European 
Communities involved the awarding of subsidies, compensatory measures, and other 
forms of aid97. The two largest areas of EU spending have traditionally been the 
Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds98. The current trend is that the 
relative weight of these areas in the common budget is reduced, but agricultural, 
regional and other development funds constituted the by far largest share of the budget 
of the European Communities during the first decades of its existence99. The Treaties 
called on the establishment of a common organisation of agricultural markets, for which 
the set-up of agricultural funds were necessary. The Commission needed to transfer 
those funds from its budget to the individual beneficiaries. 
 
 National authorities were logically called to intervene in the allocation, the 
actual transfer, the control, and the eventual recovery of the funds. The schemes to that 
end could take the form of indirect administration, with a national administration 
granting the funds to the beneficiary, but some other mechanisms were also set up. The 
implementation of the vast Common Agricultural Policy required delegation of 
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 Fuanteaja, La Administración Europea... at 446. 
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 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Palgrave (Basingstoke, 2006), at 
456. 
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 Andrew Moravcsik, "Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union", 40(4) Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2002), 603-24, at 608. 
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 The share of agricultural policy in the European budget reached its peak in 1973, at 80 %, and has been 
steadily declining ever since. See for more details Peter Robson, The Economics of International 
Integration, Routledge (New York, 1998), at 148. Today, it amounts to just over 40 %; source DG 
Agriculture website, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf 
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executive competences -a phenomenon which is at the origin of comitology, as 
previously explained- as well as joint execution mechanisms with shared powers 
between the Commission and Member States. In such a way, the arrangements needed 
for the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy shifted the balance of 
competences between the Commission and the Council and, more importantly, between 
the Commission and Member States100.  
 
 Considerable funds were necessary to carry out the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and they were put in place with the first European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
(EAGF) in 1962101. Member States agreed that the financing of these large funds will be 
attributed to the Community, but not entirely its execution102. However, the Member 
States would not hold the monopoly of execution either and they would either receive 
very detailed rules that would restrain their margin of appreciation or participate in 
mechanisms of cooperation, whose features resembled sometimes composite 
procedures, in form of a sequence of administrative steps with responsibilities allocated 
subsequently to the Commission and to the national administrations. 
 
 A similar rationale lies behind the establishment of the other structural funds103. 
Structural funds are financial instruments designed to assist the Commission and the 
Member States in setting up, implementing and financing the structural policy of the 
Union104,  the most important of which are the Regional Development Fund, which aims 
to strengthen economic and social cohesion by correcting imbalances between the 
                                                 
100
 Jesús Ángel Fuenteaja Pastor, "Las competencias ejecutivas de la Administración European en el 
ámbito de la Política Agraria Común", 26 Revista de Derecho de la Unión Europea (2014), 41-76, at 42. 
101
 Council Regulation 25/62/EEC, of 4 April 1962 (OJ 1962 L 30, 11). 
102
 Fuenteaja Pastor, "Las competencias ejecutivas...", at 43. 
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 According to Article 174 TFEU and following structural funds aim at the adjustment policy among the 
different Member States, and include, together with the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the 
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Oswald Jansen and Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold, The European Composite Administration, Intersentia 
(Cambridge, 2011), 25-54, at 26. 
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European regions, and the European Social Fund, an instrument for the promotion of 
fairer job opportunities.  
 
The schemes for the distribution of the subsidies often also entailed cooperation 
between national and European administrative actors, in such a way that these funds are 
cited as example of policy networks and multilevel administration105. The management 
of these funds is thus shared106. The cooperation is so intertwined that German authors 
name 'grant administration' (Leistungverwaltung) the whole of the national and 
European bodies in charge of the allocation of budgetary commitments for structural 
funds107. 
 
 The specific mechanism though which these subsidies were transferred are 
different for each instrument and have changed through time. Moreover, the principle of 
procedural and organisational autonomy of Member States is generally respected, so 
rules vary according to each national system, although there is certainly an influx of the 
European rules108.  
 
The system is thus very complex and difficult to analyse systematically from a 
legal point of view, but what is important to retain for our purposes is that the execution 
of the policies does not only involve national authorities. The implementation, meaning 
the award and control of individual subsidies, is mostly carried out jointly by European 
and national authorities, like the Borelli case which will be examined in detail later 
exemplifies. Mechanisms of cooperation, such as a grant being requested to a national 
authority, which will deal with the file and forward a reasoned opinion to the 
Commission which, on the basis of such opinion, decides to award the subsidy can be 
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 See further in Hubert Heinelt and Randall Smith, Policy Networks and European Structural Funds, 
Aldershot (Avebury, 1996), at 11. 
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Disbursement of Community Funds and the Regulatory State, in Herwig C. H. Hofmann and Alexander 
H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law – Towards an Integrated Administration, 
Edward Elgar Publishing  (Cheltenham , 2009), 348-59. 
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 Thomas Oppermann, Europarecht - Ein Studienbuch, C. H. Beck (Munich, 1999), at section 968. 
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 Schöndorf-Haubold, "Common European Administration...", at 32. 
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qualified as composite procedures109. Similarly, the schemes for the award of the 
European Social Funds are also composite procedures that have risen many questions 
on the procedural rights of individuals110. 
 
Here again, the different mechanisms of joint execution of the EU budget have 
also contributed to the proliferation of composite procedures. The administrative model, 
which has evolved through time, of a cooperative, tiered allocation of subventions does 
not fit into the conventional categories of direct and indirect implementation, but rather 
a common administrative set up of procedures which involves both national and Union 
bodies111. Today, the essential elements of shared implementation of the EU budget are 
laid down in the Financial Regulation, which contains a specific category of shared 
management, as different from both direct management and indirect management112. 
These joint activities concern not only the very allocation of the funds, but also the 
planning, implementation and monitoring of the funds113. The pragmatic procedural 
approach of the implementation of those European funds and, in general, of the shared 
management of the EU budget in some sectors, can also be considered at the origin of 
composite procedures. 
 
4.4.-Composite procedures in EU law: Analysis and some examples 
 
4.4.1.- The logic of cooperation in the implementation of EU law and policy 
 
                                                 
109
 The example is taken from Council Regulation (EEC) No 355/77 of 15 February 1977 on common 
measures to improve the conditions under which agricultural products are processed and marketed (OJ 
1977 L 51, 1–6), which is examined later in section 4.4.7. 
110
 See section 5.2.2. 
111
 Schöndorf-Haubold, "Common European Administration...", at 32. 
112
 Article 59 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L298, 1-96): 
"Where the Commission implements the budget under shared management, implementation tasks shall be 
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sound financial management, transparency and non-discrimination and shall ensure the visibility of Union 
action when they manage Union funds. To this end, the Commission and the Member States shall fulfil 
their respective control and audit obligations and assume the resulting responsibilities laid down in this 
Regulation. Complementary provisions shall be laid down in sector-specific rules." 
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 Holger Holzwart, Der rechtliche Rahmen für die Verwaltung und Finanzierung der 
gemeinschaftlichen Strukturfonds am Beispiel des EFRE, Duncker und Humblot (Berlin, 2003), at289.  
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Cooperation between national and European administrations has become the key 
element in the implementation of EU law and policies. Indirect administration having 
become insufficient, schemes that stress cooperation rather that separate distribution of 
competences are becoming more and more common114. This trend is not exclusive of 
areas where indirect administration was formerly the rule but also in the inverse 
situation. One example is the field of competition law, traditionally an example of direct 
administration by the Commission. Since Regulation 1/2003115, new provisions 
facilitate cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission. 
There are also areas where the co-operation is rather facilitated among national 
authorities of Member States, who keep the exclusive competences of implementation, 
like in happens in the field of consumer protection116. Composite procedures are only 
one manifestation of the cooperative nature of the relationships between the 
administration of the Union and that of Member States. Composite procedures 
constitute a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly common in various policy 
areas117.  
 
 Professor Craig explains that these composite procedures are growing 
particularly in the different sectors of Internal Market law because of the Commission's 
move towards a strategy118 based in product standardization119, rather in the technique 
of mutual recognition following the old Cassis de Dijon ruling120 of the past. In this 
sense, many of the newest Internal Market regulations on product authorisation 
establish and lay provisions for composite procedures. 
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 At the moment, even the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security, so characterised 
by inter State cooperation, is becoming increasingly prone to composite procedures as 
well, although in this subject-matter the intervention of European agencies or other 
bodies is still relatively modest. The procedures of exchange of information and intense 
cooperation of the Schengen area is one example121, asylum procedures is another122. 
Police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters also include many composite 
procedures123. 
 
Composite procedures have existed for several decades, in particular in the field 
of agricultural policies, where those procedures can be identified back to the first 
mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy in early years of the decade of 1960. 
The proliferation of composite procedures began in the last decade and they cover many 
of the new procedures being established for the approval of products in relationship 
with the functioning of the internal market. It is in this field that most composite 
procedures are found, and where the examples are more illuminating. The area of 
freedom, security and justice, with increasing competences awarded at the Union level 
of decision-making will be another field with an increasing number of composite 
procedures. 
 
 In this section the main examples of composite procedures will be analysed. 
Some procedures that fall short to qualify as composite procedures stricto sensu, i. e. 
when the intervention of either level of public administration is not binding, shall also 
be explained because they are borderline cases which can be useful to draw a clear limit 
of what are composite procedures from a strict point of view for the purposes of the 
dissertation. They also raise some of the concerns that will be subsequently explained.  
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Code) OJ 2006 L 105, 1–32, especially articles 14-17; and Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 
October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004 L 349, 1. 
122
 Council Regulation No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" 
for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ 2000 L 316, 
1-10. 
123
  Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009, establishing the European Police Office, OJ 2009 L 
121, 37; Council Decision 2000/642/JHA of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation 
between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, OJ 2000 
L 271, 4; and Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ 2002 L 63, 1. 
213 
 
 
 In any case, it is worth noting that some areas have experienced an evolution 
from national procedures with limited intervention from Union's authorities to a 
transformation into composite procedures124 or, more intensely, into purely EU 
procedures with significant reliance on the expertise of Member States125.  
 
Examples of composite procedures are explained in the following sections. They 
cover the areas of EU law where composite procedures are relevant, but not all 
composite procedures are analysed. Many concrete procedures for the granting of 
agricultural and structural funds, for example, are not explained as the dissertation 
would otherwise be lost in details. The procedures that most clearly exemplify 
composite procedures, where the characteristics that were described in the previous 
sections appear in a more noticeable way, are explained first. In the last sections, 
borderline procedures, where its composite nature according to the criteria used in this 
thesis can be debated, are analysed. 
 
4.4.2.- Active substances and plant protection products (Pesticides) 
 
 
The marketing of pesticides has not been subject to a common EU authorisation 
until very recently. Directive 91/414/EC126 harmonised national legal regimes by 
introducing common authorisation criteria and giving the Commission, assisted by the 
European Food Safety Authority (hereinafter EFSA), a right to review national 
decisions. The regime followed a certain composite rationale127, that can be described as 
procedures with common authorisation criteria in a multilevel setting128 and used 
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 In the area of pharmaceuticals for human use there has been a progressive incorporation of more and 
more types of medicines to composite procedures. In the past some of those procedures were purely 
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unified environmental principles129, but the administrative procedures remained purely 
national. However, a more consistent, centralised procedure was considered 
necessary130 with enhanced powers for the Union's decision making authorities, while 
Member States would keep an important role, and therefore a new Regulation was 
passed. 
 
Regulation 1107/2009131 providing for a procedure for the placing of plan 
protection products in the market constitutes a very illuminating example of composites 
procedures. Not only it reflects all the essential features of composite procedures, but it 
explicitly addresses the need to combine the different levels of protection in the 
Member States, as well as their different weather and climatic conditions, with the 
Internal Market and the pertinence of harmonised criteria with view of authorising those 
products132. Indeed, in the case of plant protection products, there is an additional 
obstacle to a full harmonisation. The burden consists on the fact that environmental and 
climatic conditions are different and can thus result in different products authorised in 
the different areas, but the Regulation contains specific provisions in this vein133. 
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There is an additional procedure foreseen for the authorisation of adjuvants, to 
be set up in a Regulation to be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure 
with scrutiny137, but it has so far not been adopted. As regards the procedure for the 
authorisation of active substances, it starts with the submission of the application of the 
interested party138, with an attached summary dossier and a complete dossier139. The 
producer of an active substance shall forward its application to a Member State. It might 
be submitted to several Member States at a time, in which case a co-rapporteur system 
is foreseen140. 
 
 At the early stage of the procedure, there is an initial assessment on the 
admissibility of the application, based on a checklist for the dossiers submitted141. Once 
the application is deemed admissible, cooperation begins and the dossiers shall be 
forwarded to the other Member States, to the Commission, and to the EFSA142. The 
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Regulation 182/2011. 
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EFSA shall make the summary dossier available to the public143, hereby involving other 
stakeholders and civil society. From this moment, the rapporteur Member State shall 
draw up a draft assessment report144 within twelve months of the notification of 
admissibility. This report shall evaluate whether the active substance meet the criteria 
for approval provided for in the Regulation145 and whether maximum residue levels 
shall be included146. 
 
 Later on, EFSA takes charge of the file and circulates the draft assessment report 
to the applicant and the other Member States and makes it available to the public147. 
Additionally, it can organise a consultation of experts148 or ask the Commission to 
consult a reference laboratory149. After one hundred and twenty days of the end of the 
period for the submission of written comments, the EFSA shall adopt a conclusion. 
 
 Subsequently, the Commission shall present a review report and a draft 
regulation to the standing committee on the food chain and animal health150. This 
committee is composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the 
representative of the Commission151. The Regulation refers to a regulatory procedure152. 
Under the new comitology rules153, it is the examination procedure that shall apply. 
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Through this mechanism, a Regulation shall be adopted with the approval of the active 
substance; subject to conditions, where applicable; or the rejection thereof154. In case of 
approval, it shall be included in the list of approved active substances electronically 
available to the public155. This approval can later be renewed, through an application 
submitted to a Member State156 and following a procedure involving other Member 
States, the Commission and the EFSA with the same pattern as the one just 
examined157. 
 
There is also a possibility for the Commission to review the approval at any 
time. This constitutes a different composite procedure in which the Commission enjoys 
a still more predominant role. It might start the procedure ex officio or at the request of a 
Member States158. In any case, it shall gather the opinions of the Member States and the 
EFSA159 and, in the light of thlea e new scientific and technical knowledge indicates 
that the substance no longer satisfies the criteria provided for in the Regulation, it shall 
issue a new Regulation withdrawing or amending the approval, again by means of a 
comitology procedure160.  
 
The second procedure established in Regulation 1107/2009, leads to the 
approval of plant protection products. It differs significantly in terms of the sequence 
and the powers coffered to the different actors. As this products result from a 
combination of different authorised active substances, safeners and synergists161, this 
procedure is posterior to the one we have examined, and it is also less requiring. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
within two months, or refer the matter to the appeal committee. If the appeal committee is called upon, its 
opinion must be positive if the draft act is to be adopted. 
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The applicant shall submit an application in each Member State where he wishes 
to place a plant production product in the market162. Like in the previous procedure, the 
applicant must provide a number of documents and pieces of information163. The 
application shall be examined by the Member States proposed by the applicant, unless 
another Member State in the same zone agrees to examine it. In any case, the other 
Member States can be called to cooperate164. 
 
The Member State examining the application shall make assessment in the light 
of current scientific and technical knowledge using guidance documents available at the 
time of application. It shall give all Member States in the same zone the opportunity to 
submit comments to be considered in the assessment165. For that, it shall apply the 
uniform principles of evaluation laid down in the Regulation166, and conclude with an 
assessment report167. The conclusions of this assessment report shall be used not only 
by the examining Member States, but also by all the other Member States to decide 
whether or not to grant authorisation for those products in the respective market168. 
 
 In order to strengthen the cooperation among Member States, a system of 
exchange of information is set up169. Moreover, the holder of an authorisation granted 
by on Member State may apply in another Member States through a simplified 
procedure of mutual recognition170. Nevertheless, this recognition is not automatic and 
Member States may decide not to grant the authorisation171. In a similar way as the 
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powers of the Commission concerning active substances, Member States can renew, 
withdraw or amend the authorisations granted in accordance with this procedure172. 
 
 Even though it might appear that in this second procedure, the input from the EU 
bodies is relatively limited173, considering that plant protection products need to contain 
active substances, safeners and synergists previously approved by the Commission it 
can be deemed as a composite procedure stricto sensu as a whole. In any case, whether 
considered one or two separate procedures, the global scheme laid down in Regulation 
1107/2009 constitutes a powerful example of the level of procedural cooperation that 
some areas of EU administrative law has reached, not only between EU and national 
authorities, but also among Member States. 
 
 Overall, the procedure involves several actors and stakeholders, with a principal 
role played by national authorities, but where the most important analysis is carried out 
by the EFSA, an agency where Member States participate too. During the first phase of 
the procedure, the input of Member States is relevant inasmuch as their assessment 
report is necessary for the Commission to take a decision. Thus, the Commission makes 
the final decision as regards active substances, but with relevant participation from the 
Member States again through a comitology committee. Furthermore, the procedure 
ensures the participation of the relevant stakeholders, the general public and technical 
experts. On a second phase, it is Member States that take the final decision on the plant 
protection product, but it shall be based on the decision previously adopted by the 
Commission on the active substances. 
 
The scheme entails a very entrenched balance of powers, the Commission and 
the EFTA on the one hand, and the national authorities, recipients of all applications, 
sole decision makers as regards plant protections products, and participant in the 
Commission's Regulation through a comitology committee, on the other. A jurist could 
soon envisage many eventual legal shortcomings in this complex scheme, beginning 
with a possibly controversial access to justice in case of a procedural breach without a 
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direct link to the final decision174. The complexity of the procedure makes it a likely 
field for criticism in terms of judicial deficit175. 
 
 4.4.3..- Genetically modified organisms  
 
 Although the marketing and deliberate release of genetically modified organisms 
(hereinafter GMO) was only covered by a general regulatory framework in the EC since 
1990176, it has attracted a significant legal, technical, and media attention since then. 
 
The current legal framework results from long negotiations to strike a delicate 
balance between the precautionary principle and economic development which is not 
always evident177. Although the European Union has enacted one of the most stringent 
GMO regulations in the world178, there is a perception of at least part of public opinion 
that the approval of these organisms should be still more limited179. Procedural 
provisions on how these organisms are authorised largely reflect the policy and politics 
on the issue180. The legislators made a self-conscious effort to share authority and avoid 
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The application for authorisation, together with a comprehensive dossier186, shall 
be sent to the national competent authority of the Member State187. The national 
authority shall forward the application to the EFSA, which shall inform the other 
Member States and the Commission and make a summary of the dossier available to the 
public188. 
 
Within six months from the receipt of a valid application, the EFSA shall issue 
an opinion. This opinion can be in favour, with conditions or against the 
authorisation189. Together with a reasoned report, it shall forward its opinion to the 
Commission, the Member States and the applicant190. It shall also make it public so that 
other stakeholders may make comments to the Commission191. 
 
Within three months after receiving the opinion, the Commission shall submit a 
draft decision to the comitology committee in charge192. From that moment, through an 
examination comitology procedure193, a decision shall be adopted granting or rejecting 
authorisation194. 
 
As in the case of plant protection products, there is a second phase, but in this 
case, it is governed by a different instrument: Directive 2001/18/EC195. This Directive 
establishes the procedure for authorisation of the release into the environment of GMOs. 
This release may aim at placing GMOs on the market or at any other purposes than 
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on the market, a reasoned decision shall be issued rejecting the notification201. If it 
concludes that the GMO(s) may be placed on the market it shall send the report to the 
Commission, which shall forward it to the other national authorities202. If neither of 
them raises a reasoned objection, the notified party will be given consent for placing the 
GMO(s) in the market203. The EFSA can be asked to issue an opinion by the 
Commission204. In case there is an objection, a decision shall be adopted by the 
Commission205 thorough an examination comitology procedure206. 
 
It all results in a very cautious approach in which the precautionary principle 
plays a critical role, in such a way that the rejections of authorisation is, overall, clearly 
favoured. Reluctant Member States have a way to oppose the placing of the market of 
these organisms, but they cannot veto them. In case of approval, they shall enjoy full 
free circulation in the internal market207.  
 
It is particularly illuminating to analyse this procedure in comparison with the 
plan protection authorisation procedure. The intervening parties are the same; the 
interests at stake (health and consumer protection, internal market, economic and 
scientific development) are alike and the resolution is similar, a Commission's decision 
and regulation through an examination comitology procedure. Member States intervene 
in both cases, and have a powerful say. However the procedures cannot be assimilated. 
In both cases, the EFSA plays a critical role. Both cases are in a middle ground, 
between direct EU implementation and autonomous national implementation. In the 
case of plant protection products, the decision of a Member State is a reference decision 
for the rest. In the case of GMOs, the decision of a Member State, eventually endorsed 
by the Commission and a comitology committee if positive, is binding upon the others, 
and hence it can be called a transnational decision. 
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The structure of the procedure for the approval of GMOs diverges from that of 
plant protection products, but both are very illustrative examples of composite 
procedures from a strict point of view. In both cases the administrative procedure is 
characterised by an intense cooperation and, at some point of the sequence, the 
intervention of one actor is binding for the one that takes the final decision of 
authorisation. 
 
4.4.4.- Pharmaceuticals for human use 
 
 
The field of pharmaceuticals was one of the first areas where the need for 
European regulatory action was felt208. Not only was it necessary for the completion of 
the internal market, but the economic benefits of a unified system were felt by all the 
parties involved. Despite the fact that the various regulatory systems where designed to 
ensure a consistent standard of performance, safety, and quality, there were technical 
and procedural differences among Member States, leading to several, time-consuming 
processes and tests to meet each country’s requirements. The system was expensive not 
only for pharmaceutical companies, but also for national health authorities209. 
Simultaneously, the public demanded new drugs as quickly, but also as safely, as 
possible210. 
 
In response to concerns that the EU pharmaceutical industry was losing its 
competitiveness due to market divergence, the Commission assessed the possibilities of 
a deeper harmonisation from the nineties211. In its communication on single market in 
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pharmaceuticals of 1998212 it stressed the need to harmonise the European market of 
pharmaceuticals. The other Institutions agreed that this market should be a priority213, 
but the Commission acknowledged that integration of the pharmaceuticals markets was 
complicated not only by the diverse interests involved but also by the unique nature of 
this sector, which is a research-based industry214.  
 
There are also big differences between the national markets in pharmaceuticals, 
product of different conceptions of health systems, diverse disease incidence and 
certainly the disparate standards of living, all of which make demand for and 
consumption of pharmaceuticals, distribution costs, and public health care systems 
significantly diverging215. 
 
While the Commission has long been pushing for a successful "euro-industry", 
Member States focus on the protection of defined national interest and diverging 
priorities216. There were specificities of a market what made it unfit for full integration, 
but especially reluctance of many Member States to full legal harmonisation led to other 
solutions being envisaged217, and it was only logical that composite procedures were 
relevant also in this field. 
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Since its establishment in 1995, the European Medinines Agency (hereinafter 
EMA) has made notable harmonisation efforts with testing guidelines, assessment of 
quality, safety and efficacy218, and had a conception of its roles as a facilitator of 
cooperation and shared technical expertise among its many partners and stockholders219. 
More relevant from our procedural point of view, a pragmatic approach was designed 
consisting of staged introduction of normal market mechanisms in the subsectors ready 
for convergence wherever possible without compromising patients' access to medicines 
at an affordable cost or the Member States' public health expenditure objectives.  
 
As a result, under the current rules there are several procedures that emerged as a 
middle ground between the alternatives of full harmonisation and mere interstate 
cooperation220: a centralised procedure, a decentralised procedure, a mutual-recognition 
procedure, and purely national authorisation procedures. Indeed, this field comprises 
special national interests and a difficult achievement of an internal market, and it is thus 
especially prone to composite procedures. The main instrument in this field is 
Regulation 726/2004221, amended on several occasions222. 
  
The existence of these different procedures shows that even with the relevant 
participation of Member States, composite procedures entail a notable harmonisation, in 
the field where they are not willing to yield competences when it is not deemed strictly 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market. 
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why the sponsor believes the application should fall under the centralized procedure. 
The Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use226 shall be responsible for 
analysing the information submitted and for drawing up the opinion of the Agency227. 
The Committee may request the competent authority of a Member State the information 
showing that the manufacturer of a medicinal product concerned and carry out the 
necessary control tests228. Once the decision regarding acceptance of marketing 
authorisation application has been taken, the EMA will notify the applicant 
accordingly229. 
 
Following the acceptance of the marketing authorisation application, a 
rapporteur is selected230. The rapporteur is a regulatory authority from an EU Member 
State. In certain cases, a co-rapporteur may might appointed231. The selection of the 
rapporteur is based on objective criteria, in order to ensure objective scientific opinion 
and the best use of available expertise at the EMA232. The two Rapporteurs draw on the 
expertise of their national agency staff and external experts in the field to prepare the 
two separate assessment reports within seventy days.  
 
Each report makes a provisional recommendation on whether or not marketing 
authorisation shall be granted and, eventually, lists any objections and points of 
clarifications it deems necessary. The reports are forwarded to the other Member State 
authorities, who have thirty days to comment, and to the EMA. After a discussion, a 
document is sent to the applicant, who shall forward a reply. Once the response has 
been sent, the rapporteurs prepare a Joint Assessment Report within thirty days and the 
Committee may make comments within twenty days. 
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The Committee shall then reach an opinion233 within 210 days since the 
procedure formally started and an assessment report. This report shall be adopted if 
possible by consensus, and otherwise by absolute majority. If the opinion is negative, 
the applicant has a right of appeal, and then eventually a second opinion is issued. In 
case of a positive opinion, or a negative opinion that has been appealed, the 
Commission shall prepare a draft decision234. Following a comitology procedure235 the 
Decision of the Commission shall eventually be adopted and published so the new 
medicine would have EU wide authorisation to be freely marketed236. 
 
This procedure reveals a complex co-operation between Member States and EU 
authorities, where the successive inputs have different legal effects (sometimes binding, 
sometimes not). Being such a technical area, the procedure responds again to the 
precautionary principle, while trying to gather as much relevant expertise as possible. 
This centralised procedure has been successful in terms of efficiency but also, unlike 
some of the previous areas of risk regulation, in generating consumer confidence; 
leading to a possible future extension of its scope237.  
 
The mutual recognition procedure can be used when an authorisation has already 
been granted in one Member State and the applicant wishes to extend it to other 
Member States. In principle, the procedure remains at the interstate level but it is  
regulated by a EU instrument, Directive 2001/83/EC238. It simplifies the national 
authorisation procedure inasmuch as the concerned Member State will only have to 
authorise the medicinal product based on the assessment report drafted by the reference 
Member State239.   
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However, if the concerned Member State has objections, a dispute procedure 
begins where both Member States must use their best endeavours to reach an 
agreement240. If they are unable to reach an agreement, the Committee for medicinal 
products for human use is called to arbitrate241. Taking into consideration the points of 
disagreement, the Committee issues an opinion, which must be eventually confirmed by 
the Commission242. The decision of the Commission can be appealed by Member States 
to the Standing Committee referred above under a comitology procedure243. The 
decision shall be binding to Member States244. This is thus also a composite procedure 
but in inverse direction. 
 
Finally, there is a decentralised procedure with a similar structure as the mutual 
recognition procedure except that it applies to pharmaceuticals which have not received 
a marketing authorisation in any Member State. An identical application is submitted to 
the competent authorities of the different Member States simultaneously, but one of 
them shall act as reference Member State245. The eventual authorisation is granted 
individually, but once the reference Member State has issued the authorisation, the 
others may only refuse to grant it on the grounds of potential risk to public health. In 
case of disagreement, negotiation is facilitated to reach and compromise. If it is not 
possible, a procedure similar to the one for mutual recognition follows with the 
intervention of the Committee for medicinal products for human use246 and the 
Commission, eventual thought a commitology procedure reaches a final resolution247. 
 
All those procedures are composite in the sense that there is an intense 
cooperation between national and European authorities during the different steps. 
However, from a strict point of view, they are a less characteristic example of composite 
procedures as the binding element of the intervention is less clear than in the previous 
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procedures described (plant protection products, GMOs, and, as will be examined next, 
biocides). 
 
4.4.5.- Biocides 
 
Biocides are substances or microorganisms which can deter, render harmless, or 
exert a controlling effect on any harmful organism by chemical or biological means. 
Although pesticides can fall under the scope of this definition, in EU law they are 
treated differently248. Like pesticides, biocides are aimed at killing living organisms, 
and for this reason biocidal products can pose significant risk to human health and 
welfare. Examples of biocides include disinfectants for human hygiene, disinfectants for 
water treatment or preservatives for wood, masonry or other materials. 
 
The first significant harmonising approach to the approval of biocides was put in 
place in Directive 98/8/EC249. The former biocides Directive introduced a two-step 
process of approval that entailed a first evaluation of the active substance at the Union 
level, and a subsequent product authorisation at Member State level, a structure that is 
common to other composite procedures which have been analyzed. This was intended to 
be done progressively according to a list of different products250. Even at the level of the 
national authorisation, cooperation was still very intense, and a mutual recognition 
procedure was also established to facilitate the subsequent authorisation of a product by 
the manufacturer across the different countries251. 
 
The new Regulation 528/2012252 keeps this two-step scheme while providing for 
the possibility that some biocidal products be authorised at the Union level thus gaining 
direct access to the entire internal market. In this sense, the new rules stem from the 
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The procedure for a single Union authorisation of biocidal products is restricted 
to certain product types, whose number shall be enlarged at different stages254. The 
applicant shall submit an application with certain information255 to the ECHA256, which 
shall forward it immediately to the national authority selected by the applicant257. 
 
The national competent authority shall validate the application upon checking 
that the relevant information has been submitted258. Otherwise it shall request the 
applicant to complete it259. From the date of validation, the national authority has one 
year to evaluate the application260 and draw up an assessment report261. This will 
involve risk assessment for human health and the environment in the context of the 
intended use and to establish any additional necessary conditions262. This report shall be 
sent to the applicant, who can make comments in thirty days263. Then the report shall be 
forwarded to the ECHA264. 
 
Within 180 days after the receipt of the conclusions of the evaluation, ECHA 
shall prepare an opinion on the authorisation of the biocidal product for the 
Commission265. Upon its reception, the Commission shall adopt an implementing 
                                                 
254
 Article 42 states that Union authorisation may be grnated from 1 September 2013 for product types 1, 
3, 4, 5, 18 and 19; from 1 January 2017 for product types 2, 6 and 13; and from 1 January 2020 onwards 
to the remaining products types 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 22. 
255
 This information includes an application form; a dossier that satisfies the requirements of Annex II and 
Annex III of EU BPR; a copy of the proposed label and Safety Data Sheet for the biocidal product; a 
safety data sheet for all active and non-active substances; a draft summary of product characteristics; and 
the national competent authority selected. 
256
 For this purpose there is an internet register for biocidal products available at 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/env/r4bp2/ 
257
 Article 43(2). 
258
 Article 43(3). 
259
 Article 43(4). 
260
 Article 44(1). 
261
 Article 44(3). 
262
 Article 21(2). 
263
 Article 44(1). 
264
 Idem.  
265
 Article 44(2), if the opinion recommends the authorisation, it shall include: a statement on whether the 
conditions for approval are fulfilled; a draft summary of biocidal product characteristics; details of any 
terms or conditions which should be imposed; and the final assessment report. 
236 
 
regulation that shall eventually grant the Union authorisation to the biocidal product266 
through an examination comitology procedure267. 
 
There is another mechanism for operators to market biocidal products; the 
mutual recognition that places a much more relevant role on national authorities. here 
are two processes for mutual recognition. These are mutual recognition in sequence and 
mutual recognition in parallel. 
 
The mutual recognition in sequence procedure can apply if a national 
authorisation is granted already in one Member State. Applicants shall submit an 
application to the competent authorities of the Member State or Member States where 
they seek recognition. The application must include, in particular, the national 
authorisation granted by the reference Member State and, eventually, its translation268. It 
shall be submitted to the register of ECHA, which will forward it to the concerned 
Member State. 
 
The submitted application and dossier will be evaluated to check the risks to 
health and the environment, intended use and efficacy taking into accounted the first 
evaluation by the reference Member State within thirty days269. 
 
If the concerned Member State disagrees with the evaluation done by the 
reference Member State, they will be referred to a Coordination Group270, which has 60 
days to seek agreement271. If the Coordination group agrees with the concerned Member 
State, the biocidal product will not be authorised. If an agreement cannot be reached, the 
matter is referred to the Commission, which may ask ECHA for an opinion on the 
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scientific or technical aspects of the case272. In this case, it is for the Commission to 
make a final decision273, through the same comitology procedure referred above. 
 
Similar rules apply in the procedure of mutual recognition in parallel. In this 
case, the first national authorisation procedure is launched simultaneously as the 
application for mutual recognition274. The reference Member State authority must first 
evaluate the application, while the other national shall wait until the authorisation is, 
eventually, granted within one year275. Then, the other Member States shall validate that 
authorisation within thirty days. If they disagree, the question is referred to the 
Coordination Group and, if disagreement persists, the Commission shall decide. 
 
The procedure for the authorisation of biocidals is a clear example of the move 
towards a more centralized procedure in the European Union, as results from the 
comparison between Directive 8/98/EC and Regulation 528/2012. It is also an example 
of a relatively simple composite procedure where the characteristics are easily visible. 
 
4.4.6.- Chemicals 
 
Chemicals have been subject to European normative action since Directive 
67/548276 when only approximation of national law on certain aspects of chemicals was 
envisaged277. The initial aim was to check the main hazards related to chemicals, but 
progressively other interests were covered by subsequent directives, like consumer 
protection278 and environmental concerns279. 
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Health and environmental protection were the key elements of the Commission’s 
renewed policy on chemicals best illustrated in the White Paper COM(2001) 88 final 
“Strategy for a future Chemicals Policy”280. Its conclusions led to the discussion and, 
after years of political debates and interinstitutional discussions281, the adoption of 
Regulation 1907/2006282, the most important piece of legislation in the domain of 
chemicals. It entered into force at different times for each part of it and it has been 
amended on many occasions to reflect the progress of science283. Legal experts have 
characterised this piece of legislation as the product of the compromise between human 
health and environmental protection, on the one hand, and economic development and 
market-oriented rules, on the other284. The many risks and hazards related to chemicals 
brought about a more intense and centralized intervention than in other sectors285 where 
risk assessment is essential, and hence a reinforced interest for a unified procedure 
prevails; a rationale that operates in detriment of the intervention of Member States. 
However, like in the other areas where composite procedures have been established, a 
compromise guaranteed that they also played a relevant role.  
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 The general procedure for the authorisation of chemical substances must be 
triggered by private operators. This authorisation procedure is limited to substances 
included in Annex XIV of the Regulation, that is, substances of extremely high 
concern289. The application shall be submitted to the ECHA290 together with some 
information291. Once the ECHA receives the application, the Agency's Committees for 
Risk Assessment and Socioeconomic Analysis shall give their draft opinions within ten 
months292. Member States experts take part in the committees and, in practice, the 
scientific and technical controls aimed at assessing the compliance with the different 
chemical standards of safety are carried out by national agencies or institutes. Their 
evaluations do not have to be followed by the committees of the ECHA but the 
experience shows that the committees do rely on the work of the national experts due to 
the very specialised technical expertise required to perform the tests and obtain the 
relevant results. 
 
Afterwards, the applicant has the right to comment on the draft opinions by the 
committees293. The Member States and the Commission shall be forwarded these 
opinions as well294. It is the Commission which shall prepare a draft authorisation 
decision within three months of receipt of the opinions from the ECHA295. The final 
decision granting or refusing the authorisation shall be taken in through an examination 
comitology procedure296. 
 
Member States thus are formally informed of the opinions in preparation of the 
procedure and are involved in the decision-making procedure, by taking part in the two 
Committees of the ECHA and subsequently in the comitology committee. Besides their 
involvement, which is embedded in institutionalised collegial bodies, Member States do 
provide with a relevant input, much more relevant than in practical terms it would seem 
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just by looking at the REACH regulation. This is due to the fact that the technical tests 
are performed by national agencies and institutes, whose results are most usually 
followed, even though they are not legally mandatory.  
 
The scheme established by the REACH regulation is, thus, different from the 
previous examples that we have seen, inasmuch as the formal role of national authorities 
is less relevant. However, the procedure does entail in practice an intense cooperation 
that remains quite visible. From the strict point of view on the concept of composite 
procedures, the element of a bonding intervention of national authorities is hard to see, 
unless one is aware of the practical functioning of the cooperation. Although it is not 
obvious when reading the text of the regulation, the national level of decision making is 
essential because it is there that the technical expertise necessary for a sound decision 
lies. For instance, the technical evaluation of chemical substances fall under the 
competence of one or more Member States. It is national authorities that carry out the 
technical assessment and forward the results to the ECHA, which formally takes a 
decision. Perhaps, this serves as an example that a too rigid, dogmatic approach on 
composite procedures is of little use as the legislator designed the administrative 
procedures without a particular legal pattern in mind. The design rather takes the form 
of a sequence of successive interventions of the different actors aimed at keeping 
difficult balances between the need for a centralised decision-making procedure for 
European-wide authorisation of chemicals and the reality of the source of expertise and 
know-how that remains at the national level.  
 
 
4.4.7.- Management of European funds  
 
The management of European funds often entails the participation of both the 
Commission and the competent Member State authorities. The procedural arrangements 
thought which the allocation and control of those funds take place can many times be 
characterised as composite297. There are two main areas where shared management of 
European funds is relevant, Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds. They  
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all will be analysed in this section. However, similar schemes of shared responsibilities 
are increasingly being used in other areas, like development cooperation298. 
 
These European funds are permanent financial instruments designed to assist the 
Commission and the Members States in setting up, implementing and financing the 
structural policy of the Union, thus contributing to the development of projects in 
Members States299. Although each individual fund is based on different provisions of 
primary law300, their legal framework is essentially the same301. We will distinguish the 
funds in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy from the other Structural 
Funds.  
 
The Common Agricultural Policy has been a core element of the old European 
Economic Community302, as recognized in the Treaties303, and the European Union's 
most important policy in terms of the portion of the EU's budget allocated to it304. The 
financing of agricultural policy has been based on different schemes of cooperation 
between the European and the national and subnational authorities305. The mechanism 
of agriculture support put in place in the years following the creation of the EEC and the 
direct finance by the EC budget remained stable for about thirty years, until the reforms 
of the nineties306. From 1992, in part due to the negotiations relating to the World Trade 
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Organization307, in part due to a change in priorities and the need for protection of 
human health and environmental concerns there was a major overhaul in agricultural 
policies308. 
 
Even with the reform, for the purposes of this analysis, what is important is that 
public intervention in the agricultural markets has taken place and still does via 
subsidies309. Subsidies play a major role even though there have been a move from a 
state assisted model to a more liberal one310. 
 
Two funds are essential in the implementation of European agricultural policy, 
the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD). The former finances direct payments to farmers and 
measures to respond to market disturbances, while the latter finances the rural 
development programmes of the Member States311. 
 
The EAGF entails direct payments to individual beneficiaries. Although the 
Commission manages the fund, the tasks of handling the funds individually is normally 
delegated onto Member States, which either manage the payments at national level or 
have regions or other entities in charge of those tasks. Even after the reforms, 
agricultural funds still account for the largest share of the budget of the European 
Union312. The legal instrument for the management of agricultural funds have been 
progressively amended and repealed313, but the basic scheme remains valid today. 
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The management arrangements entail that while national authorities pay and 
control the expenditure for agricultural and rural development subsidies, the 
Commission is responsible for the administration of payments and for auditing the 
control system of Member States314. Several of the procedures to implement the 
common agricultural policy are composite. 
 
One example is the procedure for the preparation approval and review of rural 
development programmes. These programmes shall be prepared by national 
authorities315, with the cooperation of the local authorities, economic and social 
partners, and representatives316, and shall cover a number of aspects317. These 
programmes must be in line with the Community strategic guidelines, adopted at the 
Union level by the Council318. The Commission is in charge of assessing whether the 
proposed programme is coherent with the strategic guidelines319. If it is not, the Member 
State concerned will have to revise it. The decision of the Commission must be taken 
through a comitology procedure320. The review of those programmes also requires the 
intervention of Member States in their proposals and the Commission in their 
approval321. 
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Another example can be found in the procedures for awarding subsidies to 
individual beneficiaries. Although the current system entrusts most of the tasks to 
national authorities who are accountable to the Commission for the distribution of 
funds, in the past the arrangements also constituted composite procedures with the aim 
of awarding grants. The clearest example is the system under the old Regulation 355/77, 
which gave rise to the Borelli case which shall be examined extensively in the following 
Chapter322. This procedure started with the application with the individual interested in 
carrying out a project for developing storage, preservation or processing of agricultural 
products or their marketing channels323. Those applications had to be submitted by the 
Member State concerned to the Commission324. The Commission had to decide through 
a comitology procedure325, but the prior approval by the competent authority in the 
territory where the project was to be carried out326. 
 
The patterns that we have shown as examples are less intricate that some of the 
previous areas examined. Their composite nature lies on the fact that both national and 
EU authorities have to give subsequent approvals in an administrative sequence in order 
to reach a final decision. The procedures in the field of the CAP are very specific, and 
diverge substantially both in terms of the products concerned and the point of time 
where they take place. However, inasmuch as the input from national authorities 
consists on reports or favorable opinions necessary to proceed with the final decision to 
be taken at the European level.  
 
Structural funds, which include European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the Cohesion Fund, are governed essentially 
by Regulation 1303/2013327 although there are more detailed specific rules concerning 
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each particular instrument. With this in mind, for the sake of simplification, we can 
describe the arrangements for the management of structural funds in the following way.  
 
Member State authorities are in charge of the individual management and 
control of the funds. However, competences are distributed among several bodies. As a 
general rule, there must be a separate managing authority, the certifying authority, 
where applicable, and the audit authority, each with different duties. Additionally, a 
monitoring committee can be set up. As the funds are usually related to local or regional 
competences, those bodies are often designated at the local level, and some private 
bodies can be awarded some of the functions. Thus, most of the procedure remains at 
the national or sub-national level, namely the managing of the programme, the 
relationships with the beneficiaries, the certification of the statements of expenditure, 
and the subsequent audit thereof. 
 
The Commission holds powers of budget implementation and is ultimately 
responsible for the efficiency and accountability of the system. It keeps the formal 
power to award the final payments, all the previous payments being provisional. 
Commission officials or authorised Commission representatives may carry out on-the-
spot audits or checks328. 
 
As we will see in the next Chapter, litigation in the field of structural funds on 
grounds of procedural breaches stemming from the composite nature of the 
administrative procedures for the awarding of funds has been abundant329. Therefore, 
procedures in the field of the awarding of EU funds are clear examples of composite 
procedures and they have the advantage that they have been assessed by the European 
Courts from different perspectives. 
 
Unlike the composite procedures described in the previous chapters, the legal 
framework governing European structural funds and funds related to the Common 
Agricultural Policy is more diverse and thus harder to systhematise. However, the 
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elements of composite procedures, as well as their legal shortcomings can easily be 
identified and since these procedures have been in force for a longer time, relevant 
conclusions can be drawn on how they were assessed by the European courts. 
 
4.4.8.- Protection of geographical indications and designations of origin 
 
 
The 'geographical indication' is a type of intellectual property right330 in the form 
of a distinctive signs that permit the identification of product whose where quality, 
reputation or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. 
 
 The protection of geographical indications dates back to old national 
legislations which aimed at the protection against the adulteration of local products that 
had acquired a considerable reputation. The quality of the produce was thus linked to a 
geographical location with regard to its climate or its geology331. The development of 
international trade brought about the need for a international system of protection, 
starting at the end of the 19th Century332. The international instruments still constitute 
the basic international regime of protection together with the rules of the WTO 
Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights333. The international 
system of protection is based on compromise with third countries that have a weaker 
interest in protection of geographical indications, consequently the European rules, both 
at the national and EU level, tend to offer a more complete protection334. 
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The necessity of a European-wide system of protection of geographical 
denominations became apparent since the early case-law instituting the principle of 
equivalence as a pillar of the common market335. The reasoning of the Court of Justice 
was that technical standards could not be used by a Member State to prevent the 
marketing of goods legally produced in another Member State. Harmonization of 
geographical designations has been adopted through different regulations336, firstly in 
the area of wines337, and then more generally on agricultural products and foodstuffs 
with Regulation 2081/92338, taking into account the existing principles of the protection 
under national legislation and, sometimes, establishing links with it339.  
 
The unfavourable outcomes of WTO disputes relating to the system of 
protection of Regulation 2081/92 triggered its abrogation and replacement340 by 
Regulation 510/2006341. The mechanism under Regulation 2081/92 was a central 
registration system managed by the Commission but in which Member State authorities 
play a significant role342. Today, the legal regime is found in Regulation 1151/2012343, 
that reproduces the same procedures of Regulation 510/2006 while establishing other 
rules on the quality of agricultural products and foodstuffs. This Regulation sets out 
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provisions on agricultural products and foodstuffs (excluding wine-sector products) 
from a defined geographical area. There are two basic categories of geographical 
indications. A protected designation of origin (PDO) relates to foodstuffs which are 
produced, processed and prepared in a given geographical area using certain recognized 
know-how344. A protected geographical indication (PGI) relates only to a link with the 
area in at least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation345. The 
procedure for their registration is essentially the same. 
 
The application shall be submitted by a group of producers or processors to the 
competent authorities of the Member State346, accompanied by certain documents and 
specifications347. The application dossier must be scrutinized by the national authority, 
in order to check that it fulfills the necessary conditions. As part of the scrutiny, a 
national opposition procedure must be initiated, by which the application is published 
and interested parties are given the right to oppose the admissibility of the 
application348.  
 
If the competent authority of the Member State considers that the requirements 
are met, it shall take a favourable decision and it shall lodge an application dossier with 
the Commission349. The favourable decision shall be public and subject to appeal. Once 
received, the Commission shall, during a period of six months, scrutinise the application 
and verify that it is justified and meets the conditions350. If it is the case, the application 
shall be published in the Official Journal and an opposition procedure shall begin for a 
period of three months. Any legal o natural person may lodge an opposition notice, 
which shall be forwarded by the Commission to the national authority. In case of 
opposition, there shall be consultations between the person who lodged the opposition 
and that applicant.  
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Once the opposition and, eventually, consultation period has expired the 
Commission shall take a decision on the registration351. Such decision must be an 
implementing decision, which shall be adopted through a comitology examination 
procedure352 in case it decides not to register the geographical indication, or decides to 
register it but that has been opposition. In case it decides to register the indication, it 
shall adopt the implementing decision without the assistance of the comitology 
committee, except if there has been no agreement with the opposing party. The 
procedure for the registration of geographical indications is a clear example of upwards 
composite procedure with a relatively simple structure, without the intervention of any 
EU agencies and, in some cases, not even comitology committees. The national bodies 
have a prominent role, as their decision to lodge the application with the Commission is 
an obligatory pre-requisite for the registration on which they enjoy certain discretion. 
Some of the important cases that we will examine in the next chapter with regard to the 
challenges of composite procedures relate precisely to this field353. 
 
 
4.4.9.- Ecolabels 
 
A peculiar type of composite procedure is the procedures for awarding European 
Union ecolabels. The scheme encourages companies to develop environmentally 
sustainable products and services. Companies can be authorised to tag an EU ecolabel 
to their products and services as long as they comply with the criteria laid down by the 
Commission in cooperation with national authorities and relevant stakeholders. The 
criteria should ensure that selected products and services have a reduced environmental 
impact throughout their life cycle, from the extraction of raw material through to 
production, use and disposal. The individual award of an ecolabel follows a composite 
administrative procedure initiated at the Member State level and, following a decision 
by the Commission after consultations with other Member States, a contract by the 
                                                 
351
 Article 52. 
352
 Article 57(2). 
353
 Case T-114/99, CSR Pampryl SA / Commission, [1999] ECR II-3334; C-269/99, Kühne / Jütro, [2001] 
ECR I-9541; T-215/00, La Conqueste / Commission [2001]ECR II-181; T-381/02, Confédération 
générale des producteurs de lait de brebis and des industriels de Roquefort / Commission [2005] II-5337; 
T-369/03, Arizona Chemical and Others / Commission [2005] ECR II-5839; and Case C-343/07, Bavaria 
/ Bayerischer Brauerbund, [2009] ECR I-5491. See further in section 5.3.5. 
251 
 
national department responsible and the applicant on the conditions of the use of the 
ecolabel. 
 
The idea of voluntarily labelling products and services as environmentally 
sustainable was developed and implemented in some Member States, notably Germany 
with the so called Blue Angel (der Blaue Engel) as early as 1978, which inspired the 
European ecolabel354. The proliferation of these labels in different Member States led 
the Commission to realise the importance of harmonising such labels in order to avoid 
distortion of the Internal Market, while maintaining the national labels355, and to the 
adoption of the first ecolabel Regulation in 1992356. 
 
The system proved to be unsuccessful in the first years357, with no ecolabels 
granted from 1992 to 1995358, but it was amended by a new Regulation in 2000359 and 
later in 2009360, resulting in a more useful and efficient system. At present, it has 
reached considerable acceptance361 and the scheme enjoys a good reputation362. 
 
There are two different phases in the procedure for the issuing of ecolabels. The 
first is the establishment of the criteria for granting the labels. These criteria are set by 
the Commission, based on the general requirements laid down in the ecolabel 
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ecolabel, the national authority shall draw up a contract with the applicant regarding the 
eco-label’s conditions for use366. 
 
To a certain extent, this procedure is less formalised than some previous ones. 
This is logical considering the licence to use an ecolabel is merely voluntary, and does 
not have the same legal effects that binding authorisations. However, again the clear 
interactions of national and European authorities in an administrative sequence can 
clearly be distinguished. Because the procedure ends with an act of the national 
authorities, a contract to be concluded with the applicant, this procedure can be 
qualified as top down procedure367.n 
 
4.4.9.- Procedures in the area of freedom, security and justice. Comparison of 
fingerprints relating to asylum and other international protection procedures 
 
 
The area of freedom, justice and security, formerly referred to as Justice and 
Home Affairs368, has traditionally been prone to compromises between the reluctance of 
Member States to yield competences and the need to find a response to questions that 
have an essentially European dimension.  
 
Hence, cooperation among national authorities with limited involvement of the 
Institutions remain a frequent scheme. However, in the field of asylum and immigration 
the European Union has experience an exponential growth of competences. Although 
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European Union law has already become the centrepiece of legislation in the matter369, 
procedures remain essentially national. However, recent developments bring about a 
reinforced cooperation that goes further than a mere exchange of information between 
national authorities. 
 
The current legal framework consists of a set of acts passed on the same date, 
out of which a Directive on "procedure"370, a Directive on "standards for reception of 
applicants"371, a Regulation on "Member State responsible"372, and a Regulation on 
"eurodac"373. Apart from setting common rules for the national administrative 
procedures, it is noteworthy that a central database has been set up to gather all the 
information that national systems can collect and forward that information to tha 
national authorities who shall than make the relevant decisions.  
 
This central database regulated under Regulation 603/2013 is not only a source 
of information for national authorities dealing with asylum or other international 
protection procedures, but it has an active role and it is interlinked with the national 
police services. Member State authorities are obliged to promptly take the fingertips of 
every applicant and immediately transmit it to the Central System374, together with 
certain other information.  
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The Central System holds the data375 stemming from all national authorities for 
ten years376, making it accessible to national authorities377 and to Europol378. Notably, 
the fingerprint database allows for a quick contrast of all data available and thus for law 
enforcement and fraud prevention purposes. The rules are established in a way that 
Member States rely in the information provided by the Central System to make their 
decision in the national administrative procedure, but the combination of the rules of the 
other aforementioned instruments lead to a specific decision.  
 
Thus, for example, national authorities will end the procedure for granting 
asylum as soon as they receive the information that there was an entry to another 
Member State before, in which case the procedure shall be dealt with in that first 
country, according to Regulation 604/2013379, and the Member State where the 
application is being submitted shall be declared inadmissible, in accordance with 
Directive 32/2013/EU380. What is important for the definition of composite procedures 
is the fact that based on the communication received by the Central System, Member 
States shall take a particular decision, that is, it is not a mere transmission of 
information that the national authorities might assess with a margin of appreciation.  
 
Considering the recent evolution, the area of freedom, security and justice is 
likely to see a proliferation of composite procedures, with larger Union's powers than at 
present. 
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concerned after a successful transfer; (i) where applicable in accordance with Article 10(c), the date when 
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4.4.10.- Trade of endangered species of wild flora and fauna 
 
International trade of endangered species has been protected by an international 
instrument since 1975 the Washington Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora381, of which all EU Member States are 
signatories. Within the European Union, Regulation 338/97382 (the CITES Regulation) 
entailed a compromise between the need to regulate the international trade in 
endangered species and the need to respect free movement of goods383. 
 
The annexes of Regulation 338/97 list a number of species that fall under the 
scope of protection. Any holder of a specimen of such species wanting to use it for 
commercial purposes shall apply for a single licence. The procedure in this case is 
carried out by national authorities on the conditions laid down by the Regulation, that is, 
in particular, certain requirements for the breeder of the specimen384, as well as a 
certificate demonstrating its legal origin385. A similar mechanism works for the import 
of such specimens, but in this case the national authorities shall seek scientific advice as 
to the prospective impact in the environment of the imported species386. However, if the 
port of import is not located in the country of destination, they shall recognize the 
authorisation granted by the Member State of destination387. 
 
Member States shall reject the application if the requirements laid down in 
Regulation 338/97 are not met388. Even if all the conditions are fulfilled, national 
authorities might still decline the authorisation following the advice of the scientific 
                                                 
381
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed at 
Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973 and amended at Bonn, on 22 June 1979. 
382
 Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna 
and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ 1997 L 61, 1–69). 
383
 Andrea M. Keessen, European Administrative Decisions. How the EU regulates products in the 
internal market, Europa Law Publishing (Groeningen, 2009), at 21. 
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 Article 8(3) and 10, further elaborated by Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 
laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the 
protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (OJ 166 L 2006, 1-69). 
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authority; however, it is not allowed to take national safeguard measures, only the 
Commission can impose a trading ban relating to certain countries or species. 
 
As a result, even if the criteria are the same for all Member States the possibility 
exists that some national authorities take a stricter stance than others for authorisations 
that have a legal effect in all Member States. Several measures are foreseen in order to 
mitigate this possible discrepancy, discouraging operations to intentionally choose one 
Member State over the other, or to go to try a second application with the same scope to 
another Member State389. First, in cases of rejections in case which are significantly 
relevant to the objectives of the Regulation, the Member State shall inform the 
Commission, which shall in its turn inform the other Member States so as to ensure the 
uniform application of the Regulation390. Secondly, it is mandatory for the applicant to 
inform of previous rejections. Lastly, previous rejections by other Member States shall 
be recognized and only when circumstances have changed significantly or when new 
evidence to support the application has become available may the other Member States 
adopt a different position391. 
 
Although the Regulation is aimed at a single authorisation under the competence 
of national authorities, one Member State can put one authorisation issued by another 
Member State into question and declare it void after consultation the issuing Member 
State. If disagreement persists after consultation, the declaration will only be unilateral 
and the issuing Member State is not obliged to revoke it. There is no settlement 
procedure where the Commission can eventually take a final decision.  The only 
possibility would be that the Commission launches an infringement procedure against 
the Member States that is following an unreasonable interpretation of the 
requirements392. 
 
The composite element exists only in case of dispute, when the Commission is 
called into play, but even in this case its decision is not final. This procedure is at the 
borderline of the notion of composite procedures, because the input from the EU is not 
                                                 
389
 Keessen, European Administrative Decisions..., at 61 and 62. 
390
 Article 6(2). 
391
 Article 6(4)(a). 
392
 Keessen, European Administrative Decisions..., at 61 and 62. 
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binding. However, the structure of the procedure provides evidence that the role of other 
Member States and the Commission is not negligible. This is also an interesting 
example because it proves that procedures with slight composite elements can actually 
be very detrimental to the coherence of the systems and lead, perhaps even more 
intensely than with composite procedures in the strict sense, to serious shortcomings for 
judicial review and in general individual protection393. 
 
 
4.5.- Conclusions 
 
 Composite procedures are the procedural manifestation of the increasingly 
intense cooperation taking place between the national and European public 
administration. Legal academia has come into terms with the existence of a category of 
administrative procedure which goes beyond the classic dichotomy direct-indirect 
implementation and that has become more and more common. Yet the legal 
characteristics of this category, composite procedures, are hard to define in a conclusive 
and comprehensive way.  
 
 The gist of composite procedures is that actors from both the European and 
national level of administration provide a relevant input to an administrative procedure 
which ends by the adoption of a decision by one of them, with regard to the 
implementation of EU law. This is the basic definition that combines 
comprehensiveness and accuracy. It is worth noting that some of the examples that are 
considered composite procedures fit better than others in this definition. 
 
Taking a look at the origins of composite procedures we discover that they were 
born out of practical necessity, as a compromise between yielding implementing 
competences to the European level of administration and keeping Member States 
involved in the execution of EU law, thus respecting their procedural autonomy. It is 
only logical that this fragmentation at origin implied a lack of a common legal 
framework, and thus a complicated academic elaboration before analysing the 
challenges they entail. 
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The criticism shall not be addressed at composite procedures themselves, but at 
the lack of legal solutions to the problems they bring about, in terms mainly of access to 
justice and procedural rights. On the contrary, composite procedures appear as 
pragmatic solutions with positive results for European integration. The expansion of 
composite procedures provides evidence of its success, for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
they have facilitated expansion of the EU administrative action to areas which member 
States would otherwise have kept away from European intervention. Secondly, they 
have provided the necessary information flow and technical expertise for common 
decision-making mechanisms in highly specialised areas. Thirdly, they have helped to 
create a network of mutual confidence where implementation and enforcement are more 
effective. Fourthly, they gather inputs from different actors, even outside of the EU and 
national realms, enabling for wider participation and pluralism. Lastly, the structures 
and settings are adaptable to the permanent state of change and development of areas 
covered by their action. 
 
A common legal framework, notably in the form of certain rules to be included 
in the regulation on a common European administrative procedure, would contribute to 
meet the challenges composite procedures bring about and which would be analysed at 
length in the following chapter. 
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5.1.- Preliminary remarks 
 
 Composite procedures are mechanisms of intricate legal complexity that has 
emerged out of practical necessities and political compromises. In these 
circumstances, composite procedures bring about serious legal challenges. The legal 
position of individuals vis-á-vis the different public administrations that take part in 
the administrative procedure remains unclear. At times, the individual lacks the 
essential procedural rights that would be evident in the case of a 'normal' 
administrative procedure. The lack of clarity leads to situations where the individual, 
finding himself in a complex system of procedural arrangements, cannot effectively 
invoke or exercise his rights. When confronted with these cases, the Court of Justice 
reasons on a case-by-case basis, without seeing composite procedures as a peculiar 
phenomenon on its own, leading to a lack comprehensive solutions. At times, 
responsibility is yielded to the national courts, which are in practice unable to review 
the whole procedure. In many cases, the approach of the Court of Justice is the only 
one capable of complying with the respect for national jurisdictions, but it fails to 
secure individual rights at stake convincingly. 
 
 The analysis and systematisation of composite procedures is pertinent because 
the solution to the challenges they entail presupposes the need of a coherent legal 
category. Once established, specific mechanisms apply to cope with its peculiarities. 
These peculiarities cannot, as we will see, be solved satisfactorily with the currently 
existing legal tools alone. The challenges of composite procedures do not only raise in 
theory, they have appeared in practice and the legal response for them has been 
largely insufficient. With the current proliferation of composite procedures, there is a 
risk that they appear more and more often. 
 
 As discussed in the third Chapter, administrative procedures are sequences 
whereby public authorities take decisions or enact rules respecting and ensuring 
certain rights of the citizens. Composite procedures entail a fundamental mutation in 
the nature of administrative procedures, because the responsibility does not lie within 
a single legal entity, but within several bodies. This feature affects dramatically the 
procedural rights of the citizens. The relevance of a profound legal analysis of 
composite procedures is not a mere theoretical exercise, it is much needed precisely 
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because the EU judges have lacked a systematic approach to these problems. The 
relevance lies with the fact that the present fragmentary situation is unsatisfactory; 
procedural rights may be breached and the subsequent right to review decisions before 
a judicial authority brings about so many shortcomings that at times one can see that 
the right to effective access to justice is not respected. 
 
 The objective of this Chapter is to identify these challenges. Considering the 
rulings issued by the Court of Justice and the GC so far and the many examples of 
composite procedures described in the previous Chapter, the structure results from the 
three basic challenges that can be identified, the first two concerning two procedural 
rights, the right to be heard during the administrative procedure and the right to a 
reasoned decisions, and the last one related to the most important right once the 
administrative decision has been taken, namely, the right to its judicial review. This 
does not mean that these are the only rights are stake. There are some others where 
one could identify shortcomings related to the phenomenon of composite procedures, 
such as the right to access one’s file and the right to a compensation in case of liability 
of the administration1.  
 
For each section, there will be an analysis of each of the rights in the specific 
context of composite procedures followed by the assessment of the existing case law 
of the EU courts for each of them. This structure shall not be an obstacle for the 
important consideration that the shortcomings are very often related to one another 
and result, overall, on an unacceptable weakening of the legal position of the 
individual when affected by composite procedures. 
 
5.2.- The right to be heard in composite procedures 
 
5.2.1.- The right to be heard in the EU and in Member States 
 
The right to be heard is one of the main procedural rights that citizens have 
during the administrative procedure. It is among the administrative rights of defence 
                                                 
1
 These two however will not be analysed autonomously as one could link them to one of the sections 
covered; the right to be heard and the duty to reason the decision are intimately linked to the right to 
access one’s file; while the right to sue for damages is connected to the right to access to justice and the 
determination of the competent judge, as well as the liable administration. 
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or, in the Anglo-Saxon terminology, a right under the concept of the due process of 
law. The right to be heard is a procedural law as aged as the oldest legal system in the 
Western world. It is a right existent in ancient Roman law that was famously 
elaborated by Seneca in Medea with the quote:  
 
Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera, aequum licet statuerit, haud æquus 
fuerit.2 
 
The old component of "audi alteram partem" was an essential element for a 
fair trial in the sense of respect for the principle of contradiction in a judicial 
proceeding. When administrative procedures began to be considered as procedures in 
which citizens had certain rights3, this right was immediately adopted as part of the 
elementary procedural rights before the public administration4. Additionally, this right 
has been conceived from the standpoint of human dignity that an individual should 
take part in decisions relating to him or her5. 
 
In England, for example, the application of this principle before public 
authorities can be identified in a judicial ruling as far back as the mid-19th Century, 
where a judge stated that "although there are no positive words in a statute requiring 
that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the 
omission of the legislature"6, a stance which notoriously resembles that of the Court 
of Justice of the EU a century later, as we will see afterwards.  
 
 Nevertheless, even if this right was originally 'transposed' from judicial 
procedures to administrative procedures, the scope and legal protection of this right 
                                                 
2
 He who decides a case without hearing the other side, though he decide justly, cannot be considered 
just. Seneca, Medea, CXCIX cited in William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2009), at 403.  
3
 See section 3.2.3. 
4
 Servulo Correia, "Administrative Due or Fair Process: Different Paths in the Evolutionary Formation 
of a Global Principle and a Global Right", in Gordon Anthony, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison, and 
Tom Zwart (eds.), Values in Global Administrative Law, Hart Publishing (Oxford, 2011), 313-62, at 
326. 
5
 Ibid. at 327. 
6
 Stanley Alexander de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Stevens (London, 1973) at 
134, citing the judgment of judge Byles J. in Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 
C.B.N.S. 180. 
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are not exactly comparable. As a procedural right before the courts, the right to be 
heard is normally considered a fundamental right integrating the right to a fair trial7. 
Some Constitutions, like the Spanish Constitution, enshrines this right in 
administrative procedures too, although not with the category of a fundamental right8. 
The example of the maximum level of protection in the EU is Greece, where the 
Constitution equals the protection of the right to a hearing in an administrative 
procedure to that before the Courts9.  
 
Within the broader European context, the right to a hearing is enacted as part 
of the right to a fair trial provided for in Article 6 of the ECHR. This human right 
concerns criminal procedures before a court, yet an array of administrative procedures 
can be included under the scope of this right. The ECtHR has held that some punitive 
administrative procedures can be assimilated to 'criminal' procedures within the 
meaning of Article 6 ECHR10, and that, if these administrative procedures did not 
offer the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR, then the courts must have the power to rehear 
the evidence11. The debate on the applicability of some of the guarantees of Article 6 
ECHR, in particular a proper right to a hearing, has been particularly intense in the 
field of EU competition law12. However, the guarantees of the Convention would not 
apply to all administrative procedures, but only to a particular kind (sanctioning 
                                                 
7
 For example, Article 103(1) of the German Constitution 1949; "In the courts every person shall be 
entitled to a hearing in accordance with law"; or Article 45(1) of the Constitution of Poland of 1997: 
"Everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue delay, before a 
competent, impartial and independent court";   
8
 Article 105 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 reads: "The law shall make provision for:  
...  
c) The procedures for the taking of administrative action, with due safeguards for the hearing of 
interested parties when appropriate." 
It is worth noting that this provision is not located within the list of fundamental rights in Part I of the 
Constitution. 
9
 Article 20 of the Greek Constitution of 1975:  
"1. Every person shall be entitled to receive legal protection by the courts and may plead before them 
his views concerning his rights or interests, as specified by law. 
2. The right of a person to a prior hearing also applies in any administrative action or measure adopted 
at the expense of his rights or interests." 
10
 La Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere / Belgium, Appl. no. 6878/75 and 7238/75, A/43 para 51; 
and Ozturk / Germany, A/73 ( 1984) 6 EHRR 409. 
11
 Tsfayo / United Kingdom, App. No 60860/00, All ER (D) 177 (Nov), para 48. 
12
 Nicolo Zingales , "The Hearing Officer in EU Competition Law Proceedings: Ensuring Full Respect 
for the Right to Be Heard?", 7(1) Competition Law Review, 129-56, at 129. 
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procedures), for this reason the relevance of Article 6 ECHR for our purposes in this 
respect is limited. 
 
In the context of the European Union, the right to be heard is now explicitly 
included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as part of the right to a good 
administration. Article 41 ChFR provides for the "right of every person to be heard, 
before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken".  
 
This right had previously been recognised by the Court of Justice very early as 
an essential procedural right which applied even in the absence of specific rules 
concerning the procedure in particular13, or any other general provision in EU law but 
drawing inspiration from national legal systems14. The Court called the right to be 
heard a fundamental principle of Community law15. Later, the Court included it as 
part of a right to a good administration, deemed by its case-law as a general principle 
of law16. The wording or Article 41 results from judgements of the Court of Justice17.  
 
                                                 
13
 The ruling of the Court of Justice on the right to be heard dates back from 1963. C-32/62, Alvis / 
Council [1963] ECR 49 (English special edition). It elaborated on this right later in cases 17/74, 
Transocean Marine Paint Association / Commission [1974] ECR 1063;  85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche / 
Commission [1979] ECR 461, at paragraph 9; 234/84 Belgium / Commission [1986] ECR 2263, at 
paragraph 27; 301/87 France / Commission (“Boussac Saint Frères”) [1990] ECR I-307, at paragraph 
29;     C-238/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij / Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, at paragraph 85; 
C-382/99,  Netherlands / Commission [2002] ECR I-5163, at paragraph 49; Case T?189/02, Ente per le 
Ville vesuviane /Commission [2007] ECR II?89, at paragraph 88; and  Case T?170/06, Alrosa 
Company Ltd  / Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, at paragraph 91. 
14
 Advocate General Warner is eloquent in his description of the national systems which generally 
included this right. In the Opinion delivered on 19 September 1974 in 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint 
Association / Commission [1974] ECR 1082 he states: "There is a rule embedded in the law of some of 
our countries that an administrative authority, before wielding a statutory power to the detriment of a 
particular person, must in general hear what that person has to say about the matter, even if the statute 
does not expressly require it. Audi alteram partem or, as it is sometimes expressed, audiatur et altera 
pars." For a detail reference of the legal protection of the right to be heard in Member States see 
Sabrina Nöhmer, Das Recht auf Anhörung im europäischen Verwaltungsverfahren, Mohr Siebeck 
(Tübingen, 2013), at 79. 
15
 Joined Cases C-48/90 and C-66/90 Netherlands and Others / Commission [1992] ECR I-565, at 
paragraph 44, Case C-135/92 Fiskano / Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, at paragraph 39, and Case C-
32/95 P Commission / Lisrestal and Others [1996] ECR I-5373, at paragraph 21. 
16
 Case C-255/90 P, Burban [1992] ECR I-2253, and Court of First Instance in Case T-167/94 Nölle 
[1995] ECR II-2589; and, more explicitly in Case T-54/99, max.mobil / Commission,  [2002] ECR II-
313, at paragraph 48. See further Miguel Antonio Guevara Quintanilla, El derecho a la buena 
administración, Publicaciones de la Universidad Complutense (Madrid, 2010), at 135. 
17
 Among others, Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097; Case 374/87 Orkem [1989] ECR 3283; C-
269/90 TU M?nchen / Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] ECR I-5469. 
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All these general considerations are important for composite procedures, 
because as we have specified at length in the previous Chapter, there are no general 
provisions for composite procedures. It is unquestionable that the right exists with the 
category of fundamental right, not only regarding the individual vis-à-vis the 
European administration but also to Member States' administrations when 
implementing EU law18.  
 
The peculiarity of composite procedures lies on the fact that several authorities 
participate in the decision making process, which implies that this right could 
potentially be exercised before different bodies. The essence of this right might be at 
stake if the hearing does not take place before the relevant level of administration. 
 
There is a clear evolution of the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance on the extent to which the right to be heard is guaranteed in 
composite procedures, and specially, before what administration can this right be 
exercised. However, there is a very fragmentary approach, and the European courts 
fail to see the connection between some of the cases, perhaps because the notion of 
composite procedures is not accepted as a general category. For this reason, it is 
illuminating to structure the evolution of the case-law in three different subject-
matters. 
 
5.2.2.- Evolution of the case-law concerning the recovery of structural funds. 
 
The first emblematic case of the judicial assessment of the right to be heard in 
the context of composite procedures is Lisrestal19, one of the often cited cases where 
the CFI acknowledges that the right to be heard is a fundamental principle of 
Community law20. 
 
                                                 
18
 According to Article 51 of the Charter: "The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the 
Institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law." 
19
 Case T-450/93, Lisrestal and others / Commission [1994] ECR II-1180. 
20
 Ibid. at paragraph 42. 
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The case concerns several applicants of financial aid under the European 
Social Fund. Pursuant to the applicable rules at the time21, the application for funds 
was submitted to the competent authority in Portugal and it was followed by payment 
by the ESF of an advance of 50% of the assistance approved on the date on which the 
operations concerning vocational training of young people were scheduled to begin. 
Upon the end of the activities, the ESF reviewed the file and, after the visit of ESF's 
inspectors to the premises of the applicants, found that some of the funds had been 
used for ineligible expenditure. As a result, the Commission considered that some of 
the funds would have to be repaid, and notified in that sense the Portuguese authority 
acting as intermediaries. The Portuguese authorities were asked for their observations 
but, without giving notice to the concerned parties, informed the ESF that they did not 
have any observations to make. Once the Commission issued the decision to reduce 
the assistance granted, the Portuguese authorities informed the applicants and ordered 
the recovery22. In these circumstances, it was a paradigmatic case where the 
applicants had not been given the opportunity to make they views heard before an 
unfavourable decision was made relating to them. 
 
The CFI took the view that the applicants were directly affected by the 
economic consequences of the decision to reduce the assistance, which adversely 
affected them, so the fact that they were not given the chance to express their position 
during the administrative procedure was deemed a procedural breach that lead to the 
annulment of the decision23.  Nevertheless, the CFI acknowledged that the applicable 
rules established that the Member State was the sole interlocutor of the ESF vis-á-vis 
the applicants24 , even though national authorities lacked any power to make its own 
assessment25. Despite that role of mere interlocutor the CFI stated that: 
 
"the Commission, which alone assumes legal liability to the applicants for the 
contested decision, was not entitled to adopt the contested decision without 
                                                 
21
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2950/83 of 17 October 1983 on the implementation of Decision 
83/516 (OJ 1983 L 289, 1), and Council Decision 83/516/EEC of 17 October 1983 on the tasks of the 
European Social Fund (OJ 1983 L 289, 38). 
22
 Case T-450/93 ... at paragraphs 1-28. 
23
 Ibid. at paragraphs 48 and 50. 
24
 Ibid. at paragraph 43. 
25
 Ibid. at paragraph 44. 
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first giving those undertakings the possibility, or ensuring that they had had 
the possibility, of effectively setting forth their views on the proposed 
reduction in assistance."26 
 
This conclusion implies that the right to be heard could have validly taken 
place before the national authorities, even though they did not enjoy any discretion to 
decide on the recovery27. This viewpoint was later endorsed by the Court of Justice on 
appeal. However, the ruling of the Court of Justice provided fewer details on the 
mechanism that would have been deemed acceptable and it did not specify whether 
the right to be heard could take place at the national or at the EC level28.  
 
The hypothetical statement of the CFI in Lisrestal materialised in practice in 
the later case Mediocurso29. The facts in this case are similar, as it also concerns the 
recovery of the initial payment stemming from the ESF made to Portuguese 
applicants. However, in this case, the applicants were heard by the Portuguese 
authorities with regard to the circumstances that motivated the reduction of the aid30. 
Even then, there were circumstances in the case indicating that the right could have 
been infringed, such as the short time the applicants were given to comment on certain 
relevant documents or the fact that the national authorities did not forward to the 
Commission all of their observations. In spite of that, the CFI accepted that the right 
to be heard was ensured by the national administration on behalf of the Commission31. 
It is worth noting that the CFI specifies the validity of its previous statement in 
Lisrestal because it was not criticised on that point by the Court of Justice on appeal32.  
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 Ibid. at paragraph 49. 
27
 Giacinto della Cananea, "Il diritto di difesa e il controllo giurisdizionale", in Sabino Cassese (ed.), 
Corso di Diritto Amministrativo. Vol. 6, Giuffrè Editore (Milan, 2006), 217-31, at 219. 
28
 Case C32/95 P, Commission / Lisrestal and others [1996] ECR I-5393, there is likewise no 
assessment of paragraph 49 of the ruling of the CFI in the Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola on 
that case.  
29
 Joined Cases T-180/96 and 181/96, Mediocurso / Commission [1998] ECR II-3477. 
30
 Ibid. at paragraph 51. 
31
 Christina Eckes  and Joana Mendes, "The Right to be Heard in Composite Administrative 
Procedures: Lost in between Protection?", 36 European Law Review, (2011), 651-70, at 660. 
32
 Joined Cases T-180/96 and 181/96 ...  at paragraph 50. 
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 This time, the Court of Justice quashed the ruling of the CFI33, but it was not 
because the hearing took place at the national level but rather because no reasonable 
period was granted to it between the time at which it was able to examine the reports 
and the time at which it had to express its view34.  
 
This understanding of the right to be heard would entail limitations in the right 
of defence, as it appeared more evidently in the case Vlaams Fonds35. In this case, the 
beneficiary of aid stemming from ESF had been heard by the Belgian authorities 
dealing with the funds. However, it was only after the national authorities forwarded 
the applicant's comments to the Commission that some relevant documents were 
drawn up, thus effectively preventing the concerned party to comment on that36.  
 
The CFI thus annulled the decision. Although it did not follow from the CFI's 
argument that the right to a hearing is best guaranteed if it takes place at the level 
where the decision is made, it would be a better solution for cases where new 
documents can appear partially depriving the concerned party of his or her right to be 
heard. 
 
A similar line of argument is followed concerning Regional Development 
Funds. In Ville vesuviane37 the CFI assessed the situation where a recipient of RDF is 
adversely affected by a decision of the Commission. According to the rules governing 
the RDF38, national authorities act as the sole interlocutor. The CFI considered that 
the rights of the applicant are protected inasmuch as it could have submitted its 
observations to the relevant Italian authorities, even if not expressly asked to do so39. 
Moreover, it finds that the observations could not possibly have changed the outcome 
                                                 
33
 Case C-462/98 P, Mediocurso / Commission [2000] ECR I-7183. 
34
 Ibid.  at paragraph 38. 
35
 Case T-102/00, Vlaams Fonds voor de Sociale Integratie van Personen met een Handicap / 
Commission [2003] ECR II-2433. 
36
 Ibid.  at paragraph 83. 
37
 Case T-189/02, Ville vesuviane / Commission [2007] ECR II-89. 
38
 At the time, Council Regulation (EEC) 1787/84 of 19 June 1984, of the European Regional 
Development Fund (OJ 1984 L 169, 1). 
39
 Case T-189/02 ... at paragraph 94. 
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of the procedure, so it ruled out any breach in the rights of defence40. The appeal by 
the applicant was unsuccessful41.  
 
A recent ruling of the CFI confirms that the case-law remains unchanged. In 
Cofac42 an applicant that had requested the allocation of funds pertaining to the ESF. 
The Commission decided to reduce the amount of funds to be transferred of funds due 
to some doubts concerning certain formative actions43. The applicant argued that the 
right to be heard should have taken place before the Commission and not before the 
national administration, as it happened. This would be still more relevant considering 
some related proceedings took place after the applicant submitted the observations to 
the Portuguese body in charge. The Court assessed whether or not the circumstances 
happening after the applicant commented on her file had really had an impact on the 
decision taken, so as to avoid an infringement like the one in Vlaams fonds. Since it 
concluded they had not, the CFI dismissed the action44. It therefore confirmed that 
there is no need that the comments are submitted to the Commission. 
 
Consequently, the following conclusions can be drawn from the case-law of 
the European courts concerning structural funds. First, as a starting point, the right to 
be heard must be respected even if not expressly provided by the applicable rules.  
Second, however, it is not mandatory that this right be exercised before the body that 
makes the decision, i. e. in this case the Commission. As the rules concerning 
structural funds indicate that the national authorities are the only point of contact with 
the beneficiaries, it is acceptable that the eventual observations of the parties are 
submitted before the Member State and then forwarded to the Commission. In this 
case, the CFI and the Court of Justice accept that the right to be heard is guaranteed 
'on behalf of' the Commission. Lastly, if there are relevant facts or documents 
appearing after the observations have been submitted, as happened in Vlaams Fonds, 
the concerned party needs to be given the opportunity to comment on them, but this 
can be done again by the national authorities. As we will see, this position of the 
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Courts is different from the case-law regarding the repayment of import duties, where 
there is an evolution towards a more protective view of the rights of defence. 
 
5.2.3.- Evolution of the case-law of the CFI on the repayment of import duties 
 
 Before the creation of the Court of First Instance, the Court of Justice ruled on 
several cases concerning the repayment of import duties. In those cases the applicants 
would complain that they were entitled to reduced import duties which the 
Commission, in the application of the old Community Customs rules45, had denied.  
 
The scheme laid down in these old rules was that the concerned party could 
request a remission of the duties paid in special circumstances duly justified, but that 
it would be the national authorities whom individual could contact, although the 
Commission would enjoy the discretion to decide. That scheme implied that the 
individual did not have the right to be heard by the Commission. 
 
The scheme was ruled acceptable by the Court of Justice in various occasions. 
In Control Data46 the applicants, who claimed an exemption of import duties for a 
scientific apparatus47, criticized that the procedural practice did not permit either an 
exchange of opinions or allow the parties concerned to give their views on any 
matters at issue or even give them the opportunity to provide additional explanations 
before the decision was taken48. 
 
The Court of Justice dismissed those arguments by acknowledging that the 
Commission followed the procedure laid down by the relevant Community rules. This 
procedure enabled the applicant to state in full its arguments concerning nature of the 
imported goods with the Belgian authorities and that the file was later made available 
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to the Commission49, and such arrangement was considered respectful of the rights of 
defence of the applicant by the Court of Justice. 
 
In Van Gend en Loos and Bosman50 (not to be confused with the famous Van 
Gend en Loos 26/62 twenty years before) the Court of Justice again acknowledged 
that the procedure set up in the applicable rules was followed and that "that procedure 
allowed the applicants to put forward all their arguments to the Netherlands 
authorities. All the documents on the file were available both to the committee on 
duty-free arrangements and to the Commission. In those circumstances, the complaint 
based on a breach of the procedural requirements was dismissed."51 
 
The last case heard on first instance by the Court of Justice was CT Control52. 
The Court of Justice was more descriptive in stating that the "procedure for adopting 
the disputed decisions, which comprised several stages, some of which took place at 
national level and some at Community level, afforded the persons concerned all the 
necessary legal safeguards."53  
 
The Court of Justice reiterated that the right of the individuals to submit all 
their arguments to the national authorities, and then the latter forwarding them to the 
Commission, entails an acceptable mechanism with regard to their procedural rights54. 
What is more, the applicants argued that a development from the case-law of the two 
previous cases55 could be desirable. Such development would be justified in view of 
recent developments in the case-law of the Court regarding the rights of the defence in 
the field of competition law and anti-dumping duties and in view of Article 6 of the 
ECHR, but the Court of Justice rejected that possibility56.  
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Moreover, the applicants acknowledged that all the arguments which they 
could have put forward in favour of remission had been mentioned in their 
applications and that there was no new factor that they could have introduced into 
their arguments. As the court argued, they knew that their applications were being 
forwarded to the Commission and could have supplemented the arguments contained 
in them if they had so wished.  
 
 This point of view was adopted by the Court of First Instance in the first cases 
that it dealt with, but the CFI would later depart from it. Relevant conclusions can be 
drawn from this evolution. The following cases provide evidence of the development.  
 
The case French Aviation57 shows the complexity of the exercise of 
administrative procedural rights in a composite procedure and the initial stance of the 
the CFI, similar to the first case-law on recovery of structural funds described 
before58.  
 
 Because this case shows very well the intricacies of composite procedures and 
the practical exercise of procedural rights throughout them, it will be described as the 
paradigm of the cases on repayment of import duties and will explain why the 
decision of the European judges is not satisfactory. The relevant facts are the 
following. The applicant was a company importing aircraft components and spare 
parts into France under two subheadings of the Common Customs Tariff depending 
on whether they are intended for civil or military use. There was a more favourable 
tariff arrangement if the end-use of the components imported was civil and not 
military. According to the rules in force59, it should have requested prior authorisation 
to meet the conditions for such favourable treatment. However, provided that when 
the components in question are imported, it was impossible for the applicant to 
indicate in advance whether they will be fitted to civil or military aircraft, so the 
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 Case T-346/94, France Aviation / Commission [1995] ECR II-284. 
58
 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2006), at 387. 
59
 Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4142/87 of 9 December 1987 determining the 
conditions under which certain goods are eligible on import for a favourable tariff arrangement by 
reason of their end-use (OJ 1987 L 387, 81). 
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French authorities tolerated all components imported by the applicant benefitted to a 
consideration as "civil" subject to the periodical regularization ex post of the situation 
of components used for military purposes.  
 
This administrative practice was subsequently modified, because the applicant 
had undertaken to set up a computerized private customs warehouse which would 
enable it to declare each component as being intended for civil or military use when it 
was taken out of store. The French authorities notified the applicant that they would 
discontinue in the future the method of the ex post settlement of customs duty used in 
the preceding years.  
 
However, the set-up of the customs warehouse was delayed, in part, as the 
applicant argued, due to the slowness of the administrative authorities granting the 
authorisations. As a result, for three years the applicant was forced to pay the 
increased customs duty immediately, including that on components to be put to "civil" 
use. Later on, the applicant asked the customs administration for the repayment of the 
customs duty which it had paid in respect of imports carried out in 1990, 1991 and 
1992 of components which had ultimately been fitted to civil aircraft.  
 
Following the wording of the applicable rules, the French authorities replied at 
the time when the imports in question were entered for consumption, it did not have 
authorization qualifying it for the favourable end-use tariff arrangement with the 
result that the customs duty could not be reimboursed, but given the exceptional 
circumstances of the case, it had decided to forward the application for repayment to 
the Commission60, which could exceptionally agree the repayment. In order to do that, 
the transmission by the national authorities to the Commission should include all the 
facts necessary for a full examination of the case presented.   
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 Pursuant to Article 13(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1430/79 of 2 July 1979 on the repayment 
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According to the Commission Regulation implementing the Community 
Customs Code61, in order for this repayment to be granted the Commission should 
assess the information submitted by the Member State (eventually asking for 
additional information if necessary), consult a group of experts composed of 
representatives of all Member States and notify to the Member State concerned so that 
national authorities can decide on the application of the person concerned.  
 
In the circumstances of the case, the French authorities had failed to describe 
the situation exhaustively, in particular, omitting to mention the administrative 
practice tolerated before and the delays in the setting-up of a customs warehouse. It all 
resulted in a Commission decision stating that repayment of customs duty was not 
justified. One of the main grounds of the applicant before the Court was infringement 
of the principle audi alteram partem inasmuch as it did not have an opportunity to put 
its arguments to the Commission.  
 
The CFI agreed that the right to be heard was complied with in so far as the 
procedure at issue enabled the applicant to put all its arguments to the French 
authorities and its case, which was transmitted by those authorities, was available both 
to the group of experts and to the Commission. The applicant’s right to be heard was 
thus placed in the relations between the person concerned and the national 
administration62. 
 
However, it acknowledged that the Commission did not have all the necessary 
elements to make a reasoned decision. Despite this, the solution it finds is that the 
Commission should have requested additional information from the national 
authorities and, considering the circumstances of the case, even arranged for the 
applicant to be heard by the French authorities63. This denial of a right to be heard 
directly by the Commission stems from the fact that the applicable rules at the time 
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did not provide for any contact between the Commission and the applicant, and relied 
exclusively on the mediation by the national administration. 
 
 This solution, which some authors described as "bureacratic detour"64, was an 
artificial mechanism to avoid confronting a clear shortcoming embedded in the very 
essence of composite procedures, that is, the procedural right to be heard had been 
'lost' in the communications between the Commission and the national administration. 
The scheme envisaged by the CFI would not have solved the situation for the 
concerned party, as it would only see his or her interest fully protected if it could 
express his or her view before the body that actually makes the decision.  
 
 Ultimately, the CFI annulled the decision for the infringement of the right to 
be heard, but the mechanism that it suggested as the scheme being fully respectful of 
the interests of the applicant is highly questionable.  
 
The ruling in France Aviation led the Commission to change its proceedings 
and ensure the right to be heard in another fashion. It also revoked the decisions it had 
taken without that guarantee65. However, in analogous cases that would follow 
afterwards, the CFI would modify its stance towards a more protective apporach.  
 
In Eyckeler66 the circumstances were very similar to France Aviation. It 
concerned the right of repayment of import duties in special situations67. The 
applicant, a German importer of Argentinian beef, claimed a reimbursement because 
its imports had not been subject to the favourable duty it deemed applicable. The 
Commission considered that the application for remission was not justified68.  
 
By contrast to France Aviation, the CFI found (although in this case the breach 
of the right to be heard was not strongly argued by the applicant) that "[d]uring the 
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procedure before it, the Commission did not give the applicant an opportunity to put 
its case and effectively make its views known on the relevant circumstances relied on 
against it as the basis for the contested decision."69 So "the contested decision was 
adopted following an administrative procedure which was vitiated by a breach of 
essential procedural requirements."70 As a result, even when the applicable rules did 
not foresee a hearing before the Commission, the CFI understood that such a 
procedural step was necessary in order to fully guarantee the rights of defence. 
 
The CFI elaborated its position in its ruling in Primex Produkte71. Again a case 
involving the repayment of import duties, the CFI maintained that the right to be 
heard must take place before the EU administration inasmuch as it is the body who 
enjoys the discretion to take a decisions, in view of the circumstances of the case and 
the position of the interested person. It stated: 
 
"The principle of respect for the rights of the defence thus requires not only 
that the person concerned should be placed in a position in which he may 
effectively make known his views on the relevant circumstances, but also that 
he should at least be able to put his own case on the documents taken into 
account by the Community institution."72 
 
 The position of the CFI became clearer in the case Mehibas Dortselaan73. The 
reimbursement of certain import duties was again at stake. However, it this case the 
applicant had had the opportunity to express its views to the national authority, but 
this element, that could have been considered sufficient under the light of France 
Aviation, did not exclude that the interested person had to be heard before the 
Commission as it was the body who had the discretion to take a decision. That was 
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true, the Court stated, even though the rules in question74 did not provide for a contact 
of the company with the Commission because the right to be heard is a fundamental 
principle of Community law75. Nevertheless, the CFI would eventually dismiss the 
action because it considered that without the irregularity consisting on the lack of 
hearing before the Commission, the procedure would not have resulted in a different 
decision76. 
 
 The idea of an autonomous right to be heard is stated even more clearly in the 
following case Wilson Holland77, where the CFI argues that "[t]hat conclusion (that 
applicant were not heard before the Commission) is not affected by the fact that most 
of the applicants made a declaration that the file which the national authorities 
transmitted to the Commission was complete and they had nothing to add."78  
 
This implies that fully expressing its position before the national authorities 
and having that position transmitted by the Member State to the Commission is not 
enough because the right to be heard is a procedural right of the individual that must 
be exercised before the authority that has the discretion to make a decision able to 
affect his or her interests. 
 
The case law on the right to be heard related to repayment of import duties 
stopped at this point, because the Commission Regulation implementing the 
Community Customs Code was amended in order to include this right to be heard 
before the Commission79. The Court of Justice did not have the chance to rule on the 
stance taken by the CFI80. 
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 As a result, the development of the case-law in this subject-matter has cleared 
the way for the interpretation advocated in this work. The right to be heard must take 
place at the level where the discretionary power to make the decision lies, be it the 
Union's or national public administration. It makes sense because the essence of the 
right to be heard is that the position of the concerned party it taken into account by the 
body with the competence to issue a decision that concerns him or her. It is easy to 
see that this procedural right is not fully guaranteed when exercised before an 
intermediary body because, as we saw in practice when commenting the court cases, 
sometimes the transmission is not fully satisfactory, or there needs to be a truly 
exchange of views between the individual and the authority, or new evidence appears 
and it is unpractical to have the national authorities intervening as well, as the Vlaams 
Fonds case showed. In practice, a rule such as the one now enacted in the 
implementing provisions of the Customs Code requiring the right to a hearing to take 
place at the relevant level is also more straightforward and less complex.  
 
 It is thus striking that the European courts have not come to the same 
conclusion in the other area where the right to be heard in composite procedures is 
highly contentious, that is, the recovery of structural funds. Before dwelling into the 
justification of this different treatment, there is an additional subject-matter where in a 
composite mechanism of decision-making the right to be heard has been highly 
controversial. 
 
5.2.3.- Case-law on the listings of terrorist organisations 
 
 The following area of case-law where the approach of the CFI and the Court of 
Justice on the right to be heard and other procedural guarantees for the individual is 
that of the sanctions adopted by the Council against persons or organisations with 
links to terrorist groups, which has attracted a lot of scholarly attention during the past 
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decade81. The Kadi case, resolved differently by the CFI82 and the Court of Justice83, 
and its sequels84, brought a lot of attention among EU legal scholars85 in an area that 
had traditionally had only a marginal impact in the whole of the EU law. This is a 
paramount case in areas such as fundamental rights and the position of public law in 
among the sources of EU law. For the purposes of composite procedures, its relevance 
is limited. Other cases in the field of antiterrorist measures of the decade of 2000 
better illustrate the position of the EU courts with regard to the right to be heard and 
its consequences for composite procedures. 
 
In the context of composite procedures, the case-law in this area present 
several peculiarities that render these cases substantially different from the general 
notion of composite procedures which is the focus of this thesis and the reasoning of 
these judgements cannot be generalised to other composite procedure where the 
tension between legal principles (and political considerations) is not so acute. 
However, some elements of the reasoning of the EU courts in confronting the legal 
dilemmas in this subject-matter, where a national decision is the base of a EU act that, 
as we will see, often ignores procedural basic guarantees of the individual, will enable 
us to develop further insights on the legal protection of the right to be heard in 
composite procedures. 
 
These peculiarities are the following. Although they are administrative 
procedures aimed at listing persons and organisations linked to terrorist acts, the 
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nature of the cases is borderline with criminal law, meaning that the decisions taken at 
the EU level need a prior backing of a national judgement of a criminal court. 
Furthermore, complex elements of international law are also present and the cases do 
not only involve national and EU actors, but also at times international actors, such as 
the United Nations. A further particular element, is that the decision-maker at the EU 
level is the Council acting in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at 
the time outside of the EC pillar, so certainly not the most usual body considered in 
this dissertation as 'European public administration'.86  
 
Keeping these considerations in mind, the approach of the CFI and the Court 
of Justice to these cases does allow us to draw some relevant conclusions of the 
effectiveness of the right to be heard in composite procedures and the mechanisms to 
ensure the procedural rights in such complex procedures. 
  
The relevant rules applicable and their context were as follows. In 2001, the 
United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1373(2001) laying down strategies 
to combat terrorism87. On the European level, the Resolution was implemented 
through Common Position 2001/931/CFSP88 and Regulation 2580/200189 which 
ordered the freezing of funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
“persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist attacks” as determined by a 
“competent authority”90. The UN Security Council complemented later these 
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measures with other more specific rules that pinpointed some specific organisations91. 
The lists of persons and organisations were to be drawn up on the basis, among others, 
of a decision taken by a national 'competent authority', meaning a judicial authority 
or, where judicial authorities have no competence in the relevant area, an equivalent 
competent authority in that area. 
 
The case-law involving a national decision as a pre-requisite started with the 
action brought by the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran against the decision 
of the Council to list it as an organization with links to terrorist acts92. This case is a 
good example because the basic arguments of the CFI are already laid down, and the 
same applicant would litigate in the European courts on several other occasions. 
 
In this case, the national decision was an order of the United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for the Home Department. The applicant had challenged 
unsuccessfully such order in the British jurisdiction, and according to the rulings at 
the national level, there was no requirement to hear the applicant’s views beforehand, 
considering such hearing impractical or undesirable in the context of legislation 
directed against terrorism93. 
 
The line of reasoning of the CFI was the following. According to the 
applicable rules, there are two kinds of listings. An initial listing and a subsequent 
listing, the latter following a decision to keep the concerned organisation in the list. 
The CFI admits that a hearing prior to the first listing would jeopardise the 
                                                 
91
 The following year the Security Council passed Resolution 1390 (2002), which deals exclusively 
with Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban, and leaves no discretion to the Member States 
where the lists were created at the level of the UN Security Council’s Sanction Committee. The 
implementing legislation for Resolution 1390 (2002), Council Regulation 881/2002, Imposing Certain 
Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with Osama 
bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda Network and the Taliban, (OJ 2002 L 139, at 9) (the list annexed to this 
regulation is reviewed by the Commission, on the basis of updating by the Sanctions Committee). This 
regulation was annulled in the Court of Justice’s Kadi decision, referred to before. In the Kadi saga the 
European Union, via the Council, lists persons or organisations with links to terrorists groups in 
execution of a UN Security Council sanction.  
92
 Case T-228/02, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran / Council, [2002] ERC II-4665. The 
decision by which the organization was listed was Common Position 2002/340/CFSP, of 2 May 2002 
(OJ 2002 L 116, 75). 
93
 Case T-228/02, ... at paragraph 16. 
284 
effectiveness of the system94. However, this is not the case for the subsequent listings, 
where a previous hearing must be mandatory95. In accordance with the reasoning of 
the CFI, however, this hearing must take place at the national level96. It went on to 
argue that the principle of sincere cooperation entails for the Council the obligation to 
defer as far as possible to the assessment conducted by the national authority97. Since 
it could not be proven that there was any kind of hearing at the national level, and 
there were several other breaches like the infringement of the duty to state reasons and 
that of the the right to a fair trial98, the CFI decided to annul the listing. 
 
Following the reasoning that we have developed in the previous sections, a 
prior hearing shall be a requirement whenever a decision taken with a certain degree 
of discretion happens. If the decision by the Council to list was automatic once the 
decision of the national authorities is forwarded to it, it would make sense to keep the 
right to a hearing at the national level. This is, however, not the case. The CFI 
recognised that the Council enjoys broad discretion in its assessment and although it 
needs a decision of a national authority to list, it is under no obligation to do so once it 
is notified99. For this reason, it cannot be understood how a hearing at the national 
level would be sufficiently protective of the rights of the concerned party.  
 
After the first ruling of the CFI there were two additional cases brought again 
by the same organisation100, because it was maintained in the lists in spite of the first 
rulings. The CFI denied categorically that this right to a prior hearing before the 
                                                 
94
 Ibid. at paragraph 128. There needed to be a surprise effect so that the freezing of assets was 
effective, otherwise, the concerned party could move their assets to a country not implementing the UN 
Security Council resolutions. 
95
 Ibid. at paragraph 137. 
96
 Ibid. at paragraph 119, there are practical reason for this, as the Union's body with the competence to 
draw the lists is the Council and in the field of CFSP, the effective organisation of these hearings would 
be highly complicated. 
97
 Ibid. at paragraph 122. 
98
 Ibid. at paragraphs 214, 218, and 225.. 
99
 Ibid. at paragraph 159. 
100
 T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran / Council, [2008] ECR II-3019; and T-284/08, 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran / Council, [2008] ECR II-3487. 
285 
Council exists in this particular case as claimed by the applicant101, although it did 
argue that the organisation should have been informed of the evidence against it and 
the reasons for its listing. At the end, the CFI annulled the listings again on the ground 
that the British authorities had by that time ordered the removal of the applicant from 
the lists102.  
 
In this vein, the reasoning of the CFI is aligned with the old ruling in France 
Aviation, inasmuch as the right to be heard can be safeguarded at the national level. 
Except that, in these cases, the CFI goes a step farther in the removing the procedural 
protection of the individual and relinquishes the EU institutions of any duty to control 
the procedural conduct of the national authorities103.  
 
Since 2007, the Council introduced some changes in the procedure for 
listing104, in particular, the obligations to notify the listing to the concerned party, to 
provide them with a statement of reasons, to give them a right to request de-listing, 
and to challenge the decision to list before the General Court. However, the right to a 
prior hearing is still not guaranteed at the Council level. With the measures introduced 
in 2007, the breaches in procedural rights seem less flagrant. However, for the 
purposes of the right to be heard in composite procedures, there are still grounds to 
remain critical of system, as well as of the position of the European courts about it. 
 
There would be other cases where the CFI would stick to this view105. The 
Court of Justice would endorse the arguments of the CFI in the different appeals106. 
                                                 
101
 T-256/07 ... at paragraph 93. The CFI states: "With regard to the applicant’s argument concerning 
the Council’s refusal of its request to be heard at a formal hearing, it is sufficient to state that neither 
the legislation in question, namely, Regulation No 2580/2001, nor the general principle of observance 
of the rights of the defence, gives the persons concerned the right to such a hearing". 
102
 T-256/07 ... at paragraph 180. 
103
 Eckes  and Mendes, "The Right to be Heard in Composite...", at 665. 
104
 These changes are summarised in the Council Document 10826/07, of 28 June 2007, not published 
in the OJ, but declassified and available in the link: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st10826-re01en07.pdf  
105
 T-390/08, Bank Melli Iran / Council [2009] ECR II-3967, at paragraph 96; T-348/07, Stichting Al-
Aqsa / Council of the European Union [2010] ECR II-4575,  at paragraph 165; and Joined cases T-
329/12 and T-74/13, Mazen Al-Tabbaa / Council of the European Union, [2014] 
(ECLI:EU:T:2014:622), at paragraph 76. 
286 
The much awaited ruling in Kadi II seems to have put an end to most of the scholarly 
concerns107 of the backlash on the protection of fundamental rights with regard to the 
counter terrorist legislation of the last decade108. Although with this last ruling and the 
modifications in the antiterrorist legislation, the listing of such organizations will be 
less controversial and, in practice, the level of procedural guarantees has been 
increased, the position of the European judicature is still unsatisfactory. 
 
As it was previously argued, in composite procedures every discretionary 
decision taken at the EU or national level must be proceeded by certain procedural 
guarantees, among them the right to a prior hearing. That being said, as it was warned 
in the beginning of this section, it would be a mistake to extrapolate the reasoning of 
the EU courts on the area of antiterrorist measures to other composite procedures in 
ordinary circumstances. 
 
5.2.4.- Remarks on the current state of affairs of the case-law on the right to be heard 
in composite procedures and rights-oriented approach  
 
In view of the case-law of the European courts on the right to be heard in 
composite procedures, it is striking that their position is so different in each of the 
three examined areas. Whereas in the repayment of import duties the CFI finally came 
to the conclusion that a hearing at the level where the decision was taken was 
necessary, in the structural funds cases it was enough that such hearing took place at 
the national level, but the European authorities should ensure that it had taken place 
under the appropriate guarantees. In the antiterrorist legislation cases, the Court of 
Justice goes further and considers sufficient that the hearing took place at the national 
level, but with no duty to monitor to what extent the guarantees at the national level 
were sufficient.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
106
 For instance, in C-27/09 P, France / People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran [2011] ECR I-13427, 
on appeal against T-284/08, or Case C-548/09 P, Bank Melli Iran / Council [2011] ECR I-11381, 
upholding the ruling on T-390/08 ... .  
107
 See in this respect Takis Tridimas, “Economic Sanctions, Procedural Rights and Judicial Scrutiny: 
Post-Kadi Developments” 12 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2010), 455-90. 
108
 Joined Cases C?584/10 P, C?593/10 P and C?595/10 P, Commission / Kadi [2013] 
(ECLI:EU:C:2013:518).. 
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These different, contradictory approaches are a direct consequence of the 
absence of a general category of composite procedure for the European courts. The 
individual, differentiated approach that they take for each set of cases result in 
substantial inconsistencies. It is useful for our purposes to investigate on the reasons 
for the different treatment given by the CFI and the Court of Justice, particularly, 
given that the cases of antiterrorist legislation are very specific, regarding the fields of 
import duties and structural funds. 
 
The question was addressed specifically by Advocate General Mischo109 in the 
appeal of one of the ESF cases described above. For him, the reason can be found in 
the more unfavourable character of customs duties with respect to structural funds. 
The first have a negative impact in the estate of the individual, whereas the latter have 
a positive one, even considering their recovery does not imply a worse position as the 
individual had at the beginning. In other words, Advocate General Mischo is of the 
opinion that the concerned party is not penalised when it is called to give back the 
funds he was granted if the conditions are not fulfilled. Moreover, in the field of 
structural funds the economic agent is the one that decides to institute the procedure, 
not the public authority110. 
 
 It is true that procedural rights need stronger protection in the framework of 
procedures susceptible of penalising the individual than in procedures by which the 
individual aims at acquiring a right that he or she did not enjoy before or, in other 
words, the intensity of the interference with the person's legal sphere should be in 
                                                 
109
 Opinion of Advocate General Misho delivered on 25 November 1999, Case C-462/98 P, 
Mediocurso / Commission [2000] ECR I-7185. 
110
 Ibid. at paragraphs 17 and 18. It is worth reproducing the opinion literally in this regard: 
"17.     ... with regard to the remission of import duties, it is necessary to make a distinction between 
fields such as competition law or the collection of anti-dumping duties, where it is the Community 
institutions which decide to institute the procedure which may lead to the punishment of an economic 
agent who has contravened the provisions of the Treaty, and other situations. 
18.     In the context of the ESF, it is undertakings or private individuals who submit applications for 
aid from the Fund. That aid is granted subject to certain conditions. If those conditions are not 
observed, a reduction may be made in the aid. In accordance with the distinction made by the Court of 
Justice, that situation is not to be treated in the same way as the procedures for penalising an economic 
agent, in which the audi alteram partem rule therefore assumes special importance. It is therefore 
sufficient, in order for that rule to be observed, for the beneficiary to have had the possibility of making 
known to the Commission, either directly or through the competent national body, the reasons for 
which it considers that the reduction of aid is not justified, before the Commission takes its final 
decision. ..." 
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accordance with the protection of his or her procedural rights111. Koen Lenaerts 
described in a paper the academic debate on a FIDE Conference in 1997112 on 
whether there should always be a right to a fair hearing in procedures initiated by the 
applicant aimed at grating him or her a right, following a controversial ruling of the 
CFI in Windpark Groothusen113. He argues that, in cases where the applicable 
legislation does not confer a right upon the applicant to make known his views at 
some stage following the filing of his application, the recognition of any such right 
was not always mandatory.  
 
That conclusion would be harder to maintain at the moment in the light of 
Article 41 ChFR, which does not make a distinction on the type of administrative 
procedures for the recognition of this fundamental right. But more importantly, in the 
structural funds cases examined in the previous section, the right to be heard must be 
observed -even "on behalf of" according to the CFI- because the procedure for 
recovery was not initiated by the applicant and it might indeed affect the individual 
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 Joana Mendes, " “Participation and Participation Rights in EU Law and Governance”, in Herwig 
Hofmann and Alexander Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law. Towards an 
Integrated Administration, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham, 2009), 257-87, at 273. 
112
 Koen Lenaerts and Jan Vanhamme, "Procedural rights of private parties in the community 
administrative process", 34 Common Law review (1997) 531-69, at 537; "Upon discussion of this case 
law at the FIDE Conference, the tentative conclusion was reached that the applicant in administrative 
proceedings should be granted the right to a fair hearing to the extent that the administration has 
gathered evidence against him or targets him with his own behaviour while handling his application. In 
any event, there appeared to be consensus that, in cases where the applicable legislation does not confer 
a right upon the applicant to make known his views at some stage following the filing of his 
application, the recognition of any such right should be the exception rather than the rule. It is in line 
with that thought that the result of the Windpark Groothusen case must be seen. In that case, the Court 
of First Instance considered it logical that financial support programmes are solely conducted on the 
basis of the documentation submitted by the requesting undertakings in their applications." 
113
 Case T-109/94, Windpark Groothusen GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG v Commission [1995] ECR II-
3007.  Even though the CFI denied the infringement of a right to be heard as claimed by the applicant, 
the circumstances of the case were quite particular and, in any case, fundamentally different from the 
structural funds cases that we examined. 
"48 The Court notes, first, that the Commission explained the procedure for the submission of projects 
for financial support ...  it is in accordance with the procedure in financial support programmes for 
candidates for such support not to be given a hearing during the selection procedure, which is 
conducted on the basis of the documentation submitted by them. That procedure is appropriate in 
situations where hundreds of applications must be evaluated and it therefore does not constitute an 
infringement of the right to a hearing. ... 
50 The facts in the present case are quite different from those underlying the judgment of the Court of 
First Instance in Case T-450/93 Lisrestal v Commission [1994] ECR II-1177, relied on by the 
applicant. In that case, the Court ruled that, where the Commission intends to reduce the financial 
assistance originally granted, the beneficiary must be placed in a position in which it can effectively 
make known its views on the evidence relied on against it to justify the decision reducing the 
assistance. In the present case, no financial support had been granted to the applicant which had merely 
been placed on a reserve list of possible beneficiaries of Community financial support. " 
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adversely114. The argument of the differentiated treatment becomes even weaker if it 
is put under the light of the antiterrorist legislation cases. In that area, where the Court 
of Justice endorses a much less protective stance of procedural rights, even though 
those cases entail much more stringent possible restrictions of individual rights, being 
borderline, as regards their effects, with criminal offences. 
 
In recent cases concerning asylum procedures in the national context, the 
understanding of the scope of the right to be heard continues to be quite limited. An 
example of such statement in the ruling in Mukarubega115, where the Court of Justice 
was asked by a French judge whether or not according to the law of the Union third-
country nationals who have been duly heard on the illegality of their stay need to be 
heard again before the adoption of a return decision. The answer of the Court of 
Justice is that such hearing must not take place again. This situation remains at the 
very national level without any composite element, but the reasoning is revelatory, 
because the Court of Justice considers sufficient the previous hearing before the 
administrative authorities (police), and thus unnecessary again before the judge takes 
the return decision116. The Court of Justice justifies it by arguing that reason is that a 
return decision is closely linked to the decision determining that a stay is illegal117 but, 
while that is true, the national judge still has a margin of manouvre to decide and it is 
not bound to automatically issue such return decision. As we have maintained, that 
element of discretion in the last authority to decide is the key element to require a 
further hearing. Consequently, there are arguments to adopt a critical view of the 
position of the Court of Justice. 
 
In conclusion, the arguments justifying the different approach on the right to 
be heard are unconvincing and the different rationales of the Court of Justice and GC 
                                                 
114
 In all of the aforementioned cases the CFI acknowledged that:  "It is equally settled case-law that a 
Commission decision reducing or cancelling financial assistance granted by the ESF is capable of 
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(ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336). 
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 Ibid. at paragraph 82. 
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 Ibid. at paragraph 60. 
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are difficult to justify. In reality, the reason for this fragmented case-law is the lack of 
a unitary approach towards composite procedures. If seen as a peculiar category of 
administrative procedures, composite procedures would enjoy a homogeneous judicial 
approach. This is an essential reason why composite procedures should be included in 
a general codification of administrative procedure at the EU level118. 
 
In the context of composite procedures, the only way to keep the right to a fair 
hearing sufficiently protected is to give the opportunity for the applicant to express his 
or her position on the file at level of the administration that enjoys the discretion to 
formulate a decision. In the cases that we have examined where the Member States 
were mere interlocutors with no formal powers, the solution is quite straighforward; 
grant this right before the European Union authority in charge, in the sense of the 
amendment of the implementing Regulation of the Customs Code119.  
 
The solution might be more complex in cases where both levels of 
administration have the discretion to make an assessment and issue a decision. In 
some of the recent regulations where a procedure with such characteristics is laid 
down, the right to be heard is already ensured more than once whenever an 
administrative body has to make a decision. The case of the procedure for the 
authorisation of pesticides120 analysed in the previous Chapter121 is very illuminating: 
the applicant has the right to make observations when the Member State authority is 
considering the admissibility of the application122, later when the assessment report 
drafted by the national body is evaluated by the EFSA123, and finally when the 
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 Sabrina Nöhmer, Das Recht auf Anhörung im europäischen Verwaltungsverfahren, Mohr Siebeck 
(Tübingen, 2013), at 317. After a detailed analysis of the right to be heard in the European Union, this 
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 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 
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 See section 4.4.2. 
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 Article 9(2). 
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 Article 12(1). 
291 
Commission is ready to make a final decision124. However, this protection of the right 
to be heard is not present in all of the recently enacted composite procedures125. 
 
However, in the procedural schemes where one level of administration makes 
a recommendation that can later be contradicted by the other level of administration, 
the right to be heard can work effectively if it takes place before the final decision is 
made, as long as the concerned party has full information on the recommendation and 
is given the possibility to refute the conclusion of such recommendation. 
 
The generalisation of this scheme with a rule that mandates the possibility for 
the concerned person to submit observations at the authority with the competence to 
make a discretionary decision, on several occasions if the stages of the procedure so 
require, would be the only mechanism to ensure a sufficient protection of the right to 
be heard in composite procedures. This conclusion is in line with the proposal of the 
research network on EU administrative law (ReNEUAL). In the draft model rules on 
EU administrative procedures presented in 2014, Article III-24 proposes the rules on 
the right to be heard in composite procedures, and it specifies that the right shall be 
respected at all stages of a composite procedure, national and European126. 
                                                 
124
 Article 13(1). 
125
 Joana Mendes , "Participation in European Union Rulemaking. A Rights-Based Approach", Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 2011), at section 7.2.2.  
126
 The Draft model rules were presented in the ReNEUAL conference of 19 May 2014, for which 
documentation is available at www.reneual.eu.  
Book III - Single case decision making. Article III-24: 
 Right to be heard in composite procedures 
"(2) In a case of composite procedure, where an EU authority makes the decision it must comply with 
the procedural requirements in Article III-23. Where the decision is made by a Member State authority 
it must comply with the requirements of Article III-23 where sector specific legislation renders the 
procedural rules in Book III applicable. In the absence of such legislation, or any other EU legislation 
specifying applicable procedural requirements, the Member State authority will apply national rules of 
administrative procedure, which must comply with EU general principles of law concerning fair 
hearings. 
(3) In a case of composite procedure, the form and content of the hearing provided pursuant to Article 
III-23 (5) by the public authority that makes the decision will be affected by the extent to which the 
rights of the defence were adequately protected at a prior stage in the administrative proceedings by 
another public authority. 
(4) In a case of composite procedure, where the public authority making the decision is legally bound 
by a recommendation made by an EU authority, then the right to be heard must be adequately protected 
before the EU authority that makes the recommendation, including through application of the principles 
in Article III-23 (3)-(5).  
(...) 
(5) In a case of composite procedure, where the EU authority’s decision is predicated on a 
recommendation made by another public authority and where there was no opportunity for a hearing 
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5.3.- The obligation to state reasons 
 
5.3.1.- The right to a reasoned decision as a citizen's right under EU law 
 
The duty to state reasons is at the gist of the legitimation of modern public 
administration. At one point of modern history, myth, tradition, culture or inheritance 
can no longer constitute valid ground for the exercise of public power, and it will have 
to be based on reasons127, connected with legality, fairness, openness, impartiality, 
transparency and other valued attributed to modern administrative law128. 
 
The discretion awarded to the public administration can be acceptable for 
individuals, even if it is in their detriment, because reasons can be given why those 
subject to the law would affirm its content as serving recognisable public purposes129. 
As Max Weber argued in justification of the powers of the administration, "the 
legitimacy of bureaucratic action resides in the promise to exercise power in the basis 
of knowledge"130 and, being accountable for the decision it makes, that knowledge 
must be shared to reassure the individual or, in case of review, the courts. 
 
The obligation to state reasons prevents arbitrary rule in decision making, 
following the maxim of logic, "no conclusions without premises". Thus, if they are 
not to act capriciously in taking decision, decision-makers need to narrow down their 
choices to find a way of avoiding distraction and focusing on the things that need 
                                                                                                                                            
before such a public authority, the right to be heard before the decision is taken shall include 
knowledge of the recommendation and the ability to contest its findings(...)" See further note 97 in 
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attention at a given time131. This statement, which can be applied to general situations, 
can be translated into legal terms as the limitation of the choices based on procedural 
rules, as well as the legal rights and protected interests at stake. This need of 
legitimation of the measures taken by administrative authorities is felt even more 
intensely the case of actors not belonging to a State132. 
 
This obligation on the administration is a well embedded principle in the 
administrative law traditions on the Member States. In most national legislations, the 
obligation to state reasons for individual decision is mandated133, and in some 
constitutional texts, there are references that can be interpreted in this sense134. In a 
wider context, the ECtHR has argued that the duty to give reasons is implicit in the 
rights protected in Article 6 ECHR135. 
 
In the European Union, the duty to state reasons appeared from the beginning 
in primary law with the peculiarity that is concerned acts of general application 
(rules), unlike the national legislation, where this duty was related to individual 
decisions136. Article 296(2) TFEU, similarly to former Article 190 TEEC, reads:  
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"Legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to 
any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by 
the Treaties." 
 
The obligation to state reasons for acts of general application is related to the 
principle of conferral and the need to ensure that the Union is acting within the limits 
of its competences137.  
 
This obligation concerns individual decisions as well. The Court of Justice 
gave details from its early jurisprudence on the nature of this obligation, linking it to 
the right of the individuals during the administrative procedure. Thus, in case 24/62 
Commission / Council it argued138:  
 
"In imposing upon the Commission the obligation to state reasons for its 
decisions, Article 190 is not taking mere formal considerations into account 
but seeks to give an opportunity to the parties of defending their rights, to the 
Court of exercising its supervisory functions and to Member States and to all 
interested nationals of ascertaining the circumstances in which the 
Commission has applied the Treaty."  
 
The Court of Justice soon distinguished between general acts and decisions as 
to the standards applicable in terms of statement or reasons need to differ, being 
stricter for individual decisions139, whereas for legislative acts, the Court of Justice 
finds reference to the legal basis and the appropriate competences is an acceptable 
legal justification140. 
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This distinction has been notoriously reflected in the recognition of the 
obligation to state reason, or the right to a reasoned decision, conceived within the 
right to a good administration, and thus, as a fundamental right of the EU in Article 
41(2)(c) ChFR, for which the scope is limited to individual decisions141. 
 
The Court of Justice elaborated on the rationale behind this obligation in terms 
of the subsequent judicial review of the decision, as the reasons stated would serve as 
the grounds on which the legality of the contested measure would be adjudicated by 
the Court142. Consequently, when assessing whether the reasons provided are 
sufficient, the EU courts focus on the expression of the facts and legal considerations 
which are of decisive importance in the context of the decision and verify whether the 
decision is well founded143. 
 
However, there is an additional implication of this duty of the decision-maker, 
which is more closely related to the subjective rights of the concerned party. That is 
that the knowledge of the relevant facts and legal grounds so as to assess the 
pertinence of challenging the measure before the courts. These two rationalities 
appear interlinked in the ruling of the Court of Justice in Heylens144: 
 
"Effective judicial review, which must be able to cover the legality of the 
reasons for the contested decision, presupposes in general that the court to 
which the matter referred may require the competent authority to notify its 
reasons. But where, as in this case, it is more particularly a question of 
securing the effective protection of a fundamental right conferred by the 
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Treaty on Community workers, the latter must also be able to defend that right 
under the best possible conditions and have the possibility of deciding, with 
full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in their 
applying to the courts. Consequently, in such circumstances the competent 
national authority is under a duty to inform them of the reasons on which its 
refusal is based, either in the decisions itself or in a subsequent 
communication made at their request." 
 
It is important to stress that the Court of Justice has tended to proceduralise the 
rationality of the bases for decisions, in order to avoid invading the discretion 
reserved to the Administration because, as professor Schwarze argues, the judges can 
assess administrative procedure rigorously to counter-balance the far-reaching 
discretionary powers of the executive145.  
 
The rationale of the protection of subjective rights is further enhanced by the 
European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. The Code, proposed by the 
European Ombudsman in 1999 and approved by the European Parliament in 2001146, 
supplements and gives details on the obligations set out in the Charter. Although not 
all of the indications it provides are legally binding147, the explanations it provides in 
Article 18 are very illuminating, it reads: 
 
"1. Every decision of the Institution which may adversely affect the 
rights or interests of a private person shall state the grounds on which it is 
based by indicating clearly the relevant facts and the legal basis of the 
decision. 
 
2. The official shall avoid making decisions which are based on brief 
or vague grounds or which do not contain individual reasoning. 
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3. If it is not possible, because of the large number of persons 
concerned by similar decisions, to communicate in detail the grounds of the 
decision and where standard replies are therefore made, the official shall 
guarantee that he subsequently provides the citizen who expressly requests it 
with an individual reasoning." 
 
The reasoning shall thus be individual or, at least, susceptible of being 
individualised if the citizen so requests. In this sense, the case-law has required that 
statement of reasons on which a decision adversely affecting a person is based be such 
as to enable the person concerned to ascertain the matters justifying the measure 
adopted so that, if necessary, he or she can defend his or her rights148. Although the 
administration does not need to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on by the 
persons concerned, it does need to state both the particular facts and applicable legal 
considerations which explain the decision made149.  
 
This right appears very closely interconnected with other procedural rights. 
The right to access to documents is the clearest example because, in consulting the 
documents that the administration has used regarding one case, a citizen can find the 
explanations he or she needs concerning his or her case.  
 
Two other rights are connected. Firstly, the right to be heard, examined in the 
previous section, can be relevant at two points of time. The first one is that the right to 
a hearing is effective inasmuch as the concerned party is informed of the reasons and 
the factual background that concerns him or her. The second is that once the decision 
is made, although the administration does not need to take a position on all the points 
argued by the concerned party, the arguments of the party would have to be refuted. 
Secondly, the right to a judicial review, which will be examined in the following 
                                                 
148
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section, is also at stake as the grounds given by the public administration shall be used 
as the parameters of the administration to rule on the validity of the measure. 
 
The two dimension of the obligation to state reasons, the provision of the 
parameters for the judicial review of the decision and the information of the 
concerned party could be undermined in the course of a composite procedure. For 
example, the lack of statement of reasons in the measure taken by a national authority 
that has been taken into consideration in a decision made at the EU level might 
disempower the individual with an interest of the relevant knowledge on why the 
decision was made, as well as the judge that would eventually review the final 
decision. 
 
5.3.2.- The right to a reasoned decision in composite procedures 
 
The cases where the obligation of the public administration to state reasons 
was at stake in the context of composite procedures resemble the cases related to the 
right to be heard. The subject-matters are similar, inasmuch as it concerns the breach 
of procedural guarantees in administrative procedures that involved national 
administrations and the Commission. 
 
One of the frequent schemes of composite procedures is that where the 
Commission takes an individual decision on the basis of a recommendation or an 
opinion of the competent national authority, which is normally the one that has 
handled the case directly with the concerned party. The first question that arises is 
then to ascertain whether a motivation per relationem of the decision taken at the EU 
level suffices. 
 
Concerning the reduction of financial assistance with regards to structural 
funds, the Court of Justice initially focused on whether or not the reasons for a 
Commission's decision to reduce financial assistance were sufficient along the 
procedure, with no requirement that they would be included in the final decision150.  
                                                 
150
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That line of reasoning implied that there was no specification on what was the body 
with the specific duty to make them known to the beneficiary, and the statement of 
reasons would considered valid if given by the national authority even though the 
final decision would be made by the Commission.  
 
In the case Technische Universität München151 the Court of Justice was 
confronted with the procedural requirement of the statement of reasons in the context 
of an administrative procedure of several stages. According to the rules in force152, 
some goods were granted an exemption of import duties under certain conditions, 
notably that no other good of equivalent scientific value. A committee of experts from 
Member States had to determine whether such requirement was met for the good in 
question, a microscope. The committee issued a negative assessment and the 
Commission consequently decided that the microscope could not be imported free of 
Common Customs Tariff duties153. The Commission had followed the advice of the 
experts but had failed to state the reasons in a sufficient manner, so the Court of 
Justice determined that the decision was invalid154. Unlike in subsequent cases, the 
Commission had not even referred to or extracted the reasons given at an earlier stage 
of the procedure. 
 
The CFI would later carry out a more specific analysis of the circumstances in 
which these statements of reasons had to be laid down. A clear example of an 
assessment of the validity of the motivation per relationem is the Branco case155. In 
this case a beneficiary of the ESF brought an action seeking annulment of the 
Commission decision reducing the financial assistance initially granted. This case is 
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thus similar to the ones examined in section 5.2.3.but the ground based on the lack of 
a statement of reasons was in this case determinant of the outcome.  
 
The case is particularly illuminating because both the applicant and the 
defendant stated that there was no statement of reasons in the Commission's decision, 
because, according to the Commission, two parallel bilateral relationships exist, 
namely the relationship between the Commission and the national authority of the 
Member State concerned, on the one hand, and the relationship between that national 
authority and beneficiary, on the other. Since the Commission merely approved the 
final payment on the basis of the information submitted by the national authority, the 
Commission is not bound by the obligation to state reasons with regard to the 
beneficiary156. Furthermore, the defendant considered that this ground would only be 
applicable to the national authority and, therefore, it should be adjudicated at the level 
of the national jurisdiction157.  
 
The CFI analysed to what extent the Commission is bound to the national 
administration's proposal to reduce financial assistance. It acknowledged that 
according to the applicable rules158 the Commission alone has the power to reduce 
ESF financial assistance, so it must assume, vis-à-vis the recipient of ESF assistance, 
the legal responsibility for the decision by which its assistance is reduced, irrespective 
of whether or not that reduction was proposed by the national authority concerned159.  
 
Since the Commission did not comply with its obligation to state the reasons 
of its decision, the CFI decided to annul it160. However, what is more interesting about 
this ruling is that the CFI also considered whether or not the motivation provided in 
the relationship of the applicant and the competent national authority was correct. The 
CFI admitted that if there was a clear reference in the Commission decision to the 
measure containing the explanation at the national level, and properly communicated 
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to the applicant, the final decision would not have been annulled161. In conclusion, the 
CFI considered that the obligation to state reasons is complied with either with the 
very statement of reasons for the reduction of the grant or by a clear reference to the 
national administrative act162, which implies that validates this motivation per 
relationem.  
 
The same reasoning had been argued by the CFI in the case Lisretal163, 
examined in the section related to the right to be heard. The CFI admitted that the 
statement of reasons could be a mere reference to the documents produced at the 
national phase of the procedure. Since it considered that the applicant had not had 
access to all the information that motivated the final decision (and the proposal made 
at the national level)164, it annulled the decision. The Court of Justice confirmed the 
ruling of the CFI, although it did not consider the pleas regarding the statement of 
reasons in detail165, it confirmed the CFI's stance that the focus should be placed on 
whether or not the procedural rights of the concerned person were respected in 
practice. In this sense, Advocate General La Pergola analyses in this case whether or 
not the transmission of the right documents containing the motivation had taken place 
at the national level, that is, in the relationships of the national agency with the 
beneficiary166. If that happened, a mere reference to such pieces of information in the 
final decision would suffice. 
 
This point of view is expressed more clearly shortly afterwards in Partex / 
Commission167 where the CFI argued: 
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"In a case such as this where the Commission purely and simply confirms the 
proposal of a Member State to reduce financial assistance initially granted, 
the Court considers that a Commission decision may be regarded as 
sufficiently reasoned, for the purposes of Article 190 of the Treaty, either when 
the decision itself clearly demonstrates the reasons justifying the reduction of 
the assistance or, if that is not the case, when it refers sufficiently clearly to a 
measure of the competent national authorities in the Member States concerned 
in which the latter clearly set out the reasons for such a reduction."168 
 
The incorporation of the statement of reasons for measures of national 
authorities in the Commission's decision would only be possible when the 
Commission's decision does not diverge on any particular point from the measures 
adopted by the national authorities169.  
 
This conclusion became clearer when the CFI rejected the pleas of applicants 
based on the breach of the duty to state reasons when the motivation per relationem 
was considered appropriate. For example, in Associação Comercial de Aveiro170 the 
CFI assessed again the validity of a Commission's decision reducing financial 
assistance in the framework of the ESF. As the Commission was simply confirming 
the proposed reduction by the national authority, the Court analysed whether or not 
the documents referred in the final decision contained sufficient motivation to ensure 
the applicant's right of defence. Since the various factors making it possible for the 
beneficiary to understand the reasons which led the Commission to reduce the amount 
of the assistance granted by the ESF are set out in the letters and reports cited 
therein171, the CFI rejected the plea. In subsequent cases, the CFI followed the same 
logic and examined whether or not documents containing the motivation are refered in 
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the Commission's decision and whther such documents ensure the sufficient 
protection of the position of the applicant172.  
 
The CFI seeks then the effet utile of the duty to provide reasons as a 
procedural guarantee of the individual, so he or she has access to the relevant 
information and can thus refute the facts is appropriate. There is a very close link of 
this right with the right to be heard, which was particularly visible in Vlaam Fonds173. 
In this case, although the applicant was provided with certain information by the 
national authority at different points of time, the Commission considered other 
documents of which the applicant was not informed174.  
 
In sum, the European judges accepts that the statement of reasons consists of a 
mere reference to documents or measures taken at the national level inasmuch as 
those allow the concerned party to take cognisance of the reasons for the final 
decision175. This is a practical stance that appear to be protective of the subjective 
rights of the applicants.  
 
The obligation to give a complete motivation was also a ground in the disputes 
concerning the antiterrorist legislation. As we explained in previous sections, in this 
subject-matter, the stance of the European judges was less protective of individual 
rights as a consequence of peculiar circumstances of the cases. 
 
In the first case People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran176the plea regarding 
a breach in the duty to state reasons did not receive a lot of attention by the parties and 
by the CFI, given the fact that other, more substantial procedural breaches received 
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more attention177. However, the CFI identified that the lack of a proper statement of 
reasons was a procedural breach which, together with other infringements, rendered 
the decision to freeze assets unlawful178. However, there are two aspects that in which 
the CFI showed flexibility. The first is that motivation did not have to appear in full in 
the decision taken at the EU level. It was enough that the evidence which linked the 
activities of the concerned party to terrorist acts was made available to the 
organisation, but this could well take place at the national level179. The second is that 
this motivation could be notified to the concerned party, in so far as possible, either 
concomitantly with or as soon as possible after the adoption of an initial decision to 
freeze funds180.  
 
The possibility of a statement of reasons that is communicated after the 
decision is peculiar to the antiterrorist legislation cases, as the judges observed that 
the effectiveness of the sanctions depends to a large extent in the surprise effect of 
them. This rationale was reiterated in the later rulings181, thus focusing on the 
assessment of the procedural guarantees at the national level and releasing the EU 
bodies from any responsibility. In Sison182 for example, the CFI stated that contested 
acts must satisfy the obligation to state reasons 'taken together', and not necessarily 
one-by-one or, in this case, only the final decision183. Furthermore, it admitted that 
"the degree of precision of the statement of reasons for a decision must also be 
weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for 
making the decision"184. 
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In conclusion, the reasoning of the CFI and the Court of Justice is that the 
statement of reasons must not be explicit in the final decision taken at the EU level, as 
long as the motivation for an unfavourable act was notified to the concerned party in a 
previous stage, involving national authorities. The European courts would still keep 
the competence to assess whether this statement of reasons provided at the national 
level complies with the standards of legal protection of the individual guaranteed by 
EU law. For this reason, the unformalistic reasoning of the European judges do not 
appear to raise so many legal concerns.  
 
Paradoxically, however, the Court of Justice was reluctant to apply the 
standards of procedural guarantees as provided in 41(2)(c) EChFR to national 
legislations. A recent ruling is illuminating in this respect. The case Romeo185 
concerned the legality of a decision by Italian authorities providing for a reduction in 
the applicant's pension as a former civil servant of the region of Sicily. The applicant 
claimed that the duty to state reasons had been breached and invoked principle of 
European Union law relating to such obligation186. The Court of Justice argued that  
 
"it cannot be concluded that the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU or 
Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter or indeed other rules of European Union law 
concerning the obligation to state reasons for acts have been made directly and 
unconditionally applicable, as such, by (the relevant national rules), so that 
internal situations and situations relating to European Union law are treated in 
the same way. Therefore it must be held that, in the present case, there is no 
clear European Union interest in a uniform interpretation of provisions or 
concepts taken from European Union law, irrespective of the circumstances in 
which those provisions or concepts are to apply."187 
 
Although this reluctance to apply the rights conferred in the EChFR directly to 
national legislations is not new in the case-law of the Court of Justice188, and there is a 
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Declaration in the Treaties denying that the Charter might extend the EU law beyond 
the powers of the Union189, it is worrying that the Court of Justice rejects categorically 
the assessment of the national rules under the obligation to state reasons. It might be, 
as the CFI admits in the cases previously referred, that the statement of reasons for a 
EU decision is found in dealings of a national authority with the concerned party. This 
means that the EU courts consider that the statement of reasons given by the national 
authorities in the intermediate steps of the procedure might be sufficient, yet the EU 
courts lack the competence to rule on the validity or sufficient of the statement of 
reasons issued at the national level. 
 
For this reason, it appears to be legally sound to require that the statement of 
reasons appears at the level of public administration that made the final decision by 
which the person is concerned. This conclusion would be in line again with the 
proposal of the research network on EU administrative law (ReNEUAL). In the the 
draft model rules on EU administrative procedures presented in 2014, Article III-
29(2) proposes that the duty to state reasons in cases of composite procedures should 
be respected at all stages, national and European190. 
 
5.3.- The right to judicial review in composite procedures 
 
5.3.1.- The right to judicial review as a fundamental right and a central element in the 
configuration of public administration 
 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the right to judicial review. The 
essence of the principle of rule of law and administrative law as a whole lies on the 
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right of the individual to dispute the decision of the authority before an independent 
body with the competences to review administrative acts. As judge Marshall put it 
more elegantly in of the most often cited rulings of North American legal history, 
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to 
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury"191. 
 
More than that, one can find, embedded in the emphasis upon judicial review, 
some of the most basic principles of a democratic society, the gist of the checks and 
balances of a system of separation of powers, and the main mechanism to ensure the 
objectivity of the administration and the exclusion of arbitrariness192. For this reason, 
the right to judicial review is a subjective right; but it is also an individual right with 
far greater legal scope. It is an indispensable right for the understanding of modern 
administration and central to the constitutional configuration of the State. 
 
In the European Union, the right to judicial review enjoys no less centrality.  
Advocate General Poiares Maduro argued in the landmark ruling Kadi that "the right 
to effective judicial protection holds a prominent place in the firmament of 
fundamental rights".193 The case law of the Court of Justice194 provides evidence that 
the right to judicial review is also paramount in how the Court of Justice understands 
its role and how this right, today listed as a fundamental right, legitimises the structure 
of the European Union195. Scholars remaining attentive to evolution of the case law of 
the Court of Justice identify a quest for the completeness of legal protection in the 
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European Union196, to which the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty certainly 
contributed197. 
 
In the European context, the understanding of this right relies heavily on the 
standard of the European Court of Human Rights198. Access to the court and the right 
to an effective remedy are fundamental rights laid down in the European Convention 
of Human Rights (Articles 6 and 13, respectively). Although the EU is not part of the 
ECHR199, the Court of Justice has long accepted that its standards are a source of 
inspiration for its stance on the protection of human rights200. Taking into account that 
according to the ECtHR there should be "a remedy in order both to have a claim 
decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress”201, a system where, due to the 
complexities of composite procedures, there are situations where the individual is 
deprived of his or her right to go to court, or have his or her case fully reviewed by a 
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judge, the EU administrative system would fall short of meeting the minimum 
standards of human right protection provided in the ECHR202. 
 
As it is well known, the requirement for higher standards of human right 
protection by the Court of Justice stem from the pressure exerted by some national 
supreme and constitutional courts203, notably the German Verfassungsgerichtshof204. 
This is why the Court of Justice did not initially develop a standard of human rights 
protection different to Member States205, to which it bound itself to respect, and many 
of its rulings are inspired by the case-law of the ECtHR. Although it can be argued 
that the Court of Justice has departed from this limitative perspective206, in particular 
since the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is important to underline 
that the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, among which the right to effective 
judicial review, was initially developed by the stimuli of external agents in the context 
of an integration taking place with the predominant focus on economic freedoms.  
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For the purposes of our analysis, the focus on the right to judicial review 
cannot be any less prominent. Indeed, compliance with the right of complete judicial 
review represents the main challenge for composite procedures. It will be analysed in 
this section that the main shortcoming of composite procedures appears when the 
procedural arrangements are such that preclude the judicial control of the decision 
taken, whether it is because no court finds itself with full competence to review the 
situation or, in case of more subtle situations, where the competence of the court is 
limited and results in an unsatisfactory control of the activity of the administration.  
 
5.3.2.- The rule of law in the European Union 
 
 The rule of law is common to all member States constitutional traditions, so it 
came as no surprise207 when the European Court of Justice in its landmark case Les 
Verts stated that “the European [Union] is a community based on the rule of law”208.   
 
The gist of the rule of law entails that neither the European Union nor Member 
States can avoid review of the legality of their acts, so there should be –in the words 
of Dicey209, the most prominent classical advocate of the principle of the rule of law–, 
"an absence of arbitrary power". Among the founding values of the Union of Article 2 
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TEU210, the rule of law principle has the greatest operative relevance from a legal 
perspective211, and appears tightly interlinked to the right of effective judicial 
protection212.  
 
Indeed, when the Court of Justice first used this concept in Les Verts it did so in 
the name of a broad interpretation of the principle of judicial supervision213. The 
opinion delivered by Advocate General Mancini provides evidence that the main 
concern of that case was to determine the scope of reviewable acts214. The Court of 
Justice has later linked this notion with the protection of fundamental rights, 
particularly in UPA215, where it held that the EU is: 
 
“… a community based on the rule of law in which institutions are subject to 
judicial review of the compatibility of their acts with the Treaty and the general 
principles of law which include fundamental rights. Individuals are therefore 
entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive from the 
Community legal order…”216 
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 Judicial protection and the possibility of review of the acts of the institutions is 
the main dimension to which the Court of Justice refers when it evokes the rule of law 
principle217. However, looking at the conceptions of this principle in the different 
European national systems, one can easily conclude that it is not an univocal 
notion218. Professor Craig develops three dimensions of the rule of law principle in 
Europe219:  
 
a) lawful authority, the government must be able to point to some basis for its 
action that is regarded as valid by the relevant legal system;  
 
b) guiding conduct, the laws should be capable of guiding ones conduct in 
order that one can plan one's life; and  
 
c) justice and accountable government, governmental action shall conform to 
precepts of good administration developed through the courts, this being an essential 
facet of accountable government in a democratic society. 
 
In comparing the European legal systems, three main concepts emerge as the 
most representative, the English rule of law principle as such, the French État de droit 
and the German Rechtsstaat220.  
 
In the United Kingdom, where the rule of law principle has the longest 
tradition221, it means essentially that the government must act in accordance with the 
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law222, and that independent courts can review the legality such government action223. 
Unlike in continental Europe and the United States, courts in the United Kingdom do 
not have the power to annul legislation, which is a peculiar element in the British 
conception of the rule of law principle224. Besides that peculiarity, there is a persistent 
scholar debate between the formal and substantive conception of the principle. Today, 
it is generally agreed that it is an overarching constitutional principle of constitutional 
law which informs the interpretation of all legal norms and may be relied upon by the 
judiciary to interpret statutes as well as to assess the legality of governmental 
actions225. 
 
In Germany, the concept of Rechtsstaat is very large and encompasses both 
formal principles, such as the principles of legality, legal certainty, proportionality, 
the prohibition on retroactive laws, and substantive elements, the most important of 
which is the protection of fundamental rights and human dignity. The essential 
element of all of these components is that public power is constrained by the law226, 
but this limitation of the public power is regarded mostly from an individual rights-
approach227. The strong stance of the German courts in general and the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof in particular in the protection of fundamental rights has 
led to a constitutionalisation of the legal order in the name of the principle of 
Rechtsstaat228. 
 
In France, the notion of État de droit is in stark contrast to the British idea of 
rule of law, as its essence lies in the possibility of reviewing legislation on the 
grounds of its constitutionality229. Judged contrary to the French tradition of 
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parliamentary sovereignty, the power to annul acts of Parliament was initiated by 
ruling of the Constitutional Council of 1971230 and, since then, French doctrine has 
dealt with the concept of État de droit extensively231. From that moment, scholars 
have identified a convergence towards the concept of Rechtstaat in the sense of a 
meta-principle that contains several other related to the submission of the public 
authority to a judge232. The focus of the French conception of the État de droit still 
lies on fundamental rights, because, as Carré de Malberg argued, the État de droit is 
the state-backed legal regime shaped by fundamental liberal rights which places 
constraints on the État légal233. 
 
The shared features in the different European countries determine the 
conception in the European Union as a foundational principle that operates in the form 
of an umbrella of other formal and substantive components234, among which respect 
from fundamental rights is the most important. Today, the rule of law has become a 
dominant organizational paradigm of modern constitutional law235, both in the legal 
system of the EU and its Member States. 
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Despite the different nuances, the rule of law principle in Europe is a notion 
that encompasses similar values in the different traditions, which can be abridged in 
the subjection of public power to formal and substantive legal constraints as a 
protection of the individual against its arbitrary or unlawful use and the existence of 
an independent and effective judiciary236. Under this elementary understanding the 
rule of law is not only a founding value of the European Union pursuant to Article 2 
TEU, but also a condition to the adhesion to the European Union237.  
 
 In the EU, the rule of law principle has an additional function different to its 
meaning in EU Member States; it has been used as an instrument to justify on legal 
grounds the autonomy of European law, and thus support European integration. 
Beyond effective judicial protection and other constraints of the public authority, the 
rule of law principle is fundamental for the trajectory taken by European 
integration238. As professor Weiler pointed out239, since the early jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice, the European judges used this principle as the main tool to give legal 
support to the European integration and conceive European law as an autonomous 
system of law, independent not only from national legal systems, but also from 
political and administrative actors. The Commission also advocated for this view, 
which set the emphasis on the rules of law principle to ensure the autonomy of the 
legal system, by evoking the notion of community of law (Rechsgemainschaft) to 
describe the old communities instead of the most controversial and disputed notion of 
statehood240. 
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Considering that the gist of the rule of law principle lies precisely on effective 
systems of judicial control by the public authorities, the design of the different 
national systems of administrative justice and constitutional justice is essential for the 
understanding of what is, according to national systems, a proper protection of the 
right to judicial review. All EU Member States provide their citizens with the right to 
challenge the acts of public powers before independent courts. However, there is an 
evolution towards greater judicial control, which has resulted in a progressively 
enlarged legal standing of individuals and a wider scope of acts that can be subject to 
review. Moreover, there are different models as to the possibility to chanllenge acts of 
Parliament before an ordinary or a constitutional court. These elements are important 
in the conception of the role and functions of the Court of Justice, as it operates as 
both an administrative and as a Constitutional court.  
 
Among the different European models of administrative justice, that of 
Germany is the most protective. Its Basic Law envisages the recourse to a court 
against the administration as a true subjective right241. From its famous 
Bundesverfassungsgericht ruling in Lüth242, the German conception of fundamental 
rights as an “objective order of values” that irradiates to the whole legal order has 
enormous implications for bringing down the burdens for access to justice, from legal 
standing to the reviewability of acts243, which was captured by the German Code of 
Administrative Court Procedure of 21 January 1960244. This conception has largely 
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influenced other European legal systems and, certainly, the case-law of the Court of 
Justice245. 
 
By contrast, the model of administrative justice in France is still that of the 
Consel d’État. The original duties of the Conseil d’État were not exactly to judge but 
to regulate according to law the activity of public authorities from inside, with limited 
independence from the executive branch. However it became progressively246 an 
independent protector of the respect of the rule of law for the administration247, which 
could compel administrative bodies to execute its rulings248. 
 
Finally, there is a third system, that of the United Kingdom which deems that 
the protection of individual rights against administrative acts shall be the competence 
of ordinary courts under the Common law system. The system has been overhauled 
recently249, but the central idea remains that the judge has the main role of protecting 
individual rights within the framework of the clear separation of powers250. 
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Leaving aside the peculiarities of the British model, all European systems of 
administrative justice can be classified by their proximity to either the German or the 
French system251. Under the subjective conception of Rechtsschutz, courts are 
responsible for establishing the subjective rights of individuals who have been 
wronged by the administration. Under the objective conception, courts assess the 
administration’s respect for objective legality and the regular legal functioning of the 
administration252.  
 
The implications of these two conceptions result in different rules of legal 
standing of individuals and scope of control, because the rationale behind judicial 
control is different. In the first system, the starting point is the citizen and the 
definition of individual rights, so as to then deduce the consequences imposed on the 
administration. In the second system, the administration’s obligations and constraints 
are first defined in order to then deduce the rights of individuals253.  
 
Both approaches are complementary and can be combined. However, when 
looking at the gaps in judicial protection of composite procedures, the idea shall be 
borne in mind that the conceptions of what is a satisfactory protection of individual 
rights against administrative acts can indeed be different. We will see how the logic of 
individual rights protection has progressively gained ground in the case-law of the 
Court of Justice. 
 
The ruling in Les Verts cited at the beginning of this section, always appears 
on the academic works on the topic of the rule of law in the EU because it was the 
first judicial recognition that the "EC is a community based on the rule of law". But 
further to that recognition, which only acknowledged a pre-existing reality, it 
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identified with such 'community' a "complete system of legal remedies", an statement 
that has proven a lot more controversial than the mention to the rule of law254.  
 
 In conclusion, the rule of law principle has an unparalled relevance in the 
conception of the EU legal system and its institutional and judicial structure. The core 
element of this principle is that all acts and actions of the public authority are subject 
to the law and cannot escape judicial review255. This power of review includes the 
review of validity of legislative acts, which in national systems is represented by 
constitutional judicial review256. Procedural arrangements that result in situations 
where judicial review is not possible or is not satisfactory should attract the attention 
of the legal academia and the European judiciary. Composite procedures do entail this 
type of shortcomings, at times no fully realised by the European judges. Hence the 
relevance of this section which tackles the most pressing challenge of composite 
procedures.  
 
5.3.3.- The right to judicial review according to the Court of Justice  
 
In spite of its origins in public international law, it was evident from the 
beginning that the European communities were not an international organisation in the 
classical sense. Particularly as regards individuals. The classical paradigm of 
international law under which only States and international organisations enjoy legal 
personality and thus legal standing in the international courts257 does not hold true in 
the context of the European Union258. The Court of Justice stressed in its arch famous 
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ruling van Gend en Loos259 that special character of the old European Communities 
when it named Community law a "new legal order" and went on to affirm that "not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them right 
which become part of their legal heritage". From the moment individuals are 
recognised as subjects of rights, access to justice appears inevitably.  
 
The case-law of the Court of Justice has established a linkage between the very 
essence of the European Union as a community of law and the right to judicial review 
of EU acts260 since the very first judgement when it explored the concept of the rule of 
law principle in Les Verts261. The possibility of judicial review is not only the core 
element of the "community of law based on the rule of law", but also of the 
effectiveness of EU law. It was at the same time that the Court of Justice established 
that the principle of effective judicial protection is one of the general principles of EU 
law262. 
 
This is doubtlessly one of the reasons why the scholarly debate on the 
comprehensiveness of legal protection over EU law has been so abundant. In this 
vein, there have been numerous critics as to whether the Court of Justice has yet 
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achieved a satisfactory system of judicial protection for individuals263. Professor De 
Burca summarized the general view of the academia on the subject when she said that 
“there are few questions on which the EU law academic world (not to mention the 
CFI and Advocate Generals of the ECJ) is so united as that the right of individuals to 
seek judicial review by the ECJ under Article 230 is excessively restrictive and that it 
undermines respect for the principle of access to justice in the EU”264. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, which has brought about a significant step forward in 
judicial protection of individuals265, but even after those changes the question of 
whether or not the level of judicial protection in the EU is complete remains unsettled. 
As the President of the Court, Koen Lenaerts admits, there still remain ‘vestiges of 
limitations’ placed on the Court of Justice's jurisdiction and powers of review266. 
 
 The focus of the academia remains in the legal standing of individuals to 
challenge the validity of EU acts. Notwithstanding this, there are other elements 
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which require careful consideration, such as the scope of reviewable acts, which will 
be dealt with in subsequent sections. Concerning legal standing, neither many 
Advocates-General267 nor the General Court268 seem to be perfectly aligned with the 
strict stance of the Court of Justice. This debate transcends the objectives of this 
dissertation, but there are some questions to be clarified before tackling the specific 
issues of composite procedures.  
 
 When dealing with the so called principle of comprehensive legal protection, 
the two main pillars on which the Union's judicial architecture rests is the action for 
annulment but, not less importantly, the preliminary ruling procedure269. 
 
Direct challenge: action for annulment 
 
The main mechanism established by the Treaty to review the legality of EU 
decisions is the action for annulment. This is the procedure that has received more 
scholarly attention270. Due to the peculiarities of the EU legal order, both 
administrative and legislative acts are covered by this procedure271.  
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Under the same procedure and, until 1993272, under the competence of the 
same court, action for annulment concentrates what, in national jurisdictions, is 
considered the domain of administrative justice and constitutional justice, the first 
corresponding to actions against acts of the public administration -in most cases the 
Commission-, and the latter corresponding to legislative acts. Although the General 
Court can be assimilated to a court of administrative review and the Court of Justice 
as a court of constitutional nature in the context of the action for annulment, the 
competence of each court does not relate to the legal nature of the act subject to 
review, but of the category of applicant. As provided for in article 256 TFEU and 51 
of the Statute of the Court of Justice, individuals shall apply at the General Court 
whereas the so-called privileged applicants (Institutions and Member States) shall 
bring the action directly before the Court of Justice. Thus, since legislative acts cannot 
be challenged by private parties, the Court of Justice holds the competence to review 
pieces of legislation, but it can also act as an administrative court when an 
administrative acts is challenged by an Institution or a Member State.  
 
The distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts –we shall call the 
latter administrative acts273– was not explicit until the Constitutional Treaty274. The 
nomen iuris of legislative acts has remained unchanged in the Treaty of Lisbon275. 
The characterisation of legislative acts is merely formal, and depends exclusively on 
the procedure though which they were adopted. 
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The fact that an act is ‘legislative’ does not per se prevent it from being 
challenged in the EU Courts by individuals276. However, as legislative acts are 
characterised by the procedure for adoption277, they cannot generally be result from a 
composite procedure. So the attention will be focused on the non-legislative acts. 
 
 The first draft of the provision on the action for annulment in the Treaty of 
Rome278 limited the scope of acts that could be challenged by individuals. Only 
Decisions279 and acts of analogous nature were reviewable280, even though a latter 
case-law of the Court of Justice accepted that other acts281, not necessarily Decisions 
or Decisions in nature, could be challenged. The provisions of primary law remained 
eloquently unchanged until the Treaty of Lisbon282.  
 
The main condition for access to Justice is the twofold requirement of direct 
and individual concern. On the one hand, direct concern requires that the act must 
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directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the 
addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such 
implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without 
the application of other intermediate rules283. On the other hand, individual concern 
entails that persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim 
to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain 
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually just as in the case of the person addressed284. 
 
The latter –by far the most contested condition for standing285-, individual 
concern, requires that either the act is nominally addressed to the applicant or if it 
affects him or her by reason of certain attributes or circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons, i. e. ‘as if’ it was addressed to him or her. This 
rigorous interpretation of the Treaty provisions known as the Plaumann test persists to 
this day286. However, provisions of primary law have changed slightly in the Treaty of 
Lisbon287.  
 
There are two sets of changes incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon. On the one 
hand, as it had been long awaited by legal scholars288, the list of reviewable acts is 
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broadened289. Not only acts from Institutions can be subject to judicial review, but 
also those of other bodies, offices or agencies with legal effects vis-à-vis third parties 
shall fall within the jurisdiction of the European courts, which has major 
consequences for our purposes, although the Court of Justice had already established 
an unformalistic approach. 
 
 On the other hand, the requirement of individual concern vanishes for 
“regulatory acts”290 having direct concern on the applicant and not entailing 
implementing measures. The General Court of Justice defined them in Inuit291 as “acts 
of general application apart from legislative acts”292, and later in Microban293 it 
detailed that the more flexible approach in terms of standing required that the act has a 
legal consequence without member States adopting any measure294. Although some 
authors had hoped for wider definition which would significantly open up the 
conditions of standing for private parties295, the case law of the Court of Justice 
confirms296 a relative opening of the standing in the logic of trying to leave no 
situation where individuals are deprived of their right to effective judicial review297. 
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Additionally, the Treaty on Lisbon tried to improve the system of judicial 
protection also on the side of national courts, by enshrining the obligation of national 
courts to provide effective judicial review in article 19 (1) TEU298. Some legal 
scholars have praised this provision from the perspective of the principle of 
subsidiarity299, but others are rather sceptical of its effectiveness300. 
 
In conclusion, for most authors there has been an evolution in the last years on 
the traditionally petrified conception of legal standing at the level of the European 
judicature. The Treaty of Lisbon has, in a large part, brought about this change but the 
attitude of the Court of Justice has contributed to this relative opening301. 
 
What is remarkable of this evolution is that there is a consciousness of the 
need to attain and ensure a comprehensive legal protection under EU law302, in 
particular by the Court of Justice. Thus, effective judicial protection goes beyond a 
general principle informing the EU legal order, to be observed by both Member States 
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and EU institutions, and has rather turned into a peculiar source of self–standing 
rights which need to be protected and granted effectiveness by the Court itself and by 
national courts within the field of application of EU law303. 
 
Indirect challenge: Preliminary ruling procedure 
 
 
The preliminary ruling procedure is particularly important for composite 
procedures because it articulates the possibility of a judgement of the Court of Justice 
in the context of a national decision challenged in the national court. If such national 
decision puts an end to an administrative procedure where the European level of 
public administration has intervened, one would be at the presence of the downwards 
composite procedure. This is the inverse situation from the case of the action for 
annulment, when the action is brought against the EU decision. 
 
Legal scholarship has traditionally considered two main objectives of the 
preliminary ruling procedure established in Article 267 TFEU304: to ensure the 
uniformity in the application of EU law and to establish an effective cooperation 
between the Court of Justice and national courts305. However, there is a less evident, 
but not less important, function of the preliminary ruling procedure which is to 
complete the system of reviewability of acts in EU law, by relying on the application 
on EU law by national judges306. 
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This conception has a twofold consequence. The first is that Member States 
are under the obligation to provide for remedies for breaches of EU law, and that 
implies that national courts must ensure the effective application of EU law307. In 
doing so, the Court of Justice developed the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness with the aim that the rights of individuals recognised in EU law were 
duly respected in Member States308. 
 
The second is that the Court of Justice has relied on the preliminary ruling 
procedure to justify its restrictive approach to the standing of individuals before it. 
The rationale is that implementing measures, on the assumption that they are national, 
can be challenged before the national courts.  In case of doubt about the validity of the 
general act that was implemented, the national court shall raise a preliminary ruling 
procedure to the Court of Justice, so there is a complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures to review all measures adopted by the institutions 309.  
 
Nevertheless, such reliance on the preliminary ruling procedure to cover the 
gaps that hinder the completeness of the EU system of justice was criticised even 
within the Court of Justice. In the opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in the UPA 
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case310 "proceedings before national courts are not capable of guaranteeing that 
individuals seeking to challenge the validity of Community measures are granted fully 
effective judicial protection", because 1) national courts are not competent to declare 
measures of Community law invalid; 2) the principle of effective judicial protection 
requires that applicants have access to a court which is competent to grant remedies; 
3) in some cases it is impossible for individual applicants to challenge Community 
measures which do not require any acts of implementation by national authorities311; 
and 4) compared to a direct action before the Court of First Instance, proceedings 
before the national courts present serious practical disadvantages for individual 
applicants, such as costs and delays312. 
 
Advocate-General Jacobs reasoned that access to the Court of Justice via the 
preliminary ruling procedure is not a remedy available to individual applicants as a 
matter of right313. That is so because even if national courts might be obliged to refer 
questions may refuse to refer questions, or err in their preliminary assessment of 
general Community measures314. The conditions under which national courts must 
raise the questions which were laid down in the case CILFIT315, are controversial and, 
to many commentators, unevenly respected316. 
 
Consequently, the preliminary ruling procedure is not, in the very words of the 
Court of Justice, a means of redress317; and it cannot always be considered fit to 
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guarantee an effective remedy to applicants318. Some of the referred cases show that 
under certain circumstances the Court of Justice is not able to offer an effective 
remedy to the individual through a judgement in the context of the preliminary ruling 
procedure.  
 
As a result, the Court of Justice has not been entirely consistent with the 
proclamation, in the name of direct effect319, that nationals of Member States are also 
subject to the EU legal order320, since its stance on the rights of those individuals to 
the European courts is not so straightforward. The idea that the system of legal 
remedies and procedures is 'complete'321 stems from the logic of executive federalism 
discussed in previous chapters, and conceived in term of ideal judicial cooperation 
and homogeneity of national procedural systems of justice, assumptions that do not 
necessarily hold true. Hence, reliance on the preliminary ruling is insufficient from a 
perspective of individual access to justice.  
 
In the case of composite procedures, the complexities of the judicial dialogue 
between the European and the national judges become more intricate. When the Court 
of Justice is assessing the validity of a decision taken by the Union's administration, it 
might be precluded from judging on the validity of the national measure which was a 
previous step in the administrative procedure. The preliminary ruling procedure is 
based on the premise that national courts need the help of the Court of Justice to 
                                                                                                                                            
national court and therefore the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question 
concerning the validity of Community law does not mean that the court concerned is compelled to 
consider that a question has been raised within the meaning of Article 234 EC. Accordingly, the fact 
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interpret, and eventually rule on the validity of, the European Union's law. The initial 
logic was that this dialogue would not be necessary in a reverse direction, that is, that 
the Court of Justice would not be in a position to require the interpretation or an 
assessment of validity of a measure taken at the national level, eventually based on 
national law.  
 
The emergence of composite procedures challenges such understanding. In a 
composite procedure the validity of a measure taken at the national level might be 
relevant, even essential, for the determination of the lawfulness of the decision 
adopted at the EU level. When ruling on the later, the Court of Justice might find 
itself bound to accept, as an element outside its power of review, the measure taken at 
the national level. This possibility leads to a legal deadlock that has become apparent 
in practice and demands, given the increasing presence of composite procedures, new 
methods of judicial dialogue inspired perhaps by the preliminary ruling procedure. 
 
5.3.4.- Composite procedures and judicial review: identifying the lacunae  
 
Academic literature on the subject of access to justice before the European 
Union courts has mainly focused on the standing of private parties before the 
European courts. Other aspects have received much less attention322. However, the 
complicated structure of composite procedures raises many other concerns from the 
perspective of right to judicial review and not only from the point of view of the 
standing of private applicants. These relate to the difficulties in determining the 
competence of the court, the doubts about the nature and scope of reviewable acts and 
finally, also, the restrictions of legal standing. It is worth noting that these gaps in 
access to justice are very entrenched with each other, but it is convenient for the sake 
of the systematic treatment of this subject-matter to proceed to analyse them 
individually. 
 
(A) First gap: determining the competent court 
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The administrative decision that results from a composite procedure can be 
challenged before the national courts or before the European courts. The public 
administration that issued the act shall be the relevant criterion for determining the 
suitable judge for reviewing the validity of the act. However, the executive integration 
refered to in Chapter 2 and the asymmetries of composite procedures and323, on the 
one hand, and the dual-system of courts, on the other, provide evidence that this 
allocation of competences can be very dysfunctional in practice. 
 
This inconsistency may result in a breach of rights of the individual. The 
individual is manifestly deprived of the right of judicial review in situations where a 
decision is not actionable at a national jurisdiction but the EU courts also reject their 
competence. The situation might be apparently less striking, yet not less harming to 
the individual rights, when the Court of Justice accepts jurisdiction but refuses to rule 
on the validity of intermediate measures that constitute the substance of the 
controversy. The various situations that might arise will be assessed according to the 
following classification. 
 
Vertical upwards procedures 
 
The first breach in judicial protection that will be tackled concerns those 
procedures in which the administrative sequence takes place in part at the national or 
sub-national level, but the final decision is taken at the European level. 
 
These cases have led to judicial disputes in fields such as agricultural policy. 
The clearest sample case is Borelli324. Because this case is the first where the Court of 
Justice assessed the incoherencies of composite procedures - certainly without 
mentioning them - in the context of judicial protection, it is worth giving details of the 
facts of the case.  
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There was a procedure to grant funds to producers of certain agricultural 
products on the basis of the Council Regulation 355/77325. The Commission was 
entrusted with the competence to grant funds for investments to certain producers in 
the context of agricultural production on the basis of the opinion of the national 
authorities. According to Article 13(3) of the Regulation, the opinion, if unfavourable, 
was binding upon the Commission, and there are no mechanisms foreseen to review 
the lawfulness of such opinion. According to the Italian law, it was for the regional 
authorities to issue such opinion. In this case, aid was requested for the construction 
of an oil mill. The project did not qualify for aid because in that financial year the 
number of applications greatly exceeded the financial resources available and because 
the application could not be held to be a priority one according to the criteria of the 
national authorities. The Region of Liguria issued an unfavourable opinion which was 
notified by Italy to the Commission. Consequently, the Commission rejected the 
application326. 
 
The main claim of the applicant was that the unfavourable opinion of the 
region of Liguria was unlawful because it was adopted in breach of the Regulation 
due to an erroneous appraisal of the supply contracts concluded with other 
producers327. The Court of Justice declared that it did not have jurisdiction on the 
validity of the opinion issued by the region of Liguria, even if it acknowledged that it 
was part of a European decision-making procedure328. It went on to determine that it 
was for the national courts to rule on the lawfulness on the opinion, even offering a 
preliminary ruling if it was ever raised329. The Court of Justice thus declined 
jurisdiction, and proceeded to analyse the validity of the Commission's decision. As it 
was the case that the applicant had not contested anything in the proceedings which 
could be attributed to the Commission's discretionary powers (it was bound by the 
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decision of the national authorities) the Court of Justice dismissed the action, without 
considering the substance of the claimant's arguments.  
 
The argument put forward by the Court of Justice that it is for the national 
courts to rule on the lawfulness of the national measure at issue was insufficient 
because in so doing it was ignoring the Italian administrative system330 which does 
not give access to administrative justice in these cases. The opinion provided by the 
Italian authorities was, under Italian administrative law, merely a preparatory act and 
not a final decision. For this reason, the Italian courts were unable to review its 
legality331. 
 
In the circumstances of the case, the Court of Justice did not have any tools to 
provide a different, satisfactory solution. While it could not invade the jurisdiction of 
national courts to rule on the validity of the national decision, it was also unable to 
declare the unlawfulness of a Commission's decision that could not, because it was 
determined by the national measure, have been different. Hence, this case is a good 
example of why it is necessary de lege ferenda to provide for mechanisms which 
avoid situations where the right of judicial review is breached. 
 
A leading administrative law scholar in Spanish academia, professor García de 
Enterría, paid special attention to this ruling and argued that it implied an extension of 
the jurisdiction of the national administrative courts332. He understood that the ruling 
of the Court of Justice entailed an enlargement of the competences of the national 
administrative courts due to an implicit mandate by EU law to review national 
administrative acts, disregarding national procedural law if necessary. The position of 
the Court of Justice placing the burden to tackle the dysfunctionalities of composite 
procedures as regards its judicial control was one-sided and inadequate. Italian 
administrative law is not peculiar in limiting access to justice to the final decision in 
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an administrative procedure. This element is common to other administrative 
procedural rules of Member States333 and to the position of the Court of Justice in the 
context of EU law as well334. Furthermore, the hypothetical acceptance of the 
jurisdiction by the Italian courts would have been insufficient too, because they could 
not have invalidated the decision of the Commission, which is the one with hat had 
legal effects on the position of the applicant.  
 
It is only natural that the Court of Justice was competent, because the 
procedure ended with a decision taken by the Commission. The result reached by the 
Court of Justice was not satisfactory, and would not have complied with a basic 
standard of protection of the right of judicial review. The applicant in Borelli was 
denied the right to have a decision that affected him fully revised by a competent 
court. The procedural complexity of composite procedures could only be overcome by 
the competence of the Court of Justice to interpret national law and national measures, 
an idea that far exceeds the functions and the conception of the Court of Justice, or to 
rely on a system of judicial dialogue with national courts in an inverse direction of the 
preliminary ruling procedure. 
 
The enlargement of the jurisdiction of national administrative courts proposed 
by the Court of Justice would be a solution as simplistic and blunt as the enlargement 
of the competence of European courts. It would disregard national rules on 
administrative procedure and would likewise be restricted as regards the EU elements 
in the decision-making procedure. What is crucial is to find a co-ordinated approach 
so that the relevant court has the tools to review the legality of the entire process so 
individuals cannot be denied access to justice, as was, at that end the case of Borelli. 
The Borelli case is so relevant in this research because it provides the clearest 
evidence of the contradictions brought about by composite procedures and the legal 
dead-ends to which they lead. However, cases like Borelli have existed in other areas, 
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in some of which composite procedures are more difficult to identify, and are likely to 
appear in the future. They are indeed difficult to identify, given the lack of systematic 
treatment by the case-law. 
 
Another area where similar controversies have arisen is the procedure for the 
registration of geographical information and designations of origin, which involves 
both national administrations and the Commission335. This procedure was governed 
by Council Regulation 2081/92336 at the time when the cases were examined by the 
CFI. Although there are new rules on this area337, the structure of the procedure has 
remained unchanged. In essence, the application by the interested party is first 
assessed by a national authority and eventually forwarded to the Commission. If the 
Commission approves, the application is published, so that other Member States or 
private parties with opposing interests can intervene338.The procedure ends with a 
Commission decision on the inclusion of a new designation in the corresponding 
annex. In sum, the procedure tries to find a balance between the protection of 
legitimate denominations of origin and the avoidance of burdens to trade of foodstuff 
based on geographical origin, and may give rise to conflicting interests among 
companies or even Member States339.  
 
The first case in this subject-matter is CSR Pampryl SA340. The Court of First 
Instance considered an action for annulment brought by a company against the 
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Commission Regulation341 that registered the name 'Pays d’Auge' as a protected 
designation of origin. The relevant facts were that the applicant had been producing 
cider including the indication 'Pays d'Auge'. In 1998, the French Government 
forwarded to the Commission an application for registration of the name 'Pays d'Auge' 
as a protected denomination of origin342, which was approved and published by the 
Commission. Following the applicable procedural rules, there was a period during 
which individuals could express their opposition through their respective Member 
States. The applicant sent the competent French authority a statement of objection to 
the registration343; however, the national authority decided not to forward such 
statement to the Commission because it considered that the objections were not 
justified. The applicant brought an action unsuccessfully against such decision of the 
French authority before the Conseil d'État344.  
 
The main claim of the applicant was that the French authorities had 
disregarded its statement of objection to the application and forwarded it without such 
objection to the Commission, which had subsequently proceeded to register it. The 
applicant contested the legality of the action by the French authorities, and it 
acknowledged that, from the procedural point of view, it could not make its 
observations known to the Commission other than by means of the national 
authorities345. The CFI dismissed by an order the action as inadmissible, following the 
reasoning of the Borelli case. It declined jurisdiction to rule on the basis of the 
lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority on the following terms:  
 
"the Community judicature has no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a 
measure adopted by a national authority even if the measure in question forms 
part of a Community decision making procedure, where it clearly follows from 
the division of powers in the field in question between the national authorities 
and the Community institutions that the measure adopted by the national 
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authority is binding on the Community decision-taking authority and therefore 
determines the terms of the Community decision to be adopted."346 
 
 Although the line of reasoning is the same as in Borelli, the CFI no longer 
insists on the mechanism of recourse to national courts, because it is aware that it is 
not truly accessible to applicants347. 
 
The Court of Justice is aligned with the reasoning of the CFI in the almost 
simultaneous ruling in Kühne348, which concerns the same subject matter but where 
the legal questions are asked through a preliminary reference procedure. This time the 
controversy refers to the validity of the designation 'Spreewälder Gurken', as stated in 
the annex regulation of designations of origin349. German authorities accepted the 
application made by the interested party, even if its gherkins were produced outside 
the strict area of Spreewald, and therefore the Commission proceeded with following 
phases of the administrative procedure, so the product was eventually accepted with 
that designation of origin.  
 
The Court of Justice acknowledged that there was a system of division of 
powers and the assessment of the initial application pertained to the national 
authorities only350. However, following its reasoning in Borelli it provided that it is 
for the national courts to rule on the lawfulness of an application for registration of a 
designation, but it goes further and determines that they must do so: 
 
“on the same terms as those by which they review any definitive measure 
adopted by the same national authority which is capable of adversely affecting 
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the rights of third parties under Community law, and, consequently, to regard an 
action brought for that purpose as admissible, even if the domestic rules of 
procedure do not provide for this in such a case”351 
 
The reasoning of the Court lies on the separation of powers of both 
administrative levels in the procedure and the determination that any controversy 
arising from a step incumbent upon the national level shall be addressed to the 
national jurisdiction, regardless of the national procedural laws, but it its reasoning 
there is a vacuum in the system of effective judicial protection352. 
 
In a new ruling concerning the denomination "foie gras du Sud-Ouest"353 the 
CFI had the opportunity to confirm the case law initiated by the 'Pays d'Auge' case. 
The applicant wanted to contest some of the requirements introduced by the French 
authorities, and it sent a statement of objections to French authorities, who decided 
not to forward it to the Commission354. The Commission published the designation355, 
and the applicant challenged it on the basis of the alleged unlawfulness of the decision 
of the French authorities not to forward the observations to the Commission. 
 
The CFI reiterates its lack of jurisdiction to assess the legality of a national 
measure. Since the Commission is bound by the national decision, it cannot see its 
decision invalidated by a hypothetically unlawful decision by the national 
authorities356. The order of inadmissibility of the CFI is confirmed on appeal by the 
Court of Justice357. It expressly rejects that the reasoning is contrary to the right of 
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judicial review, because it is to the national court to do such review, irrespective of 
whether or not national procedural law explicitly allows for it358. 
 
The GC confirmed these arguments in more recent cases359. More remarkably, 
this case-law has equally remained unchanged by the Court of Justice in more recent 
cases like Bavaria360, which concerned again the rights of opposing third parties in the 
stage of national application. In particular, this case concerns the validity of the 
indication “Bayerisches Bier”, which could apply to some companies producing beer 
outside the borders of the region of Bavaria and which the association Bayerischer 
Brauerbund contested on the ground that this indication did not comply with the 
requirement of being sufficiently specific to a geographic area361.   Even though these 
opposing interests refer to the decision of the German authorities forwarded to the 
Commission, the Court of Justice rejects its competence to adjudicate in this question, 
leaving it to the national judges like in the previous cases362.  
 
The solution of the Court consists on forcing, in the name of the right to 
judicial control, national courts to accept jurisdiction on certain acts that, according to 
national procedural laws, are not always reviewable. It is a strong position pro actione 
which, one could argue, the Court has refused to accept in regard of its on jurisdiction 
in other aspects when interpreting the procedural obstacles to the judicial review of 
certain acts, specifically, in the context of the action for annulment. 
 
In some cases, the position of the Court of Justice deferring jurisdiction to 
national courts is sufficient. An example is the recent case Liivimaa Lihaveis / Eesti-
Läti363, where jurisdiction over a decision of a monitoring committee set up by the 
national authorities of Estonia and Latvia to implement the Commission’s operational 
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programme Estonia-Latvia in the context of structural Funds was at stake364.  The 
decisions of such committee could not be subject to review by the EU courts, because 
it is not a body of the Union under Article 263 TFEU. Unlike the previous cases, there 
is no subsequent administrative decision by the EU authorities on award of the funds 
in question, so the Court of Justice is right in affirming that national courts are 
competent365. Since an important element of the controversy was also that the 
applicable (Estonian) national legislation did not foresee that an act of such committee 
was subject to review by the administrative courts366, the Court of Justice reproduces 
its statement in Borelli, citing this time Article 47 ChFR367, that "it is for the national 
courts to rule on the lawfulness of a disputed national measure and to regard an action 
brought for that purpose as admissible even if the domestic rules of procedure do not 
provide for this in such a case"368. In this case, as there is no EU administrative act 
involved the case-law of the Court of Justice does not raise any legal concerns, and 
the applicability of the fundamental right to judicial review in the context of 
implementation of EU law provides a satisfactory solution. 
 
Another field which gives rise to these concerns and from which some 
conclusions can be drawn is the field of competition law. Co-operation between 
European and national authorities in the investigations is frequent, so the possibility 
exists that lawfulness of certain measures carried out by the national authorities within 
a procedure pursued by the Commission is contested before the European courts. 
Composite procedures exist in several areas of competition law369, but the area of 
merger control, to which some of the controversies explained below belong.  In the 
area f merger control the Commission holds the monopoly on the authorisation of 
mergers falling under the scope of the EU law, there are sectors like media or 
prudential rules, where Member States can invoke legitimate public interests which 
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must be taken into consideration by the Commission370. In the field of antitrust law, 
the new rules also imply enhanced level of cooperation371 that can result in some 
cases in composite procedures372. 
  
The first case that can be cited as an example is Kesko373, in which a company 
challenged a Commission decision declaring a concentration incompatible with 
European competition rules. The essential facts were that the Finnish Office of Free 
Competition had forwarded to the Commission a request to examine an acquisition of 
a company by the plaintiff374. The applicant claimed that the request forwarded by the 
Finnish authorities was unlawful because the entity in question did not have legal 
competence to send such request375. The Court of Justice declined jurisdiction on the 
validity of a measure adopted by a national authority376, even though the national 
administrative courts had previously declined to adjudicate on the substance of the 
claim and dismissed the action as inadmissible377.  
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A similar reasoning is found in Dalmine378, this time in the context of antitrust 
law. In this case, the transmission of incriminatory information by the national 
authorities to the Commission was contested. According to the claimant, the evidence 
had been obtained in an investigation conducted for a purpose different that of the 
case in question, and such action could entail a violation of the rights of the 
investigated company in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice379. 
However, the CFI still declined jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness, as a matter of 
national law, of a measure adopted by a national authority in application of national 
criminal law380, even if that information was essential for determining the liability of 
the company. That reasoning was later confirmed by the Court of Justice on appeal381. 
 
From this case-law one can conclude that there is a remarkable asymmetry. 
While Competition Law procedures entail a very intense and loyal co-operation 
between European and national authorities, the European jurisdiction refuses any 
consideration on the assessment of measures adopted by national authorities, and 
simply redirect any controversy on those measures to the national courts, which not 
always is either admissible under internal procedural rules or pertinent to satisfy the 
claim of the parties. While in some cases the solution offered by the Court of Justice 
as a compromise between the right of judicial review and a strict stance on its own 
jurisdiction may be satisfactory, in other cases we have seen there is an evident lacuna 
in the protection of individual rights. This gap entails a real violation of rights of 
judicial access that would have to be addressed with a completely new approach. 
Specific provisions of EU law establishing a clear allocation of judicial competences 
for composite procedures appears necessary. Furthermore, the possibility of the EU 
courts to incorporate an assessment of the validity of acts and measures taken at the 
national level through a mechanism of judicial cooperation analogous to the 
preliminary ruling procedure should be considered. 
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Vertical downwards procedures. 
 
This second set of cases refers to the reviewability of the acts or decisions 
made by European authorities which contribute to the final decision taken at the 
national level. One could arguably state that a solution to these kind of situations is 
already foreseen by EU law, as national courts are enabled to raise a preliminary 
ruling procedure to determine the interpretation or the validity of EU rules. However, 
practice shows that some situations might lead, here too, to a lack of determination of 
a competent court.  
 
The paradigm of this situation and the first case to be analysed is van Parys382. 
According to the European rules in force at that time383, the import licences for certain 
agricultural products had to be issued by national authorities on the basis of the 
allocation of quantities done by the Commission. One of the companies was denied a 
licence in Belgium following the limitations introduced by the Commission, and it 
decided to bring an action for annulment before the CFI. Its main argument was that 
national authorities had confined themselves to dealing with applications of operators 
following the instructions of the Commission, which were binding upon then and 
were the essential reason for the denial of the licence384.  
 
The CFI took a formalistic approach to the admissibility of the action and 
found that the Commission’s measure was not a decision within the scope of 
reviewability of actions for annulment, because indeed it had not been addressed to 
the applicant. As a consequence, the decision of the Belgian authorities could not be 
subject to review by the European courts385 and the CFI dismissed the action as 
inadmissible. 
 
This case is especially illuminating because the action was also brought in the 
national jurisdiction, where the Belgian Council of State raised a reference for a 
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preliminary ruling386, which gave the opportunity to assess the interpretation of the 
Court of Justice, and of the national courts, on the issue. On the substance, the 
controversy relates to the direct effect of WTO rules in the EU legal order. The 
controversy reveals that the system of the two jurisdictions, national and European, 
could in this case effectively review a measure that affected the individual rights of a 
party, unlike the set of cases referred to in the previous section. Such effectiveness of 
the right of judicial review was possible because the preliminary reference is possible 
in this downwards procedures, though not vice versa.  
 
However, such satisfactory solution cannot always be reached in every 
downwards procedure. Tillack387 is the sample case of a situation where there was a 
breach in the right of judicial review as a result of the two courts denying jurisdiction. 
This case can be identified as the inverse sample-case to Borelli, as it leads to the 
same kind of judicial deadlock in which the right of an individual to have his case 
reviewed by a court is denied. For the analysis carried out here, there are some 
clarifications that must be pointed out. In Tillack not only an administrative procedure 
(that carried out by OLAF) is involved, but there are aspects of criminal procedures 
too that render the case more peculiar, with some aspects that are not directly 
applicable to composite procedures. 
 
The essential facts are the following. The Commission’s anti-fraud office 
(OLAF) claimed that an individual had committed a crime, so it informed the Belgian 
prosecutor of the accusations388. The Belgian authorities raided his domicile and 
seized his belongings. Mr Tillack brought an action for damages in the Belgian courts, 
but the action was rejected on the grounds that the national judge could not rule on the 
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validity of the information provided by the European authorities, which bound the 
Belgian authorities under the principle of loyal cooperation389. 
 
In parallel, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the request by 
OLAF for information from the Belgian authorities, as well as an action for damages 
before the CFI. The CFI argued that since the forwarding of information pursuant to 
OLAF was not a legally binding measure, and because of that it could not be regarded 
as a measure capable of changing the applicant’s legal position390, a consideration that 
was contrary to the Belgian judges'. As a result, the CFI dismissed the action brought 
by Mr. Tillack as inadmissible on the grounds that the measure of OLAF was not 
reviewable, and that national authorities remained free, in the context of their own 
powers, to assess the content and significance of that information forwarded and, thus, 
the action to be taken391. The ruling was appealed but the Court of Justice agreed with 
the findings of the CFI392, rejecting the appellant’s claim that his right of effective 
judicial protection had been breached. 
 
There was a different understanding by the European and national judges as 
for the 'binding' character of OLAF's decision, and the consequence of such 
divergence was that both national and European courts had therefore refused to hear 
his case. The applicant took the case further and challenged the ruling before the  
European Court of Human Rights393. The ECtHR examined the case in light, mainly, 
of the freedom of expression provided for in article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, but the aspects related to access to justice were also assessed394. Even 
though the judgement does not rule explicitly on the activities of the OLAF, the 
Commission or the judgement of the CFI, it does indirectly address the question395 by 
arguing that no judicial protection has been offered. It declares a violation of rights 
from Belgium, although this indeed results from the lack of jurisdiction of the EU 
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courts too. This case has certain peculiarities that are not common to the standard of 
composite procedures that is relevant for our purposes, notably, the fact that it 
involved criminal law, which means that the sensitivity for human rights is greater. 
However, the case is particularly eloquent for our purposes too because the lack of 
mechanisms of coordination between European and national judges resulted in both 
judicial systems rejecting jurisdiction to adjudicate on the case result on a breach of 
fundamental rights.  
 
In addition to these two sample cases, there is a number of cases where the 
inconsistency in the approach to judicial review in composite procedures generated 
gaps in access to justice in various areas. The proceedings that will be summarized in 
this section involve acts of transmission of information by the Commission to the 
national authorities that were not considered reviewable. This case-law is to a great 
extent linked with that on the concept of reviewable acts, which will be dealt with 
later on. However, it is worth noting that the interpretation of the European courts of 
those acts of transmission of information, not giving access to judicial review, entails 
a gap in judicial protection due to lack of a competent court.  
 
An area where this question has been problematic is customs rules. The first 
ruling of this case-law is Sucrimex396. The facts of this case relate to several export 
companies which had requested a refund. According to the applicable rules at the 
time397, the decision on the funds lies within the powers of the national authorities, but 
the Commission can issue an opinion. In the specific case at stake, the position taken 
by the Commission on the loss of some necessary certificates was essential in for the 
outcome reached by the national decision, even though in the word of the Court of 
Justice, it was not binding398. In spite of the circumstances, the Court of Justice stated 
that: 
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“export refunds is a matter for the national bodies appointed for this purpose 
and that the Commission has no power to take decisions on their interpretation 
but may only express its opinion which is not binding upon the national 
authorities.”399 
 
 The problem with this reasoning lies on the fact that a decision that the 
national jurisdictions might not be able to review the substance of the national 
decision, as it relied exclusively on the information provided by the Commission. 
 
Similar cases followed in the same area. In Emeralds Meats400, the non-
binding character of the communications between the Commission and the national 
authorities in the context of the import of meats401 led to the inadmissibility of the 
action402, even though it could be proved that the content of the communication 
determined the final decision reached. More recently, in Thomson Sales Europe403 the 
CFI reiterates that a communication of the Commission expressing an opinion in an 
area where it does not have the power to take the final decision cannot be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the EU courts404, even in case the national authority expressly 
accepts it405. Other cases in the area of customs confirm the case-law of the CFI and 
the Court of Justice406. 
 
The same reasoning has been applied by the EU courts in the area of structural 
funds. A remarkable case concerning agricultural funds is Oliefici Italiani407. The case 
concerns the payment of agricultural funds to some Italian olive oil companies. The 
composition of their products was disputed and the analysis concluded that the olive 
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oil for which they claimed the funds did not meet the requirements for the allocation 
of agricultural funds408. Following the monitoring activities, the Commission sent a 
letter to the Italian authorities proposing to block the payment of funds to the 
applicants, which the Italian authorities did409.  
 
Even if there was, given the circumstances, an obligation for the national 
authorities to block undue payments deriving directly from the applicable rules410, the 
CFI considered that the Member State was not bound by the letter, which did not in 
itself have a decisional nature411, even though it was proved that it was essential in 
practice for the outcome of the procedure. For this reason, the CFI dismisses the 
action. 
  
Other cases in the area of agricultural funds412 and, more generally, European 
funds413 confirm that the approach of the Court of Justice is to reject admissibility of 
actions against communications of the Commission that, not having legally binding 
character, are in the circumstances of the case an essential element for the decision 
taken at the national level.  
 
These arguments by the Court of Justice on the non-reviewability of the mere 
acts of transmission of information without binding effects are repeated in many other 
rulings in different types of procedures. Most clearly, the Court of Justice has 
consistently held within actions for annulment that a written expression of opinion 
cannot constitute a decision of such a nature as to form the basis of such action. Thus 
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has been ruled in cases of competition law414, and authorisation of certain products 
such as medicines415 and dangerous substances416.  
 
The same line of reasoning applies in the context of actions for damages. The 
EU courts have also dismissed numerous actions for damages on the ground that the 
acts of transmission of information by the European institutions were not binding. For 
instance, in the cited case Oleifici Italiani, in which the plaintiff applied both for 
annulment of an act of the Commission and for damages417, the CFI considered that 
since the Commission has no power to take decisions and may only express their 
opinion, which is not binding418, it concluded that there is no causal link between the 
conduct of the Commission and the alleged damage. Furthermore, even if the damage 
could be imputed to the national authorities, the European Court cannot award those 
damages419. The same reasoning applied in similar cases like Alessandrini and 
others420 or, more recently, Ilademporiki421 and Bowland Dairy Products422. If the act 
by the Commission is not binding, then the connection with the national decision 
cannot be such as to generate a right for compensation from the European 
Institutions423. 
 
Finally, in preliminary ruling procedures, the Court of Justice has been very 
cautious when assessing the Commission opinions to national authorities if they were 
not binding, even if its input was essential in the outcome of the national procedure. 
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An interesting case in this respect is Eurico424. In the context of a food-aid programme 
carried out in a third country, the applicant claimed damages resulting from the 
actions performed through cooperation of the Commission and a national agency.  
The Court of Justice stated that damages resulting for the implementation of food-aid 
operation, even when the communications of the Commission indicated the actions to 
follow and the Commission kept supervisory powers on the behaviour of the national 
agency425, the liability could not be attributed to the Commission because, in the view 
of the Court of Justice, "the expression of those opinions forms part of the internal 
cooperation between the commission and the national bodies responsible for applying 
community rules in that field and that cooperation cannot make the community liable 
to individuals"426. Similarly, in Ellinika Dimitriaka427, the Court of Justice ruled that 
the Greek authorities were ultimately responsible for setting the maximum levels of 
radioactivity of products to be exported, even if the Commission had given a precise 
interpretation of the rules to be applied in the case428. 
 
After looking at the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice, it can be 
concluded that in downwards composite procedures it is possible that access to justice 
will not be satisfactory. The plain rejection of jurisdiction over certain acts adopted by 
the European bodies, on the grounds that these acts are not final or that they are not 
binding, may in some cases entail a gap in the right to judicial review. Namely, 
considering that the measure by the European level of decision making cannot be 
challenged at the European Courts and that the final decision, taken at the national 
level of administration, was determined by that EU measure, there might be a gap in 
judicial protection, if the national courts cannot rule on the validity of such acts, i. e. 
the decisions adopted at the EU level. 
 
 The case-law of the Court of Justice based on the “binding effects” of the act 
or transmission of information has at times been too strict and insensitive of the 
factual realities where national authorities rely fully on the information provided by 
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the Commission. However, the risks for access to justice are relatively inferior to 
those in upwards procedures analysed before. The mechanism of judicial cooperation 
exists in this kind of procedures in the form of the preliminary ruling procedure, and 
the competence of the judges remains at the national level. However, in some of the 
cases examined, the right to judicial review cannot be exercised fully. 
 
The national courts are the natural courts for disputes arising within 
downwards composite procedures, but sometimes they are hand-tied to review the 
validity of the European acts that have in practice originated the final act. The judicial 
habit of focusing only on final formal administrative decisions might lead  to 
situations where the right to judicial review is not respected429.  
 
Horizontal procedures  
 
Following the classification which was laid down previously, horizontal 
procedures are those where co-operation takes place among national authorities of 
different Member States, eventually with the intervention of European bodies too. 
This type of composite procedures involves several national authorities, often in the 
context of a mutual recognition procedure but it does not remain at a purely interstate 
level, because the Commission might be called to intervene, particularly in case of 
disagreement. 
 
These procedures are increasingly common for the approval of certain 
products, following the logic of mutual recognition inaugurated by the Court of 
Justice as a way to complete the internal market. There are several examples of these 
procedures in the relatively new Regulations and Directives explained in the previous 
Chapter. The most important example of this type of procedure is the mutual 
recognition decentralised procedure for the authorization of medicines for human 
use430. National authorities receive, process and eventually approve the applications 
submitted by private parties, forwarding the information to all other national 
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authorities. The system is based on the principle of mutual recognition, but if any 
Member State considers that there is a risk it might ask for the suspension of the 
marketing of the drug, informing the European Agency for Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products. In case of disagreement the Commission shall intervene, making its decision 
through a comitology procedure. The sequence is similar to the procedures established 
for the approval of genetically modified organisms431, pesticides432 and biocides433. 
 
The case-law in this type of procedures is limited, at least for the purposes of 
our analysis. Neverthless, the Court of Justice has been confronted with the questions 
of what steps in this complex sequence can be reviewed. In the field of authorisation 
of GMOs, an area particularly prone to litigation, some cases reveal the approach of 
the EU courts to this type of procedures.  The case Greenpeace / Ministère de 
l’Agriculture434 shows the difficulty in determining what acts are binding on the 
subsequent steps and what jurisdiction is competent for each of them435.  
 
This case concerns the authorisation of genetically modified maize by certain 
companies. The Commission, following the procedure established in Directive 
90/220436 considered the application and, receiving no objections by Members States 
after forwarding the dossier to them, it authorised the release of the GMO437. 
However, according to the rules in force at the time, whether the authorisation has 
been granted by the Commission or by another Member State, the Member State 
where the GMO release is intended must give its written consent438. 
                                                 
431
 Section 4.4.3. 
432
 Section 4.4.2. 
433
 Section 4.4.5. 
434
 C-6/99, Greenpeace / Ministère de l’Agriculture, [2000] ECR I-1676, more details specifically on 
this case in Ludwig Kramer, Casebook on EU Environmental Law, Hart Publishing (Oxford, 2002), at 
233.  
435
 Andreas Glaser, Die Entwicklung des Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts aus der Perspektive der 
Handlungsformenlehre, Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen, 2013), at 585.  
436
 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms (OJ 1990 L 117, 15-27), the authorisation had taken place by 
Commission Decision 97/98/EC concerning the placing on the market of genetically modified maize 
(Zea mays L.). 
437
 C-6/99, Greenpeace..., at paragraphs s 6-11. 
438
 Article 11 of Directive 90/220, and similarly Articles 15 and 16 of the French law No 92-654 of 13 
July 1992 on the control of the use and release of genetically modified organisms. "The placing on the 
355 
 
The French authorities had given the written consent to the organism in 
question, but Greenpeace challenged such consent at the Conseil d'État. It found that 
there were serious doubts as to whether the release was lawful, both on substantial 
grounds, since the precautionary principle could have been breached, and procedural 
grounds, since one of the necessary dossier was incomplete439. The Conseil d'État 
raised the question to the Court of Justice whether or not this written consent of the 
French authorities to the authorisation by the Commission or by other Member States 
was indeed mandatory. The Court of Justice replied that if no objection was raised by 
the Member State at the appropriate time, then it must issue the 'consent in writing', 
allowing the product to be placed on the market. However, if in the meantime the 
Member State concerned has new information that the GMO may constitute a risk to 
human health and the environment, it will not be obliged to give its consent, provided 
that it immediately informs the Commission and the other Member States and seeks a 
reconsideration of the authorisation granted440. 
 
The ruling of the Court of Justice is aligned with the previous Opinion of 
Advocate General Mischo. He eloquently explained that this interpretation, perhaps 
twisting the meaning of the word 'consent' which presupposes a willingness to give it 
or at least a margin of discretion to deny it, is based on the broad perspective of good 
faith and loyal cooperation, as  
 
"It would, moreover, be incompatible with the duty to act in good faith 
which should govern the relations between the Member States and the 
Community and the Member States' relations with one another. 
 
A Member State which has given a favourable opinion on a notification 
must be supposed to have decided to give its consent unless the joint 
examination of the dossier by all the Member States, which also have the 
benefit of information supplied by the Commission, produces justifiable 
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reasons for refusing it. The other Member States are not going to marshal the 
substantial resources required to examine a dossier on placing a GMO on the 
market merely in order to produce an opinion for a Member State to treat as it 
thinks fit."441 
 
It results from cases like this one, that the procedures in question have a 
peculiar legal nature which the Court of Justice does not find itself at ease assessing. 
Although the solution of the Court in this case is reasonable and does not create a gap 
in legal protection, the difficulty in allocating responsibilities for the decisions which 
are legally binding could be problematic in other cases.   
 
The subsequent case law in the area of GMOs provides evidence that the 
allocation of responsibilities is far from clear. In the case Monsanto / Presidenza dei 
Consiglio dei Ministri442the questions were raised on what was the correct appropriate 
procedure for the release of certain substances, which determined, according to 
Regulation 258/1997 to what extent Member States authorities had the competence to 
refuse the release of a GMO already authorised in a different Member State443. Doubts 
on the responsibilities of the national authorities persisted in this area444, which results 
in contradictory national legislations445 and the uncertainty of the competent 
jurisdiction.  
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In the area of pesticides, the Court of Justice was confronted with a similar 
controversy in the Bonnarel446 case. Two wine growers had been prosecuted in France 
for using pesticides bought in Spain, where they had a marketing authorisation447. 
According to the relevant provisions of French law, that implemented the directive in 
force at the time448, pesticides authorised in another Member State could not be 
marketed in France without a prior authorisation. However, it was not clear, according 
to the French courts that raised the preliminary ruling procedure, whether or not this 
authorisation was indeed necessary for the personal or limited use of pesticides 
already authorised in another Member State449. The Court of Justice replied that 
national authorities did not have the obligation to recognise an authorisation for a 
pesticide granted in another Member State, but the Member State was under the 
obligation to apply a special simplified procedure for it450. The authorisation given by 
one Member State has therefore certain binding effects on other Member States, 
which can lead to dysfunctionalities in access to justice if the validity of the first 
authorisation is at stake in the jurisdiction of the other. This case illustrates that in 
some cases the decisions taken by a national authority can, by effect of EU law, have 
a certain binding character on another Member State, which calls for at least some 
mechanism of cooperation among courts.  
 
Lastly, in the area of pharmaceuticals for human use, some other cases can be 
identified where the binding force of an authorisation given in a Member State in 
another Member State was put into question. An interesting case in this respect is 
Synthon451, where a company pursued an authorisation in the United Kingdom for a 
product approved by the Danish authorities452. The authorisation was rejected by the 
British authorities on the ground that the requirement of 'essential similarity' had not 
been met. The Court of Justice argued that the procedure of mutual recognition did 
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not allow for a second assessment on the substantial elements of the product, unless 
the specific conditions for non-recogniton -such as risk to public health - were 
present453. Furthermore, the lack of recognition was, according to the Court of Justice, 
capable of rendering that Member State liable in damages454, but the determination of 
this liability corresponded to the national courts455. This case, as some commentators 
pointed out, revealed the complexities of allocating public liability for damages456. 
 
More recently, in the case  Lyocentre / Lääkealan turvallisuus457, the Court of 
Justice was asked whether or not the classification of a product in one Member State 
as a medical device precluded the competent authorities of another Member State 
from classifying the same product as a medicinal product. The Court of Justice 
concluded that the second Member State can approve the product as a medicinal 
product458, but the previous classification as a medical device does have an impact on 
the procedural arrangements that must be followed459. 
 
Although in this horizontal schemes the shortcomings regarding access to 
justice for the individual are more difficult to see, it is certainly worth noting that, 
under EU law, an administrative decision by one national authority can potentially 
have effects on and administrative procedure operating in another Member State. The 
Court of Justice establishes in its rulings a clear distinction of powers between the 
national and European levels of decision-making. In horizontal procedures, the Court 
has often be called to rule on the binding character of the acts issued by national 
authorities in other procedures taken place at another Member State. Although the 
national courts are the jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness on such measures, the 
Court of Justice must interpret the applicable EU laws to determine to what extent 
responsibility corresponds to one or another Member State. In cases such as the ones 
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referred, if the validity of an approval issued in a country was put to question in 
another country to which the first was obligatory -in accordance with the case law of 
the Court of Justice - , a gap in access to justice would again appear. Additional 
mechanisms of cooperation between Courts would be necessary in these cases. 
 
(B) Second gap: what acts can be reviewed? 
 
The very essence of composite procedures lies on the contributions made by 
different parties and so the legal concern arises not only relating to the determination 
of the competent court, but also on whether or not this input constitute measures of 
such nature that they can be actionable.  
 
The subject matter of reviewable acts is very complex. Part of the complexity 
is explained by the fact that the relevant analysis lies not only on the position taken by 
the European courts, but also from structure the national systems of judicial review of 
administrative acts and how broadly they envisage the right of individuals to 
challenge administrative acts460. In the absence of a normative framework equivalent 
to the national administrative procedural act, the Court of Justice was forced to have a 
certain understanding of the basic concepts of administrative law, such as the 
‘administrative decision’ or ‘administrative act’, and then lay down the conditions for 
its reviewability in accordance with the Treaties461. There was a concept of 'decision' 
in primary law since the very beginning (Article 14 of the repealed TECSC), that 
through several modifications is still laid down in Article 288 TFEU462. This concept 
does not coincide with the notion of reviewable act463. This is so because the relevant 
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factor for qualifying a measure as a decision subject to judicial review is its substance, 
not its form, as it has long been argued by the Court of Justice464. 
 
The basic idea that found in the early case-law of the Court of Justice in 
interpretation of the provisions of the action for annulment is that the acts in question 
“whatever their nature of form, [shall] be intended to have legal effects” 465. The first 
case with such reasoning was ERTA466. The existence of these 'legal effects' can be 
translated into the 'binding character' of the measure in question467. This is why the 
Court of Justice rejected from its earliest cases the possibility to review opinions and 
recommendations468, among other measures469. 
 
As previously argued, the gist of the rule of law is that acts can be subject to 
review by an impartial court. However, there are two basic conceptions of 
administrative justice among the national systems in the EU. Under the subjective 
conception, the scope of judicial control should be as wide as to permit the 
reviewability of all acts, whether or not they are final, provide they affect individual 
rights. Since the ruling in ERTA, the case-law of the Court of Justice has focused on 
the substance of the act rather than its form, consequently, the scope of reviewable 
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acts is broader than laid down in the Treaties470. Like in the previous section, one can 
perceive how the lack of a general understanding of composite procedures and, more 
generally, the lack of consideration for the procedural context of each decision subject 
to review, is severely detrimental to the individual right of access to justice.  
 
These initial considerations are particularly relevant in the context of 
composite procedures. The Court of Justice only considers reviewable final decisions 
in the sense that they are apt for bringing about a distinct change to the legal position 
of the party471. There can be binding decisions along the administrative procedure, but 
if they lead to a subsequent phase where another authority is called to take a decision, 
the interim measure will generally not be subject to review472. Thus, as regards 
composite procedures in particular, the categories of acts which have raised doubts as 
to whether they could be challenged are the following: 
 
Preparatory acts 
 
Preparatory acts are those intermediate decisions or interlocutory measures 
taken throughout the administrative procedure, which contribute to the development 
of the decision-making, paving the way to, but not constituting, the final decision. Its 
main characteristic is that they do not have external legal effects, thus they do not by 
itself touch upon the legal position of the concerned party, and they are thus not 
reviewable473. This lack of legal effects does not mean that the preparatory act is 
deprived of a binding character, but the obligation that they entail, if any, remains at a 
purely internal level. 
 
Preparatory acts are particularly relevant in composite procedures because they 
involve a sequence of steps by different administrations, so each step is in itself a  
preparatory act. In the context of composite procedures, preparatory acts can appear at 
                                                 
470
 Hofmann, Administrative Law and Policy…, at 802. 
471
 Hoffman, Rowe, and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy..., at 626 
472
 Ibid. 
473
 Emilie Chevalier, "Le mécanismes de la procédure administrative non contentieuse de l'Union", in 
Jean-Bernard Auby,Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, Traité de droit administratif européen, Bruylant 
(Brussels, 2014), 201-13, at 204; Lenaerts, Maselis, and Gutman, EU Procedural Law..., at 279; and 
Scharze, "Judicial Review of European...", at 89. 
362 
an administrative level different from that at which the administrative decision is 
taken, and they sometimes bind a different administrative authority. Following the 
line of reasoning held in the previous sections, in order to provide sufficient access to 
justice at least some of these acts have to be susceptible of judicial review per se. In 
other cases however, they shall be reviewed as part of the final decision, in which they 
can be subsumed. Again, this issue is particularly delicate in composite procedures as 
the preliminary steps may be originated at an administrative level different from that 
the issues the final decision, which eventually may determine the competent 
jurisdiction too. 
 
However, it appears from the academic literature in the context of 'preparatory 
acts' in EU law that the non-reviewability by courts is an essential feature thereof474. 
That is also the view of the Court of Justice, as it systematically calls preparatory acts 
those over which it accepts no jurisdiction on the assumption that an "act is open to 
review only if it is a measure definitively laying down the position of the Commission 
at the conclusion of that procedure"475. 
 
There are alternative stances on the possibility to challenge preparatory acts, 
even if outside the context of composite procedures. For example, according to 
professor Hartley476, the exact requirements of the law for such preparatory acts is key 
for determining whether or not they can be reviewed or not. If the preparatory act is 
binding and may, in one way or another, determine the outcome of the procedure, so 
the final decision cannot be made regardless of the previous act, then it shall be 
possible to challenge it. If, on the other hand, the preliminary act has to be taken into 
account but only that, it does not affect anyone’s legal position and it is not a 
reviewable act.  
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By contrast, the Court of Justice has taken a much narrower view. The starting 
case of the judicial concept of preliminary acts is Huber / Commission477. This civil 
service case concerns the reviewability of a report by a consultative body. If this 
report was unfavourable, as was the case, the decision-making authority could not 
take the final decision to establish an official. The Court of Justice held in that case 
that:  
 
“Although … the opinion of the Establishment Board constitutes an essential 
factor in the decision if it is unfavourable to the integration of the servant, it is 
not, however, for the purposes of an appeal …, a measure separable from the 
decision of that authority. It therefore cannot be considered as having a direct 
adverse effect upon the applicant.”478 
 
It is significant that in this case Advocate-General Roemer considered that the 
report was reviewable, as the final decision was bound by this unfavourable report479. 
The reasoning of the Court of Justice leads to a legal dead end; the preliminary act is 
not reviewable as it is not separable from the final decision, but the final decision 
takes for granted the considerations of the preliminary act, so the judicial review on 
those grounds is not always complete. This latter consideration is all the more true in 
composite procedures, where one court will plainly reject jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of what other administration has decided. The initial ruling in Huber was 
reiterated by the Court of Justice in other civil service cases before the Court of 
Justice480, then the CFI481 and finally the Civil Service Tribunal482. 
 
This narrow interpretation of the reviewability of preparatory acts appears in 
other areas too. Competition law, where procedures are at times long sequences of 
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acts each entailing possible violations of individual rights, is one of the areas where 
this issue was more contested and where we can find more details on the position of 
the Court of Justice was more detailed. 
 
The sample case is IBM483. The Commission had been investigating IBM on 
the possible abuse of its dominant position. Thorought the long procedure, the 
Commission sent a letter with the statement of objections saying that it intended to 
make a decision regarding several infringements. IBM considered that administrative 
procedure was defective in a number of respects and it challenged the letter. The 
Court of Justice makes important considerations and argues that: 
 
“In the case of acts or decisions adopted by a procedure involving several 
stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, it is 
clear from the case-law that in principle an act is open to review only if it is a 
measure definitively laying down the position of the Commission or the Council 
on the conclusion of that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to 
pave the way for the final decision. 
 
It would be otherwise only if acts or decisions adopted in the course of the 
preparatory proceedings not only bore all the legal characteristics referred to 
above but in addition were themselves the culmination of a special procedure 
distinct from that intended to permit the Commission or the Council to take a 
decision on the substance of the case.  
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that whilst measures of a purely preparatory 
character may not themselves be the subject of an application for a declaration 
that they are void, any legal defects therein may be relied upon in an action 
directed against the definitive act for which they represent a preparatory step.”484 
 
                                                 
483
 Case 60/81, IBM / Commission, [1981] ECR 2640. 
484
 Ibid., at paragraphs 10-12. 
365 
Several elements are relevant within this ruling485. The Court of Justice takes 
the viewpoint that, as a general rule, only final decisions can be challenged. There are 
exceptions to this rule, but only if this preparatory act is a culmination of a special 
procedure. Furthermore, this line of reasoning does not imply that preparatory acts 
cannot be reviewed. They can be reviewed as part of the whole procedure when the 
final act is challenged486. However, this latter assumption does not necessarily apply 
to composite procedures as there are several intervening administrative authorities. 
Despite that element, the EU courts would not change the original stance of IBM. 
Moreover, the Court of Justice had consistently held, that it was not the announcement 
of the intention to adopt a decision but the actual adoption of the decision which was 
capable of having legal effects487. 
 
The strict stance of the Court of Justice on the reviewability of preparatory act 
was confirmed by an extensive case law in the same field of competition law. Thus, 
not only the statement of objections488 was deemed an unreviewable preparatory act 
but also a letter with preliminary observations to withdraw the benefit of the block 
exemption489; a decision finding that a joint venture forms part of wider 
cooperation490; a preliminary letter assessing an operation between undertakings491; a 
decision rejecting the applicant's request not to communicate to third parties certain 
information492; a decision not to pursue the procedure relating to the complaint of 
price-fixing493; a decision to bring procedures before a national court494; the initiation 
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of a proposed undertaking in an antidumping proceeding495; or the rejection thereof496, 
among many others.  
 
In the field of state aid, where procedures bring about multiple exchange of 
information, the approach of the EU courts has been similar497. Given the 
complexities of State aid procedures, the Court of Justice has taken a somewhat more 
liberal approach, giving access to justice in the context of the challenging to certain 
acts which it refuses to call preparatory498. For example, the opening of a certain 
procedure can be challenged inasmuch as it has the binding effect of blocking further 
grating of aid499. More interestingly, in Athinaïki Techniki500the Court of Justice 
quashed the previous ruling of the CFI. The approach of the Court of Justice, contrary 
to what had been decided by the CFI, is that the preliminary decision of the 
Commission, which prevented the interested party of submitting any further 
observations, was a reviewable act. The contested act cannot be classified as 
preparatory since it cannot be followed, in the context of the administrative procedure 
which has been initiated, by any other decision amenable to annulment 
proceedings501. The key element for the Court of Justice is thus whether or not the 
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preparatory act can be challenged indirectly, together with the final decision of the 
administrative procedure in question. If it is not the case, then there is no way to 
respect the right of judicial review other than to grant access to such review even if 
the measure is not final, considering the procedural rules applicable to it. 
 
This reasoning is essential in the solutions that we are advocating for in this 
work. As a commentator argued citing this ruling, "the demands arising from the EU's 
rule of law principle, including the requirement of effective judicial protection, can be 
honoured by the system supplying the shortcomings of individual avenues of redress 
offering access to others"502. In other words, the Court of Justice is obliged to go 
beyond the procedural conditions that might be laid down in the law in a particular 
case in order not to incur in a breach of the right of judicial review. 
 
Another interesting example in the field of competition law of a case where the 
preparatory decision was deemed challengeable by the Court of Justice is AZKO503. In 
this case, the Commission started an investigation procedure due to a complaint by a 
competitor of AZKO. The Commission took the decision to show some documents 
belonging to AZKO to the complainant504. Even though the final decision only was 
open to judicial review, according to the rules at the time, the Court of Justice 
understood that such review would be unable to undo the damage done to AZKO505, 
and therefore proceeded to review the substance of the preparatory decision. In this 
case, the key element that explains the admissibility of the action is that the measure, 
even if not final, had independent legal effects that affected the applicant irrespective 
of the legality of the final decision506. 
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There are some other examples along the same lines. In Cenemesa507,   the 
Commission's decision to initiate a investigative phase of the procedure for examining 
the legality of a State aid with the common market was challenged. Since such 
decision entails the automatic obligation to suspend payment of the aid, it is not 
simply a preparatory step, and has irreversible consequences regardless of the final 
decision508. Hence, the Court of Justice considered it an actionable decision509. Thus, 
the position of the Court of Justice is that a preparatory act in appeareace, can be 
deemed reviewable, thus not preparatory strictly speaking, as long as it has 
independent legal effects and such effects cannot be reviewed when challenging the 
final decision. 
 
An illuminating case for the distinction of the different categories of 
preparatory acts is UK / Commission510. The case concerned structural funds (ERDF 
and ESF) awarded to an operation programme related to three British cities. 
According to the Commission, the UK authorities had failed to meet a formality (the 
communication of the final certificate of expenditure) and sent a letter by which it 
communicated that it intended to decommit a large part of the funds511. Advocate 
General Stix-Hackl distinguished in her opinion between the internal and external 
legal effects of each step of the sequence512. Since the Commission had argued that 
decommitment itself is an internal process and, as such, not actionable, the AG, and 
subsequently the Court of Justice, reasoned in detail that the decision had autonomous 
external legal effects because it was binding and implied by itself that a certain 
amount that had been committed would not be paid513. 
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In the case of comitology, the proposal forwarded by the Commission to the 
comitology committees has consistently been considered a non-reviewable act514. 
More important would be the possibility to challenge the opinion issued by 
comitology committees, as they entail the contribution at least in some form of the 
national level to the final decision to be made at the European level.  
 
In the case of procedures involving different bodies and committees in 
agencies, the position of the CFI has been similar. The sample case is Olivieri515. The 
case concerns the application for authorisation of a new medicinal product with the 
substance deferiprone to counter iron overload caused by the treatment of Cooley's 
syndrome516. The medicine had been first researched by Dr Olivieri in the United 
States, where the clinical trials showed limited efficacy and serious side effects. 
Apotex, a Canadian company financing the trials terminated Dr Olivieri's 
involvement517, and its subsidiary in Europe submitted an application to the EMA for 
the granting of a marketing authorisation subject of the centralised authorisation 
procedure provided for in Regulation No 2309/93. The Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products delivered an opinion in favour of granting marketing authorisation 
for the medicinal product, which was transmitted by the EMA to the Commission. 
The Commission proceeded to issue a favourable draft decision which was endorsed 
by the Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use518. 
 
When Dr. Olivieri became aware of the fact that the CPMP had issued a 
favourable opinion, she sent a number of letters to the EMA and to the members of 
the CPMP giving them her observations and evidence on the low efficacy and risks 
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linked with that product519. The Commission informed the CPMP that the marketing 
authorisation procedure had been suspended pending additional scientific clarification 
of the information, and convened an ad-hoc expert working group520. In view of the 
recommendations of the Expert Group, the CPMP decided to retain the initial opinion 
in favour of granting marketing authorisation but it recommended a revision of the 
package leaflet in order to extend the information. The CPMP consequently adopted a 
revised opinion which was incorporated by the Commission into a new draft decision. 
After the favourable opinion of the Standing Committee, the Commission adopted the 
decision granting marketing authorisation521. Dr Olivieri challenged the revised 
opinion of the CPMP on several grounds. Although it resulted from the circumstances 
of the case that such revised opinion, based on the conclusion of the expert group, had 
been essential in determining the outcome of the procedure, the CFI dismissed the 
action as inadmissible. In so doing, the CFI stated that: 
 
“The revised opinion [of the committee] is therefore an intermediate measure 
whose purpose is to prepare for the marketing authorisation decision. It is a 
preparatory measure which does not definitively lay down the Commission's 
position and is therefore not a challengeable act ...”522 
 
The same position was adopted in other cases relating to the procedures for 
authorisation of pharmaceuticals. For example, in Pfizer523, the Court of Justice 
rejected that the referral made by the Commission to the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products could be challenged524. The referral did not have, in 
the view of the Court of Justice, independent legal effects. 
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Another interesting case in the field of authorisation of pharmaceuticals is 
Sepracor525. A pharmaceutical company filed an application with the EMA for the 
approval of a medicinal product used in the treatment of insomnia. Although the 
committee within the EMA recommended giving marketing authorisation to the 
product, it considered that the active substance that it contained was not new, an 
aspect that precluded that company from benefiting from a period of market 
exclusivity. Since the Commission informally indicated that it would follow the 
recommendation of the EMA, the applicant decided to withdraw its application and 
challenge the letter of the Commission with its intentions526. In particular, the 
applicant claimed that if it had waited until the final position of the Commission was 
formally adopted, it would be at risk of losing much of its competititve position vis-à-
vis its competitors527. The General Court argued that the letter did not alter the 
applicant's legal position528 and dismissed the action as inadmissible. The Court of 
Justice dimissed the appeal529, by arguing that: 
 
"the case-law shows that an intermediate measure is not capable of 
forming the subject-matter of an action if it is established that the illegality 
attaching to that measure can be relied on in support of an action against the 
final decision for which it represents a preparatory step. In such circumstances, 
the action brought against the decision terminating the procedure will provide 
sufficient judicial protection."530 
 
Coming back to the logic of composite procedures, the essential element to 
determine the reviewability of the act, even as a step of a national administrative 
sequence, is thus if it produces binding effects. The second condition, i.e. that these 
legal effects cannot be subject to review in an eventual action against the final 
decision, appear automatically in composite procedures as the EU judges will not 
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have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the measure adopted by the national 
authorities. 
 
The situation concerning the specific problem of composite procedures is not 
satisfactory. Although the case-law is still limited, the problem of considering that a 
preparatory act is not reviewable is that, coming from a different level of decision-
making, the competent court for the final act will not be able to properly assess the 
validity of the previous act. In such cases the national jurisdiction would be the 
natural forum for the reviewability of the preparatory acts, but there is no mechanism 
to ensure any coordination. 
 
As a result, unless one court has procedural means to ask the other for the 
validity of the contributions, there can be a vacuum in judicial protection of 
individuals. Furthermore, the strict stance on the possibility of challenging 
preparatory acts is not entirely consistent with some of the considerations made in the 
Borelli case-law, as it puts national courts in charge of ruling on acts that could be 
unreviewable preparatory acts according to the Court of Justice’s own interpretation. 
 
Confirmatory acts 
 
Confirmatory acts can be defined as those that merely reproduce a previous 
decision, without adding any new element or additional legal effect. The 
administrative decision which they confirm is in itself the actionable decision. Since 
an early time, the Court of Justice always declared confirmatory acts as 
inadmissible531. In many cases, the EU courts have underlined that the admissibility of 
actions against confirmatory acts would make possible to circumvent the deadline for 
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bringing an actions against the original act532, though in some cases the EU Courts 
have nuanced their position533. 
 
More interestingly for the purposes of composite procedures, a situation where 
an authority in the EU merely takes notice of a decision taken at the national level but 
which produces effects at the level of the Union is also confirmatory and therefore not 
actionable534. For instance in Le Pen / Parliament535, the European Parliament's 
acknowledgement of the French government's declaration that one of the Members 
was barred from holding office as MEP was considered not actionable536. Even 
though this case did not concern a composite administrative procedure, an analogous 
reasoning in the context of one537 would raise similar concerns as in the previous 
sections, that is, the EU courts would not have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of 
the original act, but would not be able to review the substance of the case, as the 
confirmatory act would not be actionable. One could argue that the means of redress 
would have to be expected at a national jurisdiction, but since the confirmation would 
imply legal effects at the level of the Union, it is possible that the review at the 
national level was not complete. 
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In both confirmatory and preparatory acts the assumption of the EU courts is 
that they are not reviewable because judicial review is pertinent only on the final 
decision (or the prior decision that is subsequently confirmed). That assumption might 
work if there is a common understanding of what is a preparatory act and a 
confirmatory act and in what cases they can be brought to the courts for judicial 
review. In composite procedures, the assumption is necessarily wrong when the 
preparatory, or confirmatory, act and the main, actionable act stem from different 
administrative authorities. There is no system of coordination, and a lack of common 
understanding of the reviwability of administrative acts in the different European 
administrative jurisdictions. 
 
Transfer of information 
 
Composite procedures often entail a diverse exchange of information. Such 
exchange of information faces even greater shortcoming in view of its reviewability 
than preparatory acts, because it tends to be more informal and the act to be 
challenged is often more difficult to identify.  
 
Additionally, the distinction between a preparatory act and a transfer of 
information is not clear when examining the case-law of the Court of Justice. In 
general, transfer of information can be understood as a remittance of data implying no 
decision by the sending authority. At times, however, this dispatch of information 
goes together with a certain opinion, binding or not, on the legal assessment of that 
information, which complicates the legal assessment of the operation538. 
 
The point of depart when looking at the case-law dealing with exchange of 
information is that the mere provision of information is not reviewable as it does not 
produce legal effects539. The main argument of the EU courts in this respect, similarly 
to the consideration of the preparatory acts, is that a mere transfer of information lacks 
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binding legal effects540. In some particular occasions, however, the Court of Justice 
found that a request for transfer of information could be actionable. Thus, in Deutsche 
Post541 an action for annulment was directed against the Commission's requests for 
information from the German authorities on the revenues and costs of Deutsche Post. 
Since it was considered that such request had autonomous legal effects542 and the 
presumed illegality attaching to that measure could not be relied on in support of an 
action against the final decision, the action was declared admissible543. 
 
However, the general rule is that exchange of information does not bind the 
decision-making authorities and is hence not subject to judicial review. That is not to 
say that there are no rules and principles regarding this exchange of information544. 
Besides some rules in specific areas, the duty of care and duty of diligent and 
impartial examination are considered general principles by the case-law545, besides the 
principle of good administration of Article 41(1) EChFR. However, all of these 
considerations apply when reviewing the final decision in a case in which the 
assessment of the information considered by the decision-making authority might be 
pertinent.  
 
 The application of this line of reasoning to composite procedures may result 
in obstacles for the full judicial review of the information that has been forwarded by 
a different level of administration from that that issued the final act. An enlightening 
case in this regard is Sucrimex546 and some other cases related to refund of export 
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tariffs547, examined before548. Companies could request a refund of the duties to their 
respective national customs authorities. The information regarding the conditions of 
the refund lies within the Commission, so it is transferred to the competent national 
body together with a non-binding opinion. Such transfer is not reviewable, because it 
is not binding549.  Nevertheless, it is essential for the decision of the national 
authority, and the national courts may be barred from reviewing the substance of a 
case, as it pertains to the EU level of administration.  
 
The same pattern takes place in some procedures for the award of structural 
funds. The national authorities have the competence to decide on the allocation of 
some payments, but for this they rely on the information that the Commission 
submits, or even its suggestions of specific courses of action. Like in the previous 
cases, the Court of Justice has consistently rejected its competence to rule on the 
conduct of the Commission550.  
 
The position of weakness of the individual in such cases is particularly visible 
in the context of an action for damages because the Commission cannot be held liable 
as the EU courts decline jurisdiction on the review of the transfer of information551 
and, at the national level, the competent body could also be exempted from 
responsibility if it had to rely exclusively on the information provided by the 
Commission. 
 
As a result, the information transferred is not, with few limited exceptions, 
subject to the review of the Court of Justice. However, inasmuch as this information is 
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deemed true and accurate by the decision-making authority it might lead to a wrong or 
unlawful final decision. When reviewing the final decision, the fact that the 
information came from a different administration might prevent not only the decision-
making authority, but also the competent court, to assess the validity of that 
information. 
 
 
At times, composite procedures have such a nature that even if the information 
of opinions exchanged do not have a binding character, they constitute the most 
essential element in the decision-making process and, consequently, the right of 
judicial review is not complete if those substantial elements cannot be covered by it. 
An example, in the inverse sense of the cases described just above, would be the 
procedure for the authorisation of chemicals analysed in the previous Chapter552. 
Under such procedure, the technical data and reports drafted by the national technical 
bodies do not bind the decision-making authority in the EU, but in practice it is 
inconceivable that the final decision departed from the conclusions following the 
technical assessment. In those circumstances, a case-law that only observes the 
binding character and the autonomous legal effects of an act of transmission of 
information fails to ensure the right of judicial review regarding composite 
procedures. 
 
(C) Third gap: standing to sue 
 
Even when an act is regarded as actionable, private parties still need to fulfil 
the requirements for access to the EU courts. As examined in a previous section553, 
the question of legal standing before the European Courts has a principal position in 
the academic reflections on the judicial architecture of the European Union554. The 
critical approach that many commentators express on the subject is equally applicable 
to composite procedures. The peculiarity of legal standing regarding composite 
procedure is twofold. Firstly, the fact that the allocation of different jurisdictions for 
the different acts throughout the administrative may result in a different legal 
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standing, perhaps even a different procedural status, of private parties when trying to 
annul or claiming for damages in respect to an act resulting from a composite 
procedure; and secondly, the requirement of direct concern presents particular 
elements that render access to justice more complex in the context of composite 
procedures. 
 
Those two elements are interlinked. As a general rule, an applicant has locus 
standi if the act is of direct and individual concern to him or her. As we analysed 
before, when it comes to the requirement of individual concern the strict Plaumann 
test is still applied in cases where the act in not addressed to the applicant, 
notwithstanding some novelties that the Treaty of Lisbon has brought about. In view 
of the restrictive conditions of legal standing, it appears as a logic option to applicants 
to seek for a judicial remedy at the national jurisdictions. As professor Türk argued "a 
more liberal interpretation of individual concern would have improved direct access to 
the Court and in many cases would have obviated the need to contest the validity of 
Community acts in the national courts."555. At the national level, the conditions for 
access to justice can be very different but, in any case, the problems encountered are 
analogous to those in the EU courts, namely, in upwards procedures the contribution 
by the national authorities can be a mere preparatory act and, thus non actionable, and 
in downwards procedures the national courts lack competence to rule on the EU input 
to the final decision subject to review.  
 
Different conditions of access to justice at the national and Union level 
 
The competent jurisdiction determines the conditions of access to justice. It 
goes without saying that the codes of administrative justice provide different rules of 
standing among Member States, but the question arises in the context of composite 
procedures with particular intensity. That is so because the intertwined co-operation 
which takes places between the different authorities imply that the choice of 
jurisdiction, which is largely uncertain and could be arbitrary, not only determines 
what judge will rule on the issue, but also whether or not the action is admissible at 
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all. In a previous section556 we analysed to what extent national rules on access to 
administrative justice differ and rely on different assumptions. It can be argued that in 
general terms that the strict requirements of legal standing for individuals in the 
context of EU law do not exist under such a rigorous conception in national 
jurisdictions.  
 
Firstly, access to justice in administrative law is laxer in the case of countries 
that follow the French system. The basic idea is that a decision can be challenged not 
only by those individuals to whom the acts is addressed, but also by those whose 
rights are affected. Even individuals whose material or moral interest can be 
aggrieved have locus standi too557. In eclectic systems, like the Spanish law on the 
Administrative Justice procedure, all those having subjective rights and legitimate 
interests in the administrative act can challenge it, even if it has a general nature558. In 
the German system, actions can be brought in protection of subjective rights559 just 
like in civil procedures560. Finally, in the British system, claims for judicial review 
can be brought by individuals according to the rules of civil procedures decisions, 
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actions or failures to act in relation to the exercise of a public function561. They are 
therefore put at the same level and with the same conditions as civil actions562. 
 
In sum, all the major European systems of administrative justice provide for 
more liberal rules on access to justice than those of the European courts. Perhaps 
paradoxically or this reason, some Directives require an even wider legal standing 
before national jurisdictions, in particular in the area of environmental protection563. 
The discrepancy between the national and EU rules on the conditions for legal 
standing could also relate to the concepts discussed in the previous section, that is, the 
definition of reviewable acts. Although it is difficult to say that this inconsistency is 
per se a violation of the right of judicial access at the moment, this further adds 
complexity to the conditions for the exercise of the right of judicial review in the 
context of composite procedures. In a situation where the determination of the 
competent court to adjudicate on one's claim remains unclear, the existence of very 
different standards to gain access to the courts constitutes an additional reason to urge 
for comprehensive mechanisms for a fair and consistent access to justice.  
 
Uncertain definition of direct concern in the context of composite procedures 
 
An additional aspect that must be underlined stems from the lack of consistent 
determination of one of the main conditions for legal standing before the EU courts, 
namely direct concern. Besides the lack of coordination between the national and 
European courts and the lack of equal access to administrative justice among the 
Member States, there are particular aspects with regard to EU law concerning 
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composite procedures specifically. The requirement of direct concern, usually less 
controversial than individual concern, does raise specific questions in the framework 
of composite procedures. The Court of Justice has consistently argued that direct 
concern implies that the act “must directly affect the legal situation of the individual 
and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the 
task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting 
from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules.”564 
 
This statement can be problematic in case of a European act to be implemented 
by national authorities or in co-operation between them and EU authorities, or where 
a EU acts authorises or empowers national authorities to take a particular course of 
action, or, finally, where the Union grants funds to individuals with the intervention of 
national authorities565. The standard of whether or not an act can be challenged as it is 
of direct concern to the applicant cannot be determined on formalistic grounds only. 
There is a consistent case-law of the Court of Justice underlining that the emphasis 
must be placed on the substance of the measure, not on its form or nomen iuris566. 
With regard to composite procedures, the core of the problem lies in determining 
whether an EU act does indeed affect the legal situation of the plaintiff or it is the 
national or joint implementing act which does. Two different situations can be told 
apart when analysing the case-law of the Court of Justice. Additionally, borderline 
cases where the CFI and the Court of Justice disagreed show the fragility of the 
rationale behind the case-law. 
 
a) Prior decision of the Union, implemented or carried over by the national authorities 
 
The case-law of the Court of Justice determines that the relevant criterion for 
the concurrence of direct effect is whether the implementing authorities have 
discretion in the matter.  
                                                 
564
 Case C-386/96 P, Dreyfus / Commission [1998] ECR I-2309, at paragraph 43; Case 92/78 
Simmenthal / Commission [1979] ECR 777, at paragraphs 25 and 26; Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing 
Company and Others / Council [1979] ECR 1185, at paragraphs 11 and 12; Joined Cases 87/77, 
130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others / Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, at 
paragraph 31; Case 55/86 Arposol / Council [1988] ECR 13, paragraphs 11 to 13;  and Case C-152/88 
Sofrimport / Commission, [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraph 9. 
565
 Türk, “Judicial Review of Integrated…”, at 231. 
566
 Case C-10/95 P, Asocarne / Council , [1995] ECR I-4151, at paragraph 31 
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The paradigm of the situation where there is that lack of discretion is 
International Fruit567. According to the procedure in that case568 the Commission had 
to decide on the award of import licences for certain foodstuffs, which were issued by 
national authorities to specific companies. The system worked in the following way; 
import licences of certain products were granted to the extent to which the state of the 
Community market allowed. Member States had to report periodically the number of 
license requests in their respective territory. With that information, the Commission 
had to establish the criteria and detail the reference quantities for the award of 
licences569. Although the reference quantities that operated as a limit were fixed in a 
general way for each country, the Commission decided in practice "on the fate of the 
subsequent requests for licences", even though the refusals were communicated by the 
national authorities. The Court of Justice understood that “the national authorities do 
not enjoy any discretion in the matter of the issue of licences and the conditions on 
which applications by the parties concerned should be granted”570, so it ruled that the 
plaintiff had standing before the court and that the EU act was actionable. 
 
This interpretation based on the lack of discretion was subsequently developed 
in later cases. The judgement in Weddel571 provides another good example. A beef 
importer from the Netherlands challenged the Commission Regulation572 that 
mandated the reduction of the import licences relative to quantities requested, and 
which was applied by the national agency in charge to the detriment of the 
applicant573. The Court of Justice spelt out that since the EU act in question fixed in 
great detail the criteria on the basis of which import licences must be granted, the 
agencies of the Member States do not enjoy any discretion and the EU act is of direct 
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concern to the applicant574. The same reasoning was applied to other cases in the 
field575. 
 
However, in other cases, the Court of Justice accepted the fulfilment of the 
requirement of direct concern even when the national authorities enjoyed some 
discretion576. In Bock577, the applicant was denied an import licence by the German 
authorities. The national authorities had received an authorisation by the Commission 
to take protective measures, although, in the specific case they had the discretion not 
to take them, they had warned the applicant that they would reject the application if 
they received the application by the Commission578. The action against the decision of 
the Commission was declared admissible in this case.  
 
Perhaps more interestingly, the Piraiki-Patraiki579 case involved several Greek 
cotton undertakings who challenged a Commission decision580 authorising France to 
impose a temporary quota system on Greek exporters following the accession Treaty 
of Greece. As it could be expected, the Commission, and France, argued that the 
decision had a general nature, even though the applicants were indirectly affected by 
it581. They stressed that the decision simply gave France the freedom to institute a 
quota system, but left it the discretion to apply it or not582. However, the 
circumstances of the case were that the French authorities had implicitly made clear 
how that they would take the restrictive measure in case they were authorised583. The 
Court of Justice argued that:  
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"the possibility that the French Republic might decide not to make use of the 
authorization granted to it by the Commission decision was entirely 
theoretical, since there could be no doubt as to the intention of the French 
authorities to apply the decision"584.  
 
Moreover, Advocate General verLoren van Themaat had stated in his opinion 
that direct concern:  
 
"is defined as being of direct material concern to an interested party if, even 
though it requires the adoption of a further national implementing measure, it 
is possible to foresee with certainty or with a high degree of probability that 
the implementing measure will affect the applicant". It is apparent from those 
arguments that the Court was reasoning beyond mere legal considerations and 
concentrating on the facts. Such position is, certainly, more favourable to 
wider access to the courts for individuals but does little to provide legal 
certainty on the standing of private parties in administrative procedures where 
several administrations intervene"585.  
  
There are subsequent cases in which the CFI586 provided with more details on 
the interpretation of direct concern in similar situations. Still, the judicial concept of 
direct concern and, more generally, the conditions under which individuals can 
challenge an act of the EU in the context of an administrative procedure where 
national administrations intervene remains far from straightforward.  
 
b) Ex-post authorisation by the Union of a national decision 
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385 
The position of the EU court in the inverse case remains more controversial. In 
the early case Toepfer587, the Commission had taken the decision to grant Germany a 
retroactive authorisation to maintain a protected measure already approved by 
Germany. Advocate General Roemer argued that the applicants were not directly 
concerned by the decision, because Germany was free to revoke the measure at its 
discretion588. The position of the Court of Justice was different. It considered that the 
Commission's decision to allow Germany to keep the measures rendered them valid 
and thus had direct legal effects on the applicants589. 
 
By contrast, in DSTV590 the Commission took a decision to declare an order by 
the British authorities (the banning of a TV programme broadcast from Denmark) 
compatible with Community law. This was not, according to the CFI, a retroactive 
authorisation by the Commission591, so the action was declared inadmissible. In 
subsequent cases, the CFI keep the view that ex post authorisations were not of direct 
concern to the applicants unless they had retroactive effect592, a position confirmed by 
the Court of Justice593. 
  
By the same token, the Court of Justice has also accepted direct concern in 
case of a Commission decision to confirm a measure taken by national authorities594, 
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but only if it had retroactive effect595. Otherwise, the CFI did not consider that there 
was direct concern596. 
 
c) Disagreement between the EU courts 
 
The uncertainty of the definition of the conditions for direct concern in the 
context of composite procedures is best illustrated by cases where there a fundamental 
disagreement between the CFI and the Court of Justice, in opposite direction in each 
of the cases.  
 
The first is Comafrica 597, which concerned a then recently enacted regulation 
on the import of bananas598. Two companies sought the annulment of the 
Commission's regulation fixing a reduction coefficient enabling the importers in 
question to determine the quantity which will be allocated to them, reduced relative to 
the previous year's599. This Commission's regulation had to be executed by Member 
States authorities, who would make an arithmetical operation as provided in the 
regulation and apply the reduction to the operators. The CFI argued that such 
regulation did not allow Member States any margin of discretion in relation to the 
issue of import licences, so it was of direct concern to the operators600. 
 
The Court of Justice took a completely different stance601. Advocate General 
Mischo602 infers that the reasoning of the CFI was based on the previous ruling in 
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Weddel603 (which concerned beef products) because it was possible for each operator 
to determine the final quantity which he would be entitled to import by simply 
multiplying a quantity known to him by the reduction coefficient604. However, the 
rules on the banana market were slightly more complicated involving the origin of the 
products and the economic activities involved. Due to this complexity, it was 
Members States authorities that determined the final quantities and economic 
operators were not themselves in a position to make the arithmetic calculations605. The 
complexity of the system, it was argued, impeded the existence of direct concern 
regarding the Commission's regulation. The Court of Justice followed the Opinion of 
the Advocate General and interpreted that that role of national authorities went 
beyond the mere application of coefficients and declared the actions inadmissible606. 
 
By contrast, in Glencore Grain607 the situation was the opposite. The case 
concerned a loan agreement signed by the European Community and the Ukraine, 
aimed at providing food aid to the latter, though the financing of purchases of 
agricultural products. After a public procurement procedure, the Ukrainian agency in 
charge decided to contract a supply of wheat with a provider that was not offering the 
most competitive price among the candidates. The Commission decided not to 
approve the contract, which had already been signed between the applicant and the 
Ukrainian authorities. This implied that no assistance would be granted to finance the 
contract. The applicant challenged this refusal to approve in the form of a letter.  The 
CFI considered that the Commission's role was merely to verify that the conditions for 
Community financing were fulfilled and, where necessary, to acknowledge, for the 
purposes of disbursement of the loan, that such contracts were in conformity with the 
corresponding provisions. Consequently, the CFI considered that the Commission did 
not have any legal relations with the applicant and consequently the action of the 
Commission did not directly affect the legal validity of the commercial contract 
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concluded608. That being said, the CFI acknowledged that due to the Commission's 
denial, the Ukrainian authorities were not able to pay for the supplies609 and that there 
was a suspensory clause making the performance of the contract and payment of the 
contract price subject to acknowledgement by the Commission610. Despite these 
considerations, the CFI dismissed the action as inadmissible. 
 
When the judgement of the CFI was appealed, the Court of Justice adopted a 
far more liberal approach611. It contradicted the CFI because it considered that the 
Commission's refusal to approve directly affected the legal situation of the individual 
and left no discretion to the addressees of the measure612.  Even though the 
Commission was not directly part in the dealings between the applicant and Ukrainian 
agency, the validity of the supply contract at issue was subject to the suspensory 
condition of recognition by the Commission of conformity of the contract, a detail 
which is corroborated by the socio-economic context in which the supply contract was 
concluded613. The effect of the refusal by the Commission was that the applicant was 
deprived of the possibility of performing the contract awarded to it or of obtaining 
payment for supplies614. As a result, it referred the case back to the CFI for judgement 
on the substance615.  
 
The disagreement between the EU courts in the cases Comafrica and Glencore 
Grain illustrates quite notoriously that the notion of discretion as the principal 
criterion for direct concern is not clear. Composite procedures and situations where 
several public administrations intervene put into question the conditions that the Court 
requires to enjoy legal standing. Similarly to the previous considerations, the lack of a 
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uniform approach of composite procedures is at the origin of this case-by-case 
approach which is not always consistent or straightforward. 
 
5.4.- Conclusions 
 
Composite procedures give rise to a number of legal challenges that have not 
been dealt with by the EU courts satisfactorily. These challenges concern the basic 
procedural rights of the individual a) before the administrative decision is taken, 
namely the right to be heard; b) when the decision is taken, namely the 
administration's duty to state reasons; and c) after the decision is taken, namely the 
right to challenge such decision before an independent court. 
 
The breaches of the procedural rights assessed in this Chapter affect 
fundamental rights. The position of the private parties is undermined due to the 
complexities of composite procedures. The Court of Justice, when called to rule on 
such situations, has failed to provide a comprehensive, satisfactory solution. In most 
cases, however, the EU courts did not have the tools to provide for such solution, 
without invading the competences of national courts or assuming powers of review on 
national administrative authorities. 
 
In overview, the structural legal problems that composite procedures bring 
about have not been adequately identified by the EU courts. They have reasoned on a 
case-by-case basis, incurring in contradictions between different policy areas, as it is 
notably the case of the right to be heard, or attributing responsibilities to national 
courts even when national procedural laws would have prevented them from being 
competent. The dysfunctionalities become apparent in many situations and the EU 
courts, and national courts, are unable to cope with them in an effective fashion.  
 
The lack of a general legal framework for composite procedures is very 
problematic as we have seen in this Chapter. The position of the individual as a 
concerned party affected by composite procedures was largely ignored at the time the 
procedures were set up. This only reinforces the message that a comprehensive legal 
framework is necessary and that it should take into account the peculiarities of 
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composite procedures and ensure that the same standards of protection of procedural 
rights are awarded. 
 
Concerning the right to be heard and the duty to state reasons, it is important to 
realise that these are guarantees vis-à-vis public administration because the latter is in 
a position to make a discretionary decision that affects an individual. For this reason, 
relinquishing the exercise of the right to be heard at an administrative authority 
different to that which takes the discretionary decision would place the individual in a 
position of weakness. Likewise, relying on a statement of reasons taken at another 
administrative level might be problematic in establishing the reasons why the 
administration with discretionary power decided in a certain fashion. As we have 
analysed, there are many cases where such guarantees were not respected. 
 
The shortcomings are greater and more important in the context of access to 
justice. The determination of the competent judge in procedures where different 
administrative authorities participate is difficult and leads sometimes to situations 
where the right to an effective judicial remedy is neglected. In this case, a general 
provision indicating clearly the competence of both national and EU courts is 
required. However, in this case, the solutions must be more comprehensive. The 
shortcomings in this area sometimes stem from the fact that the competent court is not 
able to review the validity of a decision taken by administrative authorities outside its 
jurisdiction. The preliminary ruling procedure may be adequate when a national judge 
has a doubt on the decision taken by the Commission, for example, but this 
mechanism is not foreseen inversely. What is more, horizontal composite procedures, 
based on the logic of mutual recognition, can result very problematic in the allocation 
of responsibilities and discretionary powers. 
 
Any coherent system of reviewability of administrative decisions presupposes 
a common notion of ‘reviewable act’ and the conditions to enjoy legal standing to 
challenge such acts. The lack of a common general framework to determine this 
procedural requirement to access a judicial procedure further adds to the complexity 
of composite procedures creating further gaps in protection for individuals. 
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The Court of Justice argues in terms of division of powers, but this division is 
rather a legal fiction, and it eludes the reality of an integrated administration. The 
Court of Justice is not to blame, it could certainly make its interpretation more flexible 
in some aspects, but the instruments to face the challenges of composite procedures 
are not sufficient. One can argue that, at present, the requirements of a complete legal 
system under the principle of the rule of law -solemnly proclaimed by the Court of 
Justice- are not met. 
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6.1.- Initial remarks 
 
The complex nature of composite procedures and the lack of a systematic legal 
framework applicable to them bring about several legal concerns. These concerns were 
identified in the previous Chapter. In most cases, these problems stem from the fact that the 
legal tools available to the individual vis-à-vis the EU public administration are limited. 
These instruments, in the form of procedural rights, have not been adapted to a phenomenon 
based on intense procedural cooperation between EU and Member States authorities. 
 
In this Chapter, we will put forward and describe solutions to challenges described 
before. The greatest challenge to any proposal in this vein is that it will have to be 
comprehensive and leave no room for the vacuum in legal protection of the individual that we 
described in the previous Chapter. This task is difficult in view of the lack of a general 
conception, let alone a general legal framework, of composite procedures.  
 
For this reason, the main proposal has to be related to the enactment of a general legal 
framework for administrative procedures in the European Union. It is essential that this legal 
framework includes particular rules on composite procedures, because it is a special category 
of procedure for which the general rules are, more than in other administrative procedures, 
insufficient or inappropriate. 
 
Some of the recent regulations laying down composite procedures in some of the 
fields examined in Chapter 4 provide partial solutions to some of the problems identified. 
While this approach shall be welcome and, moreover, it constitutes a source of inspiration  on 
more far-reaching general proposals, it is fragmentary and insufficient. The focus of this 
research will be placed on the comprehensive response to the challenges of composite 
procedures, something that both sector-specific regulations but also the case-law of the Court 
of Justice have failed to provide.  
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A common framework and a legal categorisation would precisely contribute to a 
comprehensive approach by the EU courts on the controversies related to aspects of 
composite procedures. The analysis of the case-law in the context of composite procedures 
provides evidence that the EU courts, failing to see the common elements of different 
controversies related to composite procedures, have provided only individual responses, and 
have incurred in inconsistencies. 
 
In addition to specific provisions in a new code of European administrative procedure, 
the solutions to the lacunae would require enhanced cooperation between the national and EU 
judicial systems. A scheme of intertwined administrative cooperation requires a counterpart 
system of cooperation between the Union and national judges. This cooperation exists in one 
direction, i.e. the preliminary ruling procedure, but not in the inverse direction. The situation 
where the EU courts are competent to rule on the validity of a decision but lack any 
competence to rule on the legality of essential steps taken by national public administrations 
and to ask the national courts to rule on it, leads to a legal dead end, as we had to opportunity 
to see in the previous Chapter.  
 
This second proposal would have more limited effects. In view of the lack of 
scholarly analysis of such proposal, it can be deemed innovative and probably difficult to 
implement in practice. While aware of the ambitious character of these proposals, it would be 
intellectually frustrating if we failed to cover all the possible breaches in legal protection 
identified in the previous Chapter. 
 
The essence of the problems highlighted stem from old conceptions that have not been 
changed in parallel to the reality of the proliferation and intensity of composite procedures, a 
phenomenon that is likely to increase in the future. Hence, the proposals to overcome the 
asymmetry need be visionary.  
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6.2.- Regulation of composite procedures in a General Act on EU administrative 
procedures 
 
6.2.1.- The General Act on EU administrative procedures: arguments in favour of  a 
codification  
 
 As explained in Chapter 21, the codification of administrative procedures has a 
prominent position in the academic debate in the field of EU administrative law at the 
moment. Professor Schwarze pioneered the idea of a European codification of administrative 
procedure several decades ago2. Such an idea was developed and discussed by scholars in the 
1990's3 together with the renewed study of EU administrative law as a separate field of EU 
law. 
 
Codification is a legal concept used by historians of Law to identify the process of 
drafting of an act or a code incorporating the most general rules on a certain subject matter4. 
Although there might be different nuances among the different countries, the essential 
element of the codification of administrative procedures is the enactment of a general act of 
administrative procedure, a phenomenon that has taken place in most EU Member States 
throughout the 20th Century, but not in all5. In the context of the EU law, codification of 
administrative procedures refers thus to the enactment of a Regulation on EU administrative 
procedures. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, academic debate on the possibility 
and the convenience of a Regulation on EU administrative procedures has been reinvigorated 
following the inclusion in primary law of a legal basis for an act of administrative procedure. 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, it was hard to argue for such codification without a proper legal 
basis6. At the moment, Article 298 TFEU, which calls for an open, efficient and independent 
European administration, is deemed by most scholars7 as an appropriate legal basis for a 
Regulation with a general framework on administrative procedures, complemented with 
Article 41 ChFR. For some authors, Article 298 TFEU is more than a legal basis; it 
constitutes a mandate to the legislator for a general codification of administrative 
procedures8. 
 
Besides the formal argument related to the existence of a legal basis, the need for 
codification is linked to the emergence and consitutionalization of a EU public 
administration. This phenomenon was analysed at large in Chapter 2. The new Article 298 
gives the EU administration due visibility and constitutional anchorage9. In view of the 
existence of such administration, some scholars argue, only a general act on EU 
administrative procedure can establish applicable provisions for every administrative action 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
6
 Mariolina Eliantonio, "The Future of National Procedural Law in Europe: Harmonisation vs. Judge-Made 
Standards in the Field of Administrative Justice", 8 Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper (2008), 1- 18, at 
16; and Kahl, "Hat die EG die Kompetenz ..." at 866. However, even before the Treaty of Lisbon, some scholars 
had advocated for the subsidiary legal basis of the old Article 308 TEC, see Giacinto della Cananena, "From 
Judges to Legislators? The Codification of EC Administrative procedures in the Field of State Aid", 5 Rivista 
italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario (1995), 967-980, at 979. 
7
 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2012), at 323; and Bernardo Giorgio 
Mattarella, "The Concrete Options for a Law on Administrative Procedure bearing on Direct EU 
Administration", 3-4 Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario (2012), 537-45, at 538. 
8
 Clemens Ladenburger, "Evolution oder Kodifikation eines allgemeines Verwaltungsrechts in der EU", in 
Hans-Heinrich Trute, Thomas Gross, Hans Christian Röhl, and Chistian Möllers (coords.), Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht – zur Tragfähigkeit eines Konzepts, Mohr Siebeck (Tubingen, 2008), 109-33, at 119; and  
Oriol Mir-Puigpelat, “Razones para una codificación general del procedimiento de la administración de la 
Unión”, in Mercedes Fuertes (ed.), Un Procedimiento Administrativo para Europa, Aranzadi (Pamplona, 2012), 
131-65, at 138. Notwithstanding, professor Mir-Puigperlat acknowledges that general codification is not the 
only option provided in Article 298, and partial codification or regulations by sectors could also fulfil the 
purpose of this provision, though, arguably, not so satisfactorily.  
9
 "Arguments in favour of a general codification of the procedures applicable to EU administration", Briefing 
Note of the Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, at 7, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/432776/IPOL-
JURI_NT%282011%29432776_EN.pdf 
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and measure taken at the EU level10. The legal certainty attained by codification could not be 
achieved by the addition of sector-specific procedural regulations. A general norm on the 
administrative procedure applicable in the absence of other special rules, would indeed be the 
most suitable mechanism to guarantee the principle of legality in all the actions of the EU 
administration or, in other words, the rule of law principle in the activities of this EU public 
administration. Not less importantly, the efficiency of the administrative action would also be 
boosted by such act11. 
 
Another perspective from which the codification of administrative procedures can be 
advocated is that of the rights of the individual12 as well as the other principles of 
administrative law established by the case law of the Court of Justice13, the most relevant of 
which would be the right to a good administration enshrined in Article 41 ChFR. The gist of 
the right to a good administration consists on an array of guarantees to the individual vis-à-vis 
the public administration14. The link between the right to a good administration and the 
respect of procedural guarantees and clear rules on the administrative procedure can be 
identified in the statement by Advocate General Trstenjak that this right "is used as a 
synonym for those principles which make up administrative procedure based on the rule of 
law"15. The homogenization of procedural guarantees stemming from a general act of 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
10
 Isaac Martin Delgado, "Hacia una norma europea de procedimiento administrativo", in Isaac Martín Delgado 
and Eva Nieto Garrido (eds.), Derecho Administrativo Europeo en el Tratado de Lisboa, Marcial Pons (Madrid, 
2010), 149-97, at 178. 
11
 Craig, European Administrative Law..., at 278. 
12
 Martin Delgado, "Hacia una norma europea...", at 173. While the fundamental rights approach is one of the 
more powerful legal arguments to advocate for the codification of administrative procedures, it does not 
constitute per se a sufficient legal basis or the conferral of powers to the Union to enact a regulation given that 
Article 51(2) ChFR reads: " 2. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the 
Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties." 
13
 See Section 3.4.4. 
14
 Diana-Urania Galetta, "Il diritto ad una buona amministrazione europea come fonte di essenziali garanzie 
procedimentali nei confronti della Pubblica Amministrazione", in 3 Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico 
comunitario (2005), 819-57, at 855; and Klara Kanska, "Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU. 
Impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights", 10(3) European Law Journal (2004), 296-326, at 300. 
15
 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 11 September 2008, in case C-308/07 P, Koldo 
Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso / European Parliament, [2009] ECR I-1059, cited in Martin Delgado, "Hacia una 
norma europea...", at 174. 
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administrative procedures would prove appropriate to improve the rights of the individuals in 
the context of the decisions and actions of the public administration16. 
 
Codification would arguably bring more coherence to the regulation of administrative 
procedures, in particular in a time where more and more administrative procedures are being 
established by sector-specific Regulations17. The existing fragmentation leads to two 
consequences: different treatment of certain issues without a justification and gaps that 
require recourse to analogies and/or the application of general principles18. For example, 
agencies apply their own regulations in the procedures they follow, a factor that has been 
identified by the Commission as leading to inconsistencies which should be overcome19. 
While the case-law of the Court of Justice has contributed to a coherent set of principles of 
administrative law, the courts of the Union do not have the necessary instruments and 
perspective to create a complete and consistent body of procedural rules20. 
 
Although the process of codification can be used to incorporate innovation, its essence 
consists on putting rules currently found in a variety of sources, into a single legal instrument, 
in the form of a Regulation. A source, at times very comprehensive in its scope, but very 
weak in its legal force, of general rules on administrative procedures are the Codes of Good 
Administrative Behaviour21. However valuable in terms of their goals and their indicative 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
16
 Mir-Puigpelat, “Razones para una codificación ...", at 153. 
17
 Jens-Peter Schneider, “Estructuras de la Unión Administrativa Europea – Observaciones instroductorias”, in 
in Jens-Peter Scheider, and Francisco Velasco Caballero, La unión administrativa europea, Marcial Pons 
(Madrid, 2008), 25-50, at 38. 
18
 Mir Puigpelat, “Razones para una codificación ...", at 146. 
19
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European agencies – The 
way forward COM(2008) 135 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0135&from=EN 
20
 Giacinto della Cananea , "I procedimenti amministrativi comunitari", in  Mario P. Chiti and Guido Greco 
(dirs.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo comunitario vol. I, Giuffrè, (Milan, 1998), 225-251, at 247; and 
"Arguments in favour of a general ...", Briefing Note, at 165. 
21
 The most important of these codes is the one established by the European ombudsman, available at 
www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces#/page/1; but the different institutions have adopted other 
codes, like the Commission, and some agencies have done likewise. For the Commission, it is the Commission 
Decision 2000/633/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 17 October 2000 amending its Rules of Procedure by annexing a 
Code of Good Administrative behaviour for staff of the European Commission in their relations with the Public 
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character for future developments of the law22, many scholars consider these instruments 
insufficient and improper to a public administration as developed as that of the EU23. The 
transformation of these soft law instruments into binding law is the appropriate process to 
enforce administrative fundamental rights and the full legal value of the right to a good 
administration24. 
 
Finally, in connection with the right to a good administration25, a number of essential 
principles of European administrative law can be recalled as they are better protected with a 
general codification. According to professor Wakefield, the right to a good administration 
does not relate to an individual principle of administrative law, but a combination of several 
principles of administrative law26. In the same vein, Advocate General Poiares Maduro 
affirmed in his opinion in max.mobile27 that the Court generally requires the rights invoked in 
support of an action to be sufficiently ‘precise’ and, in particular, where the individual rights 
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
See Joanna Mendes, "Good Administration in EU Law and the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour", 9 European University Institute Law reports (2009), at 11. 
22
 Mendes, "Good Administration in EU...", at 13. 
23
 Mir Puigpelat, “Razones para una codificación ...", at 150 and Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Das allgemeine 
Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee. Grundlagen und Aufgaben der verwaltungsrechtlichen Systembildung, 
Springer (Heidelberg, 2006), at 392. 
24
 Mir Puigpelat, “Razones para una codificación ...", at 150, this author presents the eloquent example of access 
to documents. A right awarded by virtue of soft law instruments until Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, 1) turned this right into a fully enfoceable right and thus 
brought about a significant change in the transparency of the European Institutions. 
25
 Some authors argue for the consideration of this right to a good administration as a general principle more 
than a right, as it includes a range of rights. See in this vein, Eva Nieto Garrido, "Administración europea y 
derechos fundamentales: los derechos a una buena administración, de acceso a los documentos y a la protección 
de datos de carácter personal" in Eva Nieto Garrido and Isaac Martin Delgado, Derecho administrativo europeo 
en el Tratado de Lisboa, Marcial Pons (Madrid, 2010), 53-85, at 54; Javier Guillem Carrau, "El avance del 
derecho a la buena Administración en el Tratado de Lisboa", 19 Revista de Derecho de la Unión Europea 
(2010), 31-70, at 43; Loïc Azoulai "Le principe de bonne administration", in Droit administratif européen, 
Jaqueline Dutheil de la Rochère et Jacques-Bernard. Auby (dirs.), Bruylant (Brussels, 2007), 493-518, at 493. 
However, the ChFR lists it as a right, which is not in contradiction with the fact that it can be broken down to a 
combination of more concrete individual rights. On the conception of Article 41 ChFR as a right more than a 
principle see also Klara Kanska, "Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU-Impact of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights", 10(3) European Law Journal (2004) , 296-326. 
26
 Jill Wakefield, The right to good administration,  Kluwer (Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007), at 23. 
27
 C-141/02 P, Commission / max-mobil [2005]ECR I-1286. 
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can be derived directly from provisions of the Treaty28. In other words, these rights are so 
broadly defined that they need a clear concretisation in secondary legislation29.  
 
It is for this reason that the arguments of the commentators that advocate for the 
codification of administrative procedures are linked to these essential principles of 
administrative law, and which are best protected by specific clauses incorporated into a 
general act of administrative procedures. The main principles concerned are the following:  
 
a) the principle of legal certainty; which can be better provided by general norms than 
by general principles by the case-law and regulations by different sectors30. The Regulation 
would establish the default procedures to fill gaps in existing law31. The codification would 
thus provide general rules for matters such as time-limits for deciding on proceedings, rules 
on impartiality of officers, position of interested third parties, rules on electronic 
communications, indication of appeals that may be lodged, and termination of proceedings by 
agreement32; 
 
b) the principle of legitimacy; the enactment of a general Regulation on administrative 
procedures would bring about the participation of experts and stakeholders during the 
codification phase of the enactment of the Regulation33; 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
28
 Ibid., at paragraph 54. 
29
 Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Bucura  Mihaescu , "The Relation between the Charter's Fundamental Rights and 
the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case", 9(1) European 
Constitutional Law Review (2013), 73-101, at 79. 
30
 This is for Mir-Puigperlat the main argument for codification, see Mir-Puigpelat, “Razones para una 
codificación ...", at 151; and Christoph Vedder, “(Teil)Kodifikation des Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts der EG?", 
1 Europarecht (1995), 75-94, at 89. 
31
 Jacques Ziller, "Is a law of administrative procedure for the Union institutions necessary? Introductory 
remarks and prospects", Briefing Note European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, (2010) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/432771/IPOL-
JURI_NT%282011%29432771_EN.pdf, at 15 
32
 "Arguments in favour of a general ...", Briefing Note, at 15. 
33
 Professor Ziller (in Ziller, "Is a law of administrative procedure for the...", at 23 )points out that in a process 
as ambitious as a codification of administrative procedures all the expertise could be gather in particular with: a) 
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c) the principle of transparency; as codification would have a twofold effect. It would 
make the procedure easier to know by citizens and it would generalise the rights to know the 
reasoning of the Administration and other related to transparency34;  
 
d) the principle of participation; considering administrative procedures as a brigde 
between the citizen and the public administration, general rules on participation will ensure 
that participation rules in all the areas and not only with a sector-specific approach35; and  
 
e) the principle of legality; not only by filling gaps in the legal system, but also by 
facilitating a better judicial control of administrative action with common standards36.  
 
There is an academic consensus emerging that the time has come to a codification of 
administrative procedures at the Union's level37, although there are some commentators that 
have expressed concerns of different nature38. Some ambivalence or reluctance, for example, 
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
practitioners coming from institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, but also from Member States’ 
public administrations; b) judges; c) representatives of addressees of administrative decisions and other 
stakeholders in EU policies; d) the European Ombudsman; e) the European Data Protection Supervisor; f) 
academia; and g) the European Parliament and to a certain extent of National Parliaments. 
34
 Martin Delgado, "Hacia una norma europea...", at 191. It must be noted that Article 298 TFEU, and its 
precedessor in the Constitutional Treaty, were proposed by the Swedish delegation with the aim, among others, 
to bring more transparency to the EU public administration. 
35
 Martin Delgado, "Hacia una norma europea...", at 195, moreover, this idea would be reinforced by Article 
11(1) TFEU, which reads: "The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action." 
36
 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Jens-Peter Schneider,  and Jacques Ziller, "Administrative Procedures and the 
Implementation of EU Law and Policies", 2 Law Working Paper Series of the University of Luxembourg (2014), 
1-29, at 4. 
37
 Oriol Mir-Puigpelat, “La codificación del procedimiento administrativo en la Unión Administrativa Europea”, 
en in Jens-Peter Scheider, and Francisco Velasco Caballero, La unión administrativa europea, Marcial Pons 
(Madrid, 2008), 51-85, at 52; Craig, EU Administrative Law..., at 279; Clemens Ladenburger, "Evolution oder 
Kodifikation eines allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts in der EU", in Hans-Heinricht Trute, Thomas Groß, Hans 
Christian Röhl, and Christoph Möllers, (coords.), Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht - zur Tragfähigkeit eines 
Konzepts, Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen, 2008), 107-33, at 107  
38
 For example, Carol Harlow, “European Administrative Procedure: the European Union as Exemplar”, in 
Sabino Cassese et al., Lisbon Meeting on Administrative procedure; Functions and Purposes of the 
Administrative Procedure: New Problems and New Solutions”, Institute for Legal and Political Sciences of the 
403 
?
to the idea of an EU-wide codification, stems from the different attitudes towards codification 
between legal traditions, in particular, between civil and common law countries39.  
 
The academic debate on the sufficiency of the legal basis appears to reach the 
conclusion that the time is ripe for a codification40, thanks to Article 298 TFEU, the 
fundamental right to a good administration included in the Charter and the other principles 
and considerations analysed before. Codification would not harm the existence of special 
procedures, for which the general Act of administrative procedure would be applicable only 
in a subsidiary basis. 
 
 Another debate, much less developed so far, concerns more specifically composite 
procedures, namely, the scope of the codification to come, and whether the general code on 
administrative procedures should cover only purely EU administrative procedures or it should 
be extended to composite procedures too.  
 
The previous considerations on the need and urgency of a codification of 
administrative procedures are particularly pertinent for composite procedures, where there is 
a more visible imperative for transparency, accountability, legal certainty, and clear judicial 
control. While it is in the context of procedures of direct administration that the previous 
arguments have been developed, the existence of comprehensive procedural rules for each 
case makes the need for a general code of administrative procedures less critical than for 
composite procedures. In composite procedures we have seen how the lack of procedural 
arrangements, let alone a basic legal framework in some cases, leads to situations where the 
procedural rights of individuals are not properly safeguarded. Therefore, from a substantive 
point of view, the general code of administrative procedures is more even necessary as 
concerns composite procedures than administrative procedures related to direct 
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
Lisbon University Faculty of Law, 37-52, available at http://www.icjp.pt/sites/default/files/media/e-
book_international_isbn.pdf 
39
 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, "National administrative procedures in a European perspective: 
pathways to a slow convergence", 2 Italian Journal of Public Law (2010), 215-58, at 217. 
40
 Mir Puigpelat, “Razones para una codificación ...", at 150. 
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implementation of Union policies. From a formal point of view, however, the possibility to 
include composite procedures in the scope of a future EU Regulation on administrative 
procedures is more complex and has to be elaborated with more detail.  
 
6.2.2.- The state of play of the process of codification 
?
The European Parliament has played the most prominent role as an Institution in 
pushing for the codification of administrative procedures. The Committee on Legal Affairs 
set up a working group on EU administrative law in July 2010. The two objectives of the 
Working Group were to establish the current state of EU administrative law and then to 
propose appropriate legislative action in the light of Article 298 TFEU. The group finished its 
work in October 2011, setting out its conclusions in a working paper41. The document 
expressed particular concern on the inadequacy of citizen’s procedural rights vis-à-vis the 
EU’s administration. The recommendation to the Committee of Legal Affairs was to request 
a legislative initiative for a general administrative law binding on the EU, which should 
provide “a minimum safety net of guarantees” for citizens. 
 
Afterwards, in 2012 the European Parliament published the so-called European Value 
Added Assessment on the Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union42. This 
study analysed the suitability of Article 298 TFEU as a legal basis for a future Regulation, 
and identified the main problems of the current state-of-affairs, notably the existing 
fragmentation and lacunae. The study concluded with a recommendation to enact such 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
41
 The working group included Members of the European Parliament from the different political groups. It took 
on board contributions by many scholars and practitioners, either in written form, or as part of conferences and 
presentations, which included many of the authors cited thoughout this work, such as Jean-Bernard Auby, Marta 
Ballesteros, Javier Barnes, Francesca Bignami, Sabino Cassesse, Edoardo Chiti, Oriol Mir-Puigperlat, Eva 
Nieto, Jürgen Schwarze, Christoph Vedder, and Jacques Ziller. The working document can be consulted at 
https://epnet.europarl.europa.eu/http://www.jurinet.ep.parl.union.eu/jurinet/webdav/site/jurinet/shared/JURI_do
c/wk groups/EU Admin Law/Working document/2011.10.19 Working%20Document%20on%20EU%20Ad
ministrative%20Law.pdf  
42
 The European Value Added Assessment on the Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union was 
published on 23 October 2012. The main contributors were professors Päivi Leino Sandberg, Jacques Ziller and 
the Blomeyer consortium.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/dv/eav_lawofadminprocedure_/EAV_Law
ofAdminprocedure EN.pdf  
405 
?
Regulation, on the basis of many of the arguments advanced before in terms of openness, 
legal certainty, individual rights, but also efficiency of the public administration. 
 
Drawing on the conclusions of the Working Group and the European Added Value 
Assessment, the committee of Legal Affairs drafted a legislative initiative report pursuant to 
Article 225 TFEU, whose rapporteur was Luigi Berlinguer. The plenary adopted it on 15 
January 201343. The European Parliament's call to the Commission to submit a legislative 
proposal was strongly motivated by legal arguments that a legal basis was available in Article 
298 TFEU. 
 
The initiative report contained six recommendations. The first relates to the objective 
and the scope of the regulation to be adopted. This first recommendation is critical for the 
purposes of our study because, besides setting that the guarantee of the right to good 
administration shall be the main objective of the Regulation, it establishes that it should only 
apply to the Union's institution, bodies, offices and agencies, that is, limited to direct 
implementation. The second recommendation is that the Regulation operates as a general 
code, so that the procedure is applicable in as much as no other sectorial rules apply but, at 
the same time, establishes a de minimis protection to individuals that cannot be undermined 
by sector-specific laws.  
 
The third and fourth recommendations relate to the content of the future Regulation. 
The third recommendation indicates the principles that should be codified, notably, the 
principle of lawfulness, the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, the 
principle of proportionality, the principle of impartiality, the principle of consistency and 
legitimate expectations, the principle of respect for privacy, the principle of fairness, the 
principle of transparency, and the principle of efficiency and service. The fourth 
recommendation establishes some rules governing administrative decisions, notably, on the 
initiation of the administrative procedure (on the administration's own initiative or at the 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
43
 European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on a Law of 
Administrative Procedure of the European Union (2012/2024(INL)). 
406 
?
request of the interested party), the acknowledgement of receipt, the impartiality of 
administrative decisions, the right to be heard, the right to access one's file, the time-limits, 
the form and notification of the administrative decisions, which shall be in written and in the 
language chosen by the addressee, the duty to state reasons, and the indication of the 
remedies available. 
 
Finally, the fifth recommendation concerns the review and correction of 
administrative decisions and the sixth recommendation regards the form and publicity to be 
given to the regulation.  
 
The Commission initially welcomed the initiative of Parliament. The Vice-President 
of the Commission Mr Šef?ovi? stated during the debate in Parliament preceding the 
approval of the report in January 201344 that a comprehensive regulation on EU 
administrative procedures would have a lot of benefits in terms of citizens' rights and 
efficiency of the administration, but at the same time, he expressed the Commission's 
concerns that it would also bring about of lack of flexibility or adaptability over time, and 
oversimplification. For this reason, he argued that the Commission would analyse and weigh 
the possible advantages against the costs.  
 
As time lapsed, the cautious approach of the Commission seems to have given way to 
inaction. During the hearings of the Commissioners-elect in 2014 on the occasion of the 
election of the new Commission, the questions asked by the Committee of Legal Affairs were 
not given a specific answer45 and a legislative proposal has not yet been presented. There is 
no indication on the side of the Commission that the proposal will be forwarded any time 
soon, and considering its plead for fewer rules, one cannot be very optimistic that the 
codification will materialise in the short term. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
44
 See minutes of the debate of 14 January 2013 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+CRE+20130114+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
45
 For instance, the eithth written question to Vice-President elect Georgieva by the Committee of Legal Affairs, 
available at http://www.elections2014.eu/en/new-commission/hearing/20140918HEA65210  
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6.2.3.- The inclusion of composite procedures in the general Act on EU administrative 
procedures 
 
Throughout the debates in the Committee of Legal Affairs of the European 
Parliament, the limitation of the scope of the future Regulation to the procedures within the 
framework of direct administration was not put into question. The wording of the first 
recommendation of the legislative resolution remained unchanged since the first report 
proposed by the rapporteur and it was not subject to any amendment. The reason for this 
choice is to be found in a very cautious approach taken by the Parliament, in view of the 
reticence of the other Institutions that will need to play a role in the enactment of the act, that 
is, the Commission and the Council. It is an approach that accepts a certain interpretation of 
the legislative history of Article 298 TFEU, though not necessarily the most appropriate.  
 
This interpretation is the following; it understands that this provision was incorporated 
to the Constitutional Treaty46 with the intention of being addressed to the Union's 
administration only, and not that of Member States, as results from the documents of the 
European Convention (Working Group V)47. This newly inserted legal basis was not meant to 
interfere directly with the autonomy of national public administrations. 
 
However, we largely explained that the old binary distinction between direct and 
indirect implementation is long outdated and composite procedures cannot be categorised as a 
form of indirect administration48. Certainly, the fact that composite procedures are not a 
category laid down in secondary legislation contributes to the confusion. It is, from this point 
of view, a mistake to imply that the hypothetical exclusion of indirect administration from the 
scope of Article 298 TFEU excludes any type of implementation of EU law that exceeds the 
traditional borders of direct administration.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
46
 Article III-304. 
47
 CONV 375/1/02 REV 1 WG V 14 Report of Working Group V "Complementary Competencies", available at 
http://european-convention.europa.eu/pdf/reg/en/02/cv00/cv00375-re01.en02.pdf  
48
 In particluar, sections 2.2.1, 2.2.3 and 2.7. 
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This confusion added to the doubts on whether composite procedures should be 
included in the codification. While some commentators point out that the codification of 
administrative procedures would be the most suitable occasion to lay down rules for the 
blurred relations between the national and the Union public administrations in the context of 
administrative procedures49, this possibility was seen as too far-reaching at the moment and 
the possibility to extend its scope outside the very limits of direct administration was ruled 
out by the European Parliament in its resolution communicated to the Commission. A 
classical conception of European administrative procedure still identifies that concept with 
the procedures for direct execution of EU law50.  
 
It has been presented in the previous Chapter that general rules on composite 
procedures would not only be useful for the completeness of the regulation of EU 
administrative procedures, but indeed essential to guarantee the basic procedural rights to the 
individuals and a comprehensive system of judicial protection. The question must then be 
addressed on whether or not the Union would have a competence for specific rules on 
composite procedures and whether or not Article 298 TFEU would also serve as an 
appropriate legal basis for these rules. 
 
Although the initiative report left aside this question and limited its scope to direct 
implementation, the preparatory work during the works of the Committee of Legal Affairs 
addressed this issue. The European Value Added Assessment on the Law of Administrative 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
49
 Pablo García-Manzano Jiménez de Andrade, "Codificación Administrativa Europea: Formas de ejecución 
conjunta del Derecho de la Unión European e Interconexión de Reguladores", in José Eugenio Soriano García 
(dri.), Procedimiento Administrativo Europeo, Civitas (Madrid, 2012), 529-54, at 535; and Javier Barnés 
Vázquez, "Sobre el procedimiento administrativo: evolución y perspectivas", in Javier Barnés Vázquez (coord.), 
Innovación y reforma en el derecho administrativo, Global Law Press (Sevilla, 2006), 263-341, at 264. 
50
 Eugenio Picozza, "Il regime giuridico del procedimento amministrativo comunitario", in Rivista Italiana di 
Diritto Pubblico Comunitario (1994), 321-48, at 324. 
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Procedure of the European Union51 contains a section in which it analyses the impact on 
composite procedures52. It rightly argues that: 
 
"A regulation establishing an EU Law on Administrative Procedure on the basis of 
Article 298 TFEU would not change the situation regarding the public authorities in 
Member States, who would still be bound only by the relevant subject-specific or 
sector-specific directives and regulations and by the boundaries set up by the ECJ’s 
case law on ‘procedural autonomy’. The principle of subsidiarity would therefore be 
fully complied with." 
 
The Regulation would still be directly binding to the EU public administration only, 
but this is not incompatible with its application to composite procedures. The Regulation 
would set a number of minimal procedural guarantees to be applied by the EU authorities in 
their part of the procedure, while national authorities would still abide by their own national 
administrative and procedural provisions.  
 
The fact that the Regulation would not be binding in its entirety on the national 
authorities does not entail that it would be irrelevant for them. On the one hand, national 
courts might refer through a preliminary ruling procedure to the Court of Justice so as to 
know whether or not the procedural guarantees had previously been complied with by EU 
authorities, and eventually annul the final national decision if this is not the case. This system 
would solve the most relevant shortcoming identified within the category of downwards 
composite procedures. On the other hand, Member States authorities are bound the respect of 
fundamental rights contained in the Charter when they are implementing EU law53, but 'only' 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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 See reference in footnote 42. 
52
 Section 3.2 at page II-50. 
53
 However, the Court of Jurtice had argued long before that when national authorities act as delegated 
authorities of the Community, they are bound by the general principles of European law, for example in Case 
230/78 Eridania - Zuccherifici nazionali [1979] ECR 2749, at paragraph 31 and Joined Cases 201 and 202/85 
Klensch / Secretary of State [1986] ECR 3477, at paragraphs 6?10. Late the Court of Justice said more 
specifically that a national measure implementing EU law must observe EU standards as regards fundamental 
rights, in Case C?2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I?955. See further Xavier Groussot, Laurent Pech, and Gunnar Thor 
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then, pursuant to Article 51(1) ChFR54. Certainly, Member States are implementing EU law 
when acting in the context of composite procedures, so it can be expected that the rules and 
guarantees of the Regulation of EU administrative procedures are configured as a basic 
content and standard of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 41 ChFR. 
 
This later aspect would require further explanation as Article 41(1) ChFR limits its 
institutional scope of the right to good administration under to 'institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union'. This means that, for this provision in particular, the threshold of 
institutional scope is set below the general limitation of Article 51(1) ChFR55. Despite this 
apparently clear limitation, the Court of Justice has accepted that Member States authorities 
may be bound in certain circumstances by some obligations deriving from the principles of 
good administration when implementing EU law56. More specifically, Advocate General 
Kokott spoke with clarity on "the principle of good administration to which the Member 
States must also have regard when applying Community law"57. 
 
Moreover, the case law of the Court of Justice has nuanced the limitation of the scope 
of application of Article 41 ChFR in its recent ruling in Mukarabega58. While it 
acknowledged that "it is clear from the wording of Article 41 of the Charter that it is 
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
Petursson, "The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on Member States?Action: In Search of Certainty 
in EU Adjudication", 1 Eric Stein Working Papers (2011), 1-36, at 4 and 5. 
54
 The scope of Article 51(1) at the national level remains unclear, and the Court of Justice has found itself in 
difficulties to provide clear-cut limits, see Allan Rosas. "When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Applicable at National Level?", 19(4) Jurisprudence (2012), 1269–1288. Many situations remain unclear, for 
example, where the Court of Justice has accepted to interpret a Union norm in a purely national situation if 
national law makes a reference to this norm in Case C-482/2010 Cicala, ECR [2011] I-14139, at paragraph 19. 
The conditions, still relatively unclear, to determine whether national legislation involves the implementation of 
EU law for the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter are laid down in Case C?40/11 Iida [2012] ECR, paragraph 
79; Case C?87/12 Ymeraga and Others [2013] ECR, paragraph 41; and Case C-206/13, Siragusa / Regione 
Sicilia [2014] (ECLI:EU:C:2013:291).  
55
 Hofmann and Mihaescu , "The Relation between the Charter's ...", at 96.  
56
 Ibid. at 97, in particular in Case C-428/05 Laub / Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2007] ECR I-5069, at 
paragraph  25, the Court of Justice argued that the principle of good administration "precludes a public 
administration (also a national administration) from penalising an economic operator acting in good faith for 
non-compliance with the procedural rules, when this non-compliance arises from the behaviour of the 
administration itself". 
57
 Case C-392/08 Commission / Spain [2010] ECR I-2537, at paragraph 16. 
58
 Case C?166/13, Sophie Mukarubega / Préfet de police, [2013]  (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336). 
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addressed not to the Member States but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies 
of the European Union"59, it also stated that Article 41 ChFR contained fundamental rights, 
such as the right to be heard, which were inherent to general principles of EU law60. These 
general principles are, at its turn, applicable to Member States when the authorities of the 
Member States take measures which come within the scope of EU law61.  
 
The inclusion of composite procedures in the general rules on administrative 
procedures for the Union would not be contrary to the principle of procedural autonomy of 
Member States. The principle of procedural autonomy, as often emphasised by the Court of 
Justice62, entails that "it is for the domestic legal system to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions intended to ensure the protection of rights which citizens have 
from the direct effect of Community law."63 It is to be noted, however, that this principle of 
procedural autonomy is recognised by the case law of the Court of Justice inasmuch as it can 
co-exist with the principles and requirements governing relations between national and EU 
law64. Thus, it is established since Rewe65 that the application of the national procedural law 
is subsidiary to explicit European law. Furthermore, the Court of Justice later elaborated that 
Member States are also bound by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness arising from 
the obligation of sincere cooperation66. This approach has even been applied even in cases 
where Member States are not obliged to implement EU law67.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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 Ibid. at paragraph 44. 
60
 Ibid. at paragraphs 45-48. 
61
 Case C-383/13, G. and R., [2013] (ECLI:EU:C:2013:533), at paragraph 35.  
62
 Henry G. Schermers and Denis F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, Kluwer Law, (The 
Hague, 2001), at 199. 
63
 Case C-33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz [1976] ECR 1989, at paragraph 5. 
64
 Diana-Urania Galetta, Procedural Autonomy of EU Member States: Paradise Lost?: A Study on the 
"Functionalized Procedural Competence" of EU Member States, Springer (Heidelberg, 2009), at 8. 
65
 C-33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz 
66
 Under Article 4(3) TEU. See Case C-261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I-4025, at paragraph 27; and Case C-
453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6297, at paragraph 29). 
67
 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005], ECR I-5285, at paragraphs 39-42. 
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Consequently, there would be no objection from the point of view of procedural 
autonomy to a certain regulation of composite procedures, which would not impose a 
complete procedural system for the national authorities participating in composite 
procedures, but would ensure certain guarantees and mechanisms of cooperation to ensure the 
coherence of the procedure and the respect for right of the individuals concerned by such 
procedures. Member States would still be bound, on substance, by the relevant subject-
specific or sector-specific rules, and act according to their procedural rules, except for a 
number of basic procedural guarantees68. This logic is in line with the proposal by the 
ReNEUAL69, which acknowledges that Member State authorities will apply national rules of 
administrative procedure, but that these rules must comply with the EU general principles of 
law and fundamental rights70. 
 
Article 298 TFEU should be the appropriate legal basis for the rules on composite 
procedures too. There are confronted views on the scope of Article 298 TFEU. Since it is a 
provision introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and it has not been used as a legal basis, there is 
so far no judicial interpretation of its scope. The narrow interpretation of Article 298 would 
posit that this legal base shall be to the regulation of the internal procedures of EU 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. There are however several reasons why this 
interpretation must be discarded. 
 
A narrow view on Article 298 TFEU would entail that the provision itself is irrelevant 
and redundant. If Article 298 TFEU was restricted to an exclusively internal dimension of the 
EU institutions and bodies, it would not add anything to the previously existing Article 336 
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68
 The European Value Added Assessment on the Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union cited 
before, at page II-50. 
69
 The Research Network on EU administrative law, ReNEUAL, elaborated the draft model rules on EU 
administrative procedures (available at http://www.reneual.eu/ ) which will be commented on afterwards. 
70
 In particular, Article III-24 of the draft model rules published by the network of scholars reads that: " In a case 
of composite procedure, where an EU authority makes the decision it must comply with the procedural 
requirements in Article III-23. Where the decision is made by a Member State authority it must comply with the 
requirements of Article III-23 where sector-specific legislation renders the procedural rules in Book III 
applicable. In the absence of such legislation, or any other EU legislation specifying applicable procedural 
requirements, the Member State authority will apply national rules of administrative procedure, which must 
comply with EU general principles of law concerning fair hearings." 
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TFEU71. Furthermore, as professor Craig argues, many reforms in the institutional 
accountability and efficiency were adopted in the past, notably after the resignation of the 
Santer Commission, without any need for Article 298 TFEU which did not exist at the time72. 
Such interpretation of Article 298 TFEU would also be contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the provision, because it results clearly from the work of the Convention on that 
provision that the writers intended to introduce a Treaty provision power for the Union to 
adopt new, more far-reaching rules on good administration73.  
 
An extensive interpretation is indeed supported by the legislative history of the 
precedent of Article 298 TFEU, i.e. Article III-398 of the Constitutional Treaty. This 
provision originated in a proposal of the Swedish Government. In view of the preparatory 
works of the Convention, it can be concluded that there we two dimensions of the provision: 
one internal, focused on the increase of the efficiency of the EU administration, and one 
external focused on the procedural rights of citizens74. This second dimension was 
particularly emphasised during the preparatory works, where it was stated that the provision 
would cover "basic principles for good administration of the work of the EU institutions. 
These could include inter alia service obligations, means to safeguard objectivity and 
impartiality, increased openness, procedures for consultation, etc." and would "indicate a 
specific legal base to adopt EU rules to this effect", pointing out that this could affect 
Member States procedures when implementing EU law75.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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 Legal basis for the staff regulations, former Article 283 TEC. 
72
 Paul Craig, "A General Law on Administrative Procedure, Legislative Competence and Judicial 
Competence," 19 European Public Law (2013), 503-24, at 511. Also, Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Jens-Peter 
Schneider, and Jacques Ziller, " Administrative Procedures and the Implementation of EU Law and Policies. 
Contribution by the Research Network on EU Administrative Law (ReNEUAL) project on administrative 
procedure to the EU Commission’s ‘Assises de la Justice’ conference in Brussels 21-22 November 2013 to the 
topic of EU administrative law", University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper Series Paper number 2014-02, 
(2014), 1-29, at 12. 
73
 Working Group V "Complementary Competencies ", Working document 30 REV 1 Revised draft report, 
available at http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/4044.pdf.  
74
 Paul Craig, "A General Law on Administrative Procedure...", at 505. 
75
 Working group V « Complementary Competencies », Working Document 13, (Subject : Note by Mrs Hjelm-
Wallen on "Good administration, efficiency and openness"). Available at http://european-
convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/1931.pdf, at 3. 
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A final argument, pointed out by professor Craig, looks carefully at the wording of 
Article 298(1) TFEU and concludes that it is not irrelevant that after reference to the 
'institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union', as if it were an exhaustive list, it says 
that 'shall have the support of a ... European administration', reflecting the fact that the 
European administration goes beyond the elements of institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union, which could constitute strictly speaking the administration of the 
EU76. The distinction, as formalistic as it might seem, has indeed large consequences. The 
analysis of the delimitation of both concepts was developed in the second chapter of this 
study77. At this point, suffice it to state that this reference to the support of a European 
administration brings about a wider concept of executive power with the potential to include 
national public administrations in charge of the implementation of EU law, as happens in the 
context of indirect implementation but also, more intensely, in the context of composite 
procedures. In this sense, the EU public administration would be core, but not the whole of 
the large executive power of the Union, which would have several shared elements with 
Member States. The European Administration comprises then both the Union's administration 
and the Member States administration when implementing EU law, in the context of indirect 
administration but also in that of composite procedures. 
 
The idea that the European Union can stipulate a norm of administrative procedure 
that applies to EU institutions as well as national agencies is not revolutionary78. There are 
several examples of sector specific EU acts which detail rules of administrative procedure 
applicable to national agencies or other authorities, including procedural rights of individuals. 
 
The framework directive on the telecommunications sector79 imposes certain 
obligations on the Member States concerning the independence of the national regulatory 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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 Craig, "A General Law on Administrative Procedure...", at 512. 
77
 Section 2.6.2. 
78
 Craig, "A General Law on Administrative Procedure...", at 505. 
79
 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002, L108, 33-50). 
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agencies80, and award certain rights to the private parties concerned, such as the right to 
consultation and certain guarantees of transparency81. The directive on integrated pollution 
prevention and control82 is another good example, as it establishes detailed guarantees in 
view of the right of access to justice to individuals83. It also imposes obligations to amend 
national procedural laws and strengthen participation rights84.  
 
Another illuminating example can be found in Regulation 1049/200185 on public 
access to documents which relates to a citizens' right vis-à-vis the public administration. 
Regulation 1049/2001 is applicable to the European institutions only and was adopted on the 
legal basis of Article 25586 TEC which established the right to access the documents of the 
Commission, the Council and Parliament. This legal basis could not possibly cover any 
enlargement of this right to the access of documents in the national administrations. 
However, the Regulation contains a provision on the interplay of documents originating from 
the EU institutions but held by Member States authorities. Thus, it provides that where a 
Member State receives a request for a document in its possession, originating from an 
institution, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed, the Member 
State shall consult with the institution concerned in order to take a decision. This provision is 
an eloquent example of an obligation created for Member States, in full respect of their 
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 Ibid. at Article 3. 
81
 Ibid. at Article 6. 
82
 Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated 
pollution prevention and control (consolidated version) (OJ 2008 L 24, 8-29). 
83
 Ibid. at Article 16. 
84
 As ammended by Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 
providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the 
environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 
85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 156, 26-32). 
85
  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 145 L 2001, 43-48). 
86
 "1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 
subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. 
2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to 
documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
251 within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding 
access to its documents." 
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administrative procedural autonomy, in order to ensure the effectiveness of a right conferred 
at the EU level on the basis of a provision, Article 255 of the old TEC, with a much narrower 
scope than Article 298 TFEU. 
 
It can be concluded from the previous considerations that Article 298 TFEU, read 
together with Article 41 ChFR, provides a sufficient legal basis for a general codification of 
EU administrative procedures. Such codification can and should include composite 
procedures, despite the doubts and precautions that the Institutions have shown so far. 
However, unlike administrative procedures within the framework of direct administration, the 
rules should not address all the details of the regulation of composite procedures as far as the 
national level of administration is concerned, but only impose the minimum obligations to 
Member States to ensure the coherence of the regulation of composite procedures and the 
comprehensiveness of the rights recognised to citizens in that regard.  
 
6.2.4.- A proposal for the provisions on composite procedures in the General Act of EU 
administrative procedures 
 
Following the considerations laid down in the previous section, composite procedures 
should be included in the regulation codifying EU administrative procedures but not in the 
same fashion as administrative procedures in the context of direct implementation of EU law, 
where only the EU level of public administration is concerned. The approach is that the EU 
regulation should concern primarily the Union's public administration. The national 
authorities should abide by their national laws and operate according to national procedures, 
but the EU regulation could include certain mechanisms of coordination and, notably, ensure 
certain individual rights that could not be otherwise guaranteed.  
 
In view of comparative law, this approach is not unseen.  In both Spain and Italy, the 
general law of administrative procedure establishing the general provisions applicable of 
administrative procedures at the central level at the same time that it establishes certain 
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obligations and minimum standards applicable to all the levels of government87. The Spanish 
legislation is particularly interesting in this regard. The Act 30/199288, establishes certain 
provisions that must be respected by all the public authorities under its scope, which includes 
the administrations of the regions or Comunidades Autónomas. There can be sector-specific 
rules, both at the central level and regional level, that detail some procedural arrangements 
applicable to some administrative procedures. However, this general law does not preclude 
the existence of regional laws on administrative procedures, even with a general nature and in 
view of their peculiar administrative organisation, as long as the minimum standards set at 
the national level are respected89.  
 
The approach proposed would not be identical to this national laws but would bear the 
resemblance that, although primarily addressed at the central level of administration, certain 
elements can be applicable to decentralised levels of administrations too. According to this 
proposal, the few obligations imposed onto Member State authorities would be limited to the 
framework of composite procedures and would only establish the minimum safeguards for 
those individual rights that, as examined in the previous Chapter, cannot be sufficiently 
enforced without an EU Regulation.  
 
Following this approach, the EU regulation should contain the following provisions. 
 
1.- A definition of composite procedures 
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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 Ziller, "Is a law of administrative procedure for the...", at 11. 
88
 Ley 30/1992, of 26 November, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento 
Administrativo Común (Law of the legal regime of the public andministration and of the common 
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 There are numerous regional laws on administrative procedures with a general character, such as the Law  
3/2003 of 26 of March, of the Balearic Islands (BOE 98 of 24 April 2003), or the Law 2/1995of 13 March, of 
the Principality of Asturias (BOE 106 of 4 May 1995). This system is based on Article 149.1.18 of the Spanish 
Constitution which awards the central State the legislation on the general administrative procedure but without 
prejudice to the competences of the Autonomous Communities stemming from their internal organisation and 
other competences, as interpreted by the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court 227/1988, of 29 November. 
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Any reference to the concept of composite procedures in the other provisions would 
need a definition of composite procedures in the first place. Apart from the legal certainty 
that this definition would bring about, it would have the merit of bringing a point of reference 
for other sector-specific regulations and, perhaps more importantly, to the Union’s courts. 
From the moment that there is a definition of composite procedures, a coherent and 
comprehensive approach to the legal concerns related to composite procedures could be 
expected from the Court of Justice.  
 
The definition should be in line with the suggestion explained in Chapter 490, i. e. 
administrative procedures involving the participation of both national and EU public 
administrations aiming at the implementation of EU law. In light of our previous 
explanations, composite procedures are sequences of procedural steps in which 
administrative bodies from the national administration and the European Union provide with 
a contribution to the final decision at either level. The core element of the notion is that 
intense cooperation between national and European authorities is reflected in a procedural 
arrangement with different degrees of formalism. The definition in the law could go along the 
lines: "Composite procedures are administrative procedures in which administrative 
authorities from the Union and from Member States cooperate and provide a relevant input to 
the final decision taken at the EU level or at the national level for the purpose of 
implementing EU law."  
 
The provisions concerning composite procedures should be applicable to both top-
down and bottom-up composite procedures. This would not mean that the EU Regulation 
would be equally applicable to them. In bottom-up composite procedures, where the final 
decision is taken by the EU public administration, the EU Regulation on administrative 
procedures, or the sector-specific Regulation, would be applicable for most of the procedure 
except for the part of the sequence where national administrations intervene, in which 
national rules are applicable but also the minimum safeguards described below. By contrast, 
in top-down composite procedures, much of the administrative procedure will be governed by 
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national administrative rules, while the participation of the Union's administration will be 
provided for in the EU Regulation, together with these minimum guarantees which national 
authorities should respect. 
 
2.- The protection of the right to be heard in composite procedures 
 
It was analysed at length in the previous Chapter that the right to be heard was an 
essential procedural right that was not always fully respected in the context of composite 
procedures. The analysis of the case-law in the previous Chapter concluded that the right to 
be heard in composite procedures was treated by the EU courts differently in different 
sectors91.  
 
In areas like the repayment of custom duties, the case law corrected the deficiencies of 
the legislation. In this sector, rules were amended to eliminate the aspects to which the judges 
had been critical92. In some other areas, like the procedure for the authorisation of pesticides, 
the procedural arrangements established are satisfactory from the point of view of respect for 
the right to be heard93.  In other fields, like the management of structural funds, the approach 
of the Union’s courts raised a number of concerns. Our analysis revealed the urgency for a 
general, comprehensive approach to the problems of composite procedures. 
 
The solution that we advanced as a conclusion to our analysis was that the right to be 
heard had to be respected at every stage at which a binding decision, even if not final, was 
taken. Consequently,? in the procedural schemes where one level of administration makes a 
recommendation of such legal nature that can later be contradicted by the other level of 
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 In this vein, Article 906 a of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 (OJ 1993 L 253, 1) 
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 See section 4.4.2. and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council 
Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, 1-47).  
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administration, a hearing does not need be repeated. The right to be heard can work 
effectively when it takes place before the final decision is made, provided that the concerned 
party has full information on the previous recommendation and is given the possibility to 
refute the conclusion of such recommendation. 
 
The incorporation of this scheme to the general Regulation on administrative 
procedures would lead to a rule that mandates the right for the concerned person to submit 
observations to the authority having the competence to make a discretionary binding 
decision. This right shall be awarded on several occasions if the stages of the procedure so 
require.  
 
In the case of bottom-up composite procedures, the right to be heard must be granted 
at the national level when the input from the national authorities is binding. Thus, the 
individual must be able to comment on the decision taken at the national level and then later, 
eventually, at the EU level at the moment when the final decision is taken. 
 
The right to be heard would then be governed by national procedural legislation, and 
not by the content of the EU Regulation on administrative procedures. However, such 
national rules would have to comply with EU general principles of law concerning fair 
hearings. As previously explained, this requirement would be unproblematic from the 
perspective of respect of national procedural autonomy.  
 
The principle of procedural autonomy entails that, unless the procedural issues are 
directly regulated in the EU law, the Member States remain autonomous and can legislate on 
procedural issues inasmuch as this possibility has not been pre-empted by the European 
Union94. The principle is both conditional and limited. Conditional because it depends on the 
lack of exercice of competences, as the Court of Justice established as early as in the 
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temps" 46 (3–4) Cahiers de droit européen  (2010), 273-309, at 276. 
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Simmenthal ruling95, and limited because Member States have to adopt solutions in alignment 
with the principles of effectiveness and of equivalence96. 
 
The principle of effectiveness, in particular, intends to prevent the situation in which 
the national procedural rules would render the enforcement of EU law based rights 
impossible or excessively difficult. In those cases, the Court of Justice asks the national 
courts to go beyond simple equivalence and to make a particular type of procedure or remedy 
available. The most classic statement of these requirements can be found in the Rewe case 
when the Court of Justice argued that “[…] in the absence of Community rules on this 
subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts 
having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law 
intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect of 
Community law". This statement was further reiterated in many other rulings97, and entails, 
for the purposes of our analysis, that a rule compelling Member States to respects certain 
minimum procedural standards in the context of their input to composite procedures would 
not violate their procedural autonomy.  
 
This approach would indeed entail the imposition of an obligation on Member States. 
This means that when participating in composite procedures they would be obliged to grant 
this right to be heard even if their internal procedural rules do not foresee such right. This 
would happen, for example, as the case has proven relevant, when national administrative law 
does not consider the decision to be made by the national authorities as final. This would also 
be justified in the understanding that national administration acts in composite procedures as 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
95
 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 
96
 Michal Bobek, "Why There is no Principle of 'Procedural Autonomy' of the Member States", in Bruno de 
Witte and Hans Micklitz, The European Court of Justice and Autonomy of the Member States, Intersentia 
(Antwerp, 2011), 305-22, at 305; and Krystyna Kowalik-Ba?czyk, "Procedural Autonomy of Member States 
and the EU Rights of Defence in Antitrust Proceedings", 5(6) Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 
(2012), 215-35, at 220. 
97
 Case C-128/93, Fisscher / Voorhuis Hengelo BV [1994] ECR I-4583, at paragraph 39; Case C-410/92, 
Johnson [1994] ECR I-5483, at paragraph 21; Case C-394/93, Alonso-Pérez / Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1995] 
ECR I-4101, para. 28; Case C-246/96, Magorrian and Cunningham [1997] ECR I-7153, at paragraph 37;; Joined 
Cases C-52/99 and C-53/99, Camarotto and others [2001] ECR I-1395, at paragraph 21; Case C-432/05, Unibet 
[2007] ECR I-2271, at paragraph 39; and Case C- 40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL / Cristina Rodríguez 
Nogueira, ECR 2009 I-09579, at paragraph 41. 
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part of a wider European administration and Article 298 TFEU would thus be a sufficient 
legal basis. 
 
In the case of top-down composite procedures, the obligation should be imposed on 
the Union public administration to grant this right to be heard before the input by the EU is 
forwarded to the national authorities. The imposition of this obligation would be 
unproblematic, as it only concerns the Union's authorities. 
 
In both cases, the further safeguard should be that the statement of the individual shall 
be included in the file so the authority that makes the final decision takes into consideration 
all the information available to it. This conclusion is in line with the proposal of the 
ReNEUAL. In the draft model rules on EU administrative procedures presented in 2014, 
Article III-24 proposes the rules on the right to be heard in composite procedures, and it 
specifies that the right shall be respected at all stages of a composite procedure, at national 
and European level98.   
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 The Draft model rules were presented in the ReNEUAL conference of 19 May 2014, for which 
documentation is available at www.reneual.eu.  
Book III - Single case decision making. Article III-24: 
 Right to be heard in composite procedures 
"(1) The right to be heard must be respected at all stages of a composite procedure between the EU and the 
Member States leading to a decision in the manner set out in this Article. The application of the right to be heard 
will depend on the division of responsibility in the decision-making process. 
(2) In a case of composite procedure, where an EU authority makes the decision it must comply with the 
procedural requirements in Article III-23. Where the decision is made by a Member State authority it must 
comply with the requirements of Article III-23 where sector specific legislation renders the procedural rules in 
Book III applicable. In the absence of such legislation, or any other EU legislation specifying applicable 
procedural requirements, the Member State authority will apply national rules of administrative procedure, 
which must comply with EU general principles of law concerning fair hearings. 
(3) In a case of composite procedure, the form and content of the hearing provided pursuant to Article III-23 (5) 
by the public authority that makes the decision will be affected by the extent to which the rights of the defence 
were adequately protected at a prior stage in the administrative proceedings by another public authority. 
(4) In a case of composite procedure, where the public authority making the decision is legally bound by a 
recommendation made by an EU authority, then the right to be heard must be adequately protected before the 
EU authority that makes the recommendation, including through application of the principles in Article III-23 
(3)-(5). Where sector specific legislation renders Book III applicable to Member States, the preceding obligation 
applies mutatis mutandis where a Member State authority makes the recommendation. In the absence of such 
legislation, or any other EU legislation specifying applicable procedural requirements, the Member State 
authority will apply national rules of administrative procedure, which must comply with EU general principles 
of law concerning fair hearings. 
(5) In a case of composite procedure, where the EU authority’s decision is predicated on a recommendation 
made by another public authority and where there was no opportunity for a hearing before such a public 
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3. The obligation to state reasons 
 
The obligation to state the reason for a certain administrative decision is closely 
linked to the right to be heard as well as to the right to judicial review. It means that the 
public authority must inform the individual concerned of the reasons of a decision against his 
interest, so he can eventually refute the those grounds and facts in an eventual application to 
review the decision.  
 
The proposal of a provision in the Regulation for EU administrative procedures would 
follow the same rationale as seen in the previous section, meaning that the statement of 
reasons must be provided for every step in which a discretionary decision is taken. For each 
decision in the administrative sequence, even if not final, motivation shall be made known to 
the interested party. In this case, however, it does not harm the position of the individual if 
the obligation is not complied with at every step, but only at the end, in which case the 
reasons included in the final decision should relate to the previous steps of the procedure. 
 
The aim of this right is to contest the administrative decision at a judicial instance. 
Hence, the statement of reasons is linked to the final decision, even if it concerns previous 
decisions too, because only the final decision can be challenged. The essential element is thus 
that the individual has full knowledge of the whole information not only on the final decision, 
but also on the previous decisions that might have been determining for the outcome of the 
procedure.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
authority, the right to be heard before the decision is taken shall include knowledge of the recommendation and 
the ability to contest its findings. Where sector specific legislation renders Book III applicable to Member 
States, the preceding obligation applies mutatis mutandis where a Member State authority makes the decision 
pursuant to a recommendation made by another public authority. In the absence of such legislation, or any other 
EU legislation specifying applicable procedural requirements, the Member State authority will apply national 
rules of administrative procedure, which must comply with EU general principles of law concerning fair 
hearings. 
(6) For the avoidance of doubt, this Article is also applicable to cases of composite procedure where EU law 
imposes legal obligations on Member State authorities to coordinate or co-operate action that leads to individual 
decisions." 
424 
?
 
The case law of the EU courts has accepted the statement of reasons per relationem, 
meaning by reference to documents or information, as long as the information referred is 
complete99. This statement of reason would remain possible provided that it is indeed 
complete and does not harm the rights of the individual in view of a possible challenge of the 
administrative decision. This means that if the statement of reasons concerning a part of the 
procedure is not communicated together with the final decision, but was made known before, 
it would suffice that the latter makes reference to it. 
 
A final element is that national administrations should be bound to respect the 
standards of the Union in its obligation to state reasons. This element would not be 
problematic, given that Member States are implementing EU law and policies in the context 
of composite procedures and thus the requirement of Article 51(1) ChFR in relation to Article 
41 ChFR would be fully complied with.  
 
Consequently, the provision should read that in the context of composite procedures 
the public administration shall state the reasons in a clear, simple and understandable way of 
its decision in each step of the administrative sequence. This statement of reasons can refer to 
a previous administrative decision as long as the concerned party is in a position to fully 
ascertain the reason of the administration for its final decision. This proposal would also be in 
line with Article III-29 of the draft Rules of ReNEUAL. 
 
4. Overcoming the shortcomings for the right to judicial review 
 
The analysis of the shortcomings regarding access to justice took up the most 
important part of the previous chapter as these are indeed the most relevant legal challenge 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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 Case T-182/96 Partex / Commission [1999] ECR II-2673, at paragraph 76; Case T-72/97 Proderec / 
Commission [1998] ECR II-2847, at paragraph 105; T-80/00 Associação Comercial de Aveiro / Commission 
[2002] ECR II-2465, at paragraph 42. 
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that composite procedures bring about. We structured the study of access to justice in three 
parts: the determination of the competent court, the definition of challengeable act, and the 
legal standing of individuals. Such structure is also useful for the solutions that will be 
advocated in this chapter.  
 
The allocation of competences to review acts in the context of composite procedures 
was the first problem identified. The paradigmatic case of Borelli100 proves that there are 
cases where composite procedures lead to a legal dead-end. Neither national courts are 
competent to review because the act in question is not final nor the EU courts can rule on the 
act challenged because the act in question emanates from a national administration. The 
general Regulation on EU administrative procedure should determine the competences 
clearly in the context of composite procedures. This specification is not necessary for 
administrative acts of the Union in general in the case of direct implementation, because they 
will be under the competence of the EU courts. For national administrative acts, even in the 
context of indirect implementation of EU law, the problem does not arise either, because they 
fall under the competence of national courts. In composite procedures, as we have seen, there 
is room for uncertainty.  
 
The determination of the competent court shall be linked to the origin of the 
challenged act. This is uncontroversial. EU courts will review the acts emanating from the 
Union, thus normally in the context of what we have called upwards composite procedures, 
and the national courts will be competent for decisions taken by national authorities, namely 
resulting from downwards composite procedures. Nevertheless, two concerns arise; the first 
is that the definition of what a challengeable act is not necessarily clear and homogeneous, 
the second is the extent to which the competent court can extend its competence.  
 
The first problem would be relatively easy to tackle. It would require a definition of 
challengeable act. This definition should be included in the General Act of EU administrative 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
100
 Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli / Commission, [1992] ECR I-6313. 
426 
?
procedures with a general character101, that is, not restricted to composite procedures. On 
substance, this would not be revolutionary as the Court of Justice has already established that 
concept which is not substantially different from the one existing in national legislations. The 
case-law of the Court of Justice has long established that challengeable acts include "only 
measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, 
the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position.102" The non-formalistic 
approach to the notion of challengeable act found in the traditional case-law of the Court of 
Justice has to be nuanced in view of the partially formalistic approach after the Lisbon Treaty 
which results from the Inuit rulings103. In any case, and taking into consideration the recent 
evolution of the case law, this notion refers to the decision affecting the legal position of the 
individual, and thus refers primarily, save for exceptional cases, to the final decision of an 
administrative procedure and with the exclusion of preparatory acts. 
 
Even if not revolutionary, laying down a definition of challengeable act would be a 
positive development and would help to clarify the competence of EU courts and national 
courts, leaving aside preparatory acts which will generally not be susceptible of a challenge 
in court. As it will be developed subsequently, the solution to the shortcoming that 
preparatory acts cannot be reviewed independently shall relate to a mechanism of cooperation 
and communication between courts that enables for a preliminary review or interpretation of 
preparatory decisions when pertinent. 
 
So, leaving aside the aspects which could be tackled in a relatively easy fashion by 
following the existing case law on the matter, the legal true conundrum of the extension of 
the judicial competence stems from the fact that in composite procedures more than one 
administration has taken part in the administrative procedure, but the competent court, either 
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 The European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on a Law 
of Administrative Procedure of the European Union (2012/2024(INL)) includes in part 4 some rules governing 
administrative decisions. The definition of challengeable act should be included in this section. 
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 Case 60/81 IBM / Commission [1981] ECR 2639, at paragraph 48; Case C-117/91 Bosman / Commission 
[1991] ECR I-4837, at paragraph 13; and T-3/93 Air France / Commission [1994] ECR II-121, at paragraph 43.  
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 Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami / Parliament, [2011]II-5599 and  T-262/10, Microban International and 
Microban (Europe) / Commission [2011] ECR II-7697, as confirmed by the Court of Justice in Case C-583/11 P 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others / Parliament and Council [2013] (ECLI:EU:C:2013:625). 
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national or European, can only review the actions of one level of administration. This 
problem could be confronted by three possible alternatives: 
 
The first alternative would be that the competent Court on the final act is competent to 
review the whole of the administrative procedure. In bottom-up administrative procedure, this 
alternative would entail that the Union courts would be competent to interpret national law 
and rule on the validity of national administrative acts. In top-down administrative 
procedures, it would mean that national courts can rule on the validity of administrative acts 
by the administration of the EU. This alternative would imply, in formal terms, the 
modification of primary law and, in substance, a radical overhaul of the conception of the 
judicial system of the Union. EU courts would be given jurisdiction over national law and 
national courts would be competent to rule on the decisions of the Commission and other EU 
Institutions and bodies, so this alternative must be discarded.  
 
The second alternative would be to allow each court to rule on the validity of each and 
every step of the administrative sequence regardless of whether it constitutes a merely 
preparatory act. This alternative is relatively realistic, and it can be deduced of the Borelli 
case law, inasmuch as the Court of Justice mandated that the preparatory acts were reviewed 
by national courts even if that runs counter their own administrative rules. However, this is 
not a satisfactory solution. It entails a denaturalisation of administrative procedures and 
appears contrary to both the national and the EU conception of administrative procedure as a 
series of steps towards a final decision that can be reviewed. It would, furthermore, create 
legal uncertainty for the individual in terms of the acts that he would be able to challenge and 
the deadlines for them. This confusion would probably worsen the position of the individual 
in practice. Considering many of the cases that have been examined the extent to which the 
binding effect of preparatory acts is unclear, this possibility would give way to potential 
conflicts of jurisdiction between the Union and national courts, a situation that cannot be 
welcomed. This alternative would thus bring about more problems than it would solve. 
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The third alternative is to use mechanisms of cooperation between the two systems of 
courts. Such mechanism would entail that if the validity of an act adopted in the course of the 
administrative procedure is at stake, the Court with the competence to review the final 
administrative decision can refer its question of validity to the court competent to rule on the 
validity of the administrative acts at stake. A distinction must be made between downwards 
and upwards composite procedures as for the viability of this proposal. 
 
Top-down composite procedures are relatively less problematic. In this type of 
composite procedures, national courts would have the opportunity to ask the Court of Justice 
through a preliminary ruling procedure. This mechanism would in theory  be suitable to avoid 
any shortcomings in the guarantee of the right to judicial review for downwards procedures, 
in spite of the inherent limitations of preliminary rulings procedures, such as the longer 
resolution time for such judicial procedures, the fact that the procedure is not obligatory for 
national courts when there is a right to further recourse, and the possibility that the national 
courts do not raise the preliminary ruling procedure at all. However, these are limitations 
common to the preliminary ruling procedure in general104. 
 
The problems in the mechanism in the peculiar context of composite procedures stem 
from the interpretation of the Court of Justice of the need for binding effects. The conclusion 
of the analysis of the case law on downwards composite procedures was that sometimes the 
appreciation of the Count of Justice in contributions by the EU administrative authorities to 
an administrative procedure were not binding and as such the final decision of the national 
authorities was fully discretionary105. In some of the situations analysed, this line of 
reasoning was open to criticism and led to unfavourable situations for the individuals. It can 
be expected, however, that a clear definition of composite procedures would encourage the 
Union's courts to look at the phenomenon more consistently, taking into consideration 
composite procedures as a whole and thus correct this approach.  
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 More details on the limitations and criticisms to the preliminary ruling procedure are included in the 
following section 6.3.1. 
105
 A notable case in this vein was Case 109/83, Eurico / Commission, [1983] ECR 3582, but there are others 
analysed in section 5.3.5. 
429 
?
 
The mechanism of cooperation between courts does not exist in the context of bottom-
up composite procedures, which are indeed the most frequent type of composite procedure. 
The Courts of the Union have neither the power to rule on the validity of the procedural steps 
taken by national authorities nor the possibility to question national courts about it. This is 
arguably the main gap in judicial protection that the individual faces in the context of 
composite procedures. It is a challenge for which the only viable solution is the establishment 
of a new cooperation mechanism between the Courts of the Union and the Courts of Member 
States, which we will call inverse preliminary ruling procedure and which need to be 
explained in detail in a separate section.  
 
This third alternative would furthermore be coherent with the rationale of cooperation 
existing at the administrative level and would mirror such cooperation, mutatis mutandis, at 
the level of the judicial systems. It would match the increasingly mixed character of the 
administrative structures of the European Union106, and would help to ease the tension 
between EU and national courts by establishing a new mechanism of communication. 
 
6.3.- Inverse preliminary ruling procedure 
 
6.3.1.- The preliminary ruling procedure and its functions 
?
The establishment of the preliminary reference procedure in the original Treaties was 
not only a revolutionary instrument unprecedented in International Law107 but the main path 
thanks to which the rulings of the Court of Justice constitutionalized the Community system 
of law108. The Court itself said that preliminary ruling procedure is "the veritable cornerstone 
of the operation of the internal market, since it plays a fundamental role in ensuring that the 
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 Gráinne de Búrca, “The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union”, 28 European 
Law Review (2003), 814-39, at 814. 
107
  Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 2010), at 5. 
108
 Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph H. H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, 
(Oxford, 2001), at 7. 
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law established by the Treaties retains its Community character with a view to guaranteeing 
that the law has the same effect in all circumstances in all the Member States of the European 
Union"109.  
 
The involvement of the Court of Justice in the litigation at national level regarding the 
interpretation of European Union law was of capital importance in the development of a 
community of Law, a milestone to which not only the Court of Justice but also the national 
courts, by their readiness to submit the relevant questions and to comply with the rulings, 
contributed110.  
 
The preliminary ruling procedure has become a central instrument for judicial control 
in the Union and for ensuring the effective application of EU law111. Its main characteristic is 
that it is based on co-operative rather than hierarchical model of control112. This element 
explains many peculiarities in the legal protection in the European Union113. As professor von 
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 Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the Treaty of the European Union 
(1995), at 5. 
110
 Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe 'Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?' and Other Essays 
on European Integration, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1999), at 32. As professor Schermers 
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(The Hague, 1993), 15-122. 
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European Constitutional Law, Hart Publishing (Oxford, 2009), 11-54, at 33. 
113
 Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: the politics of judicial integration, Macmillan (London, 
1998), at 14. 
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Bogdandy has argued "European legal unity is not perceived as centralistic, but as pluralistic 
and dialogical"114, which reflects a certain federal logic of the Union115. 
 
There are certainly different types of academic criticism against the preliminary ruling 
procedure as it is currently conceived, though the system has proven difficult to reform116. 
The lengthening of judicial procedures when a preliminary question is raised is among the 
most evident drawbacks of the system117, but laconic or inconclusive rulings have also been 
criticised118. From a more theoretical perspective, a debatable aspect is the possibility that 
courts which are not of last instance are empowered to launch the procedure. Some scholars 
have posited the limitation to the highest courts to reinforce the mutual trust between courts 
and avoid some inefficiencies of the system119. Indeed, the possibility exists that lower courts 
seek in raising a preliminary ruling to a different case-law of that established by higher 
national courts. This possibility can indeed result in a higher standard of protection of 
individual rights, as it has happened notably in certain areas recently120. 
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On the opposite direction, some criticism is addressed to the efficacy of the obligation 
to raise a preliminary ruling procedure, which sometimes national courts do not respect, and 
the limitations of the CILFIT case-law121. The so-called acte clair doctrine122 -the matter is so 
obvious as to leave no space for any reasonable doubt-, complemented with the acte éclairé 
doctrine123 -the matter has already been settled by the Court of Justice in another analogous 
case-, entails that national courts, even of last instance have a reasonable leeway to ponder 
whether the preliminary ruling procedure shall be initiated124. Abuse could take place if the 
national court argues that the interpretation of EU law is clear125. Although a breach in the 
obligation to raise a preliminary reference can be sanctioned under EU law, and the 
individual can ultimately be awarded his right126, this relative discretion of the national courts 
can result in limitations of rights of the individuals. In the most serious cases, non-referral for 
a preliminary ruling can constitute an infringement of the right to a fair trial127. This is indeed 
the main shortcoming that we identified in the context of downwards composite procedures, 
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where national courts were competent but needed to raise a preliminary ruling procedure to 
fully ascertain the validity of the final national administrative decision.?
 
Despite these reservations, the preliminary ruling procedure has proven to be a 
successful and efficient instrument in many respects128. It is a common place in the academia 
to stress the central role of the preliminary ruling procedure in the establishment of the most 
fundamental principles of EU law129, in the creation of a community of law -a jus comunae 
europeo-130, and thus in the advancement of European integration131. Other procedures for 
which the Court of Justice is competent would not have provided the Court with the 
opportunity develop such relevant case-law on the foundations of EU law132. The uniformity 
in the interpretation of EU law, and the very essential questions that the Court of Justice 
settles through preliminary references, are the reason why the possibility to transfer 
preliminary cases to the General Court foreseen in Article 256 TFEU has never been used, 
and it is not likely to be used even in specialised areas of EU law133.  
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Besides its functions in the uniform interpretation of EU law and the elaboration of 
the general principles of EU law, one of the biggest virtues of the preliminary ruling 
procedure is that it has allowed the Court of Justice to intervene in controversies where 
individual rights were at stake134, and has sometimes taken the opportunity to enforce those 
rights in the context of restrictive national legal provisions135. The Court of Justice precisely 
highlighted the function of the preliminary ruling procedure as an essential element for the 
completeness of the Union's system of judicial protection in its famous UPA ruling136, 
therefore establishing the protection of individual rights as an essential function of the 
preliminary ruling procedure. As some commentators have stressed, the Court of Justice has 
taken the opportunity to build its legitimacy and authority on this direct relationship it holds 
with European citizens when dealing with this preliminary ruling procedures137. This function 
of the preliminary ruling procedure was already examined in the previous chapter138.  
 
Indeed, this logic responds to the need for a mechanism of dialogue between the 
national and the Union's judges in order to ensure s the protection of individual rights, a logic 
which is essential for the solution that will be advanced afterwards. 
 
6.3.2.- The judicial dialogue in the EU 
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In the famous ruling of the case Cohn-Bendit139, the French Conseil d'État stated that 
"at the level of the European Community, there should be no government of judges or war of 
judges but rather there must be room for a dialogue of judges"140. Needless to say, the 
preliminary ruling procedure appears as the most important formal mechanism for such 
dialogue. 
 
This understanding of the role of the Court of Justice in the context of the preliminary 
ruling procedure by a highly reputed national authority does not aim at demeaning the role 
and the authority of the Court of Justice. Far from it, the Court of Justice had already 
emphasised, in rulings as early as Costa / ENEL??? and Simmenthal II???, the importance of 
the network of courts established by the preliminary ruling in holding both national and 
European actors accountable???. The relationship between the Courts should thus not be 
hierarchical, inasmuch as national law could not require the exhaustion of national remedies 
prior to a request for a preliminary ruling, but dialogical where a national judge is also a 
Community judge and the supremacy of Community law does not imply the inferiority of 
national courts144. The preliminary ruling procedure is described by professor Arnull as a 
source of mutual learning of practices and underlying principles145. Advocate General Jacobs 
said on this topic that : 
 
"judicial dialogue is a vital feature of the ECJ because of the unusual character of its 
jurisdiction. In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, and perhaps to supreme courts 
generally, the ECJ is not essentially an appellate court. (...) it has jurisdiction to rule 
on many, although not all, questions of Union law referred to it by the “national 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
139
 Decision of 22 December 1978 ministre de l'intérieur c/ Cohn-Bendit, Rec. Lebon  at 524. 
140
 The translation is ours. 
141
 Case 6/64, Costa / ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
142
 Case 106/77, Administrazione delle Finanze / Simmenthal, [1977] ECR 630. 
143
 Herwig C. H. Hofmann, “Composite decision making procedures in EU administrative law”, in  Herwig C. 
H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law – Towards an 
Integrated Administration, Edward Elgar Publishing  (Cheltenham , 2009), 136-67, at 158.  
144
 Ibid. 
145
 Anthony Arnull, "The Law Lords and the European Union: Swimming with the Incoming Tide", 35(1) 
European Law Review (2010), 57-87, at 62. 
436 
?
courts” —i.e., the courts of the Member States, where a national court considers, in a 
case it is hearing, that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment. Under this procedure— by which any court or tribunal of a Member State 
may, and a final court must, refer such a question to the ECJ for a “preliminary 
ruling” before it gives judgment —there is a sharing of jurisdiction between the 
national court and the ECJ which entails a special form of “judicial dialogue.”146 
 
The existence and the fluidity of this judicial dialogue have indeed been essential for 
the construction of a cooperative spirit in the application and development of EU by national 
courts, as many commentators admit147. This logic is even embedded in the structure of the 
Court, comprised of judges and advocates general coming from each Member State, as well 
as in the administrative organisation of the Court, with a research department that can provide 
information on the national laws of the Member States148.  
 
In the context of this judicial dialogue, the preliminary ruling procedure leads to a 
unidirectional pattern of communication between judges. In formal terms, this scheme only 
permits national courts to ask and the Court of Justice to reply. The reality, of course, is more 
complex and nuanced, and national courts do play an active role in the system149.  The best 
illustration of national courts modelling the case-law of the Court of Justice and developing 
new important general principles is that of German courts and the necessary respect for 
fundamental rights150. German courts saw possible contradiction between EC law and 
national law provisions on fundamental rights, and asked for the guidance of the Court of 
Justice. Without any explicit basis in the Treaties at the time, the Court of Justice 
acknowledged that fundamental rights were enshrined in the general principles of 
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Community law and protected by the Court151. The Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof would go 
further and make its recognition of the supremacy of European Union's law conditional on 
the respect of fundamental rights152, which the Court of Justice accepted153.  
 
That being said, preliminary ruling procedure remains structurally an unilateral 
mechanism of communication, which mirrors the original model of indirect administration of 
executive federalism, which, as long discussed in the second chapter, has now come far from 
reality154.  
 
Oddly enough, among the different proposals stemming from the academia on the 
reform or the improvement of the preliminary ruling procedure -many of which focus on the 
enhancement of the functions of the national courts and the increase of the mutual trust155-, 
there is no emphasis on transforming the mechanism from a unilateral pattern of 
communication to a bilateral one. While there is a call for an enhanced cooperation between 
European and national courts156, the possibility proposed has not been thoroughly explored.  
The idea of an inverse preliminary ruling procedure or a incident review of the legality of 
action by a national court at request of the Court of Justice is not new. Professor Herwig 
Hofmann proposed it as mechanism to adapt judicial review to multi-level integrated 
procedures157. 
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6.3.3.- A concrete proposal on the inverse preliminary ruling procedure  
 
Procedures for which the Court of Justice is competent are provided for in primary 
Law158. The proposed inverse preliminary ruling would be an incident procedure and would 
not constitute strictly speaking a judicial procedure of the Court of Justice, so it would not 
need to be provided for in the body of the Treaties. The inverse preliminary ruling would 
constitute a procedure for the national court and an incident for the EU courts, for this reason 
there are two types of instruments in which the inverse preliminary ruling procedure could be 
laid down. 
 
From the perspective of the EU courts, the incident should be provided for in the 
Statute of the Court of Justice. Pursuant to Article 281 TFEU, the Statute may be amended in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, with the special element that the 
legislative procedure can be initiated at the request of the Court of Justice after consultation 
of the Commission, or on proposal from the Commission after consultation of the Court of 
Justice. It must be noted that major reforms of the EU courts159, with larger implications than 
the one we are proposing, are being dealt with through this procedure equivalent to an 
ordinary secondary legislation legislative procedure.  
 
After the introduction of a provision with this possibility in the Statute of the Court of 
Justice, possibly by the addition of an Article in Title III 'the procedure before the Court of 
Justice of the Statute, the detailed provisions would have to be added to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice and to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court160. This 
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could be done by the addition of a new chapter in Title IV 'Direct Actions' of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice161 and in Title III 'Direct Actions' of the Rules of Procedure 
of the General Court162. The establishment of this incident would be more pertinent in the 
context of actions for which the GC is competent, because they are initiated by private 
applicants. However, it should be included regarding actions brought before the Court of 
Justice too. Although the General Court would be the ordinary court for controversies 
emanating from composite procedures, as they are normally brought by private applicants, it 
cannot be excluded that a decision taken in the context of a composite procedure is later 
object of interinstitutional litigation or of an action brought by a Member State. 
 
From the perspective of the national courts, the implementation of this procedure 
would be more complex. There would need to be an instrument of secondary law establishing 
that national laws implement such as system. A directive would thus need to be adopted 
making a reference to composite procedures as defined and regulated in the EU Regulation 
on administrative procedures as described in the previous section. The directive should 
establish the contact points of each Member State to which the requests should be addressed. 
These points of contact shall be competent to liaise national judicial bodies. A system of 
points of contact already exists in the field of judicial cooperation163. These contact points 
could either answer the request directly or forward it to the competent national court 
according to internal national rules. All Member States would need to incorporate the 
necessary procedural arrangements in their national legislations to implement this incident 
procedure.  
 
It is thus for national legislation to determine the competent body that would 
ultimately reply the question. This would depend on the judicial structure in each country. As 
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examined in the previous Chapter164, the system of review of acts of the public administration 
goes from the ordinary courts in the United Kingdom to the review by a specialised body of 
the Administration in France, passing through the existence of a special jurisdiction in Spain. 
Only each national law can regulate the attribution of specific competences, because this will 
be intimately linked to the national court structure and procedural rules.  
 
That said, some aspects, like the need to hear the parties, or a maximum deadline to 
forward the reply, can still be included in the directive in question. These procedural 
warrantees are necessary so that the new system does not bring down the barriers to the 
individual rights of review at the expense of a breach in the right to a judicial process within a 
reasonable time. In order to safeguard the rights of the parties, it should be ensured that their 
points of view can be heard in the court replying the request, either orally or in written. The 
procedure should not last so long that the system is counterproductive for the rights of the 
individuals. 
 
Although the procedure mirrors the preliminary ruling procedure, it is important to 
underline that its aim is restricted to the reply of the very question raised by the EU judges. 
Unlike the preliminary ruling procedure it does not aim at the homogeneous interpretation of 
the law. For that reason, the allocation of the competence to decide to a lower national court 
would be possible.  
 
That way, the system would be similar to the system which exists in some national 
procedural legislations whereby a court can refer a preliminary question on the interpretation 
of a certain decision for which it is not competent to the competent court, so as to decide on 
the final decision at stake. This is notably the case in France, where following the separation 
of the purely 'judicial jurisdiction' from the 'administrative jurisdiction'165, i. e. that of the 
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Conseil d'État, the French Tribunal des Conflits determined in his famous ruling Septfonds166 
that a civil court cannot interpret an administrative decision, and if it needs such 
interpretation to rule on the action for which it is competent, it must raise a preliminary ruling 
procedure before the administrative jurisdiction. Although this case-law has been nuanced 
since then, so that only in case of difficult interpretations must the question be raised, the 
mechanism of rénvoi between the civil and the administrative jurisdiction still exists in 
France167. In Spain, for example, these questions between courts can be raised even within 
the administrative jurisdiction itself. According to the law on the administrative 
jurisdiction168, an administrative court competent to review a certain administrative decision 
may raise a question on the validity of an administrative regulation of general application, to 
the competent court.  
 
Finally, this instrument could also be applied to relations between Member State 
administrative authorities. We identified fewer horizontal composite procedures than vertical 
composite procedures169, however the shortcomings in the right of judicial review are equally 
problematic. The system would allow national courts when reviewing an administrative 
decision by the public administration of their respective Member State to ask another national 
court to assess the validity of another administrative decision, therefore not leaving any room 
for a gap in legal protection. 
 
An indirect effect of the establishment of this incident, though not an irrelevant one, 
would be to introduce a factor of trust between the national courts. It was indicated in the 
previous section how recent rulings of the Court of Justice and the reaction of some national 
courts had been interpreted by some authors as a sign of increasing mistrust to the Court of 
Justice due to the perception that it placed itself in a position of superiority in the context of 
the judicial dialogue that was supposed to take place among EU and national courts, therefore 
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accusing the Court of Justice of a certain unilateralism170. The establishment of this incident 
and thus the transformation of the one way communication mechanism into a bidirectional 
mechanism would help to overcome this criticism.  
 
6.4.- Conclusions 
 
The interest of this study lies not only on the identification of the legal concerns of 
composite procedures, but on the outline of the solutions to those problems. The intention is 
that the ideas put forward are both plausible and complete. The rule making process in the 
European Union often reveals that these two characteristics, plausibility and completeness, 
seldom go hand by hand. In case of contradiction, as it can easily be understood, the first 
characteristic prevails over the second. Rightly so. The European Union is a political entity, 
one with numerous restrictions, not an academic entity. 
 
However, the attempt made by this dissertation would not be satisfactory if it does not 
provide a sufficient answer to each and every shortcoming that has been identified in the 
previous chapters. This proposal is complete inasmuch as it provides a reasonable response to 
the three main challenges that composite procedures bring about.  
 
A general law on EU administrative procedure, the milestone for the codification of 
administrative procedures in the European Union, is not a new idea. Scholars have been 
advocating for the adoption of such a Regulation for decades already. The Treaty of Lisbon 
provides a clear, sufficient legal basis. The European Parliament has launched the idea 
formally through a legislative resolution. Yet the Commission has not given a follow-up. A 
Commission committed politically to less law-making171, and the general political 
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atmosphere existing at this moment do not provide a very positive context for a very far-
fetched piece of legislation.  
 
The resolution of Parliament limits itself to EU administrative procedures in the 
context of direct action of the EU. This is an insufficient approach. Rules on composite 
procedures are as necessary as rules on purely Union's administrative procedures, if not more; 
and there are no obstacles from the point of view of the legal basis or the respect for 
procedural autonomy of Member States to define composite procedures and establish 
minimum safeguards for the private parties concerned by them. 
 
The mere definition of composite procedures included in the general act on EU 
administrative procedures would be an enormous step to correct the deficiencies of composite 
procedures, if only so that the EU courts had in mind that there is a separate category – 
'composite procedures' – when deciding on a dispute in the context of these shortcomings. 
 
The proposals in the context of the procedural rights of the individuals throughout a 
composite procedure are relatively modest and have been elaborated by the Court of Justice, 
at least in some of the cases analysed. They imply that the right to be heard must be respected 
whenever an administrative authority takes a binding discretionary decision. For the 
obligation to state reasons, they require that the individual is fully aware of the motivation of 
the final decision, including the previous administrative steps if relevant. The proposals are 
modest and realistic. In conclusion, they do not go further than the general scope of these 
procedural guarantees, only they are adapted to the peculiarities of composite procedures. 
Reliance on the general understanding of these rights has proven insufficient for a standard of 
protection of the individual comparable to the ones that the individual enjoys in other 
administrative procedures. 
 
In terms of the deficiencies in the access to justice in composite procedures, it is not 
possible to provide a satisfactory solution only with provisions inserted in a Regulation on 
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EU administrative procedures. In particular, for bottom-up composite procedures the solution 
would not be complete without the establishment of a new channel of communication 
between the Court of Justice and the national courts. The Borelli conundrum cannot be solved 
otherwise, unless an invasion by the Court of Justice of the national jurisdiction is foreseen.  
 
The proposal of an inverse preliminary ruling procedure is not as far-fetched as it 
might at first sight appear. It mirrors the preliminary ruling procedure but with a more 
humble, pragmatic effect, and without the pretension of uniformity of interpretation linked to 
preliminary ruling procedures. Something analogous exists in some Member States as a 
solution at the disposal of courts that need to preserve their jurisdictional exclusivity. 
Furthermore, it reinforces the notion of judicial dialogue -sometimes put into question- and 
goes along the logic of intense cooperation. A logic which exists among public 
administrations, composite procedures are the best example of it, but lacks among courts.  
  
?
?
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions 
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I 
 
The subject of composite procedures is still relatively unexplored where much 
remains to be written. It was advanced in the Introduction that the objective of this 
dissertation was to assess and make sense of the phenomenon of composite procedures. An 
academic research work of legal nature entails a conceptualisation of these composite 
procedures and, once this task is accomplished, the identification of the shortcomings that 
they bring about and the potential solutions for them. With the idea that nothing is taken for 
granted, the analysis of composite procedures is only consequential to the clarification of the 
conceptual aprioris of composite procedures, that is, the EU public administration and the 
administrative procedures of the Union. The conceptualization of the notion of composite 
procedures and the analysis of the legal shortcomings that they bring about shall be analysed 
afterwards.  
 
II 
 
There is a ‘public administration’ of the Union, but not in the sense that this concept 
was developed at its origin. The intellectual prerequisite of a public administration is neither 
to be taken for granted nor irrelevant. Whether or not the administrative bodies of the original 
European Communities qualified as something different in nature than the autocracy of other 
big international organisations is difficult to say, but in any case, it has evolved to a fully-
fledged public administration with very peculiar characteristics. In the dynamic evolution of 
the European integration, it is difficult to single out a specific point of time when one can be 
reassured to state that there is a public administration of the Union, but the Treaty of Lisbon, 
with its use of the nomenclature 'European administration', would certainly be a good 
candidate for that. 
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In the conception of the old designers of the Communities, where Monnet takes a 
prominent role, one would not need to recur to a newly created European administration, 
because the few officials of the High Authority, and later, the Commission, would just need 
to rely on the powerful administrative machineries of the Member States for the 
implementation of the policies that they set. These few officials have turned into a big 
organisation, both its central bodies and a variety of agencies and decentralised bodies, whose 
role is not as restricted as initially conceived.  
 
Today, the reliance on the national administration for the implementation of EU 
policies has given way to a logic of cooperation that permeates all aspects of the policy 
making and rule-making process. The starting point consists on the understanding of the 
profound transformations that have taken place in the change of paradigm from executive 
federalism to an integrated administrative action. The Court of Justice refers to a “division of 
powers and competences” as if administrative action of the Union happened like it did in the 
early Communities. These intellectual constructions depart greatly from the practical reality. 
In the context of the composite procedures, there should not be no assumption that it is an old 
division of powers in the sense of executive federalism, but an intense, sometimes blurred, 
cooperation which needs a clear general legal framework and another rationale of judicial 
control. 
 
Without this assessment of the reality of the Union's administrative action, all 
subsequent legal reasoning shall be faulty. On reading the rulings of the EU courts when 
confronted with the shortcomings with regard to composite procedures, it seems that the 
Court might (rephrasing an article published by professor Curtin) be resorting to a type of 
exercise of camouflage which consists, in this case, on reasoning on the basis of a legal 
fiction; the EU and national administrations issue separate acts and the only question is to 
allocate a judge and the corresponding procedural rules to the relevant act. Composite 
procedures do not work with clearly distinguishable contributions from different 
administrations, and it is not possible to give a proper answer to the legal challenges that the 
individuals may raise without the minimum common understanding of what is an act, when 
can it be reviewed, who can challenge it and what court should rule on it. 
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III 
 
Once it is established that there is a Union public administration, it is logical to 
assume that the procedures according to which it operates are administrative procedures. 
While this assumption is unproblematic for EU administrative procedures implemented 
directly by Union bodies, when implementation takes place through a composite procedure, 
the very logic of an administrative procedure is put into question.  
 
Historically, administrative procedures were considered no more than the series of 
steps to reach a correct and lawful administrative decision. More recently, an individual 
rights approach is prevalent, and administrative procedures are the guarantees for citizens that 
the powers of the authorities are exercised in conformity with the Law, and in full respect of 
the individual rights. This conception is logically shaken when the individual is put vis-à-vis 
not one but two administrations, each governed by a different legal framework. 
 
In the context of the European Union, this approach is particularly salient, and it has 
been considered by the EU judges as inherent to the right to a good administration. What is 
more, given the absence of a real legislative codification of administrative procedures in the 
Union, the Court of Justice has applied, in the three recent cases Vodafone, Schecke and Test-
Achats, a strict process review that leaves aside the former emphasis exclusively on 
substantive outcomes. Given that this prescriptive value of administrative procedures is 
prevalent, the emphasis on the legality of the procedure and the respect for the procedural 
guarantees is hard to overstate.  
 
The realisation of this procedural approach to the legality of administrative decisions 
is also crtical for the understanding of the stakes of composite procedures; an individual-
rights focus in the context of administrative procedures in the EU is not optional. General 
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principles such as the rule of law, fundamental rights such as the right to judicial review, so 
often recalled by the Court of Justice, are in question in this field and cannot be simply 
ignored due to the complexity of composite procedures. The link between the granting of 
rights and the provision of remedies is, simply put, insufficient in view of some of the cases 
examined. 
 
One cannot assume that composite procedures are not administrative procedures and 
that the guarantees of protections for individuals are different. Quite on the contrary, because 
they are administrative procedures, the same general principles and individual rights should 
be applicable to them. Because these guarantees are applicable to composite procedures and 
the current rules are not satisfactory to that end, special rules should be enacted so that those 
rights can be effectively enforced.  
 
The conclusion of the initial part of the dissertation is that the Union's public 
administration is a peculiar one, characterised by intense cooperation with the Member States 
administrations. The administrative procedures through which it operates are also peculiar, 
especially when outside the limited fields of direct administration. The logic of cooperation 
which permeates the nature of the European administration reaches its zenith with composite 
procedures. 
 
IV 
 
Composite procedures were born without the legislator realising that a category 
different from both direct and indirect administration was being created. They proliferated 
spontaneously. In technical fields of competence like the common agricultural policy and, 
more generally, the allocation of European funds, procedural arrangements were created 
allowing for the intervention of both the Commission's and Member States' public 
administrations in a single administrative procedure. These procedural arrangements were 
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relatively instable in time but they proved practical. Like the old French saying goes, la 
necessité fait loi.  
 
These procedural schemes propagated, particularly in the different fields of 
authorisation of certain products in the internal market. In those areas where it was necessary 
to go beyond the rationale of mutual recognition and to establish a EU system of 
authorisation, composite procedures became predominant. This trend began in the decade of 
1990's with the Directives on pesticides, biocides and genetically modified organisms, but 
has become more intense in recent years. 
 
The explanation for such an expansion of these procedures is twofold. From a 
technical perspective, these mechanisms enable the administrative bodies of the Union to 
gather the technical expertise available at the level of the Member States and put it at the 
service of a common authorisation procedure at the Union level. Needless to say, in fields 
like the authorisation of medicines or of chemicals, this expertise would otherwise be very 
difficult to obtain. But perhaps more importantly, from a political perspective, it facilitates 
that Member States agree to a common authorisation procedure as long as they play a 
significant role in such procedure. However, precisely because they allow for the expansion 
of EU competences, they are a positive example of European integration put to work, and 
they represent an interesting example of the creation of networks of mutual confidence. 
 
Some of the composite procedures explained as examples are indeed clear paradigms 
of composite procedures. The case of the procedure for the authorisation of pesticides is 
particularly illuminating, as the main characteristics of composite procedures appear with 
remarkable clarity. There is a distribution of tasks between the national and the Union level 
of public administration leading to a final decision taken at the level of the Union. In other 
types of procedures spelt out, the features are more difficult to perceive. For example, the 
procedure for the authorisation of chemicals also incorporates the input by national 
authorities in the sequence for a decision made at the EU level, however, this input is not 
legally binding for the European authorities, which is an important difference with the 
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procedure for the approval of pesticides. Despite this element, in practise one cannot see how 
the input of the national authorities can be less relevant since it entails so detailed technical 
expertise that the ECHA can only take the conclusions by the national body into full 
consideration. These two examples provide evidence of how difficult it is to delimit a 
comprehensive notion of composite procedures and how necessary it is to illustrate the 
conceptualisation of composite procedures with the most important examples thereof. 
 
V 
 
Whatever the merits of these new procedures, they trigger a number of challenges, 
both during the administrative procedure and after it. Specifically, the three areas where the 
main shortcomings of composite procedures arise have been identified as follows: the right to 
be heard -during the administrative procedure-, the right to a reasoned decision -at the end of 
the administrative procedure-, and the right to judicial review -after the administrative 
procedure-. There might be other rights at stake, but these three are the most important areas. 
Other rights can be assessed as connected to some of the aforementioned three, like the right 
to access to one's file in relation to the right to be heard, or the right to a compensation for 
damages as linked to the right to judicial review. The structure of the central part of the 
dissertation revolves thus about these rights. This approach is consistent with the evolution 
observed for administrative procedures more generally, that is, an 'individual rights' approach 
on the procedure. There is a coherence on the understanding that individual rights are critical 
in view of the currently prevalent approach of administrative law and thus the relevance of 
situations - examined at length - in which lacunae can be identified in the context of 
composite procedures.  
 
Oddly enough, when the Court of Justice began being confronted with the legal 
shortcomings that composite procedures were bringing about, there was no reflection on a 
comprehensive approach to these procedures. On the contrary, there was a search for the 
concrete solution to the specific problem presented by the applicant. This is certainly 
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justifiable on the grounds that there was not, and there still is not, a general legal framework 
of composite procedures, but this is an element that must be pointed out. 
 
As it could be expected, the results of this case-by-case approach were diverse.  In 
some cases, the initial reply given by the Union's courts were satisfactory, such as in the case 
of the repayment of import duties where the Court provided an adequate solution for the 
shortcoming observed in the context of the right to be heard. In others, like in the access to 
justice regarding a binding but not final decision of a national authority in the field of the 
common agricultural policy (the so often cited Borelli case), the Court of Justice was 
unsuccessful in providing for a sufficient response, which put composite procedures - or 
rather, the complications they entail - under a certain scholarly focus.  
 
Even then, and this is one of the most important claims of this work, both the 
academia and the judiciary failed to see that there was a general category of procedures from 
which systemic problems would arise. This has led to the paradox that the answers given by 
the EU courts to a particular concern related to composite procedures -such as the right to a 
hearing- was different in the different fields, for example in the area of repayment of import 
duties against the recovery of structural funds. 
 
In the field of access to justice however, the deficiencies are the most notorious. The 
structure of composite procedures leads to a situation where the competent judge to review 
the final decision is not competent to adjudicate on the validity of the whole of the composite 
procedure, because some of the procedural steps were taken by administrative authorities 
outside its jurisdiction. The preliminary ruling procedure, though useful in many of the cases 
examined, is not sufficient and some procedures lead to legal dead-ends that are in breach of 
individual rights.  
 
VI 
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The research seeks for completeness in advancing possible solutions for the 
shortcomings identified. As it usually happens in the context of European Union law, to the 
question 'what solutions could be envisaged to this problem?' one must add the not less 
difficult question 'how can these solutions be implemented?'. The first question shall be 
addressed following the structure of the analysis of the shortcomings, i. e. around the right to 
be heard, the obligation for a reasoned decision and the right to access to justice. The second 
question shall come in the form, firstly, of the codification of administrative procedures with 
a specific section for composite procedures, and, secondly and notably regarding the right to 
access to justice, of a modification of the statute of the Court of Justice to incorporate what 
we will call an 'inverse preliminary ruling procedure'.  
 
The solution to the first two shortcomings identified is relatively straightforward. 
Regarding the right to a hearing, in case of composite procedures, it is necessary to guarantee 
that the individual has an effective right to a hearing at the procedural step where one 
administration is going to make a discretionary decision which binds the other public 
administration. This means that more than one hearing can be necessary in the context of a 
composite procedure. This proposal is far from revolutionary, as it was incorporated in the 
procedure for repayment of custom duties, for example, following the case law of the Court 
of Justice1, and it is the rule for some of the recently enacted composite procedures like the 
one for the authorisation of pesticides2.  
 
Regarding the obligation to state reasons, the solution would be even simpler. It 
would consist on a provision reading that, in the context of composite procedures, the 
competent administrative body shall state the reasons of its decision in a clear, simple and 
understandable way in each step of the administrative sequence. It would be possible to either 
have all the reasons stated together with the final decision, or have it referred in part to a 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
1
 See Section 5.2.3. 
2
 See Section 4.4.2. 
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statement of reasons provided previously, in accordance with the same standards (the so 
called statement per relationem). 
 
On the substance, then, these proposals are inspired by solutions found in some 
rulings of the Court of Justice and in pieces of sector-specific European legislation. While 
agreement on the solutions given to these shortcomings can be relatively easy, the enactment 
of general provisions in this sense appears to be much more complicated. This is because one 
would need to create the category of composite procedures in EU legislation before 
establishing any general rule on them.  
 
The codification of administrative procedures provides for the perfect opportunity for 
a definition of composite procedures in a general Regulation, and for the enactment of 
general provisions that will enable to overcoming the breaches in the procedural rights 
identified.  
 
The prospects of the codification of administrative procedures remain, at this date, 
uncertain. The European Parliament has formally requested the Commission to submit a 
proposal to this aim, but the Commission has not shown any political willingness to launch 
the legislative procedure. This is one more of the domains where the Commission has shown 
an evident self-restraint, but this is of course the domain of current politics. 
 
From a legal perspective, the proposal would not only be pertinent due to its ability to 
make composite procedures fully compliant with the rights and guarantees of ordinary 
administrative procedures, but completely well founded. The legal basis of Article 298 
TFEU, so far never used as a legal basis, would not only serve to enact a general codification 
for administrative procedures of the Union, but for composite procedures as well. The modest 
approach to the European Parliament in this respect, by not covering composite procedures, is 
not justified on legal grounds although it might, certainly, be explained in political terms.  
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Despite its political complexity, it is satisfactory to ascertain that a relatively simple 
solution for the complexity of composite procedures is possible to envisage and, from a legal 
perspective, fully viable. The proposals laid down in the work are plausible and complete one 
of the main aims of this dissertation. 
 
The third problem described, related to the access to justice and the effectiveness of 
the right to judicial review would need an additional approach. Certainly, a coherent system 
of reviewability of acts presupposes a common notion of reviewable act and who enjoys legal 
standing to challenge such acts. A common general framework regarding these issues in the 
form of a general Act on composite procedures would certainly help to overcome the 
identified gaps. Although the establishment in legislation of the category of composite 
procedures would contribute to a more coherent approach also in view of access to justice, 
general rules for composite procedures would not suffice in this field.  
 
The right to judicial review implies that the competent court must be able to assess the 
legality of the whole procedure. When part of the procedure was under the responsibility of a 
different administration the competent judge on the final decision would be unable to extend 
his judicial competence to that part of the procedure. There is no other way out of this legal 
deadlock than to offer a mechanism of consultation between courts. 
 
This proposal would need to be treated outside the scope of the codification of 
administrative procedures, but could be incorporated through an instrument of secondary 
legislation. Even though this proposal of cooperation between courts can be described, in 
simple terms, as an inverse preliminary ruling procedure, its objectives are far more limited. 
It does not aim at any homogeneous interpretation of law, but it only intends to find a specific 
answer to the question of the validity of the input by national authorities in the context of a 
procedure ending in an EU decision. Even with this limited objective, the authors who had 
recently criticised the unidirectional nature of the judicial dialogue taking place today in the 
456 
?
Union by means of the preliminary ruling procedure would probably be happy to see another 
channel of communication between the national and the Union's judges. Furthermore, it 
mirrors at the judicial level the logic of intense cooperation existing among public 
administrations. 
?
Coming back to the idea, stressed in the second chapter, that the conception of the 
European administration inferred from the Treaties no longer reflects the reality of the 
administrative cooperation in the EU, the Court of Justice tends to reason in terms of a 
division of powers which is today rather a legal fiction. By providing the elements for a 
global consideration of composite procedures, the mechanisms to ensure individual rights 
along the procedure with the same guarantees as ordinary administrative procedures, and a 
system of bidirectional judicial dialogue, the shortcomings of composite procedures could be 
overcome. 
 
VII 
 
This work demonstrates thus that composite procedures, however complex they are, 
do not have to entail restrictions of individual rights when the mechanisms advocated are put 
into place. In this sense, although the dissertation has emphasised the aspects which do not 
work, legally speaking, in the context of composite procedures, the true objective has been to 
find a satisfactory solution for them. This work is, in this sense, a defence of composite 
procedures.  
 
Lawyers and practitioners of EU law are well aware of the complexities of their field. 
It is known that the simple paradigms valid in national law cannot be applied to the European 
Union. Any approach of simplification, of transposition of national categories to the rationale 
of the European Union, is more often than not doomed for failure. When one of the Vice-
Presidents of the Convention in charge of drafting the failed European Constitution said 
"Montesquieu never went to Brussels", he was terribly right. Trying to simplify and go back 
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to the two separate categories of direct and indirect administration would be a mistake. 
Composite procedures, as complicated as they are, are a better representation of the reality of 
the European Union today than the other two forms of administration, and will probably gain 
even more central role in the future. In a situation where European integration is at risk of 
stepping back rather than going forward, proposals in the sense of pragmatism and respect for 
individual rights might be a way ahead without much resistance. 
 
For the academic researcher, the analysis of the pluralism, the multi-level nature of 
the European Union and the diversity of actors intertwined in the European decision making 
process appears compelling and stimulating. For the legal practitioner, these situations are 
complex and challenging; the search for a satisfactory solution is difficult and can only be 
found on a case-by-case basis. For the citizens immersed in this procedural conundrum, the 
situation is injust. The individual is lost and powerless in his quest to have his rights 
respected. While the plethora of mechanisms of cooperation is inherent to the European 
Union, the citizen should not suffer from it. The legal framework should be as simplified and 
as coherent as possible, and the legal protection of the individual should be consistent with 
the principles and guarantees of the Union, no matter how complex the administrative 
procedures are. 
 
In combining an academic approach with a practical approach, this work has not lost 
sight of the need to provide simple, coherent, complete solutions to complex situations, 
whatever the academic ‘beauty’ of this muti-layered system of EU and national 
administrative cooperation. 
 
A quote particularly illuminating to end this work is the following: "unitary, 
constitutionalist models may seem to hold out hope for a more reasoned, more civilised 
political order beyond the state, but in the non?ideal world of European and global politics 
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they are likely to backfire. Here, less well?known, more irregular structures may be more 
appropriate"3.  
 
Composite procedures respond clearly to such description, and they are indeed 
irregular as a legal category, yet appropriate for the current stage of European integration. 
The aim of this work has been to rationalise them, and provide a system in which the 
individual will not suffer from their complexity.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
3
 Nico Krisch, "Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational 
Space Graduate", 24(4) Ratio Iuris (2011), 386-412, at 407. 
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(translation into Spanish of Chapter 7) 
CAPÍTULO 7 
Conclusiones 
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I 
 
 La temática de los procedimientos compuestos aún está relativamente inexplorada con 
aún mucho que escribir sobre el asunto. Ya se avanzó en la introducción que el objetivo de 
esta tesis era analizar y poner un orden lógico sobre el fenómeno de los procedimientos 
compuestos. Una investigación académica de esta naturaleza lleva consigo la 
conceptualización de estos procedimientos compuestos y, una vez hecho esto, la 
identificación de los defectos que conllevan, así como las potenciales soluciones a los 
mismos. El propósito ha sido el de no dar nada por sentado y que el análisis de los 
procedimientos compuestos sea posterior a la clarificación de algunos aprioris conceptuales, 
esto es, la Administración pública de la Unión Europea  y los procedimientos administrativos 
de la Unión. 
II 
Existe una 'Administración Pública' de la Unión, pero no en el sentido en que este 
concepto se desarrolló en su origen. El prerrequisito intelectual de una Administración 
Pública no es irrelevante ni puede darse por hecho para avanzar después en la investigación. 
Es difícil afirmar que los órganos administrativos de las antiguas Comunidades Europeas en 
su origen fueran calificables como algo diferente en su naturaleza jurídica que la burocracia 
de otras grandes organizaciones internacionales. En cualquier caso, hoy ha evolucionado a 
una Administración Pública de pleno Derecho si bien con unas características peculiares. En 
la evolución dinámica de la integración europea, es difícil identificar el momento en el 
tiempo en que se puede afirmar con seguridad que existe una Administración Pública de la 
Unión, pero sin duda el Tratado de Lisboa, con su uso de la expresión "Administración 
Europea", sería un buen candidato para ello. 
 
En la concepción de los antiguos arquitectos de las Comunidades Europeas, entre los 
que Jean Monnet tiene un papel preponderante, no era necesario recurrir a una 
Administración europea recién creada, porque a los pocos funcionarios de la Alta Autoridad, 
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y después, de la Comisión, les bastaría el apoyo de las poderosas maquinarias administrativas 
de los Estados miembros para la ejecución de las políticas que ellos determinarían. Estos 
pocos funcionarios se han convertido hoy en una gran organización, tanto en sus órganos 
centrales como en su variedad de agencias y otros órganos descentralizados, y en las cuales 
su papel no es tan restringido como inicialmente se concibió.  
 
Hoy en día, la dependencia en las administraciones públicas nacionales para la 
ejecución de las políticas de la Unión ha dado paso a una lógica de cooperación que permea 
en todos los aspectos del diseño de las políticas y de la creación normativa. El punto de 
partida consiste en la comprensión de las profundas transformaciones que han tenido lugar en 
el cambio de paradigma del federalismo ejecutivo a una acción administrativa integrada e 
interconectada. El Tribunal de Justicia se refiere a la "división de poderes y competencias" 
como si la acción administrativa de la Unión funcionara como en las antiguas Comunidades. 
Estas construcciones intelectuales clásicas se apartan en gran medida de la realidad práctica. 
En relación a los procedimientos compuestos, no debería partirse de la existencia de una vieja 
división de poderes en el sentido del federalismo ejecutivo, sino una cooperación intensa, a 
veces confusa, que necesita de un marco jurídico general y una lógica de control judicial 
distinta a la tradicional.  
 
Sin el análisis de esta realidad de la actividad administrativa en la Unión, todo 
razonamiento jurídico subsiguiente seria defectuoso. De la lectura de las sentencias de los 
tribunales de la Unión cuando se confrontan a los problemas derivados de los procedimientos 
compuestos, parece que los jueces estuvieran (retomando la expresión de un artículo de la 
profesora Curtin) recurriendo a un ejercicio de camuflaje que consistiría, en este caso, en 
razonar sobre la base de una ficción jurídica. Esta ficción sería que la UE y las 
administraciones nacionales emiten distintos actos administrativos y la única cuestión seria 
determinar el juez competente y las normas procesales aplicables al acto administrativo. Los 
procedimientos compuestos no operan con contribuciones claramente distinguibles de 
distintas administraciones públicas, y no es siempre posible dar una respuesta jurídica 
adecuada a los recursos jurídicos elevados por los particulares sin una mínima comprensión 
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común de lo que es un acto administrativo, cuando puede ser objeto de revisión, quién puede 
impugnarlo y cuál es el tribunal competente.  
III 
Una vez aclarado que existe una Administración Pública de la UE, es lógico suponer 
que los procedimientos de acuerdo con los cuales actúa son procedimientos administrativos. 
Aunque esta suposición no es problemática para los procedimientos administrativos de la 
Unión implementados directamente por los órganos de la Unión, cuando la implementación 
se lleva a cabo a través de un procedimiento compuesto, la base más esencial de la lógica del 
procedimiento administrativo se pone seriamente en cuestión. 
 
Desde una perspectiva histórica, los procedimientos administrativos han sido 
considerados como una secuencia de trámites para llegar a un acto administrativo correcto y 
jurídicamente valido. Hoy en día, prevalece un enfoque centrado en los derechos subjetivos, 
de forma que los procedimientos administrativos son las garantías para los ciudadanos de que 
los poderes de las autoridades públicas son ejercitados de acuerdo a Derecho, y en pleno 
respeto a los derecho individuales. Esta concepción quiebra en el momento en que el 
ciudadano se ve enfrentado no a una sino a varias Administraciones Públicas, cada una de las 
cuales estaría sometida a un distinto marco jurídico.  
 
En el ámbito de la Unión Europea, este enfoque con énfasis en los derechos subjetivos 
es particularmente destacadas y ha sido considerada por los jueces de la Unión como 
inherente al derecho a la buena administración. A mayor abundamiento, dada la ausencia de 
una verdadera codificación de los procedimientos administrativos, el Tribunal de Justicia ha 
aplicado una revisión procesal estricta en tres casos recientes (Vodafone, Schecke y Test-
Achats), con una aproximación que deja de lado el antiguo énfasis solamente en los 
resultados substantivos. Teniendo en cuenta por tanto que este valor prescriptivo del 
procedimiento administrativo es prevalente, es difícil de sobreestimar la centralidad del 
énfasis en la legalidad del procedimiento y en el respeto a las garantías procesales. 
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Este enfoque procesal de la legalidad de los actos administrativos tiene también una 
importancia crítica para la comprensión de los retos relativos a los procedimientos 
compuestos; el énfasis en los derechos individuales en relación a los procedimientos 
compuestos no es meramente opcional. Principios generales tales como el Estado de Derecho, 
derechos fundamentales tales como el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, tantas veces 
invocados por el Tribunal de Justicia, se ponen en duda en este ámbito y no pueden ser 
ignorados simplemente debido a la complejidad de los procedimientos compuestos. El 
vínculo entre el otorgamiento de derechos y el ofrecimiento de remedios resulta, 
simplemente, insuficiente a la vista de algunos de los casos examinados.  
 
No se puede admitir que los procedimientos compuestos no sean procedimientos 
administrativos o que las garantías de la protección de los particulares sean distintas. Más 
bien al contrario, dado que los procedimientos compuestos son procedimientos 
administrativos, les son aplicables a ellos los mismos principios generales y derechos 
subjetivos. Precisamente porque dichas garantías son aplicables a los procedimientos 
compuestos y las normas actuales no son satisfactorias, deben adoptarse normas específicas 
para que esos derechos puedan ser ejercitados de forma efectiva. 
 
La conclusión de esta parte inicial de la tesis es que la Administración Pública de la 
Unión Europea es peculiar y está caracterizada por una intensa cooperación con las 
administraciones de los Estados miembros. Los procedimientos administrativos a través de 
los cuales opera son también peculiares, especialmente si uno se encuentra fuera de los 
ámbitos limitados de la administración directa. La lógica de la cooperación que permea la 
naturaleza de la Administración Pública europea alcanza su punto álgido con los 
procedimientos compuestos. 
IV 
El nacimiento de los procedimientos compuestos se produjo sin que el legislador se 
diera cuenta de que, al crearlos, estaba dando lugar a una categoría de procedimientos distinta 
tanto de la administración directa como de la indirecta. Inicialmente, los procedimientos 
compuestos han proliferado de forma espontánea. En ámbitos técnicos de competencia de la 
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Unión, tales como la política agrícola común y, en general, la distribución de fondos 
europeos, se crearon esquemas procedimentales que permitían la intervención tanto de la 
Comisión como de la administración de los Estados miembros en un procedimiento 
administrativo único. Estos esquemas procedimentales eran relativamente inestables en el 
tiempo pero demostraron su eficacia práctica. Como dice la vieja cita en francés, la necessité 
fait loi. 
 
Estos esquemas procesales se propagaron, en particular a los distintos ámbitos de 
autorización de ciertos productos en el mercado interior. Los procedimientos compuestos han 
ido haciéndose predominantes en aquellas áreas en que se averó necesario ir más allá de la 
lógica del reconocimiento mutuo para establecer un sistema comunitario de autorización 
central. Esta tendencia comenzó en la década de 1990 con las directivas sobre pesticidas, 
biocidas y organismos modificados genéticamente si bien recientemente se ha hecho más 
intensa. 
 
La explicación para la expansión de estos procedimientos atiende a dos motivos. 
Desde un punto de vista técnico, estos mecanismos permiten a los órganos administrativos de 
la Unión reunir el conocimiento técnico disponible al nivel de los Estados miembros y 
ponerlo al servicio de un procedimiento común de autorización a nivel de la Unión. Huelga 
decir que en materias tales como la autorización de medicamentos o de productos químicos, 
este conocimiento técnico es muy difícil de obtener de otra manera. Pero quizá de forma más 
importante, desde un punto de vista político, estos procedimientos facilitan que los Estados 
miembros den su consentimiento a procedimientos comunes de autorización en tanto en 
cuanto ellos mantengan un papel significativo en dicho procedimiento. Sin embargo, 
precisamente porque permiten la expansión de las competencias de la Unión Europea, son un 
ejemplo positivo de integración europea en funcionamiento, y representan un paradigma 
interesante de creación de redes de confianza mutua. 
 
Algunos de los procedimientos compuestos explicados como ejemplos son de hecho 
bastante ilustrativos. El caso del procedimiento para la autorización de pesticidas es 
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particularmente representativo, ya que las principales características de los procedimientos 
compuestos aparecen con claridad meridiana. Existe una distribución de tareas entre los 
niveles nacional y europeo de administración pública que lleva finalmente a un acto 
administrativo adoptado por la Unión. En otros de los procedimientos examinados, los rasgos 
de los procedimientos compuestos son más difíciles de observar. Por ejemplo, el 
procedimiento para la autorización de productos químicos también incorpora una 
contribución por parte de las autoridades nacionales dentro de la secuencia para llegar a una 
decisión tomada a nivel de la Unión Europea, sin embargo esta contribución no es 
jurídicamente vinculante para las autoridades de la Unión, lo que supone una diferencia 
importante con el procedimiento para la aprobación de los pesticidas. A pesar de este 
elemento, en la práctica, es difícil mantener que la contribución de las autoridades nacionales 
pueda ser menos relevante, dado que entraña un conocimiento técnico tan detallado que la 
Agencia Europea de Productos Químicos no pueden sino atender a las conclusiones de la 
contribución nacional. Estos dos ejemplos dan una clara muestra de hasta qué punto no se 
puede entender los procedimientos compuestos en general sin observar los ejemplos 
concretos más importantes de los mismos. 
V 
Cualesquiera que sean numerosas ventajas de los procedimientos compuestos, lo 
cierto es que dan lugar a una serie de deficiencias jurídicas tanto durante el propio 
procedimiento administrativo como después de él. Específicamente, las tres áreas donde 
surgen las deficiencias de los procedimientos compuestos se han identificado de la siguiente 
forma: el derecho a ser oído -durante el procedimiento administrativo-, la obligación de 
motivar los actos administrativos -al finalizar el procedimiento administrativo-, y el derecho a 
la tutela judicial efectiva -después del procedimiento administrativo-. Podrían existir otros 
derechos subjetivos afectados, pero estas tres son las áreas más importantes. Otros derechos 
podrían evaluarse como conexos a alguno de los otros tres, como el derecho de acceso al 
expediente administrativo en relación con el derecho a ser oído, o el derecho a exigir una 
responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración, como ligado al derecho a la tutela judicial. 
La estructura de la parte central de la tesis gira en torno a estos tres derechos. Este enfoque es 
coherente con la evolución observada para los procedimientos administrativos en general, 
esto es, una aproximación con énfasis en los derechos individuales. Hay por tanto una 
coherencia entre la comprensión de que los derechos subjetivos tienen una importancia crítica 
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a la vista de esta concepción prevalente en el Derecho Administrativo, y de ahí la relevancia 
de las situaciones, explicadas con exhaustividad, en las que se pueden encontrar lagunas 
jurídicas generadas por los procedimientos compuestos. 
 
Curiosamente, cuando el Tribunal de Justicia empezó a confrontarse con las 
dificultades relativas a los procedimientos compuestos, no hubo nunca una reflexión pausada 
sobre una aproximación omnicomprensiva hacia dichos procedimientos. Por el contrario, lo 
que hubo fue una búsqueda de la solución concreta para el problema concreto que concernía 
al demandante. Ello parece justificable en atención a que no había, y sigue sin haber, un 
marco jurídico general para los procedimientos compuestos, pero no puede por ello dejar de 
ser puesto de manifiesto. 
 
Cómo podría esperarse, los resultados de este enfoque casuístico han sido variados. 
En algunos casos, la respuesta inicial dada por los tribunales de la Unión ha sido satisfactoria, 
como en el caso de las devoluciones de los tributos a la importación en el que el Tribunal de 
Justicia proporcionó una solución adecuada para la deficiencia identificada en el ámbito del 
derecho a ser oído. En otros casos, como en los de acceso a la jurisdicción en relación con 
una decisión, jurídicamente vinculante pero no final, por parte de una autoridad 
administrativa nacional (el tan citado caso Borelli), el Tribunal de Justicia no logró dar una 
repuesta suficiente, lo cual puso a los procedimientos compuestos, o más bien las 
complicaciones que llevan consigo, bajo un cierto foco doctrinal.  
 
Pero incluso en este caso, y esta es una de las principales reivindicaciones de esta 
investigación, ni la doctrina ni la judicatura lograron identificar una categoría especial de 
procedimientos de la cual surgirían problemas sistémicos. Esto ha llevado a la paradoja de 
que las repuestas dadas por los jueces de la Unión a un problema concreto, como el derecho 
de audiencia, han sido distintas en diferentes ámbitos, por ejemplo en él área de la devolución 
de los tributos de la importación frente a la recuperación de fondos estructurales.  
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Es en el ámbito del derecho a la tutela judicial, sin embargo, donde las deficiencias 
son más notorias. La estructura de los procedimientos compuestos lleva a situaciones en las 
que el juez competente para decidir sobre al acto que pone fin a la vía administrativa no es 
competente para juzgar la validez de la integridad del procedimiento administrativo, porque 
alguno de los actos intermedios han sido adoptados por órganos administrativos fuera de su 
jurisdicción. El procedimiento prejudicial, aunque útil en muchos de los casos examinados, 
no es suficiente y en algunos de los procedimientos se llega a situaciones jurídicamente 
imposibles de resolver en contravención de los derechos de los particulares.  
VI 
Esta investigación tiene ánimo de ser completa en relación a las soluciones propuestas 
para las deficiencias identificadas. Como ocurre a menudo en el ámbito del Derecho de la 
Unión Europea, a la pregunta ¿qué soluciones pueden ser planteadas para este problema? Se 
debe añadir la pregunta no menos difícil de ¿cómo se pueden llevar a la práctica dichas 
soluciones? La primera pregunta debe ser afrontada siguiendo la estructura del análisis de las 
deficiencias, esto es, en torno al derecho de audiencia, la obligación de motivación y el 
derecho al recurso judicial. La segunda pregunta debe considerarse, primero, dentro del 
marco de la codificación general de los procedimientos administrativos y, segundo, 
particularmente respecto al derecho a la tutela judicial, dentro del marco de una modificación 
del Estatuto del Tribunal de Justicia que incorpore lo que llamaremos un "procedimiento de 
cuestión prejudicial inversa". 
 
La solución a las dos primeras deficiencias identificadas es relativamente sencilla. En 
lo que se refiere al derecho a ser oído, en caso de que nos hallemos en un procedimiento 
compuesto, sería necesario garantizar que que el individuo tiene un derecho efectivo a la 
audiencia en cada trámite procesal en que un nivel de administración va a tomar una decisión 
discrecional que vaya a ser vinculante para otro nivel de administración. Esto quiere decir 
que puede ser necesaria mas de una audiencia en el marco de un procedimiento compuesto. 
Esta propuesta no es en modo alguno revolucionaria, sino que se inspira en el procedimiento 
para la devolución de de los tributos a la importación siguiendo las indicaciones de la 
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jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia1, por ejemplo, o en algunos de los procedimientos 
compuestos adoptados recientemente como el de la autorización de pesticidas2. 
 
En lo que se refiere a la obligación de motivar los actos administrativos, la solución 
sería incluso más simple. Consistiría en una norma estableciendo que, en caso de que nos 
hallemos frente a un procedimiento compuesto, el órgano administrativo competente debería 
motivar de forma clara, simple y comprensible cada una de las decisiones, si son varias, que 
han integrado la secuencia administrativa. Sería posible tanto incluir una motivación 
completa en el acto que pone fin a la vía administrativa, como referirse en este acto 
administrativo final a una motivación anterior referida a un acto intermedio, siempre que esta 
última cumpla las mismas garantías (en este último caso, se trataría de la llamada motivación 
per relationem). 
 
En lo sustancial, por tanto, estas propuestas se inspiran en las soluciones que se han 
encontrado en algunas de las decisiones del Tribunal de Justicia y en algunas legislaciones 
sectoriales. Aunque no haya problemas en aceptar estas soluciones, lo cierto es que 
incorporarlas como normas generales puede resultar mucho más complejo. Esto es así 
porque, como puede entenderse fácilmente, sería necesario crear por ley la categoría de 
procedimiento compuesto antes de establecer cualquier regulación sobre los mismos. 
 
La codificación de los procedimientos administrativos ofrece la oportunidad perfecta 
para una definición normativa de los procedimientos compuestos incorporada a un 
Reglamento de carácter general, así como para la adopción de las normas generales que 
permitan superar las violaciones de derechos procesales que se han identificado.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
1
 Vid. Sección 5.2.3. 
2
 Vid. Sección 4.4.2.?
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La viabilidad de una codificación de los procedimientos administrativos permanence, 
aún hoy, incierta. El Parlamento europeo ha solicitado formalmente a la Comisión que remita 
una iniciativa legislativa en este sentido, si bien la Comisión no ha mostrado hasta la fecha 
una voluntad política clara de iniciar el procedimiento legislativo. Este es uno de los ámbitos 
donde la Comisión ha mostrado una evidente autocontención, si bien ello es naturalmente un 
terreno puramente político.  
 
Desde un punto de vista jurídico, la propuesta que se plantea en este trabajo no solo es 
pertinente, dada su idoneidad para hacer que los procedimientos compuestos sean plenamente 
respetuosos de los derechos y garantías propios a todo procedimiento administrativo, sino que 
además sería bien fundada en Derecho. La base jurídica del artículo 298 del Tratado de 
Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, nunca utilizada para legislar hasta la fecha, no 
solamente serviría para aprobar una codificación general de los procedimientos 
administrativos, sino también para los procedimientos compuestos. El enfoque restringido del 
Parlamento europeo en este respecto, que opta por no abarcar los procedimientos compuestos, 
no se justifica sobre la base de fundamentos jurídicos, aunque podría entenderse por razones 
políticas.  
 
A pesar de la dificulta política, resulta satisfactorio para el investigador afirmar que 
una solución relativamente simple para la complejidad de los procedimientos compuestos 
sería concebible y, desde un punto de vista jurídico, enteramente viable. La soluciones 
propuestas en esta investigación serían plausibles y completas, una de las finalidades 
principales de esta tesis.  
El tercer problema descrito, relativo al acceso a la justicia y a la efectividad del 
derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva requeriría de un enfoque adicional. Sin duda, un sistema 
coherente de revision judicial de actos administrativos presupone una noción común de acto 
impugnable y de legitimación activa. Un marco jurídico general sobre estos aspectos ayudaría 
a superar algunas de las lagunas identificadas. Aunque el establecimiento por vía de la 
legislación de una categoría de procedimiento compuesto contribuiría a una aproximación 
470 
?
más coherente también respecto al acceso a la justicia, normas generales sobre 
procedimientos compuestos no serían suficientes en este ámbito. 
 
El derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva implica también que el tribunal competente 
pueda reviser la legalidad de la totalidad del procedimiento. Cuando una parte del 
procedimiento está bajo la responsabilidad de una Administración diferente, el juez 
competente respecto del acto que pone fin a la vía administrativa no podría extender su 
competencia a aquella parte del procedimiento administrativo. No hay otra vía de escape para 
este ‘punto muerto’ que ofrecer un mecanismo de consultas entre tribunales. 
 
Esta propuesta necesitaría ser tratada fuera del ámbito de la codificación de los 
procedimientos administrativos, pero podría ser incorporada con un istrumento de Derecho 
derivado. Aunque este procedimiento de cooperación entre tribunales podría ser descrito, en 
términos simples, como un procedimiento de cuestión prejudicial inversa, sus objetivos serían 
mucho más limitados. Este instrumento no pretende una interpretación homogénea del 
Derecho, sino que solo pretende encontrar una respuesta específica a la cuestión de la validez 
de una contribución por parte de las autoridades nacionales en el marco de un procedimiento 
que acaba con un acto administrativo de la Unión Europea. Aún con este objetivo tan 
limitado, los autores que recientemente han vertido una crítica sobre la naturaleza 
unidireccional del diálogo judicial que tiene lugar actualmente en la Unión por medio del 
procedimiento de la cuestión prejudicial verían probablemente con satisfacción otra vía de 
comunicación entre los jueces de la Unión y los jueces nacionales. Además, es un 
instrumento que reflejaría a nivel judicial la estructura de intensa cooperación que ya existe a 
nivel administrativo. 
Volviendo a la idea, destacada en el capítulo segundo, de que la concepción de la 
Administración europea derivada de los Tratados ya no refleja la realidad de la cooperación 
administrativa en la Unión Europea, el Tribunal de Justicia tiende a razonar en términos de 
division de poderes, lo cual es hoy en día más bien una ficción jurídica. Proporcionando los 
elementos para una consideración global de los procedimientos compuestos, los mecanismos 
para asegurar los derechos individuales a lo largo delprocedimiento con las mismas garantías 
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que los procedimientos administrativos ordinarios, y un sistema bidireccional de diálogo 
judicial, las deficiencias de los procedimientos compuestos podrían ser superadas.  
VII 
Este trabajo demuestra que los procedimientos compuestos, a pesar de su 
complejidad, no tienen necesariamente que llevar consigo restricciones de derechos 
individuales siempre que los mecanismos defendidos como soluciones se pongan en marcha. 
En definitiva, aunque la tesis ha puesto énfasis en los aspectos que no funcionan de los 
procedimientos compuestos, el verdadero objetivo ha sido encontrar una solución 
satisfactoria para ellos. Este trabajo es, en este sentido, una defensa de los procedimientos 
compuestos. 
 
Los juristas y los funcionarios encargados de aplicar el Derecho de la Unión Europea 
están muy al corriente de las complejidades de este campo. Es sabido que los paradigmas 
sencillos del Derecho nacional no pueden ser aplicados sin más a la Unión Europea. 
Cualquier enfoque de simplificación o de mera transposición de las categorías del Derecho 
interno al esquema lógico de la Unión Europea estén condenadas al fracaso en la mayoría de 
las ocasiones. Cuando un de los vicepresidentes de la Convención encargada de la frustrada 
Constitución europea dijo que “Montesquieu nunca vino a Bruselas” estaba definitivamente 
en lo cierto. El intento de simplificar y volver a las dos categorías separadas de 
Administración directa e indirecta sería vano. Los procedimientos compuestos, aunque 
resulten complicados, son una representación de la realidad actual de la Unión Europea 
mucho mejor que las otras dos formas de Administración, y probablemente ganará un peso 
aún mayor en el futuro. En una situación como la actual en la que la integración europea está 
gravemente en riesgo de dar un paso atrás más que de dar un paso hacian delante, las 
propuestas que van en el sentido de un cierto pragmatismo y respeto a los derechos 
individuales podrían tener una cierta viabilidad.  
 
Para el académico, el análisis del pluralismo, de la naturaleza multinivel de la Unión 
Europea y la interacción de los distintos actores intercalados el el proceso decisorio europeo 
resulta inspirador y estimulante. Para el jurista con enfoque práctico, estas situaciones con 
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complejas y llenas de desafíos, la búsqueda de una solución satisfactoria es difícil y debe 
intentarse de forma casuística. Para el ciudadano que se encuentra inmerso en este galimatías 
procesal, la situación es, simplemente, injusta. El particular se ve perdido e impotente en su 
batalla para que sus derechos sean respetados. El ciudadano no debería sufrir el perjuicio del 
gran abanico de mecanismos de cooperación inherente a la Unión Europea. El marco jurídico 
debería ser tan simplificado y tan coherente como sea posible, y la protección jurídica del 
particular debería ser consistente con los derechos y garantías de la Unión, cualquiera que sea 
la complejidad de los procedimientos administrativos. 
 
Combinando un enfoque académico y un enfoque práctico, este trabajo no ha perdido 
de vista la necesidad de ofrecer soluciones, simples, coherentes y completas a las situaciones 
complejas examinadas, cualquiera que sea la belleza intelectual de este sistema multinivel de 
cooperación administrativa entre la Unión Europea y los Estados miembros. 
 
Una cita particularmente reveladora para finalizar este trabajo sería la siguiente: 
"puede parecer que los modelos constitucionales unitarios dar lugar a una esperanza de un 
orden político más allá del Estado que resulte más razonado y más civilizado, pero en el 
mundo no ideal de la política europea y global lo más probable es que tengan el efecto 
contrario. Aquí, estructuras menos conocidas, más irregulares pueden ser más apropiadas"3. 
 
Los procedimientos compuestos responden claramente a aquella descripción, y de 
hecho son irregulares como categoría, aunque apropiados para la fase actual de la integración 
europea. El propósito de este trabajo ha sido racionalizarlos y ofrecer un sistema en el que el 
ciudadano no sufra perjuicio a causa de su complejidad. 
 
  
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
3
 Nico Krisch, "Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational 
Space Graduate", 24(4) Ratio Iuris (2011), 386-412, p. 407. 
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2009 on the EU Ecolabel (OJ 27 L 2010, 1-17). 
• Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 
2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ 2011 L 55, 13-18). 
• Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 
2011 on the citizens' initiative (OJ 2011 L 65, 1-22) 
• Regulation (EU) No. 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
making available on the market and use of biocidal products (OJ 2012 L 167, 1-123). 
• Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L298, 1-96) 
• Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 
2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ 2012 L 343, 1–29) 
• Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the 
comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for 
law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European 
Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security 
and justice (OJ 2013 L 180, 1–30). 
• Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, 31-59). 
• Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, 60–
95). 
• Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ 2013 L 80, 96-
116). 
•  Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 
2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions 
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on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and 
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006  
(OJ 2013 L 347, 320–469). 
 
 Council of Europe  
 
• Recommendation (80)2 concerning the Exercise of discretionary Powers by administrative 
Authorities Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 March 1980 at the 316th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies. 
• Recommendation (87)16 on administrative procedures affecting a large number of persons 
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 September 1987 at the 410th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies. 
• Recommendation (91)1 on administrative sanctions Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 
February 1991 at the 452nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. 
 
Internaitonal agreements  
 
• Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 awarded special protection for 
indications of sources and appellations of origin . 
• Madrid Agreement on the Indications of Source of 1891 and the Lisbon Agreement for the 
Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration of 1958. 
• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed at 
Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973 and amended at Bonn, on 22 June 1979. 
• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 
• Security Council passed Resolution 1390 (2002), on the situation in Afghanistan of 16 January 
2002 
?536 
 
 National legislations  
 
Austria 
• Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, BGBl. Nr. 51/1991 published in the 
Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich of 31 January 1991. 
Croatia?
• General Administrative Procedures Act, of 27 March 2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 
47 of 16 April 2009. 
France 
• Act of 16-24 August 1790 on the separation of the administrative and judicial authorities  
• Act on the non-contentious administrative procedure of 1 December 1978, published in Mémorial 
A n° 87 of  27 December 1978. 
• Act on the improvement of relations between the administration and the public n° 78-753 (JORF 
of 18 July 1978 page 2851). 
• Act on the motivation of administrative decisions n° 79-587 (JORF of 12 July 1979 page 1711). 
• Act on the rights of the citizens in their relations with the administrations n° 2000-321 (JORF 
n°88 of 13 April 2000 page 5646). 
• Act on the control of the use and release of genetically modified organisms n° 92-654 (JORF n° 
163 of 16 July 1992). 
Germany 
• Federal Nature Protection Act (Bundesnaturschutzgesetz of 12 March 1987) Bundesgesetzblatt 
1987 1, 889 
• German Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz of  25 May 1976)  
Bundesgesetzblatt 1976. 
• Code of Administrative Court Procedure of 19 March 1991 (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung), 
Bundesgesetzblatt 1991 I, 686 
• Federal Building Code (Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des Baugesetzbuchs of 27 August 
1997) Bundesgesetzblatt 1997 1, 2141 
Ireland 
• Freedom of information Act, of 21 April 1997, number 13 of 1997. 
Italy 
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• Act of 7 august 1990 on administrative procedure and access to documents (n. 241 Nuove norme 
in materia di procedimento amministrativo e di diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi. GU 
n.192). 
Netherlands 
• General Administrative Law Act of 4 June 1994, (Algemene wet bestuursrecht). 
Poland 
• Code of Administrative Procedure (Kodeks post?powania administracyjnego) of 14 June 1960, 
Journal of Laws 1960 No. 30, item 168. 
Spain 
• Act requesting ministeries to adopt an administrative procedure for their respective departments 
(Ley de 19 de octubre de 1889 disponiendo que por cada Ministerio se haga y publique un 
reglamento de procedimiento administrativo para las dependencias centrales, provinciales y 
locales del mismo); published in Gaceta de Madrid nº 298 of 25 October 1889.  
• Act on administrative procedure of 17 July 1958 (BOE of 18 July 1958). 
• Act 30/1992 on the legal framework of the Public Administrations and on a common 
administrative procedures of 26 November 1992 (Ley 30/1992, de Régimen Jurídico de las 
Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común; BOE 285 of  27 
November 1992). 
• Act 50/1997, of 27 November, on the Government (BOE of 28 November 1997). 
• Act 29/1998 on the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction of 13 July 1998 (Ley 29/1998, de 13 
de julio, reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) (BOE of 14 July 1998). 
United Kingdom 
• Tribunals and Enquiries Act of 1 August 1958. 
• Civil Procedure Rules of 10 December 1998 (SI 1998/3132). 
• Human Rights Act of 9 November 1998 (c. 42). 
• Freedom of Information Act of 30 November 2000 (c.36). 
•  Equality Act of 8 April 2010 
United States 
• Administrative Procedure Act, Pubic Law 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, enacted 11 June 1946. 
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